

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATOR / COMMISSION MASHINGTON, D C 20056

ריהי ביי בזז

Docket Nos: 50-323 50-330

APPLICANT: Consumers Power Company

FACILITY: Midland Plant, Units 1 % 2


SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF JANUARY 17, 1979 MELTING ON PSAR CHANGES AND REGULATORY GUIDES ON CUALITY ASSURANCE

On January 17, 1979, the NRC staff met in Bethesda. Maryland with Consumers Power Company (CPCO), Bechtel Associates, and the Babcock & Wilcox (BSW) Company. Attendees are listed in Enclosure 1. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss (1) changes to the Midland Plant designs which have occurred since construction permits issuance and (2) conformance to certain regulatory guides on quality assurance during the operations phase.

Changes From PSAR

The staff stated that the applicants response to request 031.11 in FSAR Amendment 15 (Enclosure 2 hereto) filled to comply with Section 1.3.2 of Revison 2 to Regulatory Guide 1.70 and was unacceptable. The staff further stated that, although the request was made by the instrumentation and Control Systems Branch, the request is intended to apply to all areas of the design. The staff emphasized the administrative and schedular significance of this information to the review process. CPCO will revise the response in February 1979.

CPCO stated that reviews were conducted to assure that commitments in the PSAR were addressed in the FSAR. Enclosure 3 illustrates results of the review by BSA for its scope of supply in FSAR Chapter 7. Results for balance-of-plant scope in Chapter 7 are illustrated by Enclosure 4. A few of the items noted ilso represendusign changes since the PSAR.



Consumers Power Company

CCS:

Michael I. Miller, Esq. Isham, Lincoln & Beale Suite 4200 One First National Plaza Chicago, Illinois 60670

Judd L. Bacon, Esq. Consumers Power Company 212 West Michigan Avenue Jackson, Michigan 49201

Mr. Paul A. Perry Secretary Consumers Power Company 212 W. Michigan Avenue Jackson, Michigan 49201

Myron M. Cherry, Esq. One IBM Plaza Chicago, Illinois 60611

Mary Sinclair 5711 Summerset Drive Midland, Michigan 43640

Frank J. Kelley, Esq. Attorney General State of Michigan Environmental Protection Division 720 Law Building Lansing, Michigan 48913

Mr. Wendell Marshall Route 10 Midland, Michigan 48640

Grant J. Merritt, Esq. Thompson, Nielsan, Klaverkamp & James 4444 IDS Center 80 South Eighth Street Minneapolis, Minnesota 55402

Mr. S. H. Howell Vice President Consumers Power Company 212 West Michigan Atenue Jackson, Michigan 49201

FEB 2 - 1079

ENCLOSURE 1

ATTENDEES

D. Hood M. Gerding J. Pastor B. Belke J. Howard M. Rothwell J. Cabritski D. Hoffman D. Bixel K. Marbough J. Fremeau T. Buczwinski O. Chopra H. Daniels S. Eschback R. Reed

NRC Bechtel CPCO NRC BSW Bechtel CPCO CPCO CPCO CPCO CPCO CPCO NRC NRC BEW BEW

FFG - 1171

12 N 6 1.75

Question (11.11 (1.2.2)

Section 1 is 2 of your 15Am does not satisfy the intertaint pevision. I megnitors on the 1.20 Your FLAM the third in to extensive reformating and the additional information provides in the FSAR, cross-reference of changes is not conditioned appropriate and is therefore not included." We do not agree that this information should be omitted.

The purpose of this section is to identify all significant changes from the original design which we approved during the construction permit review. We require that your FSAR describall significant changes from the construction permit design at 1 identify the FSAR location where the revised design is described. The description should in jude the basis for the change.

This section should also provide assurance that the Midland units have not been constructed to any safety criteria that are less conservative than those to which you committed and which we approved during the review for the construction permits.

Amend your FSAR to reflect these requirements.

