

POWER & LIGHT / NEW ORLEANS LOUISIANA 70174-6008

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April 16, 1984

ROTH S. LEDDICK Senior Vice President Nuclear Operations

BODI

W3K84-0974 3-A1.01.04

Mr. Harold Denton Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

SUBJECT: Waterford 3 Steam Electric Station Docket No. 50-382 Construction Adequacy of WSES-3 Basemat

Dear Sir:

On Thursday, March 22, 1984, your staff informally requested that LP&L be prepared to respond to a list of thirty-two questions at a meeting in Bethesda, Maryland on March 26, 1984. Extensive efforts of key project personnel resulted in the preparation of draft responses to the questions, which were handed out at the March 26, 1984 meeting. However, as was indicated by our representatives at the meeting, due to the extent of the questions and the volume of our response, coupled with the extremely short response time (four days, including the weekend), we were not able to subject the responses to a thorough review prior to the meeting.

Attached are our responses to the questions. There are only minor changes, mostly of an editorial nature or in response to comments from the NRC staff.

Yours very truly,

R. Leddick Senior Vice President-Nuclear Operations

RSL/KWC/cmb Attachment

cc: E.L. Blake, W.M. Stevenson, J.T. Collins, D.M. Crutchfield, J. Wilson, G. L. Constable



 a) How many nonconformance reports were issued on the basemat? b) How many relate to poor concrete placement practices? c) What were corrective actions taken? d) Provide justification to substantiate your position that these practices could not have lead to the development of cracks or localized porous zones which may be the cause of water intrusion.

Response: Ebasco 1a)

NCR's	-	106	(See Attachment	"A")
DN's	-	46	(See Attachment	"B")
DR's	-	42	(See Attachment	"C")

Response: Ebasco 1b)

Sate an

NCR's - 7 (Placement Practices)
DN's - 42 (1 on Placing Practice)(4 on Cracks)(37 on Concrete Trucks etc.)
DR's - 22 (Voids)

NCR (See Attachment "A") DN's (See Attachment "B") DR's (See Attachment "C")

Response: Ebasco lc)

NCR's - See Attachment "A" DN's - See Attachment "B" DR's - See Attachment "C"

Response: Ebasco 1d)

These practices could not have led to the development of cracks or localized porous zones which may be path of water intrusion because the deficiencies discovered were repaired and the practices which led to the deficiencies were corrected.

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Response: Ebasco la, b, c

ATTACHMENT "A"

NCR's Written Against Common Foundation Mat

Place	ement		
No		NCR#	
2		10	Curing temps low 1 day - Accept as is per cylinder breaks and concrete type only requires 3 days of cure
7A		14	Nelson stud broken off plate - plate rejected and replaced
4		15	Nelson stud broken off plate - plate rejected and replaced
7A		16	#11 bars too long - accept as is
10A		17	Rebar bent - replaced
7A		18	Rebar bent during construction - replaced
4		19	Insufficient concrete cover - area excavated as required
5B		26	Portion of forms removed early - compressive strength and curing acceptable as is
8A		43	Rebar does not have proper projection - replaced
5A,	9A	45	#9 dowels misplaced - replaced or bent to design location
5A		49	8 #11 bars bent - replaced
7A,	13A	51	2 #11 bars bent - replaced
10B,	11B	52	Rebar misplaced - replaced
10B		61	(Minor cut) Waterstop - bulb not affected - accept as is
10B		63	1 #6 bar misplaced - replaced
11B		64	Bolt bent (minor) - accept as is
11B		65	Bolt bent - replaced
14A,	12A	66	Rebar misplaced - accept as is
10B		69	(Minor) Nicks in rebar - accept as is
8B		74	2 bars 'missing', bent - replaced
Ring	Wall	76	Resteel clearance to form face - change configuration
11B		78	2 Bars mk #A201 misplaced - moved to correct area
13B		79	1 #8 Rebar 45° out of plumb - replaced
13B		80	1 #9 Rebar 45° out of plumb - replaced
11B		81	1 #9 Dowel missing - replaced
11B		82	1 #8 Rebar misplaced 5" - accept as is
11B		83	1 #9 Rebar misplaced 6" - accept as is
7B		84	Rebar bent - cut off and cadweld back
11A		85	Rebar bent - cut off and cadweld back
11B		87	Rebar - inadvertently cut off - cadweld back

ATTACHMENT "A" (coat'd)

12A	89	Rebar - linear indications - effective area insignificant - use as is
19	92	Grout deposited - concrete placed on top and consolidated - use as is - the grout has same 28 day strength
19	93	(SCD #1) (DN-C-62) Poor placement practices - concrete removed - area repaired
1	95	Surface allowed to dry for short period of time - accept as is - visual inspection performed.
3	96	Cure temps low 4th and 5th day - minor use as is
1.2.3.4.	97	Cadweld sampling not followed - engineer evaluated - test
5A&B.6.7	A&B	results accept as is
13A	98	11 cadwelds made after reject - engineer evaluated and QC visual inspection - use as is
19	102	Wrong bolts installed-bolts are same size, only longer-use as is
15	103	1 #10 dowel missing - replaced
10B	104	2 #11 bars cut - (minor) due to insignificant reduction in cross-sectional area - use as is
9B	106	Low air - engineer evaluated - average 4.5%, 28 day 5660 psi and placement method - accept as is
9B	107	1 test interval missed - engr evaluation - 28 day 5660 psi - accept as is
7B	108	Low air - engineer evaluated - average 4.6%, 28 day 5601 psi and placing method - use as is
1	109	Low air - engineer evaluated - average 4.7% and 28 day 5748 psi - accept as is
1	110	Mixing revs. concrete tests not performed at required intervals - engineer evaluated 28 day 5748 psi and placing method - use as is
7A	111	DN-C-29 - high slump, DN-C-130 - concrete test not performed at required intervals - engineer evaluated - accept as is (28 day 5335 psi slump average 3.6)
5B	113	High air w/average of 4.5% - accept as is
5B	114	(DN-C-134) Test sample frequency, (DN-C-147) Additional mixing revs - 28 day strength of 5601 psi and placement method (accept as is) (DN-C47,48,49 and 52)
5B	115	Truck discharged after 60 min FCR-CH-83 - acceptable
5B	116	(DN-C-46) high slump - evaluation performed by engr-accept as is
4	122	 Concrete placed w/out required mixing revs. Omission of test data - engineer evaluated - 28 day 5441 psi, average air 5.3%, and placement method DN-C-65,67,69,70,73,75,76,80,121 and 72

Response: Ebasco la, b, c

ATTACHMENT "A" (cont'd 1)

6	123	1) Conflicting test data
		2) Omission of test data - engr evaluated - method of placement and 28 day 6128 psi DN-C74,77, and 79 DN-C-78 -
-		accept as is
6	124	Exceeded mixing count - high slump - accept as is - 28 day 6128 psi and method of placement
6	125	1 hr time limit for concrete discharge - FCR 83 - covers this - compressive strength average 6128 psi
19	145	Nicks in resteel - minor use as is Void in mat - pour back
19	148	3 core holes repaired w/out proper documentation - QA/engr eval. use as is - corrective action retraining and new procedure
12A	151	Resteel missing - replaced
15	166	Resteel #4 dowels missing - replaced
10B	178	Resteel nicked - accept as is
N/A	181	1 #6 dowel misplaced 8 inches - accept as is
15	187	#4 dowels missing - replaced
19	242	Resteel cut - replaced
19	491	Repair not done correctly - removed and replaced
3	112	Unit weight. test data omitted - strength high and replacement method acceptable - use as is
12B	94	1 #6 dowel does not have minimum cover - OK use as is
1	127	 Test data omitted or not taken at right intervals Low mixing intervals - engineering evaluated - 28 day 5748 psi and placing method
1	128	High and low air content - average 4.6% - 28 day 5748 psi and placing methods - use as is
	24	High air - engineering evaluation - average air was 5.0% this along with method of placement and consolidation would assure durability requirements
	25	High slump - engineering evaluation - accepted as w/c ratio, unit weight and strength would meet the specified requirements.
499-4	29	1 truck high air - engineering evaluation - next truck was 6.4% 21 others taken were acceptable
2	30	Concrete discharge 2 minutes after specified time - engineering evaluation - placement time did not exceed the 1 ¹ / ₂ hour overall time limit

Response: Ebasco 1a, b, c

ATTACHMENT "A" (cont'd 2)

3	32	Mixing rev count not recorded - engineering evaluation -
S02-2	33	2 tickets low air - engineering evaluation - average for
		placement 4.9% and method of placements and consolidation would assure acceptance
2	34	Discharge time not recorded - engineering evaluation - 72 min. batching circle would result in meeting 60 min. delivery time requirements
S02-3	35	Low air (2 tickets) engr eval - average 4.7 this with the method of placement and consolidation assures durability
S02-2	36	(2 tickets) low air - engineering evaluation - air average 4.9%. This with the method of placement and consolidation
2	37	(1 ticket) high slump - engineering evaluation - use as is -
10B	39	Rain in placement concrete placed improperly - engineering
10A	40	<pre>1 ticket high air - use as is - engineering evaluation - air 5.5% average in placement - method of placement and consolidation.</pre>
10A	41	Test frequency - use as is - engineering evaluation 7 day 4010 and 3530 psi and slump and air content
	131	Test frequency - see #137
	132	Batch information see #137
	130	High slump see #137
	138	Air and slump high - use as is, see #137
	139	Test frequency - see #137
	137	Testing frequency - engineering and QA evaluation use as is - corrective action see memo from W. C. Griggs
11B	141	High air and no tests or cylinder taken at the right intervals - use as is - corrective action memo from W. C. Griggs
N/A	146	Specific gravity - fine aggregate engineering evaluation - minor deviation and cylinder breaks use as is 11B
	174	DN-C-113 High slump - engineering evaluation - 28 day 4870 psi isolated incident - accept as is
ALL	7154	Curing - engineering evaluation - use as is
ALL	7150	QV inspectors certifications - OA eval - use as is
ALL	7151	QV inspectors eye exams - QA eval - use as is
ALL	7152	QV inspectors eye exams - OA eval - use as is
ALL	7153	Curing - engineering evaluation - use as is
ALL	7149	QV inspector certification - QA evaluation of experience/training use as is

ATTACHMENT "A" (cont'd 3)

ALL	7353	Mix designs - engineer evaluated (use as is, have FCR's)
ALL	7353	Concrete mix design - engineer evaluated - use as is, have FCR's)
ALL	7154	Missing cure dates - engineer evaluated - use as is
ALL	7153	Missing cure dates - engineer evaluated - use as is, based on weather temperature.
ALL	7152	No eye exam - engineer evaluated - use as is, based on previous certification
ALL	7151	No eye exam - eng eval - use as is/all have eye exam in cert. package now
ALL	7150	No inspection certification file - engineer evaluated - use as is based on experience.
ALL	7149	Inspected prior to certs - engineer evaluated - use as is, based on prior experience/training and successful completion of training
7B	31	Air content of concrete - engineer evaluated - use as is, based on overall air content 4.7%
S02-4	12	One truck low mix rev count - engineer evaluated - use as is, letter on concrete drum revolution
S04-16	414	Concrete void engineer evaluated - chip out and replace
S03-19	341	Concrete coating prior to placement of repair - engineer evaluated - remove and replace
CFS	273	Resteel misplaced - engineer evaluated - add resteel
BASE	6212	Concrete crac's - engineer evaluated - use as is - based on
MAT RAB		there is no stability or corrosion problems
ALL	6245	Cadwelds (authenticity of signatures or initials - "/A for cracking in CFM)
ALL	6234	Cadwelding - N/A for cracking in CFM
ALL	7481	Cadwelding - N/A for cracking in CFM
S02-4	11	High slump - engineer evaluated - use-as-is - new test taken on truck, found acceptable - people re-instructed

ATTACHMENT "B"

