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NOTE TO: D. Moad, Light Water Reactors Branch No. 4, DPW
 FROM: D. Pickett, Containment Systems Branch, DSS
 THRU: J. Shapiro, Section B Leader, Containment Systems Branch, DSS
 SUBJECT: OPEN ITEMS ON MIDLAND PLANT, UNITS 1 & 2 (CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS BRANCH)

As requested from all reviewers during the last meeting of the Licensing Schedule Review Committee, I have prepared the following list of significant open items:

1. Environmental Qualification of Safety Related Equipment

Pending completion of Generic Task A-21, Main Steam Line Break Inside Containment - Evaluation of Environmental Conditions for Equipment Qualification, all thermal analyses of safety related equipment to verify the acceptability of environmental qualification testing must be based on the CSB Inertia Evaluation Model. Midland has been informed of this position at the Q-1 (022.39) and Q-2 (022.44) stage of review but has not responded. In 022.30 we also requested the applicant to justify the modeling of the safety related equipment for the thermal analyses. The applicant has committed to supply this information. Furthermore, there is a need for PSB and INSD to verify that all safety related equipment has been identified, and to specify the equipment for which thermal analysis is necessary.

2. Main Steam Line Break Analysis

022.43 of the Q-2's identifies two single active failures that have not been addressed in the MSLB analysis, namely, failure of the main steam isolation valve to close and the loss of off-site power. The applicant should justify that the limiting single active failure has been identified.

3. Reactor Cavity Subcompartment Analyses

022.41 (Q-2) identified deficiencies in the reactor cavity subcompartment analysis. We have asked the applicant to provide a nodalization sensitivity study, a discussion of how the shield plug and seal ring were

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JAN 16 1979

included in the analysis, an analysis of a postulated core flood line break, an analysis of the loads and moments acting on the vessel supports, and analyses of hot and cold leg breaks at the reactor vessel terminal ends. We presently cannot conclude that the subcompartment analysis is acceptable for the determination of loadings on the structural walls or component supports.

4. Purge Supply and Exhaust Systems

All purge systems that will operate during modes requiring containment integrity must satisfy NTP CSB 6-4, "Containment Purging During Normal Plant Operations." Presently, we cannot conclude that either the 18" or 48" purge systems meet this NTP. Q22.42 of the Q-2's itemizes the deficiencies.

5. External Containment Pressure Analysis

SRP 6.2.1.1.A Section II.8 states that the containment should be analyzed for possible damage due to the inadvertent actuation of containment heat removal systems. As stated in item Q22.45 of the Q-2s, we do not believe that the applicant has conservatively calculated the maximum external pressure that would result from the inadvertent actuation of the containment spray system.

6. Containment Leak Testing Program

We are presently unable to conclude that the applicant's containment leak testing program meets the requirements of Appendix J to 10 CFR 89. Item Q22.45 of the Q-2s questioned the use of the penetration pressurization system during the CILIT. We have been having verbal communication with the applicant concerning their response. In addition, the applicant has committed (Q 022.40) to provide additional information by February 1979 to justify not performing local Type C tests on secondary system containment isolation valves.

7. Post-LOCA Sump Monitor

SRP 6.2.1.1.A Section II.11 states that post-LOCA instrumentation should be present to monitor the sump water temperature. In question Q22.6 we stated that it is our position that this instrumentation be included.

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JAN 16 1979

The applicant responded by saying that such sump monitors had no post-accident function and would not be included. We need to readdress our position to the applicant in the SER.

Stephen Pickett
Government Systems Branch
Division of System Safety

cc: R. Tolson
M. Butler
J. Shapaker
J. Patrick
File: Midland

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