Response

1

A cross-reference of changes that occurred from the PSAR to the FSAR is not considered appropriate because extensive reformation and a significant amount of new information is provided in the FSAR. Information is provided in the FSAR on the requirements and formats of Regulatory Gaide 1.70, Rev. 2 as modified by the lefter on FSAR format and content from R.S. Boyd to S.H. Howell dated June 2, 1976.

A comparison of the PSAk to the current FSAR would require a significant amount of engineering effort and has no overall effect on plant safety. Hence, it is CPCo's position that the necessary information is available for starf review in the FSAP and a comparison or cross-referencing of the PSAR to the FSAP unnecessary and will not be done.

260 112-1

The CPCo PSAR has been searched to identify BaW commitments. The CPCo FSAR has been searched for fulfillment of those commitments. This memo reports the findings of the search as well as pointing out several areas of possible FSAR deficiencies.

Enclosure 3

- I. FSAR Deficiencies (TMAD PENL'CA
 - Reactor trip switch (RTS) environmental qualification is not addressed, however, seismic is addressed.
 - Section 7.2.2.2.2 references sections 7.1.2.17 which does not exist. Should reference section 3.11.
 - Section 7.2.2.2.3 references section 7.1.2.16 which does not exist.
 - Section 7.2.1.1 defines the reactor trip switch and cable from the NI/RPS to the CRDCS as part of the NI/RPS. The cable is in the users scope and the RTS should be treated separately.
 - Section 7.2.1.1 includes sensors in the NI/RPS scope. Pump monitors and ECCAS RB pressure sensors are in the users scope.
 - IE to IE electrical isolation is presently in the users scope. Section 7 should reflect this. NSS and BOP isolation will be revised in later FSAR amendment.
- II. Commitments

Commitments were found in sections 7.1.1.2 and 7.1.2.3.9 of the PSAR. They all related to equipment qualification either by testing or FMEA. They are quoted below for information.

- 1. Section 7.1.1.2
 - A) Line 3 "prototype and final equipment will be subjected to qualification tests as required by the subject standard." (IEEE-279)
 - 8) Line 4 "The tests will establish the adequacy of equipment performance in both normal and accident environments."
- 2. Section 7.1.2.3.9
 - A) Line 6 "A system fault test analysis will be made considering the modes of failure and determining their effects on the system vital functions."
 - B) Testing Line 5 "The equipment manufacturer is required to provide qualification test data to verify the performance requirements of the equipment."

C) Testing Last PARA - "Instrumentation and control items that must survive part or all of the LOCA environment are subject to these qualification test verification procedures and requirements."

III. Fulfillment of Commitments

Due to the differences in organization and style between the PSAR and FSAR, it is difficult to relate specific sections. The FSAR was searched for sections relating to qualification. These sections are listed below.

1. ECCAS

- A. FMEA 7.3.2.3.1 (4.2), 7.3.2.3.14 (SE7)
- B. <u>QUAL</u> 7.3.2.2.1 (3.8), 7.3.2.3.1 (4.4), 7.3.2.3.14 (SE8), Appendix 3A page 121, 3.11.2.2, and 3.11.3
- C. Seismic 7.3.2.2.1 (3.8), 7.3.2.3.5, 7.3.2.3.14 (SE6), and 3.10.2.2

2. NI/RPS

- A. FREA 7.2.2.1, 7.2.2.2.1 (4.2)
- B. <u>QUAL</u> 7.2.2.2.1 (4.1), Appendix 3A page 121, 3.11.2.2, and 3.11.3
- C. Seismic 7.2.2.2.4, 3.10.2.2

