

NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION

NIAGARA MOHAWK

300 ERIE BOULEVARD WEST  
SYRACUSE, N.Y. 13202

July 6, 1973



Mr. Donald J. Skovholt  
Assistant Director for Reactor Operations  
Division of Reactor Licensing  
United States Atomic Energy Commission  
Washington, D. C. 20545

Dear Mr. Skovholt:

Re: Provisional Operating License: DPR-17  
Docket No.: 50-220

This letter is to report a condition relating to the operation of Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit #1, in which, during routine surveillance testing the core spray differential pressure instrumentation (Barton 288-4802&3) was found to read higher value than that as set forth in the instrumentation surveillance check list. Technical Specification 4.1.4. (d) states:

"Core spray header  $\Delta P$  Instrumentation"

Check	once/day
Calibrate	once/3 months
Test	once/3 months

On June 30, 1973 at 0100 hours during routine surveillance testing both of the core spray differential pressure instruments were found to be reading 8.3 psid or 3.3 psi above the value as stated in the instrument surveillance check list, (5 psid). This is the first deviation from the procedural accepted value of 5 psid. Notification was made to Mr. Brickly, Region I, Division of Regulatory Operations on June 30, 1973. These switches are designed and intended to provide an alarm only and do not have a protective circuitry function.

As a portion of the daily activities for the plant operators, they are required to read the dial indicator of the core spray differential pressure in the north instrument room (E1. 237'). If these dial indicators had reached 5 psid or above (the alarm limit) it would have been recorded and thus awareness of an abnormal condition in the core spray header would be made known to Station Supervision that same day.

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The primary function of the core spray differential pressure indicators is to monitor the condition of the core spray piping between the reactor vessel wall and the shroud inside the reactor vessel. As a consequence if ever the core spray piping between the reactor vessel wall and the shroud should suffer a loss of integrity the differential pressure instrument would read essentially recirculation pump differential pressure. Under normal power operating conditions the recirculation pump differential pressure would be in the range of 20-25 psid.

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Mr. Donald J. Skov  
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission

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Therefore even had the integrity of the piping suffered a loss an alarm would have been sounded in the control room.

To prevent reoccurrence of this problem the cycle of calibration will be increased to every two weeks for a month. If no instrument drift problems occur during this increased surveillance the technical specification surveillance schedule will be reinstated.

It is therefore concluded that no undue hazard was present to the general public as a result of this procedural deviation from set point.

Very truly yours,

Original signed by - R.R. Schneider

Rudolph R. Schneider  
Vice President - Electric Operations

RRS:cm