

Georgia Power Company
40 Inverness Center Parkway
Post Office Box 1295
Birmingham, Alabama 35201
Telephone 205 877-7122



Georgia Power

the southern elec. system

C. K. McCoy
Vice President, Nuclear
Vogtle Project

March 2, 1992

ELV-03478
001225

Docket No. 50-425

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555

Gentlemen:

VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT
SPECIAL REPORT
VALID DIESEL GENERATOR FAILURE

In accordance with the requirements of the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Technical Specifications, sections 4.8.1.1.3 and 6.8.2, Georgia Power Company hereby submits the enclosed Special Report concerning a valid diesel generator failure.

Sincerely,

C.K.M.C.
C. K. McCoy

CKM/NJS/gmb

Enclosure: Special Report 2-92-1

xc: Georgia Power Company
Mr. W. B. Shipman
Mr. M. Sheibani
NORMS

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Mr. S. D. Ebnetter, Regional Administrator
Mr. D. S. Hood, Licensing Project Manager, NRR
Mr. B. R. Bonser, Senior Resident Inspector, Vogtle

0600 11

9203090192 920302
PDR ADOCK 05000425
S PDR

Handwritten signature/initials

VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT - UNIT 2
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SPECIAL REPORT 2-92-1
DIESEL GENERATOR 2B VALID FAILURE

A. REQUIREMENT FOR REPORT

This report is required in accordance with Technical Specification (TS) 4.8.1.1.3, which requires all diesel generator (DG) failures, valid or nonvalid, to be reported to the Commission in a Special Report pursuant to TS 6.8.2.

B. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

On February 5, 1992, at 0945 EST, DG 2B was started for a monthly surveillance test per TS requirements. At 1000 EST, the DG output breaker was closed in order to connect the DG to the grid, but reactive power indicated negative 4200 kVARs and the output breaker was opened. The DG was declared inoperable at 1002 EST.

A brief investigation found no other abnormalities. Based on this and previous similar events (LER 50-425/1991-003) when negative reactive power had been intermittently indicated, personnel decided to continue the planned testing. The output breaker was again closed, and reactive power indicated normal, positive values. With personnel monitoring performance parameters, DG 2B operated while tied to the grid for over 2 hours before the output breaker was reopened. At 1227 EST, the output breaker was again closed so that personnel could monitor breaker operation. It was reopened at 1229 EST, with no anomalies noted, and the DG was stopped at 1234 EST. Following a review of the testing, DG 2B was declared operable at 1706 EST. During this period, DG 2B was inoperable for 7 hours and 4 minutes.

Although the cause for the negative reactive power remains undetermined, engineering personnel are reviewing drawings associated with the DG excitation system and consulting with the vendor in an attempt to diagnose this continuing problem. If a probable cause cannot be determined, physical inspections of these circuits will be made against the design drawings during the upcoming Spring 1992 refueling outage. Additionally, the engine is now being tested each week while monitoring equipment is connected in order to capture any information useful to the investigation into the cause of the failure. This monitoring during testing will continue until the upcoming refueling outage.

C. SUMMARY

This event is classified as a valid failure per Regulatory Guide 1.108, Section C.2.e. There have been 2 valid failures in the last 20 valid tests of DG 2B and a total of 3 valid failures in 69 valid tests. The test frequency has been increased to once per 7 days in accordance with TS table 4.8-1.