Ebasco Base Mat DN's Where an NCR was not Initiated

Date	DN#	Placement#	Description	<u>C.A.</u>	
11-19-75	C-5	499-502-3	Rebar offset	Moved to correct location	
12-10-75	C-7	499-502-6	Cracks & rockpockets in face	Chipped out & repaired	
12-18-75	C-12	499 - S02-1	Cracks in face	Chipped out & repair	
12-16-75	C-13	499-S02-2	Cracks in face	Chipped out & repair	
01-08-76	C-27	499-502-6	Cracks & rockpockets in face	Chipped out & repair	
02-03-76	C-55	499-S02-7B	Water stop	Repaired	
02-10-76	C-61	499-S02-10B	Misplaced batch tickets and no records on concrete discharge	Accept-as-is	
02-10-76	C-62	499-S02-10B	Excessive time on truck	Accept-as-is	
02-10-76	C-63	499-S02-10B	Excessive time on truck	Accept-as-is	
02-10-76	C-65	499-S02-10B	Excessive time on truck	Accept-as-is	
02-10-76	C-72	499-S02-6	Low air	Accept-as-is	
02-10-76	C-78	499-502-6	Excessive mixing	Accept-as-is	
03-09-76	C-92	499-S03-11B 499-S03-13B	Oil on rebar	Rebar cleaned	
03-22-76	C-105	499-S03-13B	Testing time	Use-as-is	
03-22-76	C-106	499-S03-13B	Low air	Accept-as-is	
03-22-76	C-107	499-S03-13B	Testing Frequency	Accept-as-is	
03-22-76	C-108	499-S03-11B	Testing Frequency	Accept-as-is	
03-22-76	C-109	499-S03-11B	Low air	Use-as-is	
03-22-76	C-114	499-S02-5A	High air	Use-as-is	
03-22-76	C-115	499-502-5A	Added water twice	Use-as-is	
03-22-76	C-116	499-502-5A	Added water	Use-as-is	
03-22-76	C-117	499-S02-5A	Recording error	Use-as-is	
03-22-76	C-118	499-S02-5A	Recording error	Use-as-is	

ATTACHMENT "B" (cont'd)

Date	DN#	Placement#	Description	<u>C.A.</u>
03-22-76	C-119	499-S02-5A	Recording error	Use-as-is
03-22-76	C-120	499-S02-5A	Test-frequency	Use-as-is
03-25-76	C-130	499-S02-7A	Test-frequency	Use-as-is
03-25-76	C-133	499-S02-7B	Excessive time on truck	Use-as-is
03-25-76	C-145	499-S02-8A	Excessive time on truck	Use-as-is
03-29-76	C-147	499-S02-5B	Add water w/no revs on truck	Use-as-is
04-20-76	C-152	499-802-2	Test not taken	Use-as-is
04-28-76	C-153	499-503-16	Layers excessive in height. Layers sloped, excessive flow	Inspectors Retrained
04-28-76	C-154	499-S01-14A	Spill over on steps & excessive height	Inspectors Retrained
05-03-76	C-155	499-S01-13A	Mix revs exceeded	FCR-CH-117
03-26-76	C-158	499-S02-8B	Excessive time	FCR-CH-83
05-01-76	C-166	499-S02-19	lst truck not tested pumping problems	Accept-as-is
05-12-76	C-170	499-S02-5A	Insufficient drum revs	Use-as-is
05-31-76	C-176	499-503-18	Excessive Slump	Use-as-is
06-03-76	C-181	499-S03-12A	Correlation test not taken	Use-as-is
06-04-76	C-182	499-503-12A	Excessive slump	Use-as-is
06-15-76	C-183	499-S03-12A	Test frequency exceeded	Use-as-is
06-15-76	C-184	499-S03-12A	No discharge time on ticket	Use-as-is
06-15-76	C-185	499-S03-12B	No pump discharge sample	Use-as-is
06-17-76	C-187	499-502-4	Test frequency exceeded	Use-as-is
06-17-76	C-188	499-501-15	Excessive slump	Accept-as-is
06-18-76	C-189	499-S03-13B	Excessive slump	Accept-as-is
06-24-76	C-190	499-501-14A	Cure box too hot	Accept-as-is

ATTACHMENT "C"

J. A. Jones Base Mat DR's Where an NCR was Not Initiated

Date	DR#	Placement#	Description	<u>C.A.</u>
04-08-76	5	499-S03-12B	(Gouge) Waterstop	Repair EIR-200-7
04-12-76	6	499-S01-12A	(Gouge) Waterstop	Repair EIR-200-7
04-14-76	7	499-S01-13A	(Gouge) Waterstop	Repair EIR-200-7
04-20-76	8	499-SU3-16	(Gouge) Pipe Trench Frame	Repair
04-22-76	10	499-S01-12A	Defective concrete	FCR-50
04-23-76	11	499-S01-14A	Defective concrete	FCR-50
04-26-76	12	499-503-19	(Gouge) 9" P.V.C. waterstop	Repair EIR-200-7
04-27-76	13	499-S01-15	"Void" under waterstop	Repair FCR-50
04-27-76	14	499-S01-15	"Void" under waterstop	Repair FCR-50
04-27-76	15	499-S01-15	"Void" under waterstop	Repair FCR-50
04-27-76	16	499-801-15	(Gouge) waterstop	Repair EIR-200-7 FCR-50
04-29-76	17	499-S01-15	(Gouge) waterstop	Repair EIR-200-7
04-30-76	19	499-501-15	(Gouge) waterstop	Repair FCR-50
04-30-76	20	499-501-15	Void in concrete	Repair FCR Dry pack 50
05-03-76	21	499-S01-15	Void in concrete	Repair FCR Dry pack 50
0503-76	22	499-503-17	Bent studs on frame	Bend back
05-04-76	25	499-503-17	Voids under waterstop	Dry pack/ FCR-50
05-04-76	26	499-503-17	Voids under/over waterstop	Dry pack/ Repair FCR-50
05/06/76	29	499-303-19	Void concrete	Backfill with 499-503-17
05/06/76	30	499-803-19	Void concrete	Backfill with

ATTACHMENT "C" (cont'd)

Date	DR#	Placement#	Description	<u>C.A.</u>
05-17-76	33	499-503-17	Void under waterstop	Pour with 499-S03-17
05-12-76	36	499-503-19	Concrete Void	Pour with 568-8
05-12-76	38	499-503-18	Void under waterstop	Dry pack FCR-CH-50
05-17-76	40	499-S03-18	Void above/below waterstop	Dry pack FCR-CH-50
05-17-76	42	499-S03-18	Void above/below waterstop	Dry pack FCR-CH-50
05-17-76	43	499-503-18	Void above/below waterstop	Dry pack FCR-CH-50
05-17-76	44	499-503-18	Serial No's	Logged on embed sheet
05-18-76	45	499-S03-16, 18,11B,13B	Hydraulic oil spill	Remove
05-19-76	46	499-503-18	Voids in concrete	Dry pack
05-19-76	47	499-503-18	Voids in concrete	Dry pack
05-20-76	48	499-S01 3FH & W	Damaged waterstop	Repair EIR-200-7
05-20-76	49	499-S03-16	Concrete Voids	Dry pack
05-20-76	50	499-503-18	Clam shell not covered by mud mat	Cover with visquene prior to placement
05-24-76	50	499-503-18	Gouges in waterstop	Repair EIR-200-7
05-27-76	54	499-503-19	Voids in concrete	Dry pack FCR-152
05-28-76	56	499-S03-11B &	Hydraulic oil spill	Remove
		499-S02-10B		
06-02-76	58	499-S01-12A	Gouges in water stop	Repair EIR-200-7
06-04-76	59	499-503-18	Voids under elevator pit	Repair FCR-152
06-09-76	63	499-S01-7FH & W	Damaged waterstop	Repair FCR-CH-110 EIR-300-120
06-09-76	64	499-S02-10B	Cadweld at wrong elevation	Use-as-is
06-09-76	65	499-S02-9A	Cadweld at wrong elevation	Use-as-is
06-28-77	77	499-503-18	Gouge in waterstop	Repair EIR-200-7

2. Where was water table when 1977 cracks were discovered?

Response:

At the time of discovery the ground water in the shell fill beneath the mat was at about elevation -20 ft. or about 15 feet above the top of the mat. (FSAR Figure 2.5-113: "Piezometer, Heave Point and Extensioneter Responses Sh. 3 of 5). 3. Is there any evidence of convex curvature due to ring wall loading?

Response:

Attached is a graph (Figure ES-3) reflecting the contours obtained from the maps generated on April 22, 1977, November 10, 1977, and October 9, 1979. These curves reflect a before mat (ring wall) loading, after ring wall placement and a majority of concrete construction complete. These contours do reflect a convex mat with maximum differential of two inches (2").

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ES-3

Provide X-Section maps of mat flexure over time period zero to present.

Response: Ebasco

The following sketches reflect the mat by block and point settlement as monitored. Two full size copies were provided for NRC staff use at the March 26, 1984 meeting in Bethesda, Maryland.

SK-1564-15.10-G-25.1 SK-1564-15.10-G-26.1 SK-1564-15.10-G-27.1 SK-1564-15.10-G-28.1 SK-1564-15.10-G-29.1 SK-1564-15.10-G-30.1 SK-1564-15.10-G-35.0 SK-1564-15.10-G-35.1

4.

5. a) Provide complete documentation of groundwater control and foundation heave from the start of dewatering until the present time. b) Include the history of soil excavation and backfill beneath the mat.

Response: 5a)

Groundwater control and foundation heave from the start of dewatering until recent time are exhibited in FSAR Fig. 2.5-113 (sheets 1/5 to 5/5).

Response: 5b)

The history of excavation and backfill is provided in FSAR Figures 2.5-102 and 2.5-103.



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6. Provide the foundation loading history under each block during construction of the mat and walls. This should include the distribution of pressure under each block. Include the location and history of loads due to backfilling adjacent to foundation blocks.

Response: Ebasco

A computer program was developed and maintained weekly to monitor the placements made. Accumulative soil stresses were identified and maximum/minimum total stresses were noted. These figures and the differential stresses were reviewed. Differential stress did not exceed the maximum allowable of 1.0 KSF.

As can be noted on the Composite Foundation Mat Settlement (Figure 2.5-117 in the FSAR), recharging of the water table began in late 1977 and was gradually charged until completion in late 1979. Recharging commenced based on total stresses achieving the 4.5 KSF criteria. The initiation of recharging the mat was approximately week no. 85 of construction.

Distribution of pressure under each block was not maintained since the mat was considered as a single mat.

Backfilling and concrete construction was established through drawing no. LOU-1564-G-490, "General Nuclear Plant Island Structure Construction Sequence". This drawing provided the evaluation criteria for top of concrete as related to top of fill. Generally, construction was sequenced to place concrete (walls/floors, etc.) uniformally by constructing the buildings with minimal differentiation in loading. Consequently, backfilling operations followed suit and maintained a uniformity of placement as well.



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7. Provide complete settlement history for each block from initial pouring until the present time.

Response: Ebasco

The settlement drawings listed in response to question four (4) provide the settlement picture by block placement until 1981. At this time, the number of settlement points was reduced to eight (8).

 Analyze and discuss the relationship of the above variables (Qs 5-7 above) on the history of all observed mat cracks and leaks.

Response: Ebasco

The initial detection of mat cracks was made in mid 1977 when the concrete surface beneath the reactor containment was cleaned up and prepared for concrete fill placement. These cracks were identified by the minor water seepage caused by the temporary high groundwater level beneath the mat. This high groundwater level was shortly thereafter lowered by increasing the capacity of the dewatering system.

No other cracks were detected at that time and no organized search was made for such.

In 1983, a series of cracks was detected and mapped. These cracks, along with those found in 1977, show a pattern generally following the pattern of mat differential settlement. The width of the cracks and the spacing of them shows a very low state of stress. The cracks were found to be not measurable in width and could be identified in some cases only by moist concrete and in some cases only by a line of old leachate now dry. This shows that the cracks were created at some time previous to 1983 since it takes considerable time for leachate to form a measurable residue when the moisture flow carrying it is very low.

The entire process which resulted in mat differential settlements, namely stressing the underlying soils above a level which they originally had been exposed to, was completed in mid 1979 and no further significant net or differential settlements have occurred since and are not expected in the future. 9. What basis is there for accepting the adequacy of construction of the first 3 blocks?

Response: LP&L

Waterford 3 Quality Standard

Prior to Placement 6, on December 2, 1975, the Waterford 3 Project underwent extensive development and gained significant construction QA experience during the extended qualification programs for the concrete batch plant, the concrete materials (cement, aggregates and admixtures) and the design mixes. During this period prior to Placement 6, the project also gained experience in the development and conduct of quality programs for soils, reinforcing steel and cadwelding LP&L takes credit for establishing a high quality standard for the whole project during the pre-placement period, which carried over into the placement of the basemat. This high quality standard has been established and maintained throughout the project history.

Observation of Placement 6

Since basemat Placement 6 was the first Class I placement, there was much interest in LP&L, Ebasco, and the concrete contractor to assure that the placement was carried out in a quality manner. Preplacement inspections were extremely detailed and received input from many project personnel beside those inspectors who actually signed the inspection reports. In addition to the official Quality Control efforts of both Ebasco and the concrete contractor (which, alone, represents considerably more than minimum Quality control coverage), the placement was observed by several LP&L QA employees, LP&L project employees, Ebasco QA employees, management personnel of Ebasco and the concrete contractor and two NRC inspectors. It is not typical to document such participation, but many of these observers can attest to their presence during the placement.

