



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO. 81 TO FACILITY OPERATING

LICENSE NO. DPR-59

POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

DOCKET NO. 50-333

1.0 Introduction

By letter dated January 23, 1984, the Power Authority of the State of New York (the licensee) forwarded a proposed change to the Technical Specifications (TS). This change would permit the primary containment atmosphere monitoring (CAM) system to be isolated during those periods when the post-accident sampling system (PASS) is being tested for operability or used for personnel training.

The licensee states that the PASS and the CAM systems utilize a common discharge line to the torus. To prevent backflow of a potentially contaminated sample to the CAM panel during PASS operation, the CAM must be isolated. The existing TS for FitzPatrick indicate that the primary containment atmosphere shall be continuously monitored for hydrogen and oxygen when containment integrity is required. Consequently, it is impossible to test the PASS without violating the TS.

2.0 Evaluation

The licensee proposed the following additional statements for Section 3.7.A.9.a of the TS. "The exception to this (continuous monitoring) is when the Post-Accident Sampling System is to be operated. In this instance, the containment atmosphere monitoring system may be isolated for a period not to exceed 3 hours in a 24-hour period."

The staff has reviewed the licensee's proposed change to the TS and finds the change to be acceptable. This finding is based on the following rationale. The need to provide for monitoring of the hydrogen/oxygen concentrations in containment has been identified in both Regulatory Guide 1.97, Rev. 2 and NUREG-0737, "Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements." In both of the documents, continuous monitoring is indicated as being required for the time periods during and following an accident. However, this need does not extend into normal operation. This exception is clearly stated in the clarifications for Item II.F.1, Attachment 6, Containment Hydrogen Monitor, NUREG-0737. For the inerted containment of the FitzPatrick plant, there also is a need to periodically verify the inerted condition during normal operation. But, again,

continuous verification of the inert condition is not needed. As a result, the staff finds the ability to verify the inerted condition at least 21 out of every 24-hour time period sufficient to satisfy the above stated need.

3.0 Environmental Consideration

This amendment involves a change in the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area. The staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that this amendment involves no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding. Accordingly, this amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.

4.0 Conclusions

We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: A. Notafrancesca

Dated: June 28, 1984