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VPNPD-91-388
NRC-91-129

10 CFR 50.73

November 8, 1991

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Document Control Desk
Mail Station P1-137
Washington, DC 20555

Gentlemen:

DOCKET 50-301
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 91-003-00
CONTAINMENT HATCH TEMPORARY THIRD DOOR
BLOCKED OPEN DURING FUEL MOVEMENT
POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 2

Enclosed is Licensee Event Report 91-003-00 for Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit 2. This report is being filed in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i), "Any operation or condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications." This report describes the blocking open of the temporary third door of a containment hatch during fuel movement on October 10, 1991.

Please contact us if there are any questions.

Very truly yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read 'J. Zach'.

James J. Zach
Vice President
Nuclear Power

Enclosure

Copy to: NRC Regional Administrator, Region III
NRC Resident Inspector

IE22
11

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 80.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-330), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20545, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)

Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit 2

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

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PAGE (3)

TITLE (4)

Containment Hatch Temporary Third Door Blocked Open During Fuel Movement

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		DOCKET NUMBER(S)
1	0	1	0	9	1	1	0	3	0	0	0
1	0	1	0	9	1	1	0	3	0	0	0

OPERATING MODE (9)		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5 (Chap. 4 one or more of the following) (11)									
POWER LEVEL (10)	1	0	20.402(b)		20.405(c)		50.73(a)(2)(i)		73.71(b)		
			20.406(a)(1)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)		73.71(c)				
			20.406(a)(1)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(iii)		OTHER (Specify in Abstract, Below and in Text, NRC Form 388A)				
			20.406(a)(1)(iii)	X	50.73(a)(2)(iv)						
			20.406(a)(1)(iv)		50.73(a)(2)(v)						

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
N. L. Hoefert, Manager - Operations	411 4 715 51-1213121

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	NO	EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
X					

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single space typewritten lines) (16)

ABSTRACT:

At approximately 1250 on October 10, 1991, with Unit 2 in refueling shutdown with fuel movement in progress, contractor personnel blocked open the temporary third door to the personnel hatch on the containment 66 foot elevation. This is in violation of Technical Specification Section 15.3.8.1, which states, "A temporary third door on the outside of the personnel lock shall be in place whenever both doors in a personnel lock are open." The door remained open until approximately 1325 when it was shut by a plant employee who recognized that the door was open in violation of Technical Specifications.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

ESTIMATE OF AVERAGE PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THE
INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST. 600 HRS. FORWARD
COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS
AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (F-530), U.S. NUCLEAR
REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO
THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE
OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit 2	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 0 1 9 1 1 - 0 0 3 - 0 0 0 2 OF 0 3	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)	
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER		

TEXT (if more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

CAUSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The cause of this event is personnel error. The personnel who are best suited to control the temporary third door's position, namely the security officers stationed at the containment accesses during refueling outages, were not knowledgeable of the requirements concerning the temporary third doors. Additionally, contractors were not adequately alerted to the need to keep the temporary door closed.

Immediate corrective actions took place when the outer third door was shut at approximately 1325. At the same time, the security officer who was posted at the hatch was informed of the requirement to keep the door closed during refueling outages. Additionally, signs were posted on both the upper and lower temporary third doors stating the requirement that these doors be closed during periods of fuel movement. These signs were posted at approximately 1340 by a member of Operations.

In order to ensure that this event does not occur in the future, several long-term corrective actions have taken place. First, a revision to the refueling procedure has been implemented that requires the posting of signs on both the upper and lower temporary third doors prior to the commencement of fuel movement. These signs state the requirement that the door must remain closed because fuel movement is in progress. These signs are required to remain in place for the duration of fuel movement. Second, security personnel were briefed on the requirements concerning the personnel locks during refueling outages. Since security personnel are stationed in these locations during refueling outages, they will supplement the signs as another means to ensure that the requirements concerning these doors are met.

REPORTABILITY:

This Licensee Event Report is being filed in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i), "Any operation or condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications." A four-hour Red Phone report was not a required response to this event.

SAFETY ASSESSMENT:

There were no safety consequences from this event. The temporary third door was capable of being shut with minimal effort if it had been necessary. Additionally, Point Beach Nuclear Plant Abnormal Operating Procedure 8B, "Irradiated Fuel Handling Accident in Containment," requires the core loading supervisor or his designated alternate to verify the temporary third doors closed following a fuel-handling accident in containment. The health and safety of plant personnel and the public were not endangered.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 500 NRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (F&E), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit 2	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 6 0 0 0 3 0 1 9 1 - 0 0 3 - 0 0 0 3 OF 0 3	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)	
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER		

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 360A's) (12)

SIMILAR OCCURRENCES:

A review of Licensee Event Reports was performed, and no similar events were found. However, NRC Inspection Report 88022 for Unit 2 transmitted by NRC January 9, 1989, included a Notice of Violation which was issued as a result of a violation of Technical Specification 15.3.8.1. The specific violation concerned the fact that refueling was under way inside the Unit 2 containment on October 17, 1988, with cables running through the containment hatch and the temporary third door. These cables prevented the airlock doors from being shut. In our reply to the Notice of Violation, a commitment was made to conduct refueling operations with the temporary third door in place and closed.