During the conduct of Placement 6, several problems were encountered. The problems were formally documented by Ebasco (JG-75-12-2, dated 12-2-75) and LP&L (W3S-75-64S, dated 12-2-75). It is noteworthy that, despite the deficiencies which were documented, neither author made any direct statements or recommendations that the quality of the placement itself should be investigated. On the contrary, both authors (and others) attest to the fact that in-process corrective action was taken, thus preventing the placement itself from being suspect.

Consistent with the project quality standards, however, neither the author of the two reports, nor their superiors, desired the continued necessity for the type of intense in-process corrective action required during placement 6. The purposes of the reports, as attested by their authors, were to cause generic and programmatic corrective action by the concret contractor, so as to assure that future placements would be condicted with better control. To further assure mutual understanding of the deficiencies and to expedite their resolution, a meeting was held on December 5, 1975

Response: LP&L (9 Continued)

which included representation from LP&L, Ebasco and the concrete contractor. Resolution of the documented deficiencies were adequate to allow the concrete contractor to proceed with the next placement.

Basemat Placement 1

Basemat Placement 1 occurred on December 8, 1975. Corrective action on the deficiencies recorded during Placement 6, was obviously effective. No QA deficiency reports were issued. The improvement in concrete contractor performance was, therefore, adequate to allow the concrete contractor to proceed with the placement sequence.

Basemat Placement 2

Basemat Placement 2 occurred on December 11, 1975. The corrective action effected during Placement 1, although present to some extent during Placement 2, obviously did not meet the quality standard of LP&L. An LP&L QA surveillance report (W3S-75-63S, dated 12-11-75) was issued, listing deficiencies detected during the conduct of Placement 2. Since the concrete contractor apparently could not sustain the quality standards expected during the conduct of concrete placements on the basis of QA audit reports, surveillance reports, and meetings, LP&L QA decided to issue Stop Work Order Number 1 (SWO-1) in order to assure both Ebasco and the concrete contractor that LP&L was serious about project quality standards. Again, it is noteworthy that neither the LP&L QA surveillance report nor the Stop Work Order itself, make mention of any need for investigation into the quality of Placement 2. Participants atcest to the fact that the placement itself was accomplished satisfactorily, albeit with considerable effort.

Follow-on concrete placements

Following the issuance of SWO-1, a high level meeting was called to discuss and resolve the SWO-1 issues. Following implementation of programmatic corrective action to the satisfaction of LP&L, the Stop Work Order was lifted and placement of the basemat proceeded without significant incident, with the exception of placements 10B and 19.

During the conduct of placements 103 and 19, the concrete contractor encountered problems which were unique to those placements. It is noteworthy that these two placements were subjected to substantial investigation and repair, including a combined total of 302 core borings. The purpose in pointing out these intensive efforts (including an independent evaluation in the case of Placement 10B) is to emphasize that LP&L has not been bashful in demanding assurance of the quality of Waterford 3 construction. Had the actual quality of Placements 6, 1, and 2 been suspect, LP&L and/or Ebasco would most assuredly have demanded investigative measures. Response: (Continued)

Phearson memorandum

On December 15, 1975, four days after Basemat Placement 2, a hand-written "Afteraction Report" was written by a Mr. F. L. Phearson, an Ebasco Quality Assurance Engineer who participated in Placement 2, to Mr. W. C. Griggs, then Ebasco Senior Quality Control Supervisor. The Phearson memorandum lists deficiencies in the conduct of Placement 2 which are equivalent to <u>some</u> of the deficiencies listed in the previously discussed LP&L and Ebasco QA reports of December 2 and 11, 1975. Mr. Griggs does not recall seeing the memorandum at the time, and LP&L first became aware of it in mid 1983. LP&L wishes to make one speculative and two factual points regarding the Phearson memorandum.

- Factual The deficiencies listed in the Phearson memorandum had already been identified in LP&L and Ebasco QA reports, along with other deficiencies not mentioned in the Phearson memo.
- 2. Speculative On the hypothetical assumption that Mr. Griggs actually saw the memorandum (he does not recall seeing it), it is reasonable to assume that he would consider it moot, since he already had in his possession the LP&L QA surveillance report, which included the same deficiencies and more.
- 3. Factual The Phearson memorandum does not specifically state that Placement 2 is suspect, nor does it recommend or imply the need for investigation of the placement. Phearson did not leave the Waterford 3 project until mid April, 1976.

Considering the recommendation in his memorandum, it is reasonable to conclude that Phearson's motives in writing the memorandum were similar to those of others who reported deficiencies in the conduct of Placements 2 and 6 - that is, to effect programmatic improvements in the conduct of future concrete placements.

Conclusion:

Based on this information, the actual performance of the mat to date, the internal review and evaluation, the independent review and evaluation and the extreme conservatism in the mat design, LP&L has adequate confidence that the basemat will perform satisfactorily in service. 10. If engineering judgement was involved in accepting those blocks, what was the basis for that judgement? Where is it documented?

Response:

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Placements 6, 1, and 2 were conforming placements. As such, no engineering evaluations nor engineering judgements were required to support their adequacy. See also the responses to Questions 9, 11, 22, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, and 29.

11. What corrective actions were necessary for the first 3 blocks? What corrective actions were taken, and provide specifics for each pour? Where are these actions documented?

Response: LP&L

Two types of corrective action were effected with respect to basemat Placements 6, 1, and 2, the first three basemat placements. The following discussions characterize both.

A. In-process corrective action

During the conduct of basemat placements 6 and 2, and to a smaller extent, placement 1, corrective action was taken as deficiencies were detected. These corrective measures resulted from the fact that there were so many "inspectors", including the official Ebasco and concrete contractor inspectors (who would actually sign the inspection documents), Ebasco and LP&L QA personnel, and others. Although these placements occurred in excess of eight years ago, the significance of these placements (essentially the first substantial permanent safety related work at Waterford 3) and review of site records have refreshed the memories of key personnel. Attachment A represents the recollection of in-process corrective actions taken during each of the three placements.

B. Programmatic Corrective Action

Because of the recurrence of some operational problems requiring in-process correction, LP&L issued Stop Work Order #1. The Stop Work Order was not issued because there was concern about the integrity of the work completed or in progress, but to stress the urgency of eliminating the recurrence of problems. Stop Work Order #1 was based on the findings in three QA audit reports:

- Ebasco Audit Report JG-75-12-2 written on Placement 6 on December 2, 1975.
- LP&L QA Site Surveillance Report W3S-75-64S written on Placement 6 on December 2, 1975.
- LP&L QA Site Surveillance Report W3S-75-63S written on Placement 2 on December 11, 1975.

Attachment B presents each of the audit findings, the contractor responses, and the final LP&L resolution for each item. Attachment B addresses the first and third placements (Placement 6 and 2). The second placement (Placement 1) was quite uneventful and no QA audit report was generated. Response: (11 Continued)

ATTACHMENT A

Audit Report No. JG-75-12-2 (Placement 499S02-6)

ITEM 4: "Not enough vibrators were provided for adequate vibration or to make provisions for breakdown of equipment."

This finding directs attention to the fact that the auditor was unable to locate (within the immediate area of the placement) extra vibrators for backup in the event of malfunction of vibrators in use. However, no malfunction of vibrators was actually detected. The corrective action response from the contractor to Ebasco Q.A. states that..."During the actual pour, a total of twelve (12) vibrators were in operation with ten (10) more as back-up directly adjacent to the pour area." Therefore, the auditor concluded that the contractor's personnel contacted for verification of this item were not aware of the location of the back-up vibrators. Subsequent to this pour, the contractor instituted pre-pour meetings attended by cognizant supervisory personnel to assure a complete understanding of the contents of applicable work procedures and the applicable pour plan.

ITEM 5: "Workmen deviated from placing procedure; it was apparent that workmen were not cognizant with placing procedure."

Concrete placement inspection report dated 12-2-75 indicates that at 9:00 a.m. the contractor was not placing the concrete using the stepping procedure as outlined in their placement diagram. It further states that steps were taken to correct this condition by building up the north side at a faster rate.

ITEM 12: "It was observed that improper use of vibrators and insufficient vibration resulted in honeycomb."

This statement relates to an exterior surface area of the placement examined once forms were removed. The condition observed is documented on concrete pour plan form dated December 8, 1985. The extent of honeycombing was relatively minor and was concentrated around the horizontal waterstop located toward the top edge of the placement. Repairs were satisfactorily accomplished as was noted on the concrete pour plan form. Response: (11 Continued) Attachment A

ITEM 13: "At times height of drop exceeded the 5 foot limit."

While in certain isolated instances the height of drop for the concrete exceeded the 5 foot limit, no actual separation/segregation was detected. These occurrences were brought to the attention of the contractor's supervisory personnel who in turn verbally issued corrective action directives.

ITEM 16: "It was observed that for some loads that as much as 15 minutes elapsed before the discharge time was recorded; consequently, an incorrect time was recorded."

The auditor monitored the actions of the inspectors checking the incoming concrete mixers and on a couple of instances noticed that the time elapsed between the start of discharge of concrete and recording by Q.C. was approximately 15 minutes. These occurrences were brought to the attention of the Q.C. supervisor present. Action taken was to assign an additional inspector to monitor this facet of the operation. Additionally, a check of the batch tickets revealed that all trucks were discharged within the one hour time limit.

ITEM 21: "Improper handling of cylinders resulted in uncircular specimens, also Hi-Lo thermometers were not provided until late evening."

The observations were made that one set of concrete cylinders were somewhat out-of-round at the top and that thermometers were not readily available to monitor the curing of test cylinders. These occurrences were isolated events and corrective action included re-instruction of personnel and an adequate supply of thermometers at the point of need, prior to initiation of concreting operations.

ITEM 24: "Skip pan was observed to stand on top of the mat for several minutes prior to testing of the concrete which was in the skip pan."

The concern expressed was that the skip pan which contained the concrete to be used for testing was observed to remain on the mat for an extended period of time prior to testing. This condition was an isolated occurrence which resulted from an insufficient number of cranes available for use in handling the sampling of concrete. Action taken was to provide equipment to be assigned solely for the sampling of concrete. Response: (11 Continued) Attachment A

ITEM 25: "Workmen were observed to shovel concrete from the ground into the pumps, thus contaminating the concrete with shell."

A workman was observed shoveling concrete, which had spilled on to the ground from the pump hopper, back into the hopper. The corner edge of the shovel caught some shell which in turn was dumped into the hopper. The amount of shell was insignificant but the practice of picking up concrete from the ground was discouraged. This was an isolated occurrence which was corrected on the spot by the contractor's Superintendent. On subsequent placements, plywood was placed under the pumps to keep spilled concrete off the ground.

ITEM 26: "Documentation of tests and checklists were observed to be in error and omissions of data and signatures exists."

A review of concrete placement records subsequent to completion of the placement revealed certain irregularities. Q.C. personnel were reinstructed, and information was retrieved which permitted correction of the irregularities. It should be noted that this finding was limited to documentation deficiencies. Response: (11 Continued) Attachment A

Audit Report No. W3S 75-64S (Placement 499S02-6)

ITEM 1: "Contrary to Section I Paragraph 10 9, concrete was placed even though it exceeded specification requirements."

This observation resulted from a difference in understanding between LP&L and Ebasco. Ebasco Engineering stated in a November 24, 1975, memorandum that the slump could range between 1 and 5 inches. Since only one batch exceeded the requirement (5 3/4 inch slump), this was a non-problem. This one case of out-of-specification slump was documented and resolved on D.N. #C-77.

ITEM 2. "Contrary to Section II, Paragraph 5.2, concrete received disturbing shocks and vibrations from reinforcing steel which was set in motion by concrete pump discharges."

This problem was noted early in the placement. It was quickly corrected by J. A. Jones long before the concrete had set. The purpose of the finding was to formally notify J. A. Jones and Ebasco concerning this observation so that it could be prevented on future placements.

ITEM 3. "Contrary to Section II, Paragraph 4.13, concrete was inadequately vibrated."

There were some instances during the placement where minor deviation from the correct vibrating procedure was noted. These deviations occurred when the operator exceeded the required spacing between vibrating operations, or did not insert the vibrator in a perfectly vertical manner. These deviations were minor in nature and were corrected by J. A. Jones on the spot.

ITEM 4. "Contrary to Section II, Paragraph 5.1, curing water was not continuously maintained on all exposed surfaces."

The word "all" is important here. There were a few instances where standing water was not kept on a few localized surface areas of the placement. These areas were kept damp. This was not a major problem as J. A. Jones was generally conscientious in maintaining adequate curing during the placements. J. A. Jones took immediate action to assure that all areas of the placement were continuously covered.
ITEM 5. "Contrary to ACI 318 - Rebar was improperly spaced in some areas of the placement."

