

To:

James P. O'Reilly  
Directorate of Regulatory Operations  
Region I  
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From:


Jersey Central Power & Light Company  
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Docket #50-219  
Forked River, New Jersey 08751

Subject:

Abnormal Occurrence Report No. 50-219/75/ 12

The following is a preliminary report being submitted  
in compliance with the Technical Specifications  
paragraph 6.6.2

Preliminary Approval:

 4-28-75  
J. T. Carroll, Jr. Date

cc: Mr. A. Giambusso

Initial Telephone  
Report Date: 4-26-75

Time of  
Occurrence: 4-26-75

Initial Written  
Report Date: 4-28-75

Time of  
Occurrence: 0300

OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION  
FORKED RIVER, NEW JERSEY 08731

Abnormal Occurrence  
Report No. 50-219/75/12

IDENTIFICATION  
OF OCCURRENCE:

Violation of the Technical Specifications, paragraph  
3.1.1.D.3, Low Reactor Pressure Core Spray Valve Permissive  
Pressure Switches RE 17B and C were found to trip at  
pressures less than the minimum required value of 285 psig.  
This event is considered to be an abnormal occurrence as  
defined in the Technical Specifications, paragraphs 1.15B and D.

CONDITIONS PRIOR  
TO OCCURRENCE:

<input type="checkbox"/> Steady State Power	<input type="checkbox"/> Routine Shutdown
<input type="checkbox"/> Hot Standby	<input type="checkbox"/> Operation
<input type="checkbox"/> Cold Shutdown	<input type="checkbox"/> Load Changes During
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Refueling Shutdown	<input type="checkbox"/> Routine Power Operation
<input type="checkbox"/> Routine Startup	<input type="checkbox"/> Other (Specify)
<input type="checkbox"/> Operation	

The reactor mode switch was in the REFUEL position with  
reactor coolant temperature less than 212°F.

DESCRIPTION OF  
OCCURRENCE:

On Saturday, April 26, 1975 at approximately 0300, while  
performing quarterly surveillance testing on the four (4)  
Low Reactor Pressure Core Spray Valve Permissive Pressure  
Switches, it was discovered that RE 17B and C tripped at  
278 psig and 280 psig, respectively. These values are less  
than the Technical Specification limit of 285 psig. Pressure  
switches RE 17B and C were immediately recalibrated.

The "as found" and "as left" switch settings were:

	<u>"As Found" Settings</u>	<u>"As Left" Settings</u>
RE 17A	286 psig	286 psig
RE 17B	278 psig	285 psig
RE 17C	280 psig	287 psig
RE 17D	285 psig	285 psig

APPARENT CAUSE  
OF OCCURRENCE:

<input type="checkbox"/> Design	<input type="checkbox"/> Procedure
<input type="checkbox"/> Manufacture	<input type="checkbox"/> Unusual Service Condition
<input type="checkbox"/> Installation/	<input type="checkbox"/> Inc. Environmental
<input type="checkbox"/> Construction	<input type="checkbox"/> Component Failure
<input type="checkbox"/> Operator	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Other (Specify)

The cause of this occurrence is switch repeatability which is a recognized problem.

ANALYSIS OF  
OCCURRENCE:

The Core Spray System Parallel Isolation Valves open when a low-low reactor water level and/or high drywell pressure condition exists in addition to a low reactor pressure condition (285 psig). The four (4) Low Reactor Pressure Core Spray Valve Permissive Pressure Switches sense the low reactor pressure condition and provide signals to the valve opening logic. Two (2) of these switches (RE 17A and B) are associated with Core Spray System 1 and the other two (2) switches (RE 17C and D) are associated with Core Spray System 2. A trip of one switch in each core spray system is required to effect parallel isolation valve opening in that system. A review of the "as found" switch settings indicates that parallel isolation valves in both core spray systems would have opened at reactor pressures  $\geq 285$  psig had a reactor low-low water level and/or high drywell pressure condition existed concurrently. The safety significance of this event is considered to be the loss of switch redundancy.

In addition, it is noted that the reactor has been maintained at atmospheric pressure during the current refueling outage and that the low reactor pressure permissive was consequently satisfied during this time period.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

Immediate corrective action involved the recalibration of pressure switches RE 17B and C.

Set point accuracy and tolerance in not only these instruments, but in others as well, are under investigation by Jersey Central Power & Light Company, GPU Service Corporation, and General Electric Company personnel.

FAILURE DATA:

Manufacturer data pertinent to these switches are as follows:

Manufacture:	Barksdale
Type:	Pressure Actuated Switch
Range:	50-1200 psig
Ser. No:	B2T-A12SS (RE 17B)
	B2T-M12SS (RE 17C)

Prepared by: E. Manning

Date: 4/28/75