

Wisconsin Electric POWER COMPANY

231 WEST MICHIGAN, MILWAUKEE, WISCONSIN 53201

April 15, 1975

Mr. Benard C. Rusche, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Washington, D. C. 20555

Dear Mr. Rusche:

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 50-266/75-6

FAILURE OF UNIT 1
"B" MAIN STEAM LINE FLOW CHANNEL 1FT-475

This letter is to report the details of an abnormal occurrence at the Point Beach Nuclear Plant Unit 1, Facility Operating License No. DPR-24, as defined by Section 15.1.a.A of the Technical Specifications. This written ten-day report, filed in accordance with Section 15.6.6.A.2 of the Technical Specifications, follows a telephone notification of the event to Mr. Dwane Boyd, Region III, Directorate of Regulatory Operations, on April 8, 1975, per Section 15.6.A.1 of the Point Beach Nuclear Plant Technical Specifications.

At approximately 8:00 p.m. on April 7, 1975, when nearing the completion of a slow power escalation following a unit outage, a Control Operator noted a discrepancy between the two channels of steam flow indication on the "B" main steam line of Unit 1. Instrumentation and control personnel were called in and a faulty differential pressure cell was diagnosed in flow transmitter 1FT-475. As the faulty channel was by then reading 2 x 10⁶ lbs./hr., compared to the 3 x 10⁶ lbs./hr. of the redundant channel, the instrument was placed in the trip mode to establish the degree of redundancy of one, as required by Table 15.3.5-2 of the Point Beach Nuclear Plant Technical Specifications.

Two channels of instrumentation are provided on each steam generator at Point Beach which trip the reactor should a coincident low steam generator level (20% of span) and steam flow/feed flow mismatch (0.8 x 10⁶ lbs.hr.) occur on either steam generator. As additional protection in the event of a loss of feedwater, both steam generators also have three channels of instrumentation which initiate a reactor trip on a two-out-of-three, lo-lo steam generator level (10% of span).

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April 15, 1975 -2-Mr. Benard C. Rusche A second function of 1FT-475 is initiation of main steam line isolation in the event of high steam flow (.483 x 106 lbs./hr.) in conjunction with low Tavg (543° F) and safety injection. As the measured steam flow was already in excess of the high steam flow setpoint, this trip function was already accomplished and only awaited a low Tavg and safety injection signal to complete this purpose. A third function of 1FT-475 is to provide main steam line isolation in the event of high-high steam flow (3.98 x 106 lbs.hr.) in conjunction with safety injection. In addition to the capability of initiating this action with the redundant channel, it is known that "wipe in" action on the part of the reverse check valve type main steam stop valves at Point Beach provides assurance that the main steam stop valves will, in fact, close without the initiation of a closure signal should steam flow exceed 4 x 10 bs./hr. The minimum number of operable channels of high or high-high steam flow permitted by the Technical Specifications is one per loop. This provision was not violated at any time. However, during the approximate one hour following the discovery of a downward drift of 1FT-475 and its subsequent placing in the trip mode by I & C personnel, the minimum degree of redundancy of this instrumentation on the "B" steam generator was not met. In reviewing the available instrumentation described above, it is not considered that the brief loss of 1FT-475 created a hazard to the health and safety of the public. A spare transmitter was installed in place of the faulty 1FT-475 transmitter on April 10, 1975, the channel then being returned to service. The failed differential pressure cell appears to be an isolated case at this time; therefore, no further action is planned. Very truly yours, Executive Vice President Sol Burstein Copy to Mr. James G. Keppler, Regional Director, Region III