This was a practical problem caused by bulkheads, interferences with embedded items, and clearance for concrete pumping equipment. The deviations from drawings were minor in nature. These problems were corrected by J. A. Jones on the spot.

ITEM 6. "Personnel involved in placement activities were not aware of or failed to follow J. A. Jones Co., 'Concrete Pour Plan'."

This comment centered around difficulty in keeping with the "stair stepping procedure" for concrete placement. An example of this difficulty, and on-the-spot corrective action can be found in the Ebasco <u>Concrete Placement</u> Inspection record (form no. 6ClP 7-1, 11-30-75) for placement no. 499 S02-6 (12-2-75). See 0900 hours entry in the record.

ITEM 7. "Several Ebasco concrete test records (form no. QC18-7-2, 11-30-75) were not completely filled out."

Problems with the records noted during the placement were minor in nature and were usually corrected on the spot. Considering that this was the first placement, the inspection documentation was, in fact, very good.

Surveillance Report W3S-75-63S (Placement No. 499S02-2)

ITEM 1: "Rejected concrete being used."

ITEM 2: "Ebasco inspector's rejection of concrete overridden by Ebasco QC Supervisor."

This statement related to Batch No. 001441, so action would be taken, correcting any doubt about the concrete in question. The Ebasco response to Surveillance Report No. W3S-75-63S, states in part: "instructed all Ebasco Q.C. personnel this date to have verification test made on questionable items prior to release for use."

ITEM 3: "Concrete allowed to be placed that could not be vibrated under rebar.

This concrete was removed from the placement immediately, after notification by LP&L Q.A. The concrete in question was being removed from a plugged pump line.

After this incident, a container was used to catch out-of-specification concrete.

ITEM 4: "Concrete being vibrated in order to flow from truck chute."

A laborer used a vibrator to assist the flow of concrete to the pump hopper. This procedure was stopped immediately by LP&L Q.A. The finding was written to assure programmatic corrective action.

ITEM 5: "Continuous use of low slump out of specification concrete after being warned by LP&L. (Had to have QA Corporation at Placement correct)."

This finding was written because a period of successive low, but in-specification, could cause pumping problems and delays in placement.

ITEM 5: "Concrete being controlled before pump hoppers by J. A. Jones."

J. A. Jones was responsible for concrete <u>placement</u>. The quality of the concrete which J.A. Jones received for placement was the responsibility of QA Corporation. This finding was written to assure that J.A. Jones had no control of the concrete quality prior to their receiving it.

ITEM 7: "Dry concrete being removed from discharge hose and being permitted to drop in placement area. (Was made to remove by LP&L)."

See Item 3 above. The action desired by this finding was for J. A. Jones to train their employees in the use of a catch pan. Also, the J. A.Jones response to W3S-75-63S, states in part: "when a transport line becomes plugged, the area underneath the cleaning operations on the top mat will be covered to prevent the concrete dropping through the top mat into the pour area."

ITEM 8: "Improper placement of concrete."

Corrections were on the spot. The finding was written so that J. A.Jones would be aware problems and make necessary corrections in the following areas.

- Improper use of vibrators not inserting the vibrator in the proper vertical position.
- 2. Improper height of drop-at times the drop exceeded the 5 foot limit.
- 3. Allowing the concrete tremie to swing while pumping concrete.

ITEM 9: "Inadequate supervision by J. A. Jones."

This finding was written to cause J. A. Jones to increase their supervision at placement areas.

ITEM 10: "Inadequate supervision by Ebasco."

This finding was written to cause Ebasco to increase their supervision at placement area.

ITEM 11: "Corrective action not taken by some of Ebasco personnel after being brought to their attention by LP&L."

When correcitve action was not as expeditious as desired by LP&L, corrective action was taken by LP&L QA. (Corrective action amounted to giving directions in problem areas as needed, but this item was also designed to make Ebasco aware that additional training was needed by their personnel.)

ITEM 12: "Complete failure by most to meet requirements of procedures and specifications."

"The finding was not in intended to imply that personnel were not qualified to perform their duties. It was intended to indicate that there were some personnel which indeed needed additional training in such areas as:

- The limit of acceptable drop of concrete from the end of tremie or hose.
- 2. The proper thickness of placement layers-not exceeding the 20 inches.
- 3. Proper use of vibrators.

ITEM 13: "No evaluation of crack growth in west wall of pour #6 until brought to the attention of supervisors by LP&L."

The finding was written to make Ebasco evaluate the crack and take necessary action on the matter. See Ebasco response to this observation dated December 17, 1975, F-4614 4.0.

Response: (11 Continued)

ATTACHMENT B

STOP WORK ORDER #1 (Ref. 1, 2)

This attachment presents quotations of:

- a) Each unsatisfactory finding as stated in:
 - i) Ebasco Audit Report JG-75-12-2,
 - 11) LP&L QA Site Surveillance Report W3S-75-64S, and
 - 111) LP&L QA Site Surveillance Report W3S-75-63S.
- NOTE: These three reports constitute the basis for Stop Work Order #1.
- b) The written response from the appropriate contractor, (J.A. Jones Construction Company), Ebasco Services, Inc. or both; and
- c) The LP&L evaluation and resolution of the contractor's reply to each item. Generally, LP&L either accepted the reply and closed the item, or provided direction for additional action. These evaluations and resolutions are documented in meeting minutes (LP&L and Ebasco, 1-2-76, Ref. 6) written by Ebasco.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS (Ref. 6)

These observations were made by LP&L to Ebasco at the end of the meeting.

- "All J. A. Jones responses and corrective action to non-conformances are to be accepted by Ebasco." - (Clarification: This means that LP&L will not accept a response from J. A. Jones or Ebasco unless the response and corrective action are also acceptable to Ebasco QA.)
- "Ebasco will be required to have site management conduct audits to see that programs developed for the corrective action are being implemented and adhered to."

I. EBASCO AUDIT REPORT JG-75-12-2 ON PLACEMENT 6 (Ref. 3, 4)

ITEM 4: "Not enough vibrators were provided for adequate vibration or to make provisions for breakdown of equipment."

J. A. Jones Response (Ref. 5):

"The approved Concrete Pour Plan dated November 26, 1985 specified that six (6) Electrical and three (3) Air-Driven Vibrators were planned for use on Pour #6. Just prior to pour, twelve (12) Electrical and ten (10) Air-Driven Vibrators were verified for frequency of vibration and certified for use on subject pour. During the actual pour, a total of twelve (12) Vibrators were in operation with ten (10) more as back-up directly adjacent to the pour area. J. A. Jones considers the allegation as stated unfounded."

Ebasco Response (Ref. 15):

"It has been verified by this department that 23 vibrators are available for subsequent placements and that the lack of vibrators would be highly unlikely in the event of equipment failure."

LP&L Resolution (Ref. 6):

"LP&L considered the response controversial."

No LP&L direction was provided and no additional correspondence or discussion followed. Therefore, it is presumed that the J.A. Jones and Ebasco responses to this item were ultimately accepted.

ITEM 5: "Workmen deviated from placing procedure; it was apparent that workmen were not cognizant with placing procedure."

J. A. Jones Response (Ref. 5):

"Subsequent to this pour, J. A. Jones instituted pre-pour meetings attended by all cognizant supervisory personnel to assure a complete understanding of the contents of J. A. Jones Work Procedure W-WP-7 and the applicable pour plan. J. A. Jones will continue these meetings and will place even greater emphasis on the contents of the placing procedures."

Resolution (Ref. 6)

"LP&L observed that the response appeared to be acceptable."

ITEM 12: It was observed that improper use of vibrators and insufficient vibration resulted in honeycomb.

Ebasco Response (Ref. 5):

"A formal training class was presented on December 16, 1975 by J. A. Jones Quality Engineering covering proper techniques for vibrator operators. This class, which presented the reasons for and the required method of vibrator operation, was attended by all operator personnel assigned to Pour #3 and those Construction Supervisors responsible for placement operations. Course contents, graphic illustrations and attendance has been documented and is available on request. It is our intention to conduct this training for any new vibrator operators assigned to subsequent concrete placement operations."

LP&L Resolution (Ref. 6):

"LP&L observed that the response appeared to be acceptable."

ITEM 13: "At times height of drop exceeded the 5 foot limit."

J. A. Jones Response (Ref. 5):

"Cognizant Construction Supervisory personnel have been counciled subsequent to this pour and fully understand that the dropping of concrete from a height of more than five (5) feet onto exposed reinforcing steel can cause separation of the aggregate. They have been further instructed that in the future it is mandatory that the approved procedural direction must be followed at all times."

LP&L Resolution (Ref. 6):

"J. A. Jones response must be in the form of written instructions similar to that described in Item 1 on Report W3S-75-63S. Objective evident of implementation is required. J. A. Jones complied via Ref. 14 which directed personnel to read and understand a) Ebasco Specification LOU-1564.472, Section II, b) J. A. Jones Concrete Pour Plan, and c) Concrete Placement and consolidation training session and class notes."

ITEM 16: "It was observed that for some loads that as much as 15 minutes elapsed before the discharge time was recorded; consequently an incorrect time was recorded."

Ebasco Response (Ref. 7):

"The time that is stamped on the batch ticket at the point of discharge is the discharge completion time."

"The driver will not leave until he has the ticket returned to him. A check of the batch tickets did not reveal any discrepancies. All trucks were discharged within the one hour time limit."

LP&L Resolution (Ref. 6):

"LP&L observed that the response appeared to be acceptable. Ebasco QA has verbally accepted the response." [Ebasco QA verbally accepted the Ebasco response in the LP&L - Ebasco meeting (1-2-76, Ref. 6), thereby satisfying LP&L's condition per GENERAL OBSERVATIONS No. 1.]

ITEM 21: "Improper handling of cylinders resulted in uncircular specimens, also Hi-Lo thermometers were not provided until late evening."

Ebasco Response (Ref. 7):

"All Inspection and Testing Personnel have been instructed as to the proper method of handling concrete test cylinders."

"The Hi-Lo thermometers have been mounted in the concrete cylinder curing boxes."

LP&L Resolution (Ref. 6):

"LP&L observed that the response appeared to be acceptable. Ebasco QA has verbally accepted the response."

ITEM 24: "Skip pan was observed to stand on top of the mat for several minutes prior to testing of the concrete which was in the skip pan."

Ebasco Response (Ref. 7):

"The skip pan was moved to the testing area as quickly as it was possible. There were a few times that the crane was being used for another operation and could not be used immediately but was released for the testing as soon as possible."

LP&L Resolution (Ref. 6):

"LP&L observed that the response appeared to be acceptable. Ebasco QA has verbally accepted the response."

ITEM 25: "Workmen were observed to shovel concrete from the ground into the pumps, thus contaminating the concrete with shell."

Ebasco Response (Ref. 7):

"Ebasco's Q.C. notified J.A. Jones during the placement that this was not permitted. J.A. Jones Superintendent instructed their personnel as to the requirements."

Ebasco Response (Ref. 15):

"It should be recognized that workmanship does have an effect on the quality of concrete, therefore, caution must be exercised to eliminate any possibilities of contamination. On subsequent placement the use of plywood should be utilized on the ground by the pumps."

LP&L Resolution (Ref. 6):

"LP&L observed that the response appeared to be acceptable. Ebasco QA has verbally accepted the response."

ITEM 26: "Documentation of tests and checklists were observed to be in error and omissions of data and signatures exists."

Ebasco Response (Ref. 7):

"Concrete testing and inspection personnel have been re-instructed in the proper use of forms. Subsequent placement reveals much improved documentation." ["Subsequent placements" refers to placements completed after audit report JG-75-12-2 was written.]

ITEM 26:

LP&L Resolution (Ref. 6):

"LP&L observed that the response appeared to be acceptable. Ebasco QA has verbally accepted the response."

II. LP&L-QA SITE SURVEILLANCE REPORT W3S-75-64S OBSERVATIONS (Ref. 2, 8)

ITEM 1: "Contrary to Section I Paragraph 10.9, concrete was placed even though it exceeded specification requirements."

Ebasco Response (Ref. 9):

"Section I, Article 10.9, of the Concrete Masonry Specification LOU 1564.472 gives a range of slumps for various types of construction. Our Concrete-Hydraulic Engineering Department interpreted this paragraph regarding slumps for the common mat foundation and provided the site with direction in memorandum from R. Vine/A. Wern to J.O. Booth dated November 24, 1984 (Ref. 6). This memorandum stated that slumps could range between 5 inches and 1 inch. This is consistent with the first paragraph of Section I, Article 10.9, which states that concrete shall be of a consistency and workability suitable for the conditions of the job. A review of the concrete Test Records, Form No. QCIP-7-2, show that only one batch of concrete (5-3/4 inch slump) was used for Block No. 499S02-6 that exceeded the specified requirements concerning slumps."

