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UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

June 21, 1995

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Mr. Paul Leventhal, President  
Nuclear Control Institute  
1000 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.  
Suite 804  
Washington, D.C. 20036

Dear Mr. Leventhal:

I am responding to your letter of May 25, 1995, in which you and Mr. Daniel Hirsch of the Committee to Bridge the Gap urge the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to reassess the rule on protection of nuclear power plants against the malevolent use of vehicles. Although the Commission is proceeding as planned with the new rule to enhance the security of nuclear power plants, we are also reviewing all new issues raised by the Oklahoma City attack for appropriate additional action. As part of this review, the NRC will reevaluate the new vehicle control measures and their implementation schedule. The NRC will also consider your recommendations in this review.

As a result of the Oklahoma City bombing, the NRC staff sought to determine if the attack represented a credible threat to NRC-licensed facilities or if any other credible threat to NRC-licensed facilities had been reported. Working with the FBI and other agencies, the staff concluded that there was no credible threat to nuclear facilities associated with the Oklahoma City attack and that licensees would not be required to implement contingency plans. However, both the Department of Energy and the NRC issued coordinated advisories regarding heightened security awareness.

With respect to the Phase II reassessment of the design-basis threat, the NRC staff completed its review on March 15, 1994. At that time, the reassessment did not support any further changes in the design-basis threat. We will continue periodically to reassess the design-basis threat in accordance with existing procedures and our continuing concern for public health and safety.

Regarding a possible meeting, the Commission recognizes that your organizations participated in several NRC public meetings on the vehicle rulemaking. However, any potential changes in the implementation of the new rule would involve Safeguards Information that cannot be made publicly available. As we are still assessing the Oklahoma City attack's potential impact on the rule, we do not believe that a meeting could usefully take place at this time.

Sincerely,

Ivan Selin

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(Originated by: RDube, NRR)

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UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

June 21, 1995

Mr. Daniel Hirsch, President  
Committee to Bridge the Gap  
1637 Butler Avenue  
Suite 203  
Los Angeles, California 90025

Dear Mr. Hirsch:

I am responding to your letter of May 25, 1995, in which you and Mr. Paul Leventhal of the Nuclear Control Institute urge the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to reassess the rule on protection of nuclear power plants against the malevolent use of vehicles. Although the Commission is proceeding as planned with the new rule to enhance the security of nuclear power plants, we are also reviewing all new issues raised by the Oklahoma City attack for appropriate additional action. As part of this review, the NRC will reevaluate the new vehicle control measures and their implementation schedule. The NRC will also consider your recommendations in this review.

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Sincerely,

Ivan Selin