



Commonwealth Edison  
One First National Plaza, Chicago, Illinois  
Address Reply to: Post Office Box 767  
Chicago, Illinois 60690

Dresden Nuclear Power Station  
R. R. #1  
Morris, Illinois 60450

WPW Ltr. #559-73

August 7, 1973



Mr. A. Giambusso  
Deputy Director for Reactor Projects  
Directorate of Licensing  
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission  
Washington, D.C. 20545

SUBJECT: LICENSE DFR-25, DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT #3,  
SECTION 6.6.C.1 OF THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS,  
FAST CLOSURE OF MSIV 3-203-1B.

- References:
- 1) Letter from W. P. Worden to Mr. Giambusso dated December 8, 1972, concerning Fast Closure Time on "1B" MSIV.
  - 2) Notification of Region III of AEC Regulatory Operations.  
Telephone: F. Maura, 1030 on July 30, 1973  
Telegram: B. Grier, 1250 on July 30, 1973
  - 3) Dwg: P + ID M-345

Dear Mr. Giambusso:

This is to report a condition relating to the operation of the unit, when during surveillance testing, main steam isolation valve (MSIV) 3-203-1B was found to have a closure time of 2.6 secs, which is outside the limits specified in the Technical Specifications (Table 3.7.1). These limits are  $\leq 5$  secs and  $\geq 3$  secs.

#### PROBLEM AND INVESTIGATION

At 0050, July 29, 1973, with the reactor at a power level of 50 MWe, quarterly MSIV timing surveillance was being conducted.

During these tests, it was discovered that MSIV 3-203-1B had a closure time of 2.6 seconds, faster than the 3 second to 5 second limits specified in the Technical Specifications (Table 3.7.1). Both valves in the "B" steam line were promptly closed in accordance with section 3.7.2 of the Technical Specifications, and was maintained in that condition until a subsequent shutdown. The MSIV's on the other three steam lines had closure times within the 3 second to 5 second limits.

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August 7, 1973

The limits specified on fast closure of the MSIV's are intended to prevent a rapid reactor isolation, and subsequent rapid reactor pressurization and resulting relief valve operation. Closure of one MSIV in 2.6 seconds instead of 3 seconds does not significantly increase the pressure spike or the potential for relief valve operation. Additionally, any pressure transient from the fast closure of one MSIV would be "softened" by the slower MSIV closure on the other three lines. Consequently, it is concluded that the fast closure of the 3-203-1B MSIV was of no safety significance to the public or plant personnel.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

At present, Unit 3 is in the shutdown condition. Inspection of "1B" MSIV speed control will not be performed prior to letter issuance but will be made before unit startup.

A followup report will be issued to specify the results of the investigation, the corrective action taken, the resulting MSIV travel time, and the date on which "B" steam line is returned to service.

Sincerely,

*W. P. Worden*

W. P. Worden  
Superintendent  
Dresden Station

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


Commonwealth Edison  
One First National Plaza, Chicago, Illinois  
Address Reply to: Post Office Box 767  
Chicago, Illinois 60690

50-237/249

WPW Ltr.#572-73

Dresden Nuclear Power Station  
R. R. #1  
Morris, Illinois 60450  
August 10, 1973



Mr. A. Giambusso  
Deputy Director for Reactor Projects  
Director of Licensing  
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission  
Washington, D. C. 20545

SUBJECT: LICENSE DPR-19/25, DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT #2/3,  
SECTION 3.8.D OF THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.  
HIGH ACTIVITY IN ABOVE GROUND TANK "B" FLOOR DRAIN SAMPLE TANK.

References: 1. Notification of Region III of AEC Regulatory Operations  
Telephone: G. Fiorelli, 1400 hours, on 8-2-73.  
Telegram: B. Grier, 1500 hours, on 8-2-73.  
2. Dwgs: P & ID M-44.

Dear Mr. Giambusso:

This letter is to report a condition relating to the operation of Unit 2/3 Radwaste at about 0820 hours, August 2, 1973. At this time the 24 hour period for reprocessing above ground tanks with radioactivity concentrations above 0.7 curies allowed by the Technical Specifications (Section 3.8.D) was exceeded by 2 hours.

PROBLEM

At 0820 hours on August 1, 1973 the processing of water to "B" Floor Drain Sample Tank from the Floor Drain Collector was completed and the B.F.D.S.T. was placed on recirculation for sampling. The sample results indicated the beta-gamma radioactivity to be  $1.3 \times 10^7$  pCi/l. This concentration combined with a tank level of 82% resulted in a total curie content of 0.89 curies in the "B" Floor Drain Sample Tank.

Although the tank was promptly analyzed, there was a misunderstanding between laboratory and operational personnel concerning the radioactivity reporting. Therefore, action on reprocessing the water was delayed until the morning of August 2, 1973 when another shift foreman verified that "B" Floor Drain Sample Tank radioactivity was  $1.3 \times 10^7$  pCi/l. (0215 hours).

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August 10, 1973

In order to reduce the radioactivity of the water in the "B" Floor Drain Sample Tank to within Technical Specifications limits, at 1105 hours on August 2, 1973, the "B" F.D.S.T. was partially transferred to the "B" Neutralizer Tank. At 1135 the concentration of  $1.3 \times 10^7$  pCi/l at a tank level of approximately 63% resulted in a curie content of 0.68 curies in the "B" F.D.S.T.

Before water could be transferred from the "B" Floor Drain Sample Tank to the "B" Neutralizer Tank, the "B" Neutralizer Tank had to be emptied. The Floor Drain Collector, which had filled up again, was transferred to the "B" Neutralizer Tank next. At 1105, August 2, the conditions existed that allowed the transferring of the "B" Floor Drain Sample Tank to the "B" Neutralizer Tank.

#### INVESTIGATION

A review was made of the procedures applicable to the incident. It was determined that in following one operating procedure, the step requiring beta-gamma analysis of the Floor Drain Collector prior to processing was omitted. The delay in reprocessing the water in the "B" Floor Drain Sample Tank was caused by a misunderstanding between laboratory and operational personnel about the radioactivity reporting units.

#### CORRECTIVE ACTION

Enough water in the "B" Floor Drain Sample Tank was transferred to the "B" Neutralizer Tank to reduce the curie content in the "B" F.D.S.T. to within Technical Specifications.

A review of the appropriate procedures has been made with the personnel involved. In addition, a revision of the operating procedure, 2000-XX, paragraph B, has been effected to clarify the section requiring radioactivity analysis of the Floor Drain Collector prior to processing to the Floor Drain Sample Tanks.

#### EVALUATION

The presence of 0.89 curies in the "B" Floor Drain Sample Tank did not produce a hazard to the public since it was not released to the river and the tank beta-gamma radioactivity was reduced to below Technical Specifications 26 hours after the collection of the first samples. If a failure of the "B" Floor Drain Sample Tank had occurred as described in Amendment #9, Section V.C.1 of the S.A.R., and the radioactivity contained in the tank had been released to the aquatic environment, the limits as specified in CFR 20.106 would not have been exceeded when averaged over one year.

Sincerely,

*W. P. Worden*  
W. P. Worden  
Superintendent

WPW:do

cc: File-AEC Corr.