Ebasco Response (Ref. 12)

"Please refer to the supplemental response to Item 5 of Site Surveillance Report No. W3S-75-63S."

LP&L Resolution (Ref. 6)

"Memorandums of interpretation of specifications are to be on controlled distribution as discussed under Item 5 of the preceding report (i.e., W3S-75-63S)."

ITEM 2: "Contrary to Section II, Paragraph 5.9, concrete received disturbing shocks and vibrations from reinforcing steel which was set in motion by concrete pump discharges."

J. A. Jones Response (Ref. 10):

"The discrepancy was observed at the start of the pumping operation and was corrected prior to placing second lift of concrete which was vibrated into a homogeneous mix eliminating any detrimental effect on the placement."

ITEM 2:

"In the future, transport lines and conveying equipment will be properly supported and restrained to eliminate transporting shock to forms and embedded items in the placement. We have ordered additional concrete pipe fittings to install a shock absorber on the pump lines to help minimize this shock effect. (J. A. Jones purchase order No. 75-317/po311)"

ITEM 3: "Contrary to Section II, Paragraph 4.13, Concrete was inadequately vibrated."

J. A. Jones Response (Ref. 10):

"Adequate equipment for proper vibration of the concrete was on hand and the craft has been instructed in the proper use of the equipment with written instructions of required spacing between vibrating operations and depth of vibrations, copy attached (Ref. 17). The craft had inadequate experience in the use of the equipment resulting in some instances in inadequate vibration."

"We feel adequate instructions have since been presented to the craftsmen and that they have now gained more experience and a better understanding of why concrete is vibrated."

"We have experienced better workmanship on the subsequent pours and consequently, efficiency will increase throughout the life of the project."

LP&L Resolution (Ref. 6):

"Response acceptable."

ITEM 4: "Contrary to Section II, Paragraph 5.1, Curing water was not continuously maintained on all exposed surfaces."

J. A. Jones Response (Ref. 10):

"A crew of personnel have been assigned the sole task of continuous placement of water on all exposed concrete surfaces for the required period of seven (7) days."

"More areas will be covered with burlap in the future to aid in holding the moisture."

> "We feel that these corrective actions are sufficient to eliminate the problem completely. Additional personnel will be added as required."

LP&L Resolution (Ref. 6):

"Response acceptable."

ITEM 5: "Cont

"Contrary to ACI 318 - Rebar was improperly spaced in some areas of the placement."

J. A. Jones Response (Ref. 10):

"This deficiency was corrected at the time of placing concrete over the top mat except where resteel went through the bulkheads and interferences of embedded items and strongbacks would not allow us to reposition the bars."

"On subsequent pours, this is being watched more closely so that bars can be repositioned at the top of the bar and be within tolerances."

ITEM 6: "Personnel involved in placement activities were not aware of or failed to fo Jones Co., 'Concrete Pour Plan'."

J. A. Jones Res, Kef. 10):

"Due to poor communications on the first placement, all personnel were not supplied a copy of the Concrete Pour Plan, consequently, causing interpretation conflicts between the general work procedure for placing concrete and the specific Concrete Pour Plan for the specific pour."

"The concrete was placed over the entire area, however, by modifying lift depth, the concrete was kept alive and resulted in a slower pour rate but produced a satisfactory placement. This problem has been resolved by assuring that all personnel associated with the placement has a copy and understands the approved pour plan."

"We feel through training and work experience obtained through subsequent pours that the discrepancies have been greatly reduced and will continue to be improved as the work progresses."

LP&L Resolution (Ref. 6):

"Response acceptable."

ITEM 7: "Several Ebasco concrete test records (Form No. QCIP-7-2, 11-30-75) were not completely filled out."

Ebasco Response (Ref. 9):

"Concrete Test Records for Block No. 499S02-6 have been reviewed by the Quality Control Civil Supervisor. Incomplete information was retrieved, where possible, and recorded. This was the first permanent plant concrete for this project, and prior to the next placement, our Quality Control personnel were instructed and are required to record all data on the forms as the work is being performed. A review of our records for subsequent Blocks No. 499S02-1 and 499S02-2 indicates that this is being accomplished. As further assurance that concrete is satisfactory, 27 of 30 test cylinders broke in excess of 4,000 psi with the lowest of the remainder being 3,530 psi."

LP&L Resolution (Ref. 6):

"Response acceptable."

III. LP&L-QA SITE SURVEILLANCE REPORT W3S-75-63S OBSERVATION (Ref. 2, 11)

ITEM 1: "Rejected concrete being used."

ITEM 2: "Ebasco inspector's rejection of concrete overridden by Ebasco QC Supervisor."

Ebasco Response (Ref. 9):

"Items 1 & 2 No rejected concrete was used in Block No. 499S02-2. Our understanding of these two items is that LP&L is concerned about one truck load of concrete which was initially rejected by our Quality Control Inspector and later allowed to be used. This incident occurred once with Batch No. 001441. Upon arrival at the site, a visual inspection of this load indicated that it probably had a high slump; consequently, a slump test was performed. The results were 7-3/4 inches and the Quality Control Inspector rejected the load for placement at that time. The truck stood turning its drum at agitating speed. After a period of time, which did not exceed the one hour limit, the Quality Control Civil Supervisor visually examined this load of concrete and judged the slump to be less than 5 inches and the concrete acceptable for placement. The load was subsequently used in the placement."

"It is the responsibility of the Quality Control Supervisor to review the evaluations/decisions of inspectors under his supervision. In this regard, we feel that his decision to override the Inspector was correct. We have instructed all Ebasco Q.C. personnel this date to have verification tests made on questionable items prior to release for use."

Supplemental Ebasco Response (Ref. 12):

"The Sr. Quality Control Supervisor via written memorandum dated December 18, 1975, has instructed the Quality Control Engineers, Supervisors, and Inspectors to perform verification tests on suspect materials prior to release for use."

LP&L Resolution (Ref. 6):

"The Ebasco position is acceptable provided the instructions to Ebasco QC Personnel are in writing indicating the date that the instructions are to be implemented and executed by the responsible individual in Ebasco for implementation."

ITEM 3: "Concrete allowed to be placed that could not be vibrated under rebar.

J. A. Jones Response (Ref.13):

"Concrete found to be too stiff for proper placing, at the point of placement, was rejected and the concrete already delivered and placed in the form was mixed with higher slump mixed concrete and vibrated to place properly around the reinforcing steel."

"In the future, concrete entering our conveying equipment will be more closely observed and concrete of a consistency too thick for proper placement will be rejected and not placed in the form."

LP&L Resolution (Ref. 6):

"J. A. Jones is to issue written instructions similar to those defined in Items 1 and 2 for implementation. Also change "will" to "shall" in the response."

ITEM 4: "Concrete being vibrated in order to flow from truck chute."

J. A. Jones Response (Ref. 13):

"J. A. Jones' Supervisor rejected the truck as soon as it was observed that the concrete did not flow from the truck chute. Instructed dump man not to dump concrete into conveying equipment that will not readily flow from truck chute. Vibrators should not be used to assist concrete to flow down truck chutes."

Ebasco Response (Ref. 9):

"This item has been reviewed with the Ebasco QC personnel, and although inspectors were deployed in accordance with placement plan, no one from Ebasco observed the use of a vibrator to assist the flow of concrete from a truck chute. However, instructions have been issued to Ebasco QC personnel that this practice is not allowed."

Supplemental Ebasco Response (Ref. 12):

"In the same memorandum as referenced above, the Sr. Quality Control Supervisor has instructed the Quality Control personnel that the use of a vibrator to assist the flow of concrete from a truck chute is not allowed at this project."

ITEM 5: "Continuous use of low slump out of specification concrete after being warned by LP&L. (Had to have QA Corporation at Placement to correct)."

Ebasco Response (Ref. 9):

"A review of the Concrete Test Records for Block No. 2 does not reveal a continuous use of low slump, out-of-specification concrete. Of 41 slump tests that were performed, our records indicate that only three (3) batches of concrete exhibited unusually low slumps. Batch 001444 had a slump of 1-1/4 inches; Batch 001536, 1 inch; and Batch 001550, 1-1/2 inches. Although these slumps are low, they are within the ranges given in Concrete Masonry Specification LOU 1564.472, Section I, Paragraph 10.9 as interpreted by the Ebasco Concrete-Hydraulics Department in R. Vine/A. Wern's memorandum dated November 24, 1975, attached hereto."

Supplemental Ebasco Response (Ref. 12):

"As agreed, Ebasco shall initiate a program to control memorandums which contain an interpretation of an engineering document. The procedure for this shall be described in a revision to ASP-III-2, "Site Document Control". The date of full compliance for this commitment is February 2, 1976."

LP&L Resolution (Ref. 6):

"Response is OK. A procedure will be developed for controlled distribution of interpretations of specifications. The appropriate QC procedure for document control must be revised."

ITEM 6: "Concrete being controlled before pump hoppers by J.A. Jones."

Ebasco Response (Ref. 9)

"Our Quality Control Inspectors were controlling the acceptance or rejection of concrete. J. A. Jones personnel were observing the delivered concrete for workability, and they were requesting through Ebasco Q.C. Inspectors the addition of water as necessary to obtain workability. Water was added to approximately 35 percent of truck loads used in this placement. One addition of water to the concrete is permitted by the specifications. This addition of water is controlled within the limits of the w/c ratio established for Concrete Mix No. 14A6 which is being used for the common mat foundation."

ITEM 6:

LP&L Resolution (Ref. 6):

"Response accepted. Ebasco will discuss this matter in detail with QA Corporation."

ITEM 7: "Dry Concrete being removed from discharge hose and being permitted to drop in placement area. (Was made to remove by LP&L)."

J. A. Jones Response (Ref. 13):

"Concrete of a consistency too stiff to be conveyed by the pump was discharged into the conveying equipment consequently plugging the line. During the operation of breaking down and clearing the plugged line, concrete was allowed to drop through the top mat. This concrete was removed prior to placing concrete in the immediate area."

"In the future, when a transport line becomes plugged, the area underneath the cleaning operation on the top mat will be covered to prevent the concrete dropping through the top mat into the pour area. The concrete will be removed from the protective cover and discarded."

LP&L Resolution (Ref. 6):

"J. A. Jones must write a procedure governing the response to be acceptable."

ITEM 8: "Improper Placement of Concrete."

J. A. Jones Response (Ref. 13):

"Concrete was generally placed in accordance with our approved pour plan. The discrepancies noted were corrected on the spot resulting in a concrete placement in a workmanship-like manner. We are continuing to teach our people the proper pouring and placing techniques which will continue throughout the life of the project."

LP&L Resolution (Ref. 6):

"The response should make reference to the Training Course to be acceptable."

ITEM 9: "Inadequate supervision by J. A. Jones."

J. A. Jones Response (Ref. 13):

"During this initial training phase and observation of craft capabilities, J.A. Jones had increased top line supervision to expedite the training cycle."

"Through this effort, we anticipate added assurance that procedures will be followed. Labor unions have been contacted and requested to supply craftsmen with capabilities more in line with the task to be performed. We have their assurance that this request will be granted in all cases possible."

LP&L Resolution (Ref. 6):

"Response acceptable."

ITEM 10: "Inadequate supervision by Ebasco."

ITEM 11: "Corrective action not taken by some of Ebasco personnel after being brought to their attention by LP&L."

Ebasco Response (Ref. 9):

Items 10 & 11

"One Construction Supervisor, one Q.C. Civil Supervisor and nine Q. C. Civil Inspectors were assigned to each shift for this placement. The number of personnel assigned to Block No. 2 was consistent with our plans for project staffing. All Ebasco personnel are qualified by experience and education for work assigned to them and are receiving Q.C. training at the site to improve proficiency."

LP&L Resolution (Ref. 6):

"ITEM 10 - "Response acceptable." "ITEM 11 - "Response acceptable."

ITEM 12: "Complete failure by most to meet requirements of procedures and specifications."

Ebasco Response (Ref. 13):

"The general intent of the procedures and specifications were followed as close as work area and equipment would allow. The requirements of the procedures and specifications were known by the supervision directing the work and incidents of non-conformance by the inexperienced craftsmen were corrected as they occurred throughout the placement."

J. A. Jones Response (Ref. 9):

"The deviations that occurred during Concrete Block No. 2 were typical of the problems encountered with concrete work, particularly in the early stages. These deviations were addressed as they occurred and the necessary action was taken by Q.C. personnel to have the problems corrected and bring the deviation back into compliance. The records for Block No. 2 show that the Q.A. Program is functioning effectively, and the statement of "Complete failure ...to meet requirements of procedures and specifications" is not an accurate assessment. However, it is our intent to continue training with our personnel to furtner improve the effectiveness of the Q.A. Program at Waterford 3."

