

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401

400 Chestnut Street Tower II

May 9, 1984

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BLRD-50-438/84-33
BLRD-50-439/84-31

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
Attn: Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator
101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:


BELLEFONTE NUCLEAR PLANTS UNITS 1 AND 2 - FIRE DAMPER INSTALLATION AND
CLOSURE PROBLEMS - BLRD-50-438/84-33, BLRD-50-439/84-31 - FIRST INTERIM
REPORT

The subject deficiency was initially reported to NRC-OIE Inspector
Ed Ford on April 11, 1984 in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) as
NCR BLN MEB 8403. Enclosed is our first interim report. We expect to
submit our next report by May 16, 1986.

If you have any questions, please get in touch with R. H. Shell at
FTS 858-2688.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY



L. M. Mills, Manager
Nuclear Licensing

Enclosure

cc: Mr. Richard C. DeYoung, Director (Enclosure)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Records Center (Enclosure)
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
1100 Circle 75 Parkway, Suite 1500
Atlanta, Georgia 30339

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ENCLOSURE

BELLEFONTE NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2
FIRE DAMPER INSTALLATION AND CLOSURE PROBLEMS
BLRD-50-438/84-33, BLRD-50-439/84-31
NCR BLN MEB 8403
10 CFR 50.55(e)
FIRST INTERIM REPORT

Description of Deficiency

Fire dampers are required to be installed in heating, ventilating, and air-conditioning (HVAC) ductwork at fire barriers (walls, floors, partitions, etc.) to maintain separation requirements for redundant safety-related equipment. Various deficiencies exist, such as fire dampers were improperly attached to field-fabricated sleeves, sleeve retaining angles do not overlap the opening and adjacent wall or floor surface as required, fire dampers were undersized, installation discrepancies have led to closure problems, and environmental conditions resulting from high-energy line breaks when determining fusible link temperature ratings.

Interim Progress

TVA is presently in the process of investigating various corrective action options and actions to prevent recurrence. More information will be provided in our next report.