



UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20545

May 7, 1970

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Division of Compliance Files

CAROLINA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY (H. B. ROBINSON NO. 2)

On Monday, May 4, 1970, J. P. O'Reilly notified me that Compliance Region II (Atlanta) was having difficulty with Carolina Power and Light Company (CP&L) in arranging for our inspectors to continue their investigation of the failure of the six-inch relief valve transition pipe in the Robinson 2 reactor. The nature of the problem was a reluctance on the part of CP&L to arrange for access to Westinghouse personnel and facilities responsible for doing the metallurgical analysis of the failure.

Region II told O'Reilly that when they initially tried to set up a meeting with Westinghouse, Mr. H. R. Banks, Resident Engineer (CP&L), was fully cooperative and promised to arrange for the meeting. A short time later, however, he notified Region II that because there would be possible litigation associated with the accident at Robinson, his company felt that it would be improper for Compliance to pursue the matter at this time. He indicated that at some future point in time a report of the failure would be available to the Commission from CP&L and felt that this should be adequate.

On the afternoon of May 4 I called Mr. W. B. Kincaid, Manager, Design and Construction (CP&L), to discuss the problem. Mr. Kincaid, in essence, repeated what Mr. Banks had told Region II. I told Mr. Kincaid that we felt that it was important to obtain the factual information and results of the Westinghouse analysis at the earliest possible time because we felt that the accident had important safety implications, not only with respect to the Robinson plant, but also, perhaps, to other plants. I told Kincaid that it was routine procedure for us to investigate such matters promptly and in whatever depth was necessary to obtain the most reliable and complete information. I also told him that these activities were well within our authority and that we make independent analyses of incidents of this type to understand their significance and how they relate to the safety of all reactor facilities. Mr. Kincaid was rather reluctant to pursue the matter further without checking with his legal department and promised to call me back.

On the afternoon of May 4, Kincaid and L. E. Smith, Technical Director (CP&L), again called me to pursue the matter further. They repeated the objections which Kincaid had stated earlier and told me that our plan to visit Westinghouse and to discuss the Westinghouse analysis with Westinghouse personnel far exceeded their understanding of what they thought a regulatory agency was supposed to do. They indicated that they felt that our inspections were primarily reviews of records associated with site construction. I explained that our responsibilities for safety and inspections went well beyond their concept of the regulatory program. At this point in the discussion, Kincaid

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then invited a Compliance representative to attend a meeting at the Westinghouse metallurgical laboratory in Pittsburgh at 10:00 a.m. on Wednesday, May 6, to be briefed by Westinghouse personnel on the results of their investigation. I told Messrs. Kincaid and Smith that we would undoubtedly accept the invitation but that our investigation might extend beyond mere attendance at the Westinghouse briefing, i.e., that we might also want to visit the laboratory where the work was being done and review some of the raw data in connection with the analysis. I made it clear that we did not want to have any constraints on our investigation or inspection activities and that we were operating well within our authority in making a full investigation of the Robinson accident. Mr. Kincaid then promised to call me on the following day to give me details concerning the location and time of the Westinghouse meeting.

Arrangements for our attendance at the Pittsburgh meeting on May 6 were completed by telephone by Messrs. Kincaid and Smith on May 5. On May 6 Messrs. Potapovs and Kelley from Region II and G. W. Reinmuth from Compliance Headquarters attended the meeting at Westinghouse. They were well pleased with the results of the meeting and felt that Westinghouse was doing an in-depth investigation of the failure and that they received full information and full cooperation from Larry Smith, who was in attendance at the meeting, and from all Westinghouse personnel. Details of this meeting will be reported in a trip report prepared by Region II.

R. H. Engelken, Assistant Director
for Inspection and Enforcement
Division of Compliance

RHE:ej

cc: M. M. Mann, DR
L. D. Low, CO
J. P. O'Reilly, CO
W. Seidle, CO:II



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