VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORPORATION

SEVENTY SEVEN GROVE STREET

RUTLAND, VERMONT 05701

VYV-3108

REPLY TO:
P. O. BOX 157
VERNON, VERMONT 05354

December 26, 1973

Director
Directorate of Licensing
United States Atomic Energy Commission
Washington, D.C. 20545

REFERENCE: Operating License DPR-28
Docket No. 50-271
Abnormal Occurrence No. AO-73-35

Gentlemen:

As defined by Technical Specifications for the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station, Section 6.7.B.1, we are reporting the following Abnormal Occurrence as AO-73-35.

On December 19, 1973, at 1330, during conduct of the monthly Main Steam Line Isolation Valve functional test as referenced in Technical Specifications, Table 4.1.1, valve V2-86C was exercised and cycled to the closed position. This was verified when the valve "closed" limit switch caused Reactor Protection System relay 5A-K3C to deenergize. When the valve returned to the open position, it was noted that relay 5A-K3C failed to energize as it should have with an open valve condition. Operating personnel, attempting to determine the cause, discovered the limit switch actuating arm to be in a position indicating valve closure. The actuating arm was manually reset and the associated relay was immediately energized. This action restored the Reactor Protection System logic to its normal operating condition. Valve V2-86C was cycled again and all valve limit switches were verified to be functioning properly. The reactor was operating at approximately 68% power at the time of this incident.

The Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC), meeting to review the incident, noted this to be the first instance of this nature relative to Main Steam Isolation Valve limit switches. Considering this and the fact that all limit switches operated properly during the valve retest, the incident was determined to be an isolated case of instrument

malfunction and an increase in the monthly surveillance frequency was deemed unnecessary. In addition, it was ascertained that this condition would not have compromised the safe operation of the Reactor Protection System in that the system is a normally energized configuration of logic. Failure of this particular limit switch to reset would have maintained its associated relay in a deenergized or more conservative state.

Very truly yours,

VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORPORATION

B.W. Riley

B.W. Riley
Plant Superintendent

WFC/kbd