

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Sequoyah, Unit 2	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 2 8	PAGE (3) 1 OF 2
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TITLE (4)  
Containment Purge Isolation Valve Testing

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		DOCKET NUMBER(S)
06	20	84	84	010	000	07	19	84			0 5 0 0 0
											0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9) 1	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR § (Check one or more of the following) (11)									
POWER LEVEL (10) 1 0 0	20.402(b)	20.406(c)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)						
	20.406(a)(1)(i)	50.38(e)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)						
	20.406(a)(1)(ii)	50.38(e)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)						
	20.406(a)(1)(iii)	XX 50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)							
	20.406(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)							
20.406(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(ix)								

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)		TELEPHONE NUMBER	
NAME M. R. Cooper, Compliance Section Engineer		AREA CODE 6 1 5 8 7 0 - 6 1 4 6	

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)										
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUF. TURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUF. TURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)			EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		
<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO			MONTH	DAY	YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

This event occurred while unit 2 was in mode 1 (100% reactor power, 2235 psig, 578 degrees F). Technical specification 4.6.3.4 requires each containment purge isolation valve to be demonstrated operable within 24 hours after each closing of the valve. Valves 2-FCV-30-9, -10, -52, and -53 were closed at 2020 CDT on 06/18/84 after an upper containment purge and were not tested until 1005 CDT on 06/20/84. The failure to test these valves was due to Operations failing to notify the Engineering Test Section that an upper containment purge had been completed. Upon discovery of this condition, the Engineering Test Section was immediately notified, and the valves were tested per applicable procedures.

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PDR ADDCK 05000328  
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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)  Sequoyah, Unit 2	DOCKET NUMBER (2)  0   5   0   0   0   3   2   8	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
		8   4	-   0   1   0	-   0   0	0   2	OF	0   2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

At 2020 CDT on 06/18/84, the unit operator (UO) completed upper compartment purge per SI-410, AI-18 File Package 59, SI-286, and logged upper compartment purge complete in the unit 2 unit operator logbook. He also completed SOI-30.2, "Upper Compartment Purge Shutdown" up to step G which is notification of purge dampers being cycled to Engineering Test. The unit operator expected the 2300 - 0700 shift to continue the use of the same SOI-30.2 package for their performance of a lower compartment purge. The midnight shift instead pulled a new SOI-30.2 package and proceeded to perform a lower compartment purge. The lower compartment purge was completed on the 0700 - 1500 shift, and Engineering was notified, and the lower compartment dampers were tested. It was not until the next evening shift on June 20, 1984, that it was discovered that the upper compartment dampers had not been tested. Engineering was immediately notified, and testing was completed on the upper compartment isolation purge dampers. Test results were acceptable, and the dampers were declared operable.

This event was caused by a breakdown in communication between operations shift groups.

Corrective Action

A temporary change and a revision request was made to SOI-30.2 requiring immediate notification to Engineering Test upon completion of a purge. A night order per OSLA-30 to all shift engineers, assistant shift engineers, and unit operators is also being prepared and will be issued to emphasize the testing requirement for containment purge isolation valves.

There have been no previous occurrences in 1984.

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

Sequoyah Nuclear Plant  
Post Office Box 2000  
Soddy Daisy, Tennessee 37379

July 19, 1984

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Document Control Desk  
Washington, DC 20555


Gentlemen:

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2 - DOCKET NO.  
50-328 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-79 - REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE REPORT  
SQRO-50-328/84010

The enclosed licensee event report provides details concerning the failure to test containment purge isolation valves within 24 hours as required by technical specification 4.6.3.4. This event is reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, paragraph a.2.i.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY



P. R. Wallace  
Plant Manager

Enclosure  
cc (Enclosure):

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NRC Inspector, NUC PR, Sequoyah

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