Jersey Central Power & Light Company

MADISON AVENUE AT PUNCH BOWL ROAD • MORRISTOWN, N. J. 07960 • 201-539-6111

MEMBER OF THE General GPU ELECTRIC POWER COMPANIES SYSTEM Public Utilities Corporation

November 18, 1974

Mr. A. Giambusso
Deputy Director for Reactor Projects
Directorate of Licensing
United States Atomic Energy Commission
Washington, D. C. 20545

Dear Mr. Giambusso:

Subject: Oyster Creek Station
Docket No. 50-219
Abnormal Occurrence Report No. 50-219/74-58

The purpose of this letter is to forward to you the attached Abnormal Occurrence Report in compliance with paragraph 6.6.2.a of the Technical Specifications.

Enclosed are forty copies of this submittal.

Very truly yours,

Donald A. Ross

Donald A. Ross
Manager, Generating Stations-Nuclear

pk
Enclosures

cc: Mr. J. P. O'Reilly, Director
Directorate of Regulatory Operations, Region 1

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OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION
FORKED RIVER, NEW JERSEY 08731

Abnormal Occurrence
Report No. 50-219/74-58

Report Date

November 18, 1974

Occurrence Date

November 8, 1974

Identification of Occurrence

Violation of the Technical Specifications, paragraph 3.5.B.1, failure to maintain secondary containment integrity (as defined in paragraph 1.14 of the Technical Specifications) with the reactor operating at power. This event is considered to be an abnormal occurrence as defined in the Technical Specifications, paragraph 1.15B.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence

The plant was at steady state power with major parameters as follows:

Power:	Reactor, 1907.51 MWt
	Electric, 655 MWe
Flow:	Recirculation, 15.6×10^4 gpm
	Feedwater, 7.12×10^6 lb/hr
Reactor Pressure:	1019 psig
Stack Gas:	30,525 μCi/sec*

*Standby gas treatment system in operation.

Description of Occurrence

At approximately 1630 on November 8, 1974, while performing secondary containment leak rate testing, it was noted that the common indicator for isolation valves V-28-5 and V-28-6 did not indicate closed following isolation of the reactor building ventilation system. Investigation revealed that V-28-6 was not in the fully closed position. The redundant valve, V-28-5, was found to be in the fully closed position. Note that the test results were acceptable even with V-28-6 partially open.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence

Rust accumulations were found on the piston lands and cylinder walls of the valve operator for V-28-6. These accumulations caused binding which prevented the valve from closing fully. It is believed that condensation on the valve operator components caused the rust accumulations.

Analysis of Occurrence

The safety significance of this event is the loss of isolation valve redundancy. Although V-28-6 did not fully close, the redundant isolation valve, V-28-5, functioned normally and closed fully.

Corrective Action

The valve operator for V-28-6 was disassembled by the maintenance department and small rust accumulations were found on the piston lands and cylinder walls as mentioned above. These rust accumulations caused the parts to bind, and this prevented the valve from closing fully. The rust was removed and the operator reassembled. V-28-6 was satisfactorily tested and returned to service on 0400 on November 9, 1974. All operators on air operated ventilation isolation valves in the reactor building will be inspected. The operators will be cleaned if the inspection indicates it is necessary. In addition, a surveillance program on the instrument air system will be developed and implemented in order to ascertain problem areas, if any, in that system.

Failure Data

Manufacturer - Rockwell
Type - 14" Butterfly Valve (air operated)