CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.1.7 The 48-inch containment purge supply and exhaust isolation valves (CBV-HV-3198A, 3198D, 3196, 3197) shall be deactivated and secured in their closed position. The 8-inch containment vent supply and exhaust isolation valves may be open for safety related reasons.

APPLICABILITY: MODE: 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

With one 48-inch containment purge supply and/or one exhaust isolation valve open, close the open valve(s) within one hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.


SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

- 4.6.1.7.1 The 48-inch containment purge supply and exhaust isolation valves shall be determined closed at least once per 31 days.
- 4.6.1.7.2 The valve seals of the 48-inch and the 8-inch vent supply and exhaust isolation valves shall be replaced at least once per 5 years.

FARLEY-UNIT 1

3/4 6-10

AMENDMENT NO.



BASES

The maximum peak pressure expected to be obtained from a LOCA event is 45 psig. The limit of 3 psig for initial positive containment pressure will limit the total pressure to 48 psig which is less than design pressure and is consistent with the accident analyses.

3/4.6.1.5 AIR TEMPERATURE

The limitations on containment average air temperature ensure that the overall containment average air temperature does not exceed the initial temperature condition assumed in the accident analysis for a LOCA or steam line break accident.

3/4.6.1.6 CONTAINMENT STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY

This limitation ensures that the structural integrity of the containment will be maintained comparable to the original design standards for the life of the facility. Structural integrity is required to ensure that the containment will withstand the maximum pressure of 48 psig in the event of a LOCA. The measurement of the containment lift off force, visual examination of tendons, anchorages and exposed interior and exterior surfaces of the containment, and the Type A leakage test, is sufficient to demonstrate this capability.

The surveillance requirements for demonstrating the containment's structural integrity are in compliance with the recommendations of paragraph C.1.3 of Regulatory Guide 1.35 "Inservice Surveillance of Ungrouted Tendons in Prestressed Concrete Containment Structures," January 1976.

3/4.6.1.7 CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM

The 48-inch containment purge supply and exhaust isolation valves are required to be closed in modes above cold shutdown since these valves have not been demonstrated capable of closing during a LOCA or steam line break accident. Maintaining these valves closed during plant operations ensures that excessive quantities of radioactive materials will not be released via the containment purge system.

The use of the containment purge lines is restricted to the 8-inch vent supply and exhaust isolation valves to ensure that the site boundary dose guidelines of 10 CFR Part 100 would not be exceeded in the event of a loss-of-coolant accident during venting operations.

Safety related reasons for venting containment during operation (Modes 1, 2, 3 and 4) includes controlling containment pressure and reducing airborne radioactivity.

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.1.7 The 48-inch containment purge supply and exhaust isolation valves (CBV-HV-3198A, 3198D, 3196, 3197) shall be deactivated and secured in their closed position. The 8-inch containment vent supply and exhaust isolation valves may be open for safety related reasons.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

With one 48-inch containment purge supply and/or one exhaust isolation valve open, close the open valve(s) within one hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

- 4.6.1.7.1 The 48-inch containment purge supply and exhaust isolation valves shall be determined closed at least once per 31 days.
- 4.6.1.7.2 The valve seals of the 48-inch and the 8-inch vent supply and exhaust isolation valves shall be replaced at least once per 5 years.

BASES

The maximum peak pressure expected to be obtained from a LOCA event is 45 psig. The limit of 3 psig for initial positive containment pressure will limit the total pressure to 48 psig which is less than design pressure and is consistent with the accident analyses.

3/4.6.1.5 AIR TEMPERATURE

The limitations on containment average air temperature ensure that the overall containment average air temperature does not exceed the initial temperature condition assumed in the accident analysis for a LCCA or steam line break accident.

3/4.6.1.6 CONTAINMENT STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY

This limitation ensures that the structural integrity of the containment will be maintained comparable to the original design standards for the life of the facility. Structural integrity is required to ensure that the containment will withstand the maximum pressure of 48 psig in the event of a LOCA. The visual examination of tendons, anchorages and exposed interior and exterior surfaces of the containment, and the Type A leakage test, along with the data obtained from Unit 1 tendon surveillance, is sufficient to demonstrate this capability.

The surveillance requirements for demonstrating the containment's structural integrity are in compliance with the recommendations of paragraph C.1.3 of Regulatory Guide 1.35 "Inservice Surveillance of Ungrouted Tendons in Prestressed Concrete Containment Structures," January 1976.

3/4.6.1.7 CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM

The 48-inch containment purge supply and exhaust isolation valves are required to be closed in modes above cold shutdown since these valves have not been demonstrated capable of closing during a LOCA or steam line break accident. Maintaining these valves closed during plant operations ensures that excessive quantities of radioactive materials will not be released via the containment purge system.

The use of the containment purge lines is restricted to the 8-inch vent supply and exhaust isolation valves to ensure that the site boundary dose guidelines of 10 CFR Part 100 would not be exceeded in the event of a loss-of-coolant accident during venting operations.

Safety related reasons for venting containment during operation (Modes 1, 2, 3 and 4) includes controlling containment pressure and reducing airborne radioactivity.