3. CRDCS

- A. FMEA Appendix 7A
- B. QUAL 3.11.2.2, 3.11.3
- C. Seismic 3.10.2.2

4. RTS

- B. Environmental not addressed
- C. Seimic 3.10.4.2

Enclosure 4 FEB 27 1979

PSAR Subsection	PSAR Commitment	FSAR Commitment Description	FSAR Beference
7.1.1.2	The protection systems are designed to meet the requirements of the IEEE Std proposed Standard for Nuclear Power Plant Protection Systems (IEEE Std 279, Revision 10). Prototype and final equipment will be subject to qualification tests as required by the subject standard.	The protection systems are designed to the issued IEEE Std 279-1971, which supersedes the proposed standard.	SAR Subsection 7.1.2.4.a, 7.2.1.2.1, 7.2.2.2.1, 7.3.2.2.1, 7.3.2.3.1, 7.3.3.3.1, 7.3.3.4.1
- 7.1.1.2	The reactor protection and engineered afeguards systems are designed to meet the design criteria specified in Subsection 7.1.1.2 of the PSAR, and the functional requirement. listed in Subsection 7.1.1.3.	The design criteria of PSAR Sub- section 7.1.1.2 are incorporated in the FSAR except for PSAR Sub- section 7.1.1.2.4b. All ESFAS subsystems comply except RAS and RBSAS whose sensor channels are energize-to-trip. This design reduces the possibility of spur- ious RB spray actuation while still complying with IEEE Std 279-1971. The functional requirements of PSAR Subsection 7.1.1.3 are in- corporated in the FSAK. In addition, the FSAR states that 83 isolation valves will be operated upon detection of a low RCS pressure.	FS48 Subsections 7.2.1.1, 7.2.2.2, 7.3.2.1, 7.3.2.3, 7.3.3.4, 7.3.3.2
1.1.1.4.7	 Ianual testing facilities shall be puilt into the protection systems to provide for: A. Preoperational testing to ensure that the protection systems can fulfill their required fonctions Contine testing to prove op facility and to depond tate 	The PSAR commitment for manual testing facilities is incorporated into the FSAR and is described in detail in the discussions of compliance with IEEE Std 279-1971, Section 4.10.	Fel Subsections Subsections Subsections Subsections Subsections

relish: tity

PSAR	PSAR		FSAR
Subsection	Commitment		Commitment Description
7.1.1.4	The operating environment for equip- ment will be maintained in accordance with Subsection 7.1.1.4 of the PSAR.	1. 2.	The maximum operating RB tem- perature is 120F as described in the P.AR and in FSAR Table 3.11-2. The continuous operation environ- ment design for RPS instrumen- tation inside RB will be provided

- by amendment.
 Engineered safety features actuation system (ESFAS) equipment inside the RB is designed to operate under an accident environment of a steam/air mixture of 100% relative humidity.
 277.7F, and 70 psig as described in FSAR Table 3.11-3.
- Several seismic Category 1 14. redundant ventilation or cooling systems have been added to the plant design since the PSAR review. The operation of these systems limits auxiliary building ESF equipment room temperatures to less than 104F (see FSAR Tables 3.11-2 and 3.11-3 for specific areas and temperatures). Therefore, instrumentation in these areas is designed to operate continuously at a temperature of 104F or greater, rather than 1201 as indicated in the PSAR. Institumentation in these areas is also designed to operate at 100% relative haudity rather than 90% relative humidit; as indicated in the PSis. Instrumentation outside these aicas to destroyed to operate at at lea t lost and 100, relative hur idit rather than 1201 and 91% relation hauldity as indicated in the Park.

FSAR Reference

FSAR Subsection 3.11

PSAR Subsection

. 7.1.2.2.1

PSAR Consitent

7.1.1.4 (Continued)

When active and passive (check valves) engineered safeguards valves are used redundantly, the active valve will be equipped with two OR control elements, each driven by one of the engineered safeguards channels.

à system fault analysis will be 7.1.2.3.9 made considering the modes of failure and deteraining their effect on the system's vital functions. Acceptance testing and periodic testing will be designed to ensure quality and reliability of the completed systems.