LP&L Resolution (Ref. 6):

"Response acceptable ... "

ITEM 13: "No evaluation of crack growth in west wall of pour #6 until brought to the attention of supervisors by LP&L."

Ebasco Response (Ref. 9):

"Cracks which were observed by our Quality Control Inspectors were mapped, and a discrepancy notice was prepared. These cracks were evaluated with New York Engineering and determined to be surface cracks. Disposition was provided by the Senior Resident Engineer to remove the cracks by chipping and this was completed and reinspected the day before placing concrete. It is our understanding that a crack was detected by LP&L on the morning of the placement. This crack was also removed immediately after discovery prior to placing concrete."

ITEM 13:

Ebasco Response (Ref. 12):

"As a follow-up to this item, the Sr. Quality Control Supervisor via written memorandum dated December 18, 1975, has instructed the Ebasco Quality Control placing inspector to inspect, just prior to start of a concrete placement, existing concrete surfaces for cracks."

LP&L Resolution (Ref. 6):

"The Ebasco check sheet used by QC Inspectors is to be revised to include a check for shrinkage cracks in the pre-placement inspection."

REFERENCES

- SWO #1, issued to Booth (Ebasco Services, Inc.) by LP&L. December 16, 1975.
- SWO #1, transmittal letter LP&L-4503 to R. K. Stampley from R. J. Meyer. December 17, 1975.
- Ebasco QA Engineering Audit Report JG-75-12-2 on Placement 6. December 2, 1975.
- Ebasco letter W3QA-230 transmitting Ref. 3 to J. A. Jones. December 9, 1975.
- J. A. Jones reply to Ref. 4, Greathouse to Hussain. December 17, 1975.
- Meeting minutes on SWO #1. January 2, 1976.
- Ebasco memoranda (unnumbered) Booth/Griggs to Hartnett. December 15, 1975.
- LP&L QA Site Surveillance Report W3S-75-64S by Gerrets. December 2, 1975.
- Ebasco letter F-4614, Booth to Meyer (LP&L). December 17, 1975
- 1Al letter 75-317(J)A&G #59, Leonard to Booth (Ebasco). December 17, 1975.
- LP&L QA Site Surveillance Report W3S-75-63S, by B.P. Brown. December 11, 1975.
- Ebasco letter F-4618, Booth to Meyer (LP&L). December 18, 1975.
- J. A. Jones letter 75-317(J)A&E #58, Leonard to Booth (Ebasco). December 17, 1975.
- J. A. Jones Directive from Leonard to all personnel involved in the placement of concrete. December 18, 1975.

REFERENCES (Continued)

- Ebasco Materials Engineering and Quality Compliance Report No. W3QA-241. December 18, 1975.
- Ebasco memorandum Vine/Wern to Booth. November 24, 1975.
- 17. Concrete Placement and Consolidation Training Session Class Notes.

12. a) Were any cracks discovered in 1977 outside of the ringwall? Provide documentation. b' If none were discovered outside ringwall why not infer that these three blocks were poorly constructed?

Response: Ebasco 12a)

Nc, the only NCRs generated against "cracking" are as follows:

- NCR #W3-535 supplement 1-3 was initiated 7/28/77. This NCR deals with cracking inside RCB only. (see attached)
- NCR #W3-6212 was initiated 5/11/83. This NCR deals with cracking in the RAB. (see attached)

Also see answer to Question #8

Response: Ebasco 12b)

The implementation of the Quality Program in the construction of the base mat assures that all blocks are properly constructed. Procedural deficiencies identified during the placement of the first 3 blocks were corrected at the time at the direction of Quality Program personnel.

It is the applicant's position that the mat is properly constructed, that hairline cracks which may be penetrated by moisture are normal and not an indicator of any deficient condition, and that the mat is fully capable of performing satisfactorily for the life of the plant.

W3-5	335- Supt #1 2 NONCONFO	TY ASSURANCE	Dis Whi Yel	tribution: te - PQAE or Site QA Supervis low - Organization recommendin disposition
NSTRUCTIONS: (See back	Pin	k - Initiator of NCR		
CLIENT OR PROJECT (2) Waterford SES Ur	it #3		DRAWING NO./SPE	EC NO. (3)
SUPPLIER, CONSTRUCTION QC	OR CONTRACTOR (4)	P.O. NO. (3)	PSAR Section 5.2.2.10	
Common Foundatio	PART OR SYSTEM (6)			
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DISPOSITION FOR NONCONFORMANCE W3-535

In order to establish a method of repair, perform the following operations and resubmit the nonconformance with results.

- A. Drill and grout in place three 1/8" pipe nipples to a depth of two-three inches. The above to be performed on at least two cracks. Pipe nipples to be approximately 8" -2" c.c.
- B. Seal the surface of the crack using a quick setting epoxy. A window may be provided between selected nipples in order to monitor the flow of epoxy which is to be injected as follows.
- C. Pressure inject Concressive 1380 epoxy as manufactured by Adhesive Engineering into the middle pipe nipple. Grouting pressure to be increased gradually as required to make the epoxy flow. Maximum pressure to be used is 180 PSI. New York Engineering (ESSE) to witness the grouting operation and provide final disposition of nonconformance.

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SUPPLEMENT TO NCR W3-535

EVALUATION

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Rev. 1

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August 3, 1977

After an unsuccessfull attempt at pressure injecting epoxy grout into the cracks, the following procedure should be used to effectively control the leakage or weeping of water through the cracks.

1 - Chip a 1" deep trench along the length of the crack.

- 2 Roughen (by sandblasting or bush hammer) and clean the surface thoroughly along the crack as well as a 1 ft. strip on either side of the crack.
- 3 Fill the l" deep trench with SIKA Hi-Mod-LV epoxy which may be used as a seal coat in the dry, damp or wet area in accordance with manufacturer instructions and surface preparation.

4 - After the epoxy is tack free, apply a brush coat of the Hi-Mod-LV to the roughened and clean surface 2 ft. wide along the crack length.

5 - Monitor the repairs for 1 day to visually inspect that leakage has ceased to penetrate the cracks. At this time, the concrete placements may continue.

Hi- MOD W/ quarte Aggre filler

EJJallagher



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W3-535

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The attached evaluation sheet for epoxy grout repairs does not affect the original disposition of this nonconformance report.

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SUPPLEMENT #2 TO NCR W3-535

August 5, 1977

All cracks in placement 502-6 have been inspected and found satisfactorily repaired according to the outlined procedure in supplement #1 of NCR W3-535. There is no indication of water weeping since the application of the SIKA Hi-Mod epoxy. All subsequent cracks detailed on the attached mat drawing should be repaired in an identical manner.

Placement 502-6 may proceed after Quality Control performs normal pre-placement inspection.

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E. J. Gallagher Civil Site Support Engineer

	Supp #3 NONCONFO	TY ASSURANCE		White - P Yellow - O d Pink - In	n: PQAE or Site QA Supervi Irganization recommendi ispasition nitiator of NCR
Waterford SES - Unit	No 3		DRAWING NO	SPEC NO.	(3)
WATEFIOTE SES - UNIT NO 3 UPPLIER, CONSTRUCTION QC OR CONTRACTOR (4) [P.O. NO (5)			PSAR Section 5.2.2.10		
Construction					
Common Foundation Mat	Within the RCB Wall				
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NONCONFORMANCE REPORT CLOSURE VERIFICATION

NCR No. W3-535 and Sup REINSPECTION: X Required Not Required Repair or rework to be witnessed by Ebasco's Q.C. Inspector XYes No Corrective Action Taken (Use sketch if necessary) the subject surface cracks on the mat withen the Reactor Blog love been satisfactority repaired in accordance and supplement to NCR CU3-535 Sitted aux 3. 1977. 7/2 insection too been performed & indicates successful of water from the crock any weeper to verify the above 5 placements 7 the 14 C Halleyle Alt. On 8/18/17 were NCR W3- 535 F. desposite 1 4 Edalla Contractor's Q.C. Inspector MA Jate Accept Ebasco's Q.C. Inspector Date C Reject

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Form No. ASP-III-7-4 (3-16-76)

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EVALUATION OF DISPOSITION TO NCR SUPPL. #3 w3-535

The newly identified cracks which are indicated by the dashed line on the attached sketch, are to be sealed and repaired according to the Supplement #2 attached to NCR W3-535. All such cracks beneath a specific concrete placement must be sealed and dry prior to concrete placement. These cracks, after being repaired, will not cause any further effect on the structural capabilities of the foundation mat. If any of the construction joints indicate leakage, the entire construction joint is to be sealed until all leakage ceases.

Quality Control should carefully inspect the cracks prior to placement to verify that no cracks have been missed due to surface dust or placement equipment and that the cracks that have been repaired are not continuing to leak.

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E. Gallagher 8-26-77 Site Concrete-Hydraulics Engineer

9.11 /3.77	EBASCO SERVIC	ES INCORPORATED	Distribution: White - POAE or Site QA Supervisor					
1) 2-621.		ASSURANCE DEPORT	Yellow - Organization recommending					
REPORT NO."	2 HORCORFORM	MANCE REFORT	disposition					
IN IUCTIONS: (See back of fo	TEND TREND CODE: 2	000.00.69 SUS# 95	C Pink - Initiator of NCR					
CLIENT OR PROJECT (2)		DRAWIN	DRAWING NO./SPEC NO. (3)					
WATERFORD SES UNIT NO. 3			F.S.A.R					
SUPPLIER, CONSTRUCTION QC OR CONTRACTOR (4) P.O. NO. (5)								
J.A. JONES CONSTRUCTION CO. 193-114-4								
DESCRIPTION OF COMPONENT, PAP								
I. DESCRIPTION OF NONCON	FORMANCE (7) (Items Involved,	Specification, Code or Stand	ard to Which Items Do Not Comply,					
	Submit Sketch 1	If Applicable)						
There are concrete cracks in the base mat of the Reactor Auxiliary Building. This								
is evidence by the per	colation of water in s	mall amounts, up thro	ugh these cracks.					
These cracks are locat	These cracks are located in the Gas Surge Tank Room, Waste Gas Tank Room, and Waste							
Gas Compressor "B" Roo	m, all at elevation -3	5.00. See attached F	.S.A.R. requirements					
for supplemental infor	mation. NOTE: These	are examples of where	cracks were found.					
TTTEM 20. 14 3								
NAME AND SIGNATURE OF PERSON R	PORTING NONCONFORMANCE 18	TITLE/COMPANY	DATE (9)					
S. Forton Sam 2	reton	Q.A. Surv. Engr./	Ebasco 5-11-83					
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WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3

3.4 WATER LEVEL (FLOOD) DESIGN

3.4.1 FLOOD PROTECTION

All seismic Category I structures, safety-related systems, and components necessary for safe shutdown are located within the Nuclear Plant Island Structure (NPIS), which is designed against high water levels and wave run-up associated with probable maximum flood (PMF) to elevation +30.0 ft. MSL. The NPIS is a reinforced concrete box structure with solid exterior walls with few doors and penetrations. All exterior doors in the lant grade structures which house and protect safety related equipment and pene-tr! s how el on the north side around ith the Category components are protected against PMF by the following:

The NPIS is the common structure of Reactor Building, Reactor Auxiliary Building, Fuel Handling Building and Component Cooling Water System Structure. It is a rectangular box-like reinforced concrete structure 380 ft. long, 267 ft. wide and extending 64.5 ft. below grade. The general structural layout is shown in Figure 3.8-1. Its common foundation mat and exterior wall system are designed to withstand all loadings of postulated floods as well as to provide a watertight barrier.

The common foundation mat is 12 ft. minimum in thickness and provided with double layers of nine inch PVC waterstop at all construction joints. The walls subjected to floods are waterproofed up to plant grade. In addition, vertical construction joints of the walls between plant grade and elevation +30.00 ft. MSL are provided with minimum six inch PVC waterstops (Figure 3.4-1). Uplift forces created by the PMF to elevation +30.0 ft. MSL are accounted for in the design as described in Subsections 3.8.4.3.1 and 3.8.4.3.2.

b)

a)

Housing within another structure (NPIS) designed to protect against flooding. The Reactor Building is enclosed within the NPIS and is thus protected against PMF.

Table 3.2-1 lists the flood protection criteria applied to plant structures, systems and components. The a or b designation in the table refers to item a or b above.

Figure 3.4-1 shows details of penetration, waterproofing and waterstops for the exterior walls of seismic Category I structures.

All exterior doors of the NPIS at plant grade or below the PMF elevation, which house and protect safety related equipment, are designed to withstand the hydrostatic pressures due to PMF and are watertight. The doors, which are located in the Reactor Auxiliary Building, are swing type (single or double) for protection against tornado missiles and PMF. The doors are made watertight by continuous neoprene gasket on the inner face and sealed by the

mendment No. 2, (3/79

3.4-1

use of eight quarter-turn latch and dog devices placed around the perimeter of the door as shown in Figure 3.4-2.

