NRC Form (9-83)	LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)						U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 8/31/86								
FACILITY	NAME (1)	1									DOCKET NUMBER	(2)		PA	GE (3)
		7	cnold	Energy Ce	enter						0   5   0   0		13 1 1	1 0	T
TITLE (4)		10 711	11015	Lifer 33	211661							-1-	10 1 -	1.1	101=
	RFS	Read	ctor	High Press	sure Swi	tch S	etpo	int Dr	cift						
EVE	INT DATE		I	LER NUMBER	THE RESERVE AND ADDRESS OF THE PERSON NAMED IN	-	PORT DAT	and the second second second		OTHER	FACILITIES INVOL	VED (8	1)		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER			MONTH DAY YEAR			FACILITY NAMES		DOCKE	T NUMBER	R(S)	- 1
									Non	ie		0   5	1010	101	1.1
1								. [							
06	1 9	8 4	4 8 4	0 2 3	00	0 7	1 9	84	Non	ie		0 15	1010	101	11
	RATING		THIS R	REPORT IS BURMITTE	ED PURSUANT T	TO THE R	EQUIREM	ENTS OF 10	CFR 8: 10	Check one or more	of the following) (11	)			
	ODE (9)		21	20.402(b)			20.406(c)		50.73(a) (2)(iv)		5.4	1	73,71(6)		
POWER			2	20,406(a)(1)(i)		80.38(c)	(1)			50.73(a)(2)(v)		1	73.71(c)		
(10)		1715	) 2	20,406(a)(1)(ii)		60.36(e)(2)			X	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	true The said	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form			
			2	20.406(a)(1)(iii)		80,73(e)	(2)(i)			50.73(a)(2)(viii)	(A)		366A)		
			1 2	20.405(a)(1)(iv)		50.73(a)	(2)(6)			50.73(a)(2)(viii)	(B)				
			3	20.406(a)(1)(v)		50.73(a)	-			50.73(a)(2)(x)					
	-		-		t.	ICENSEE	CONTACT	T FOR THIS	LER (12)			12. 50.			
NAME											AREA CODE I	TELEP	HONE NUM	BER	
4-11	Tech	nnic	al Er	ngineer - M	Michael	S. Ha	arris	ALL W				0.5		7.10	~
		10.0									131119	815	111-	1/13	010
				T	1	1	MPONEN	FAILURE	DESCRIBE	D IN THIS REPO	1				
CAUSE	SYSTEM	СОМР	PONENT	MANUFAC- TURER	TO NPROS			CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC- TURER		NPROS		
Х	Jr C	PIS	SI I	B   9 6 9	Yes										
-	91	-		0 101010	100						+	+			
	1	1	1 1	111						111	1111				
	-	1		SUPPLEM	MENTAL REPORT	EXPECT	ED (14)	L					MONTH	DAY	YEAR
			ALC: U					ALIE I			SUBMISSIO DATE (18	ON			

On 6/19/84, while the plant was in the run mode at approximately 75% power, a monthly surveillance test revealed 3 out of 4 reactor high pressure switches had drifted out of tolerance in the nonconservative direction. The 4 pressure switches comprise a one out of two-twice RPS scram initiation logic for a reactor scram at high pressure (setpoint </=1035 psig).

The pressure switches were recalibrated and returned to service. The next monthly surveillance test was accelerated to ensure the drift was not indicative of component failure or an improper calibration procedure. As the higher pressure scram setpoint is enveloped by transient analytical basis, there was no effect on the ability to safely scram the reactor automatically on high reactor pressure.

8407270322 840719 PDR ADOCK 05000331 PDR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces i.e. approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (18)

IE22

<b>AND THE</b>				
NAC	- Fa	rm	364	EA.
10.00			-	

## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

and the state of t					
TY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)	PAGE (3)		
		YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER			
Duane Arnold Energy Center	0  5  0  0  0  3   3	1814-01213-010012 05012	12		

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

On 6/19/84, while the plant was in the run mode at approximately 75% power, a monthly surveillance test of the 4 reactor high pressure RPS scram switches (JC-PS-4549, 4550, 4551, and 4552) found PS-4550, PS-4551, and PS-4552 out of tolerance in the non-conservative direction. The 4 switches are Barksdale Model Number B2T M12SS (bourdon tube) and comprise a one out of two-twice RPS (JC) scram initation logic on reactor high pressure. The setpoint for all 4 pressure switches is 1035 psig +/-12, nct including head correction. The setpoints had drifted such that a full scram on high reactor pressure would not have been realized until a minimum pressure of 1051 psig had been reached (as-found setpoints were 1054, 1051, and 1053 psig, respectively,.

The affected switches were immediately recalibrated per the surveillance test procedure after being found out of tolerance. To ensure that this situation was not indicative of possible component degradation or an improperly performed surveillance procedure, the normal 30 day surveillance was performed approximately 2 weeks later. During this test, JC-PS-4549 had drifted out of calibration slightly in the conservative direction while the other 3 switch setpoints were satisfactory.

An extensive investigation into the root cause of the excessive setpoint drift was conducted. Although the investigation included extensive trending of past asfound setpoints, discussions with the instrument Technicians performing the surveillances, and consultation with Barksdale's Technical Services personnel, a root cause could not be conclusively determined. However, it is theorized that the setpoint drift on 6/19 may have been compounded from a previous surveillance performed on 5/17/84. At that time the plant was in cold shutdown and the bourdon tube may not have been pumped up to operating pressure long enough prior to testing the setpoint. Procedure changes have been initiated to ensure adequate test set times. After the plant was in run and the bourdon tube was pressurized for some time, the tube may have reset (closed) slightly and consequently caused the switch to trip late. This lack of adequate pressurization prior to the surveillance performed on 5/17 may have allowed a small, unnoticed setpoint drift to have compounded itself by the time of the subsequent test of 6/19. Engineering review is in progress as a result of previous random drift problems with these instruments. We have increased the priority of this activity and are closely monitoring instrument performance by onsite Technical Engineering pending a permanent solution that will result from this review.

In support of an ongoing power uprate program, analyses has been performed assuming a RPS high pressure scram setpoint of 1067 psig. The analyses demonstrates acceptable plant transient response. Hence, the nonconservative drift had no affect on the safe operation of the plant or public health and safety. This is the first time multiple pressure switches have been found out of tolerance in the nonconservative direction so as not to allow reactor high pressure scram within the instrument tolerance band (+/-1%).

## July 19, 1984 DAEC-84-458

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555

> Subject: Duane Arnold Energy Center Docket No. 50-331 Op. License DPR-49 Licensee Event Report No. 84-023

Gentlemen:

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73 please find attached a copy of the subject Licensee Event Report.

Very truly yours,

Daniel L. Mineck

Plant Superintendent - Nuclear Duane Arnold Energy Center

DLM/MHS/kp

attachment

cc: Mr. James G. Keppler
Regional Administrator
Region III
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
799 Roosevelt Road
Glen Ellyn, IL 60137

NRC Resident Inspector - DAEC

File A-118a