


NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION

NIAGARA  MOHAWK

300 ERIE BOULEVARD WEST
SYRACUSE, N. Y. 13202

July 3, 1973

Mr. Donald J. Skovholt
Assistant Director for Reactor Operations
Division of Reactor Licensing
United States Atomic Energy Commission
Washington, D. C. 20545



Dear Mr. Skovholt:

Re: Provisional Operating License: DPR-17
Docket No.: 50-220

This is to report a condition relating to the operation of Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit #1, in which, during routine surveillance testing of the turbine anticipatory trip bypass switches, (Barksdale B2T-A12ES) two out of the four were found to exceed the value specified in the instrument surveillance check list. Technical Specifications 2.1.2.(i) states:

"The generator load rejection scram shall be initiated by the signal for turbine control valve fast closure due to a loss of oil pressure to the acceleration relay any time the turbine first stage steam pressure is above a value corresponding to 833 Mwt, i.e. 45 percent of 1850 Mwt."

Technical Specification 2.1.2.(j) states:

"The turbine stop valve closure scram setting shall be initiated at ≤ 10 percent of valve closure (stem position) from full open whenever the turbine first stage steam pressure is above a value corresponding to 833 Mwt, i.e. 45 percent of 1850 Mwt."

On June 29, 1973, at approximately 2130 hours during routine surveillance testing, two out of the four (one in RPS channel 11 and one in RPS channel 12) Turbine anticipatory trip bypass switches were found to actuate at a value of 365 psig and 366 psig (approximately 824-826 Mwt) or approximately 5 and 6 psi above the instrument surveillance checklist value of 360 psig. The remaining two switches were found within specifications. Notification of this deviation from the accepted value for calibration was made on June 30, 1973, to Mr. Brickly of Region I, Division of Regulatory Operation.

8302280060 730703
PDR ADOCK 05000220
S PDR

COPY SENT REGION I

5329

Mr. Donald J. Skovholt
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission

- 2 -

July 3, 1973

The switches were instrument calibrated on May 25, 1973 and found correct at that time. The two switches actuating at 365 and 366 psig were recalibrated to read 357 and 358 psig.

To prevent possible recurrence of this incident and to insure that a turbine trip will provide a near instantaneous reactor scram above 45% power the Parksdale 02-13 A & B were calibrated lower than 360 psig (357 and 358 psig) and thus lower than 45% power. These will be rechecked in two weeks to insure that the instrumentation is not drifting.

In view of the fact that: (1) Redundancy was provided in the circuitry which would have caused a reactor scram at the 360 psig first stage steam pressure setting following a turbine trip, (2) The instrument surveillance checklist value for first stage steam pressure relates to a value less than that called for in Technical Specifications (806-810 Mwt), and (3) That even with the higher pressure the limit of 833 Mwt trip actuation was not exceeded; it is concluded that there are no implications or effects on the safety or health of the general public.

Very truly yours,

Original signed by - R.R. Schneider

Rudolph R. Schneider
Vice President - Electric Operations

RRS: cm