	FSAR	FSAK
	Commitment Description	Reference
	The temperature in these areas is not expected to exceed 104F as indicated in FSAR Tables	
	3.11-2 and 3.11-3.	
5.	The protective equipment in the control room will operate in an ambient temperature of at	
	least 80F rather than 110F as indicated in the PSAR. The control room HVAC systems maintain the ambient temperature less than 80F.	
6.	The discussion of the auxiliary building areasd described in item 4 above also applies to the cable spreading rooms.	
	n an active valve is used redun-	FSAR Subsection
	tly with a passive value (check	7.3.3.2.1,
onl	ve), the active valve will receive y one channel of actuation. The ck valve provides recondancy of	Fig. 7.3-8
	isolation function. This design	
	luces the potential for a loss of	

Failure modes and effects analysis are provided in the 1538. Plant technical specifications require periodic testing to ensure reliability. T/S 3/4.3.1 FSAR Sections 3.10 and 3.11 indicate the acceptance (qualification) tests or analyses for the protection systems. 3.11

independence between redundant channels.

BAN-10003. FSAR Table 7.3-5 FSAR Subsections 7.2.2.1. 3.10.

-5.

PSAR Subsection	PSAR Commitment	FSAR Commitment Description	FSAR Reference
	The RB radiation monitors and the reactor coolant pressure transmitters and associated cabling will be designed to perform the required function during the reactor building design basis accident.	Equipment seismic and environmental qualifications which ensure ESF operation are discussed in the FSAR.	FSAR Subsection 7.1, Table 3.11-1, 3.11-4, 3.10
7.1.2.2.2	 An engineered safeguards actuation system will be provided to perform the following: I. On detection of a high reactor building pressure, close RB isolation valves, start KB spray pumps, open RB spray valves, and start RB recirculate air cooling units. In detection of high RB radiation close all RB penetrations open to the RB atmosphere. (Type II). In detection of a low BWST level shift LPI and RB spray pumps suction to the recirculation mode of operation. 	 The PSAR commitments are incorporated in the FSAR as follows: RBIS-I closes RB isolation valves, RBSAS starts the RB spray pumps and opens the RB spray valves, and RBCAS starts the RB recir- culate air cooling units. All sctuate at 4 paig except RBSAS at 30 psig. RBIS-II closes RB penetrations open to the RB atmosphere upon detection of high RB radiation. RAS shifts the LPI and RB spray pumps into the recirculation mode of operation upon detection of low BWST level. 	FSAR Subsection 7.3.3.2
7.1.2.2.3	Auto close main steam and main feed- water isolation values after a main steam line supture.	MSLIS automatically closes the main steam and main feedwater isolation valves after a main steam or main feed line rupture.	FSAR Subsection 7.3.3.2

7.1.2.2.4 Auto start auxiliary feedwater system after a main steam line rupture or loss of main feedwater.

AFWAS performs the function indicated in the PSAR. FSAR Subsection

7.3.3.2

PSAR Subsection	PSAR Complianent	Commitment Description	FSAR Reference
7.1.2.3.1	The equipment manufacturer is required to provide qualification test data to verify the performance requirements of the equipment. Adherence to the equipment specifications and quali- fication test data is ensured through monitoring and inspection of the manufacturer's work.		312-10003, FSAR Subsection 3.11.3, Section 3.10, Table 3.11-4
7.1.2.4	Trip setpoints or abnormal conditions for the initiation of reactor pro- tection and engineering safeguard systems will be as specified in Subsection 7.1.2.4 of the PSAR.		FSAR Tables 7.2-1, 7.2-3, 7.3-1, 7.3-2, 76 2
+ 7.1.3.3 1 SFAS +) APS	Valid preoperational testing of the emalog sensing element associated with the protection systems will be accomplished through the actual mani- pulation of the measured variable and comparison of the results against a standard. Routine preoperational tests of analog sensing elements will be performed by the substitution of a calibrating signal for the sensor.	Simulated test signals will be util- ized to verify proper setpoint adjust- ments, correct operation of indicators and alarms, and proper logic operation in all operating modes.	i SAR Subsections 14A.1.52, 14A.1.53, 14A.1.55
7.1.3.3	The sensors will be calibrated during shutdowns, for refueling, or whenever the true status of any measured · variable cannot be assessed because of lack of agreement among the redundant measurements.	Plant technical specifications (lab.es 4.3-1 and 4.3-2) indicate channel calibration (includes sensor) to 'c performed at least every 18 months. Plant operation may continue with a channel inoperable within the require- ments of the technical specificat.et limiting conditions of operation.	and 4.3-2
7.1.3.4	Each channel of the protection system will be supplied from one of the four preferred a-c buses described in 8.2.2.8. The operator can initiate a reactor trip independent of the auto- matic protection a tion.	in the plant design.	<pre>1 :S.K Subsections 1.7.1.1.9, 1.2.2.2.1, 3.7.1.1.1, 1.2.3.1.1, 7.3.3.1</pre>