There are a total of eight watertight access doors below elevation +30.0 ft. MSL. In the Reactor Auxiliary Building there are three of the flood doors located in the east exterior wall, and two located in the west exterior wall above elevation +21.0 ft. MSL (Figure 1.2-9). In the Component Cooling Water System area there is one flood door located in the west exterior wall above elevation +21.0 ft. MSL (Figure 1.2-24). In the Fuel Building area there is one removable watertight gate located by the spent fuel cast decontainmination area above elevation +20.0 ft. MSL (Figures

P36) 3 3 F aratias bela tions below al vanion 130.1 st 151 and shown in Drawings 4001364 A to SOG 5-56 to 57 in 99501 5 SOI. The penetrations in erior walts of Component Cooling Water System structure are there in Sections A-A, B-B and E-E of Drawings G-499SC4 to SO6. Those in the exterior walls of Reactor Auxiliary Buildings are shown in Sections A-A, B-B and F-F of Drawings G-565 to 567. Those in the walls subjected to flood in Fuel Handling Building are shown in Sections B-B, C-C, F-F and Y-Y of Drawings G-593SO1 to SO3. Some of the penetrations are located in the temporary blockout as indicated in the drawings. All the temporary blackouts are provided with keyways and continuous PVC waterstop to assure watertightness and they are placed and filled with concrete after pipe installation. A typical detail of waterproofing membrane at pipe penetration is shown in FSAR Figure 3.4-1 and Drawing LOU1564 G-499805. (Drawings submitted under separate cover). The NPIS is designed to withstand ydrostatic loadings due to postulated floods, and water leakage because of cracks in exterior structures, leaking waterstop and/or wind wave action is not expected. In the NPIS is also provided with floor drainage system capable of disposing the accumulated water through the waste management system (Refer to Section 11.2).

As discussed in Subsection 2.4.14, additional specific provisions for flood protection include administrative procedures to assure that all watertight doors below elevation +30.0 ft. MSL will be locked closed in the event of a flood warning.

3.4.2 ANALYSIS PROCEDURES

The maximum water level in front of the Nuclear Plant Island Structure following a collapse of the Mississippi River levee in the immediate vicinity of the plant concurrent with the PMF and from windwaves superimposed on the overland PMH surge through Barataria Bay has been established in Section 2.4. It is calculated that the effective maximum water including dynamic head on the exterior wall is at elevation +27.6 ft. MSL. The NPIS is designed to withstand a static water level at elevation +30.0 ft. MSL, thus providing an adequate safety margin. in addition, the subject structure is designed to withstand a static water level at elevation +21.5 ft. MSL plus an additional uniform dynamic loading equivalent to 500 lb per sq. ft. of exposure below elevation +21.5 ft. MSL.

'n the design of walls and foundation slab of NPIS, the loads under flood condition are considered using the following load combination equation.

Amendment No. 17, (4/81)

2

1

1

17

1



ATTACHMENT III

The effect of postulated widespread hairline cracking of the basemat has been investigated by Civil Engineering for stability of the Containment Vessel against flotation and overturning under buoyant conditions caused by postulated groundwater intrusion and by Corrosion Engineering for groundwater induced corrosion of reinforcing steel and Containment Vessel bottom head. These were the chey Petertian Pacifiem there I Den TIPLES IN THE INVESTIGATION.

Based on their findings that there are no stability or corrosion problems it is concluded that no corrective action is required.

See attached memorandums:

- Memorandum COR-LW3-77-55M from A.W. Peabody/M.D. Oliveira to P. Grossman, dated August 5, 1977.
- 2. Memorandum from P.C. Liu to B. Grant dated May 24, 1983.

5-2:5-83

NCR W3-6212 Page 1


NCR W3-6212 PAGE 2

August 5, 1977 COR-LW3-77-55M

To:

P Grossman Blues A. W. Peabody A W Peabody/M D Oliveir

From:

Subject: LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY WATERFORD SES UNIT 3 CORROSION OF REINFORCING STEEL AND STEEL CONTAINMENT VESSEL PLATES IN CONTACT WITH WATER

In accordance with your telephone request, we have analysed a possible situation in the common mat where supposedly ground water weeping from concrete cracks found on the surface of the mat could corrode the reinforcing steel and the outside bottom plates of the Steel Containment Vessel.

It is a proven fact that concrete by its alkaline nature passivates carbon steel embedded in it.

It is also known that water in contact with concrete becomes alkaline and consequently its corrosivity to steel decreases considerably.

In addition to these factors, assuming that ground water is left inside the crack network to a certain extent, this water will be near stagnant and without replenishment of oxygen. Consequently, the rate of corrosion under the above circumstances, if any, will be negligible. This applies to the reinforcing rebars as well as to the outside of the vessel bottom plates, in case the repairs presently being conducted do not fully prevent the water from reaching the vessel.

MDO/hn

cc: R K Stampley J O Booth/B D Fowler D N Galligan L Skoblar W F Gundaker





Rec'd 5/24/83

H To: B. GRANT - Call ×277 From: P C Live Interoffice Correspondence DATE May 24, 1983 PILE REF. File: 6-5-20 OFFICE LOCATION Waterford Site GUBJECT LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY WATERFORD SES UNIT NO. 3 STEEL CONTAINMENT STABILITY

This is to confirm our conversation that the steel containment stability has been reviewed for an imaginally condition that the exterior of the comtainment would subject to subsurface water up to SL-1.50 ft. The results of the tainment would subject to subsurface water up to SL-1.50 ft. The results of the tainment would subject to subsurface water up to SL-1.50 ft. The results of the tainment would subject to subsurface water up to SL-1.50 ft. The results of the tainment would subject to subsurface water up to SL-1.50 ft. The results of the tainment would subject to subsurface water up to SL-1.50 ft. The results of the tainment would subject to subsurface water up to SL-1.50 ft. The results of the tainment would subject to subsurface water up to SL-1.50 ft. The results of the tainment would subject to subsurface water up to SL-1.50 ft. The results of the tainment would subject to subsurface water up to SL-1.50 ft. The results of the tainment would subject to subsurface water up to SL-1.50 ft. The results of the tainment would subject to subsurface water up to SL-1.50 ft. The results of the tainment would subject to subsurface water up to SL-1.50 ft. The results of the tainment would subject to subsurface water up to SL-1.50 ft. The results of the tainment will not be compromised. The stability calculations will be included in Volume II, FSAR Design Input - 6W12-FSAR-002.

PCLidg

CC: G A Eanakaris E S Kowalski F C Liu Froject File

13. a) Did Kominsky recopy illegible cadwald records? b) Under whose direction? c) Why? d) What happened to the original records?

Response:

- a) Kaminski did recopy illegible cadweld records.
- b) It is not apparent that he received any specific direction to recopy the records.
- c) He has stated that while he was Supervisor of Inspection for J. A. Jones that "work sheets" were used during the actual inspection of cadwelds. Some of the records became dirty or wet. At the end of each shift or day, the information on the "work sheet" was transferred to a clean report by himself or another inspector.
- d) One inspector has stated that the originals were attached to recopied reports. However, LP&L has been unable to locate the originals of the inspection reports.

a) Provide summary of actions taken following Hill's presentation of QA deficiencies.
b) Provide detailed report on document review undertaken and all results.

Response: 14 (a)

Deficiencies discovered by Hill were being aggressively addressed even before he left the Waterford 3 site.

- On June 8, 1983, Hill's supervisor forwarded his June 6, 1983 memorandum to the Ebasco Site QA Program Manager and recommended that the scope of the concrete records review be expanded.
- In a meeting of July 7, 1983, Hill recommended that all concrete placement packages and soil packages be reviewed.
- On July 11, 1983, project management decided to review a 10% sample of the concrete placement packages, and LP&L directed Ebasco to begin the review. (NOTE: Hill left the site on July 31, 1983).
- 4. In August 1983, the review of concrete placement packages was begun. In September, 1983, the review program was expanded to include 100% of the concrete placement packages. The review is now complete and 33 new NCRs were written as a result of this review, none of which identified significant physical deficiencies and all of which have been properly dispositioned.
- 5. Soils and backfill records were previously subjected to a comprehensive review by Ebasco. All records were reviewed for existance of required records, their completeness, and for proper organization by elevation and fill number. Approximately 50% of the records were re-reviewed for technical adequacy. No additional soils non-conformances were identified.
- 6. To gain an even greater level of confidence, LP&L personnel, in accordance with standard procedures, are currently performing additional reviews of concrete placement and backfill records. Certain types of civil records are being 100% reviewed by LP&L during this review process.

Response: LP&L 14b)

In August of 1983, four (4) Ebasco Sr. QA specialists were requested to report to Waterford III. The scope of this request was to take a 10% sampling of J.A. Jones Concrete Placement packages and to do an unbiased cursory review (based on the individuals past background of other jobsites civil documentation) to establish an understanding of the general condition of the packages with respect to records accuracy, completeness, legibility and adequacy of record availability. Following a brief orientation period, the 10% review and summary was conducted. The sampling included 100% of the base mat placement packages and a selection from the Fuel Handling Bldg., Reactor Auxiliary Bldg, Shield, Dome, Ringwall and the Reactor Containment Bldg.

The recommendation proposed to Ebasco/LP&L top management after the review, based on the general concerns noted, was that a 100% review should be performed prior to these packages being turned over to the client.

A brief synopsis of the concerns noted in this initial review is as follows:

- Some packages had embed logs which, at the time, were not obtainable in the package.
- Some packages had cadweld maps which, at the time, were not obtainable in the package.
- Some packages had missing concrete test records which at the time were not obtainable in the package.
- 4. Some packages had curing records which were inadequate.
- 5. Some packages had concrete mix designs which were indicated as being used but which had no apparent engineering approvals.
- Some packages had no traceability as to which concrete mix design was used.
- Some packages had batch tickets which, at the time, were not obtainable in the package.
- Some packages had problems with respect to the timely certification of inspectors.

Following this 10% sampling review, Ebasco and LP&L management agreed that a 100% review of these records was essential. A new review group was formed in September 1983, (which consisted of two (2) of the original reviewers and four (4) other participants). This group, for a two (2) week period, scanned applicable procedures, specifications, and standards in order to establish a review procedure which would assure a uniform and

Response: LP&L (14b Continued)

acceptable method for the review of packages involved. This procedure (QA-9 Supplement 48-3), which formed the basis for the review, also established acceptance criteria for the review. The following are examples of the minimum records which were required.

- 1. Preplacement checklist
- 2. Placement checklist
- 3. Field Test Records
- 4. Lab Reports
- 5. Repair Documents

Items within the scope of these records which required review, as a minimum, were items such as:

- 1. Personnel certifications
- 2. Curing Adequacy
- 3. DNs, DRs, and NCRs which were initiated and closed where applicable
- 4. Concrete placed was approved for use
- 5. Testing and results were acceptable
- 6. Documentation was legible and complete

NOTE: Also taken into consideration was. The fact that, during the mat placements, Ebasco performed independent Quality Control functions. When J.A. Jones records were not available, Ebasco duplicate inspections were substituted per Ebasco Procedure QAI-9 Rev. O Para. 6.1.4 which states, "In case of illegible or missing Jones documentation, the parallel Ebasco QC Inspection can be utilized as supporting documentation . . ." During the 10% review, this duplication was not taken into consideration.

During the 10% sample review, many items appeared to be discrepant. The 100% review resolved many of these apparent discrepancies. Some examples are as follows:

- 1. Missing records were retrieved from applicable contractors records.
- Missing records were retrieved from other placement packages (misfiled).
- 3. Missing records were retrieved due to misfiling in the vault.
- Since some placements were conducted at the same time as others, 4. missing records were retrieved from other packages. (i.e.) If placement No. 10 and 11 were placed together the records generated would reference both placement numbers. The inspector would make (1) one copy of each record and compile (2) two packages. (1) one package would be No. 10 and (1) one No. 11. The placement number pertaining to each unique package would be circled or in some cases highlighted to show which set of records went to which package. While during the review, if the package had, for instance, a preplacement record missing for placement No. 10, he would look at another record that was obtainable in package No. 10 to determine if another placement occurred at the same time. If, for instance, he looked at a postplacement record in No. 10 and saw that No. 11 was also entered on this document, the reviewer would go to package No. 11, pull the missing preplacement record, copy, and place this document into package No 10-thus making a completed package.

Response: LP&L (14b Continued)

4. Finally at the conclusion of this reorganization and review of these Civil Records, 33 Nonconformance Reports were generated, which adequately documented discrepancies outstanding. The following are the discrepancies which were documented as a result of the review. Some of these areas were covered under other reviews in the past, however, since this review was a 100% re-review, new documentation was initiated.

