

Initial Telephone Report Date: August 29, 1975

Date of Occurrence: August 29, 1975 *A. Diambuso*

Initial Written Report Date: September 2, 1975

Time of Occurrence: 1400

OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION
FORKED RIVER, NEW JERSEY 08731

Abnormal Occurrence
Report No. 50-219/75/24

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE: Violation of the Technical Specifications, paragraph 2.3.4, Electromatic Relief Valve Pressure Switches, 1A83C and 1A83D, were found to trip at pressures in excess of the maximum allowable value of 1070 psig.

This event is considered to be an abnormal occurrence as defined in the Technical Specifications, paragraph 1.15A.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

- Steady State Power
- Hot Standby
- Cold Shutdown
- Refueling Shutdown
- Routine Startup Operation
- Routine Shutdown Operation
- Load Changes During Routine Power Operation
- Other (Specify)

The Reactor Mode Switch was in the refuel position with the Reactor Coolant temperature less than 212 F

DESCRIPTION

OF OCCURRENCE: On Friday, August 29, 1975, while performing surveillance on the five Electromatic Relief Valve Pressure Switches, it was found the 1A83C and 1A83D tripped at 1080 and 1084 psig, respectively. These values are in excess of the maximum allowable trip points of 1077 and 1082 respectively, which are derived by adding appropriate head correction factors to the Technical Specification Limit of 1070 psig. It is noted here that switches 1A83C and 1A83D are associated with valves NR108C and NR108D, respectively. The "As Found" & "As Left" settings were:

Switch	VALVE	"As Found" Setting	"As Left" Setting
1A83A	NR108A	1073	1079
1A83B	NR108B	1071	1084
1A83C	NR108C	1080	1077
1A83D	NR108D	1084	1082
1A83E	NR108E	1082	1082

APPARENT CAUSE
OF OCCURRENCE:

Design
 Manufacture
 Installation/
 Construction
 Operator

Procedure
 Unusual Service Condition
 Inc. Environmental
 Component Failure
 Other (Specify)

Instrument setpoint drift
 is identified as the cause of this
 occurrence.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE: The relief valves are provided to remove sufficient energy from the primary system to prevent the safety valves from lifting during a transient. The limiting pressure transient is that which is produced upon a turbine trip from rated design power with a failure of the bypass system to function. Under these conditions, the five relief valves are required to operate in order to prevent reaching the lowest set point of the primary system safety valves. It should be noted that a 25 psig margin exists between the resulting peak pressure and the lowest safety valve set point as added assurance that the safety valves will not lift during this transient. With valves NR108C and NR108D actuating at 3 psig and 2 psig, respectively, above the maximum allowable trip point of 1070 psig, and assuming the most limiting pressure transient had occurred, the lowest set point safety valve or valves may have been required to actuate in order to limit the pressure transient. Since the safety valve capacity provides sufficient vessel over-pressure protection against failure of all pressure release devices in addition to a failure of the reactor to scram, over-pressurization of the vessel would not have occurred.

CORRECTIVE

ACTION: The involved pressure switches, 1A83C and 1A83D, were immediately reset to trip at allowable pressure levels. There are continuing efforts to resolve the incompatibilities between the Technical Specification setpoint limits and the sensor performance limits. It is felt that the conservative design margins associated with the derivation of the plant safety limits will permit a change in the Technical Specifications to be made which will take into account the expected sensor performance variations. This will eliminate instances of abnormal occurrence reports caused by the normal variation in a sensor setpoint within the design margins of the plant safety limits.


FAILURE DATA: Manufacturer data pertinent to these switches are as follows:

Manufacturer -- Dresser
 Type -- 1539VX
 Serial Nos. -- BK3340 (1A83C) & BK3338 (1A83D)

Previous abnormal occurrence reports:

Abnormal Occurrence Report No. 50-219/74-28
 Abnormal Occurrence Report No. 50-219/74-39
 Abnormal Occurrence Report No. 50-219/75-16

Prepared by:



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This event is considered to be an abnormal occurrence as defined in the Technical Specifications, paragraph 1.15A.