PSAR	PSAR	FSAR	FSAR
Subsection	Commitment	Commitment Description	Reference
7.1.3.2	Start MPI at 1,500 paig low RCS pres- sure and start LPI at 200 paig low RCS pressure.	ECCAS actuates HPI and LPI at 1,5 °O paig low RCS pressure. The present design simplifies the actuation system and allows starting of the LPI sooner than in the PSAR design.	FSAR Subsection 7.3.2.1
7.1.3.5	Operational tests on RPS and ESFAS channels are performed by substi- tuting an analog test signal for the variable. The test signal is manually injected into the instrument channel at the input of the first active channel element in the pro- tection system cabinets.	An operational test on the protection system channels will be performed as indicated in the PSAR and are discussed in FSAR Appendix 3A, BG 1.118, response Section C.7.	Appendix 3A, RG 1.118 FSAR Chapter 16, technical specifications
√7.1.3.6	To ensure that failures in the control	The AFW SG level control system has	FSAR Subsections
	system cannot produce a failure in	been added to the plant design since	7.3.2.3.1,
	the protection system, signals which	the PSAR. The SG level transmitter	7.2.2.2.1,
	go to control from shared sensors	inputs to ESFAS are also used to	7.3.3.3.4.1,
	and amplifiers are isolated by means	control the SG level through the	7.4.2.1,
	of isolation amplifiers. The resul-	safety grade AFW SG level control	Table 7.1-2

of isolation ampliflers. The resulting systems meet the requirements for separation of protection and

system. The output to the AFk' SG level control system is isolated from the protection system. The isolation device, the protection system, and the AFW SG level control system are all safety grade systems. The system meets the requirements of IEEE Std 279-1971.

> FSAR Subsection 7.7.1.2

power transients as follows: a. Between 20 and 902 power ramp changes of 102/min and step changes of 102.

The regulating system will limit

control and for single failure

specified in IEEE Std 279, Rev 10,

and the AIF Interpretation of the

AEC General Design Criteria 20,

21. and 22.

b. Between 15 and 202, and between 90 and 1002 ramp changes of 3%/min.

