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Docket No. 50-244

JUL 28 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: Frank Miraglia, Assistant Director for Safety Assessment,
 Division of Licensing, NRR

FROM: L. S. Rubenstein, Assistant Director for Core and Plant
 Systems, Division of Systems Integration, NRR

SUBJECT: REVIEW OF GINNA VENTILATION PROCEDURES, TAC NO. 49343

In response to your request (TAC 49343), the Auxiliary Systems Branch has reviewed the licensee's ventilation procedures E-1.4, "Steam Generator Rupture" Revision 19 and O-6.1C, "Operation with a Steam Generator Tube Leak Indication" Revision 5, in connection with the possible concern of short-term reduction in cooling of the safety-related equipment rooms at Ginna Nuclear Power Plant. This concern is an outgrowth of the Ginna steam generator tube rupture event wherein the normal auxiliary building ventilation system air intakes were isolated in order to prevent entry of airborne radiation released through the atmospheric dump valves.

Based on our review of the FDSAR and the licensee's ventilation procedures, we conclude that there will be no effect on safety-related equipment operation in the event the normal ventilation intake dampers are closed during a steam generator tube rupture event with its associated radiological releases. The basis for this conclusion is provided in the enclosed evaluation. This completes our review under TAC 49343.

*Original prepared by
 L. S. Rubenstein*

L. S. Rubenstein, Assistant Director
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SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT INPUT
REVIEW OF VENTILATION PROCEDURES
DURING STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE RELEASES
R. E. GINNA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
AUXILIARY SYSTEMS BRANCH

During the steam generator tube rupture accident at Ginna on January 25, 1982, air contaminated by steam and/or water droplets released from the affected steam generator safety valve was pulled into the auxiliary building through the ventilation intake. The staff recommended in NUREG-0916, "Safety Evaluation Report related to the restart of R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant," that the licensee consider a procedural change calling for closure of the ventilation intake ports or turning off some of the intake fans in order to reduce airborne contamination in the building while a steam generator with a tube rupture has open safety or relief valves. The evaluation of this change should consider potential short-term reduction in the cooling of safety-related equipment rooms.

In response to our recommendations, the licensee revised two procedures, E-1.4, "Steam Generator Tube Rupture" Revision 19, dated January 18, 1983, and O-6.10, "Operation with a Steam

Generator Tube Leak Indication" Revision 5, dated October 19, 1982. These procedures outline actions which should be considered in order to reduce the intake of radiological contaminants into buildings by the supply air handling units. The licensee's procedure indicates that if the building air monitoring system indicates that airborne contamination is entering the building, the supply air handling units are to be deenergized. For the engineered safety features: pump motors (residual heat removal, safety injection and containment spray pumps) and the charging pumps, which are located in the auxiliary building, the Ginna FDSAR states that separate cooling and ventilation systems independent of the normal system are provided for cooling the pump rooms. These systems maintain the temperature at or below 104°F, which is the pump motor qualification temperature.

Based on our review of the FDSAR and the licensee's ventilation procedures, we conclude that closing the normal ventilation intakes during unplanned releases will not affect the operation of safety-related equipment as discussed above.