



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

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50-244

MEMORANDUM FOR: Darrell J. Eisenhut, Director  
Division of Licensing, NRR

Edward L. Jordan, Director  
Division of Engineering  
and Quality Assurance, IE

Carlyle Michelson, Director  
Office for Analysis and Evaluation  
of Operational Data

Richard W. Starostecki, Director  
Division of Resident and  
Project Inspection, Region I

FROM: Ronald C. Haynes, Regional Administrator  
Region I

SUBJECT: NRC INQUIRY REGARDING GINNA EVENT OF JANUARY 25, 1982

7/1/82

The following is a brief summary of our discussion today regarding the Ginna event and attached is an outline for the inquiry.

1. As pointed out by Vic Stello, we are to come up with a draft report to the Commissioners within 45 days which is a factual report of what happened. We are to have findings but not recommendations. As currently envisioned, this report would be used by the various NRC offices as the basic data from which analyses could be performed and recommendations, as appropriate, be formulated.
2. I am accountable for the conduct of the inquiry and will be assisted by personnel from the various NRC offices.
3. Guidance, advice and review will be provided by a steering group comprised of Jack Heltemes, Darrell Eisenhut, Ed Jordan, and Rich Starostecki. I will function as chairman of this group. It is expected that up to four work days of effort will be required of members of the steering group.
4. The inquiry will be performed by NRC personnel from the various offices managed by the EDO.
5. I will select the Director of the inquiry group with the advice and counsel of the steering group.


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~~ENCLOSURE C~~

6. The inquiry will require the full-time services of seven to ten key persons to be selected from the various NRC offices. Additional support will be provided on an "as needed" basis by other personnel from the various NRC offices.
7. Work space will be provided at Region I for the key persons conducting the inquiry. It is expected that these key personnel will spend a major part of their time at the Region I office during this work.
8. The sequence of events for this inquiry will cover the period from 9:25 am on January 25, 1982 to 10:45 am on January 26, 1982 when the event was de-escalated to the "Recovery Phase."
9. It is expected that the report will consist of two volumes. The report will be in the format and style for issuance as a NUREG document. The first volume will cover information according to the attached outline. The second volume will contain reference data, e.g., instrument charts, procedures, copies of data sheets, etc.

You are requested to review the attached outline and provide information/suggestions/questions/issues to be covered in each of the six separate sections. Of course, if additional sections are appropriate in your view, please advise. The steering group will meet at 3:00 pm on Monday, February 8, 1982 at the AEOD Conference Room, Second Floor, East West Building (South). Richard Starostecki will act for me as Chairman in this meeting. Also at this meeting, please be prepared to recommend persons who should participate as a key person in the inquiry working group.

  
Ronald C. Haynes, Regional Administrator  
Region I

Attachment:  
As stated

cc w/attachment:  
WDircks, EDO  
VStello, DEDROGR  
HDenton, NRR  
RDeYourg, IE

## Outline

### Binna Steam Generator Tube Rupture Event

- NRC Investigation -

*Region I* I. Introduction and Executive Summary

*Region I* II. Chronology of Events  
*- Status at time of event*  
(annotated sequence of events to place further discussion in perspective)

### III. Plant Performance

#### A. Systems Response

- Secondary system
- Reactor protection system
- Reactor coolant system
- Safety injection system
- Containment isolation system
- Instrument air system
- Auxiliary feedwater system
- Charging/letdown systems
- Residual heat removal

#### B. Instrument Response

- Secondary plant instrumentation  
(S/G levels, pressures, feedwater flows, air ejector condenser monitors, steam flows)
- Primary plant instrumentation
  - i) parameters (temp, pressures, levels, flow)
  - ii) thermocouples
  - iii) tail pipe temps on pressurizer PORV
  - iv) saturation/subcooling meters

#### C. Equipment Response

- Pressurizer PORV
- Steam generator atmospheric relief *- Condenser Head in "A" - See Sig*
- Steam generator safety valves *- Process Computer (put in IV-A - alarms)*
- Pressurizer relief tank
- Control rod hydraulic fans
- Control room indicators/alarms
- Main steam line B up to MSIV (stress)

### IV. Procedures/Human Factors

#### A. Control Room Responses

- Licensed operators
- STA
- Other
- Alarms, recorders, and indicators *in control room*

B. Procedures

- Identification and selection
- Bases (generic guidelines used to develop procedures)
- Procedural guidelines available and those not provided
- Impact, if any, of degraded condition
- Small break LOCA procedure

C. Technical Support Center

- Role of plant superintendent
- PORC meetings
- Others

D. Facility Description

- Control Room
- TSC

*move to "A" -  
eg. Id Comp. Under problems?  
layouts?*

V. Radiological Response

A. Releases to Environment

- Air ejectors
- Steam generators
- Primary Coolant Activity

B. Releases to Containment

C. Plant/Onsite Contamination

- i meteorological factors
- ii quantification
- iii impacts, if any

D. Environmental Results

- i offsite sampling - licensee  
and analyses - NRC  
- other
- ii dose assessment (calculated)
- iii dose assessment (measured)
- iv meteorological factors

VI Organizational Response (Communication, transportation, level of support, etc.)

A. Licensee - TSC

- EOF
- Corporate, etc.
- Public affairs

B. NRC

- management team (HQ)
- response team (Region I)
- regional office
- public affairs
- state liaison
- technical support

C. NY State and Counties

D. FEMA, EPA, and Other Federal Agencies

VII. Post Event Activities/Results

A. Event termination - RHR, normal  
shutdown mode

B. Licensee Recovery Plan

C. Preliminary Results

- Leakage rate
- Tube rupture