



WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM

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July 25, 1995  
GO2-95-139

Docket No. 50-397

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Attn: Document Control Desk  
Washington, D.C. 20555

Gentlemen:

Subject: **WNP-2, OPERATING LICENSE NPF-21  
MODIFICATION OF SECURITY COMPENSATORY MEASURES  
COMMITMENT**

Reference: NRC Inspection 85-33 (Report dated October 29, 1985)

The purpose of this letter is to inform you of the change to a commitment pertaining to compensatory posting of vital area access doors. During the reference inspection, the NRC raised a concern pertaining to establishment of compensatory measures for doors for which the automatic closing mechanism could not be adjusted to tolerate variable air pressures and, therefore, which must be manually closed upon entry and exit by authorized personnel.

In response to the concern, the Supply System implemented a corrective action to require that a security officer be posted as a compensatory measure if a vital area door, that generates an alert open condition, is found physically open and a walk-through operability test indicates that the door will not secure without assistance.

The Supply System has evaluated the compensatory posting of vital area doors and determined that it would be appropriate to continue to require security response to door alarms during times when posting a guard is not otherwise required. However, as an alternate approach, posting of a compensatory officer would not be required in those instances where there is reasonable assurance by physical survey that the alarm was generated due to a differential air pressure condition. This conclusion is based, in part, on several access control enhancements that have

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
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**MODIFICATION OF SECURITY COMPENSATORY MEASURES COMMITMENT**

been implemented since the time-frame when the commitment was made. These enhancements include actions such as improvements to certain vital area doors, implementation of a fitness-for-duty program and increased background investigative requirements for unescorted access as delineated in Regulatory Guide 5.66. In addition, as part of General Employee Training, personnel are instructed to physically check vital area doors to verify they are completely closed and secured following entry and exit. The current process of posting a guard results in an economic burden with no commensurate improvement in security.

This submittal is made for information only. No staff action is requested. Should you have any questions or require additional information regarding this matter, please contact me or D. A. Swank at (509) 377-4563.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'J. V. Parrish', with a stylized flourish at the end.

J. V. Parrish (Mail Drop 1023)  
Vice President, Nuclear Operations

JDA/ml

cc: LJ Callan, NRC-RIV  
JW Clifford, NRC-NRR  
KE Perkins, NRC-RIV, Walnut Creek Field Office  
NS Reynolds, Winston & Strawn  
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