7.2.1.1

PSAR Subsection	PSAR Commitment	FSAR Commitment Description	FSAR Reference
7.2.1.2	The regulating system is designed to meet the safety considerations listed in Subsection 7.2.1.2 of the PSAR.		FSAR Subsection 7.2.1.1.1
7.2.3.4	Loss of Load The combined actions of the control system and the turbine bypass valve permit a 402 load reduction or a turbine trip from 402 load without atmospheric dump or safety valve action. The controls will limit steam dump to the condenser when the condenser vacuum is inadequate, in which case the atmosphere dump or safety valves may operate.	The combined actions of the control system and the turbine bypass to the condenser permit 252 (rather than 402) electrical load rejection without atmospheric dump or safety valve operation, and without tripping the reactor. No safety limits are exceeded as discussed in the accident analysis.	FSAR Subsections 7.7.1.2, 15.2.2
7.3.1.1	The nuclear instrumentation is designed to meet the requirements specified in Subsection 7.3.1.1 of the PSAR.		FSAR Subsection 7.9.1
7.3.2.1	The quantity and types of process instrumentation provided will ensure safe and orderly operation of all systems and processes over the full operating range of the unit.	Instrumentation is provided to ensure safe and orderly operation of all systems during normal plant operation. These systems not required for safety are discussed in FSAR Section 7.7.	FSAR Section 7.7, FSAR Figures 5.1-1 and 5.1-2
7. 3. 2. 1A	A study is being carried out by BSW to determine the source strengths of the various isotopes to allow an evaluation of the required sensitivity of this monitor for detecting rapid fuel failures.	Study completed.	BLW Report 1335, 8/69, Frais Sub- section 9.3.6
5.2.1	A xenon oscillation threshold power versus core life curve will be devel- oped from analyses performed during the design of the reactor.		NRC Safety Lais nation, Supplement Pass 2-3,

PSAR Subsection	PSAR Conmitment	FSAK Commitment Description	FSAR Reference
7.3.3.2.2	The incore monitoring detectors will be continuously compensated for detector burnup, control rod position, fuel burnup, etc. 27 calculations derived from experimental programs.		FSAK Subsection 7.8.2.2.1
7.3.3.3	The application of this system for detection of kenon oscillation and its minimum sensitivity is being examined through the analysis of experimental data. The analysis should be completed by the end of 1968.		NRC Satety 1 al- uation, Supplement 2, Page 2-3
7.5.1	The radiation conitoring system is designed to peet the requirements specified in Subsection 7.5.1 of the PSAR.	The design requirements of FSAR Subsection 7.5.1 are met in the design discussed in the FSAR Section 11.5.	FSAR Section 11.5
7.5.2.1	The absence of heavy particulate and halogen isotopes will be demonstrated by laboratory analysis of fixed inte- grating filters.	Inis commitment is contained in the FSAR.	FSAR Subsections 11.5.2.4, Table 11
7.5.2.2	Supplementing the continuous monitor- ing, samples are taken from coolant systems for laboratory verification that the gross activity levels are within permissible limits.	This committent is repeated in the FSAR.	ES., Su
7.5.3.1	Fach channe: I the radiation monitor- in; system shall have a down scale alarts set be: - the natural counting rate so that and loss of this natural signal will cause annunciation.	The alarm discribed is provided.	1833 Sana Ara 11.5.2
	tersonnel relation prefection and health pixels practice will be encoded as a contrict in tabasetion lister of the list.	ROWS WOMMAN	FS38

PSAR Subsection	PSAR Commitment	FSAR Commitment Description	FSAR Reference
7.5.5	Periodic calibration checks of the area radiation monitors and table radiation monitors are made to ensure that these instruments remain operational.	Commitments for periodic calibration checks are included in the FSAR for area radiation monitors and portable radiation monitors.	FSAR Subsections 12.5.2.2, 12.3.4.1.5
7.6.2	The information avai able in the con- trol room will include the parameters listed in PSAR Subsection 7.6.2.	Information is available in the main control room for the parameters listed in PSAK Subsection 7.6.2.	FSAR Tables 7.5-1, 7.5-2, drawings listed in Table 1.7-9
7.5.2.3	The selection and number of points for area radiation monitors are coordinated with the plant access control so that operating personnel are not able to enter an unmonitored area in which they could be exposed to a dose in excess of the limits of 10 CFR 20.	The area radiation monitoring system is provided to supplment the person- nel and area radiation survey pro- visions described in Section 12.5 to ensure compliance with the per- sonnel radiation protection guide- lines of 10 CFR 20, 10 CFR 50, 10 CFR 70, and Regulatory Guides 8.2, 8.8, and 8.12.	FSAR Subsection 12.3.4.1, Section 12.5
7.6.3	Visible and audible alarm units will be incorporated into the control room to warn the operator if unsafe conditions are approached by any system. Audible reactor building evacuation alarms are to be initiated from the radiation monitoring sistem or manually by the operator. Audible alarms will be sounded in appropriate areas throughout the plant if high radiation conditions are present.	Visible and audible alarms are pro- vided at the areas indicated in PSAR Subsection 7.6.3.	FSAR Subsections 11.5.2, 12.3, 12.3.4.2.4.5, 7.7.1.5
1.0.5	ine magnitude of a fire in the control - is limited by the factors listed in Subsection 7.6.5 of the PSAR.		Midland Fire Protection Lval- sation Report, FSAR Subsection 9.3.1