CONDITIONS PRIOR
TO OCCURRENCE:

<input type="checkbox"/> Steady State Power	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Routine Shutdown
<input type="checkbox"/> Hot Standby	<input type="checkbox"/> Operation
<input type="checkbox"/> Cold Shutdown	<input type="checkbox"/> Load Changes During
<input type="checkbox"/> Refueling Shutdown	<input type="checkbox"/> Routine Power Operation
<input type="checkbox"/> Routine Startup	<input type="checkbox"/> Other (Specify)
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Operation	

The Reactor Mode Switch was in the refuel position with the Reactor Coolant temperature less than 212°F

DESCRIPTION

OF OCCURRENCE: On Friday, August 29, 1975, while performing surveillance on the five Electromatic Relief Valve Pressure Switches, it was found the 1A83C and 1A83D tripped at 1080 and 1084 psig, respectively. These values are in excess of the maximum allowable trip points of 1077 and 1082 respectively, which are derived by adding appropriate head correction factors to the Technical Specification Limit of 1070 psig. It is noted here that switches 1A83C and 1A83D are associated with valves NR108C and NR108D, respectively. The "As Found" & "As Left" settings were:

<u>Switch</u>	<u>VALVE</u>	<u>"As Found"</u> <u>Setting</u>	<u>"As Left"</u> <u>Setting</u>
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1A83D	NR108D	1084	1082
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PARENT CAUSE
OCCURRENCE:

 Design
 Manufacture
 Installation/
 Construction
 Operator

 Procedure
 Unusual Service Condition
 Inc. Environmental
 Component Failure
 X Other (Specify)

Instrument setpoint drift
is identified as the cause of this occurrence.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE: The relief valves are provided to remove sufficient energy from the primary system to prevent the safety valves from lifting during a transient. The limiting pressure transient is that which is produced on a turbine trip from rated design power with a failure of the bypass system to function. Under these conditions, the five relief valves are required to operate in order to prevent reaching the lowest set point of the primary system safety valves. It should be noted that a 25 psig margin exists between the resulting peak pressure and the lowest safety valve set point as added assurance that the safety valves will not lift during this transient. With valves NR108C and NR108D actuating at 3 psig and 2 psig, respectively, above the maximum allowable trip point of 1070 psig, and assuming the most limiting pressure transient had occurred, the lowest set point safety valve or valves may have been required to actuate in order to limit the pressure transient. Since the safety valve capacity provides sufficient vessel over-pressure protection against failure of all pressure release devices in addition to a failure of the reactor to scram, over-pressurization of the vessel would not have occurred.

RECTIVE ACTION:

The involved pressure switches, 1A83C and 1A83D, were immediately set to trip at allowable pressure levels. There are continuing efforts to resolve the incompatibilities between the Technical Specification setpoint limits and the sensor performance limits. It is felt that the conservative design margins associated with the derivation of the plant safety limits will permit a change in the Technical Specifications to be made which will take into account the expected sensor performance variations. This will eliminate instances of abnormal occurrence reports caused by normal variation in a sensor setpoint within the design margins of the setpoint at safety limits.

ADDITIONAL DATA: Manufacturer data pertinent to these switches are as follows:

Manufacturer -- Dresser
Type -- 1539VX
Serial Nos. -- BK3340 (1A83C) & BK3338 (1A83D)

Previous abnormal occurrence reports:

Abnormal Occurrence Report No. 50-219/74-28
Abnormal Occurrence Report No. 50-219/74-39
Abnormal Occurrence Report No. 50-219/75-16

Prepared by: J.P. Sullivan

Date: September 2, 1975

TO:

James P. O'Reilly
Directorate of Regulatory Operations
Region I
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

FROM:


Jersey Central Power & Light Company
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Docket #50-2
Forked River, New Jersey 08731

SUBJECT:

Abnormal Occurrence Report No. 50-219/75/ 24

The following is a preliminary report being
submitted in compliance with the Technical
Specifications, paragraph 6.6.2.

Preliminary Approval:

 7/2/75

J. T. Carroll, Jr.

Date

CC: Mr. A. Giambusso