

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Nine Mile Point Unit #1	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 2 0	PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 2
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TITLE (4)  
SCRAM Due to loss of Reactor Protection System Busses

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		DOCKET NUMBER(S)
0 4	1 3	8 4	8 4	0 0 6	0 0 0	0 5	1 4	8 4			0 5 0 0 0
											0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9)  N

POWER LEVEL (10) 0 0 0

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)

20.402(b)	20.406(c)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
20.406(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
20.406(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
20.406(a)(1)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
20.406(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)(B)	
20.406(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(ix)	
20.406(a)(1)(vi)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)		

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME Robert Randall	TELEPHONE NUMBER
	AREA CODE 3 1 5    3 4 9 - 2 4 4 5

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS
X	E C	5 2	G 0 8 0	N					

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)     NO

EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

ABSTRACT

During a refueling outage, while performing maintenance on AK Breakers, a normally open tie breaker was closed to feed a powerboard while another was opened to perform maintenance. Subsequent to this action, the breaker feeding power tripped open due to dirty contacts causing the loss of power to this powerboard. Due to a permissable, but abnormal bus alignment, a Reactor Protection System (RPS) bus, a Reactor Trip Bus, and an area radiation monitor for the refuel bridge lost power.

This resulted in a full scram signal and the initiation of the Reactor Building Emergency Vent System.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)  Nine Mile Point Unit # 1	DOCKET NUMBER (2)  0 5 0 0 0 2 2 0 8 4 - 0 0 6 - 0 0	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)	
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER		
					0 2	OF 0 2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

TEXT

On April 13, 1984 at 2:50 pm during a refueling outage, an attempt was made to realign the power supplies to powerboard 13, A & B sections, so that maintenance could be performed to the A section supply breaker. The B to C section tie breaker was closed, and the A section feeder opened, so the A, B, and C section were provided power by the C section feeder. Immediately after the transfer was made, the B to C section tie breaker opened due to dirty contacts, causing a loss of power to sections A & B of powerboard 13. Concurrently, the power to the Reactor Protection System (RPS) bus 12 and Reactor Trip bus 131 were being fed from Instrument and Control (I&C) bus 130 due to modifications being performed on the motor generator (MG) sets that normally provide power to bus 12 and bus 131. I&C bus 130 receives its power from section B of powerboard 13. The result of this occurrence was a full SCRAM signal, and since the refuel bridge bypass switch was in the refuel position, and I&C bus 130 also supplies power to the high range refueling bridge radiation monitor, which fails upscale, an automatic initiation of the reactor building emergency ventilation system occurred.

ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CONSEQUENCES

There are no potential safety consequences resulting from this event because 1) The reactor was defueled at the time. 2) The control rods were valved out of service. 3) This event resulted from a plant power supply configuration that was set up to allow for modifications required by the NRC on plant motor-generator sets. This configuration could not be set up during plant operation. 4) All safety related equipment functioned properly.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

The breaker which opened and caused the loss of power was taken out of service, had it's contacts cleaned and has been returned to service.

NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION

NIAGARA  MOHAWK

300 ERIE BOULEVARD, WEST  
SYRACUSE, N. Y. 13202

May 14, 1984

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Document Control Desk  
Washington, DC 20555

RE: Docket No. 50-220  
LER 84-06


Gentlemen:

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, we hereby submit the following Licensee Event Report:

LER 84-06      Which is being submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(iv), "Any event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of any Engineered Safety Feature (ESF), including the Reactor Protection System (RPS). However, actuation of an ESF, including the RPS, that resulted from and was part of the preplanned sequence during testing or reactor operation need not be reported."

This report was completed in the format designated in NUREG-1022, dated September 1983.

Very truly yours,



Thomas E. Lempges  
Vice President  
Nuclear Generation

TEL/lo  
Attachments  
cc: Dr. Thomas E. Murley  
Regional Administrator

IE22  
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