PSAR Subsection	PSAR Commitment	
7.6.7	Special emphasis will be given to main- Th	

Laining control integrity during accident conditions. The layout of the engineered safeguards section of the control board will be designed to minimize the time required for the operator to evaluate the system performence under accident conditions.

FSAR Commitment Description

e control room ventilation system is designed to protect the control room operators and equipment from hazardous conditions which may result during accident conditions. Engineered safeguards control boards have been designed to minimize the the time required for the operator to evaluate system performance under accident conditions. This has been done by arranging controls and instrumentation by system and by flow of control or system operation. In addition, a status display is provided to allow the operator to quickly evaluate the performance of equipment which is automatically actuated by the protection system.

FSAR Referance

FSAR Subsections 9.4.1, 7.5.1.2, 12.3.2.2.5, drawings listed in Table 1.7-9

DEL Questions	Complement	FSAR Commitment Description	FEAR Reference
7.7.1	The MPS and ESPAS will be designed to IEEE Std 279 effective 8/30/68.	The protection systems are designed to IEEE Std 279-197 which supersedes the 1968 revision.	FSAR Subsections 7.1.2.4.s, 7.2.1.2.1, 7.2.2.2.1, 7.3.2.2.1, 7.3.2.3.1, 7.3.3.3.1, 7.3.3.4.1
7.3	All safety and protection equipment will be monitored by quality pro- grams which include the quality control methods and procedures in the response to DRL Question 7.3.	The quality control methods and proceedures listed in the response to DRL Question 7.3 are included in the QA program in the FSAR.	FSAR Section 17
7.4	The primery coolant leakage detec- tion system design criteria in- clude the criteria listed in response to DEL Question 7.4.	 The leakage detection system described in the FSAR differs in some respects from that described in the PSAR. However, the system is designed in compliance with BG 1.45. Differences are discussed below: 1. Reactor building atmosphere relative humidity detectors are not provided. Instead, RB air temperature and pressure monitors are used as an alarm to alert operator of potential problems. 2. RB sump level alarm described at 3 inches is not provided. A rate of change level alarm is provided to alarm increase of a 0.5-inch within 1 hour in conformance with RG 1.45. 3. RB area monitors at the discharge of the RB air coolers are not provided. However, RB gaseous and particulate monitors are used. 	Appendix 3A, BG 1.45

provided in conformance with RG 1.45.

ML. Questio	ne <u>Counitment</u>	FSAR Commitment Description	FSAR Beference
* 7.7	Environmental testing which may be required for controls and instru- mentation is indicated in response to DEL Question 7.7.	The environmental testing performed on safety-related controls and in- trumentation is described in FSAR Section 3.11, Table 3.11-4.	PSAR Section 3.11, Table 3.11-4
7.8	The protection system and engi- meered safety feature equipment and components will be differentiated from similar items not related to protection or safety by location and grouping, color codinge, name- plates, individual equipment tags, or special alphabetical latter designations.	The PSAR commitment described is incorporated into the PSAR.	FSAR Subsection 8.3.1.3
7.9	The design criteris for the reactor coolant deborating system is as described in response to DRL Question 7.9.	The reactor coolant deborating sys- tem is designed as described in the PSAR response to DRL Question 7.9.	FSAR Subsections 7.7.1.3, 9.3.4.2.3.4.d
7.12	The data available from similar core configurations of comparable size will be evaluated to verify or disqualify the stated reliance on out-of-core (instrumentation) for safe and reliable spatial power indications from the core.		Supplement 2, 7/77, FSAR Section 7.8
¥ 7.10	The design bases for the system which transfers process steam from Unit 1 to Unit 2 include the requirement of separation between NSS systems as well as single-failure analysis.	The process steam transfer system (PSTS) is not required for safety. Interlocks prevent the cross- connection of the two NSSS units through the respective secondary systems. Because the PSTS is not required for safety, no single-failure analysis is provided.	FSAR Subsection 7.7.1.6, Section 10.3

