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MEMORANDUM FOR: William V. Johnston, Assistant Director Matarials and Qualification Engineering Division of Engineering

FROM: Zoltan R. Rosztoczy, Chief Equipment Qualification Branch Division of Engineering

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SUBJECT: GENERIC RECOMMENDATION BASED ON THE STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE AT GINNA

My staff reviewed the report (NUREG-909) on the subject incident from the point of view of the plant system response. Our generic recommendation is discussed in the attachment to this memorandum.

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Zoltan R. Rosztoczy, Chief Equipment Qualification Branch Division of Engineering

Enclosure: As stated

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| OFICER DE: EDBAT SURNAME & GBEGGHI/WWW DATE & 5/ 182 | ZRRosztoczy | ******* | | | ****** | |
| IC FORM 318 (10-80) NRCM 0240 | | OFFICIAL | RECORD C | OPY | kan menangan kenangan kenanga | USGPO. 1981-335-950 |

Generic Recommendation Based On The Steam Generator Tube Rupture At Ginna Division of Engineering: Equipment Qualification Branch

Plant System Response: The malfunction of the PORV for the pressurizer was caused by the solenoid values controlling the air supply to the relief value. The mechanical operability of a value similar to the one in Ginna was verified through the test program recently completed by EPRI. However, a combination of air quality and flow restriction to the solenoid value caused the relief value to remain stuck open. If plant modifications like the one in Ginna involving air operator flow restriction to safety related values are performed without a thorough analysis of the effects on the safety related values, there can be a potential for significant consequences.

The generic concern is that modification of air operators for safety related valves may render them inoperable. As evident from the Ginna incident, in-service inspection and testing cannot simulate the total effect of modification; and therefore, in-service inspection and testing cannot fully assure operability. A careful review should be made as to how all in plant modifications of safety related active valves compare against the manufacturer's recommendations for installation in the plant. Significant deviations from the recommended installation should be evaluated and appropriately dealt with.