DRL.	Commitment	FSAR Commitment Description	FSAR Reference
7.13	All of the radiation monitoring in- struments used in protection sys- tems will be designed to meet the protection systems standards requirements (IEEE Std 279, 10/68).	The redistion conitors used in the ESFAS system are designed to IEEE Std 279-1971 which supersedes the 1968 standard.	FSAR Subsection 7.1.2.2, Table 7.1-2
7.54	The bases for criteria used to determine the locations, range, types, and sensitivities of the area and process radiation monitor- ing systems are as stated in range and to DRL Question 7 14.	The area and process radiation modi- toring systems design criteria in- cludes those listed in the response to DEL Quantion 7.14.	FSAR Subsection 12.3.4, Section 11.5
, 10	if it becomes necessary to suddenly evacuate the control room, the reactor can be brought to sither hot or cold shutdown condition by operation of valves and equipment from either local breakers or local panels as described in response to DRL Question 7.19.	The capability to shut down the plant from outside the control room is provided. An auxiliary shutdown panel is not described in the PSAR aids the operator then shutdown is required from outside the control roop.	FSAR Subsection 7.4.3.1
7.20	A diverse backup reactor trip to the low RCS pressure trip will be provided so that effective core cooling is ensured following a LOCA.	Both low RCS pressure and high containment pressure trip the reactor.	FSAR Subsection 7.2.1.1.2
7.17	The instrumentation and controls for engineered safeguards, the emer- gency electric power system, and the reactor protection system are designed to meet Class I seismic design criteria. Therefore, there will be no loss of function in these systems during or following the maximum earthquake.		FSAR Table 7.2-2

DOL. Quest lone

Comitment

FIAR Commitment Description

Enclosure B - Identification of Problem Areas [PSA A T.6]

11

MIL

In accordance with the requirements of IEEE Std 279, Sections 4.9 and 4.11, the RB protective instrumentation sensor outputs will have the capability of being checked during power operation. Provisions for testing and calibrating channels and the devices used to derive the final system output signal from the various channel signal will be located external to the RB or within the RB air room and will be accessible during power operation. The sensor signals shall have the signal offset from zero in such a manner to permit detection of shorted, or open circuits.

A RAD program dischased in re- ... sponse to Item 12 will be conducted to ensure the adequacy and feasibility of the measurement system used to detect radioactivity in the process steam.

Enclosure A - Additional DRL Questions " [PSAR Tab]

The high pressurizer level alars shall be designed and tested as per the criteria listed in PSAR Vol. III, Enclosure A. P 7.00-1.

Cutputs of protective instruments located inside the BB will be clacked during power operation per IEEE Std 279-1971 by cross checking between channel indicators located on the system cabinets in the suriliary building. Actuation logic will be tested during power operation at the system cabinets in the auxiliary building. It is not necessary to enter RB during power operation to test instruments. This testing will be done at refueling or plant shutdown.

FSAR Reference

FSAR Subsections 7.2.2.2.1. 7.3.2.3.1. 7.3.3.4.1. Chapter 16 technical specifications, Appendix 3A. (BG 1.118)

This item is currently under discussion with the MRC.

CPCo Serial 4154

12

7