Although every placement has been documented in this manner, the following listing <u>only</u> deals with the Basemat. Discrepancies <u>not</u> noted within the following seven (7) NCRs generated against the basemat were either satisfactorily corrected prior to the conclusion of this review (or) were satisfactorily identified on previous NCRs. (See the response to Question 1).

NCR #W3-7152 (Eye Exams)

- Description (4) Jones Inspectors performed inspection prior to having eye exam on file (10) common foundation structures.
- Disposition Two of the four inspectors were certified on 11-24-75 and 11-26-75 apparently eye exams lost. Other two inspectors listed on NCR#W3-7150.

NCR #W3-7153 (Cold Weather Cure)

- Description Surface temp. of concrete dropped below 50° on (6) occasions and ambient below 45° on (19) occasions without notifying engineering or an NCR written.
- Disposition ACI require concrete to be maintained to a min. of 40° for Class I structure 72" thick lowest temp. recorded was 42°. Test results on 28 days exceeded 5000 psi therefore on (6) occasions this did not affect the 4000 psi required strength.

NCR #W3-7154 (Cure Records)

- Description On (19) nineteen placements records of curing are not complete
- Disposition Method of curing is on Jones Inspection Reports and on Pour Plans. No average temperature occurred to prevent hydration. Cure records shown that moisture was sufficient for proper curing.

NCR #W3-7353 (Mix Design)

Description Mix designs were used without engineering approval

Disposition Mix designs were approved by engineering. Mix design number was apparently misprinted batch tickets give quantities. Response: LP&L (14b Continued)

NCR #W3-7150 (No Certification on File)

- Description (2) Jones Inspectors performed inspection without certification on file
- Disposition Resumes and Dual Inspections by Ebasco rendered work as being acceptable.
- NCR #W3-7149 (Inspectors Certifications)
- Description Six inspectors performed inspections prior to certification
- Disposition Use-as-is based on prior experience/training and currently have records of completing certification
- NCR #W3-7151 (Eye Exams)
- Description (9) Jones inspectors performed inspections prior to eye exams
- Disposition (9) Jones inspectors have exam after the fact. Eye sight usually gets worse rather than better without corrective means

After the review of packages was concluded, but prior to turnover, additional steps were taken to aid in future handling of subject packages. All concrete placement package numbers as well as all DNs, DRs and NCRs were entered into the Waterford III Site computer program. Printouts were developed to aid in package retrievability as well as traceability to discrepancies per package and total placement accountability. Other steps taken were to compile various back-up record traceability through means of various record matrixes (see response to Question 20) to aid in the retrieval of applicable documents which are related although not generally found within the concrete placement package itself.

In January, 1984, records were turned over to the QA Records Vault as being completed for review and closure of corrective action.

15. Provide LP&L's evaluation of adequacy of Harstead's third report. Does LP&L assert that it represents their views as well?

Response

LP&L contracted with Harstead Engineering Associates (HEA) to perform a review of the records associated with the Basemat. Their review was independently performed and copies of the report (HEA 8304-3) were distributed in parallel to LP&L and the NRC.

LP&L has reviewed this report and concludes that the technical review of the records necessary to assure the adequacy of the Basemat was indeed performed by HEA. Further, LP&L strongly endorses the conclusions reached in HEA 8304-3, Harstead's third report. 16. Provide specific basis for Harstead's conclusion that the documentation problems do not affect their prior conclusion as to basemat's strength. What documents did Harstead review? What did he look at? Did he see the Phearson-Brigg memo? Hill's NCR's? Other NCR's?

Response:

HEA Report No. 8304-3, dated 01/09/84, summarizes the results of the review of construction documentation performed on behalf of Louisiana Power and Light Company.

The following items were reviewed:

- a) Concrete pour packages
- b) Cadwelding activities including testing
- c) Clam shell filter blanket under the basemat
- d) Waterstop splicing and testing

There are 28 concrete pour packages that make up the basemat: 499S02-1, 2, 3, 4, 5A, 5B, 6, 7A, 7B, 8A, 8B, 9A, 9B, 10A, 10B; 499S01-11A, 12A, 13A, 14A, 15; 499S03-11B, 12B, 13B, 14B, 16, 17, 18, 19.

Each concrete pour package contains the following documents.

- 1) Concrete pre-placement checklist record (J.A. Jones)
- 2) Concrete pre-placement checklist record (Ebasco)
- 3) Daily concrete inspection (Ebasco)
- 4) Concrete placement inspection (Ebasco)
- 5) Concrete curing log (J.A. Jones)
- 6) Concrete curing record (Ebasco)
- 7) Concrete test record (Ebasco)
- 8) Concrete physical tests (Ebasco)
- 9) Concrete pour plan (J. A. Jones)
- 10) Embed map log (J. A. Jones)
- 11) Cadwelded locations (as-built)
- 12) Requisition on warehouse
- 13) Concrete mix delivery tickets

These documents were reviewed in their entirety.

The following documents were totally or partially reviewed for the basemat cadwelds.

- 1) Daily cadweld inspection reports (J. A. Jones)
- 2) Cadweld daily inspection-visual (Ebasco)
- 3) Reports of tensile tests-cadweld splices (Ebasco)
- 4) Weekly cadweld or rebar test reports (J. A. Jones)

Emphasis was placed on a review of the tensile test reports and daily inspection reports.

Sections 4 and 5 of the referenced HEA report detail the review performed for items (c) and (d), the clam shell filter blanket and waterstop splicing.

Response: LP&L (16 Continued)

The Phearson - Griggs memo was not reviewed by HEA. It is not a formal document and was not contained either in Stop Work Order No. 1 or concrete pour package '499502-2.

However, a review of the Phearson memo was conducted by HEA at the Waterford site on March 24, 1984. A comparison was made between the issues raised in the Phearson memo (dated 12/15/75) and Stop Work Order No. 1 (dated 12/16/75).

HEA concludes that the issues raised in the Phearson memo are adequately addressed by Stop Work Order No. 1.

Response: LP&L (16 Continued)

Following is the list of NCR's that were reviewed by HEA.

NCR NO.	Title	Comment
W3-10	Concrete Placement	
W3-24	Pour 499S02-7A-Air Content	
W3-25	Pour 499S02-7A-Slump	
W3-26	Removal of Formwork	
W3-27	Placement 499S02-8A-Embedded Elephant Trunk	
W3-29	Foundation Mat-Air Content	
W3-31	Common Mat-Air Content	
W3-32	Coumon Mat-Number of Revolutions	
W3-33	Common Mat-Air Content	
W3-39	Common Mat-Strip #3, Section 10B	
W3-93	Common Mat-Placement No. 499803-19	
W3-5563	FHB Bridge Crane-Connection Tests	N.A.*
W3-5564	FHB Stairs-Welding and Bolting Inspection	N.A.*
	of Seismic Class I Stairs	
W3-5565	FHB Bridge Crane	N.A.*
W3-5598	Tubing	N.A.*
W3-5973	FHB Tornado Door Frame	N.A.*
W2-5997	Clam Shell Filter Blanket Under the Nuclear	
	Plant Island	
W3-5998	Production Cadwelding	
W3-6234	Cadwelding	
W3-6245	Daily Cadweld Inspection Reports	
W3-7149	Concrete Placement Packages-Common Foundation	
W3-7150	Concrete Placement Packages	
W3-7151	Concrete Placement Packages-Common Foundation	
W3-7152	Concrete Placement Packages-Common Foundation	
W3-7154	Concrete Placement Packages	
W3-7353	Concrete Placement Packages	
W3-7481	Cadweld Tensile Test Reports	

* Not applicable or related to Basemat

17. Provide differential settlement contours for 6 month periods, starting from early 1977 to present.

Response:

Attachments are provided which present differential settlement contours as available.

These attachments represent a period between April 1977, and August 1979.







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18. According to the settlement contours shown in figure 2.5.118 the curvature is concave downward in both directions. This implies cracks on the top surface in both directions which would not penetrate all the way through.

In view of the above why did the water seep thru? Why doesn't the crack pattern match the given differential settlement?

Is it possible that there are localized convex surfaces on the mat which are not shown in the figure (the grid is quite rough)?

Response: Ebasco

The crack pattern does follow generally the pattern of mat differential settlement. The contours of differential settlement show a pronounced greater convexity in the north-south direction than in the east-west. The general crack pattern lies east-west reflecting the pronounced north-south convexity.

The minor water seepage showing at some hairline cracks in the surface of the mat has been identified as originating at flexural cracks at the bottom of the mat and following embedded items which intersect these cracks, such as structural steel rebar support structures and conduit, horizontally and vertically through the mat to an intersection with hairline racks at the top of the mat.

Localized reversal of curvature (convex surface) may occur in the immediate vicinity of heavy loads. These may be undetected by the settlement monitoring program.

19. Please provide all soil properties (re. results of soil tests, reports confirmed compression test results, boring records, shear modulus, etc).

Response: Ebasco

Soil properties, boring logs, test reports and results are provided in FSAR Chapter 2.5 and Appendices.

20. Provide all concrete property data, rebar data, placement data, (i.e., also detailed as built drawings of mats).

Response: LP&L

Attachment "A" consists of a listing of documentation which typically exists in the Waterford 3 concrete placement packages. This documentation is available for review at the Waterford 3 site.

Attachment "B" provides a list of associated quality records generated (not filed in the placement packages) which can be found in other QA record vault locations.

Response: 20 Continued Attachment "A"

ATTACHMENT "A"

CONCRETE PACKAGE CONTENTS

I Required Documents

- A. Preplacement Checklist Records.
 - 1. Concrete
 - Α. Sandblast
 - Β. Greencut
 - C. Treatment

2. Forms

- A. Dimensions
- B. Line and Grade
- C. Clean
- D. Tight
- E. Braced
- F. Coating
- G. Chamfer Strips H. Key Ways
- I. Block Outs
- J. Whalers and Strongbacks K. Waterstops
- L. Release Agent
- 3. Reinforcing
 - Bar Quantity A.
 - Spacing Β.
 - с. Elevation
 - D. Cadweld Mapping
- 4. Embeds
 - A. Quantity
 - Line and Grade Β.
 - C. Elevation
 - Identification D.
- 5. General
 - A. Cleanliness
 - B. Instrumentation
 - Weather Protection C.

Response: 20 Continued Attachment "A"

ATTACHMENT "A" (Continued)

- B. Daily Concrete Inspection Report
 - 1. Q.V. Inspector
 - A. Placement Area/Location
 - B. Area/Location Released by Engineer
 - C. Concrete Delivery Acceptable
 - D. Concrete Placement Acceptable
 - E. Consolidation Acceptable
 - F. Finishing Acceptable
 - G. Curing Acceptable

C. Concrete Curing Log

- 1. Q.V. Inspector
 - A. Date
 - B. Time
 - C. Current Temperature
 - D. High Temp.
 - E. Low Temp.
 - F. Continuous Moisture
 - G. Maintain log for seven (7) days for Items A thru F
- D. Concrete Physical Test Records

Many Concrete Packages contain test records, but not all. A complete file of test records can be found in the vault arranged by placement dates.

E. Repair Documents

This documentation could be for such items as: repair of bent rebar, addition of stub-ups, or a possible weld repair on an embed plate. If there is any damage by whatever means, these items were documented.

II Support Documents

- A. Concrete Pour Plan
- B. Embed Map Log
- C. Cadweld Maps and Map Logs
- D. Requisitions on Warehouse
- E. Batch Tickets

ATTACHMENT "B"

- I Inspector Certifications
 - A. J.A. Jones
 - 1. Cadwelds
 - 2. Concrete Placement
 - B. Ebasco
 - 1. Batch Plant
 - 2. Concrete Test Station
 - 3. Placement
 - 4. Backfill

C. Barrow-Agee/Peabody/GEO

- 1. Concrete Lab
- 2. Concrete Field Testing
- 3. Concrete Batch Plant Insp. and Mix Design
- 4. Soils Lab and Field Testing
- 5. Rebar Tensile Testing

II Concrete Materials

A. MTLs Receiving Docs/Certs

- 1. Admixtures
- 2. Cement Types I & II Midlothian & Artesia
- 3. Aggregate

B. Materials Acceptance Tests

- 1. Calibration of Test Equipment
- 2. Test Reports on
 - a. water quality
 - b. sand daily, weekly, monthly, bi-annually
 - c. ½" daily, weekly, monthly, bi-annually
 - d. 1" daily, weekly, monthly, bi-annually
 - e. rebar pull tests (tensile)
 - Offsite test Reports
 - a, cement
 - b. water
 - c. ice
- 4. Cadweld tensile tests
- C. Miscellaneous

3.

- 1. DNs
- 2. DRs
- 3. NCRs

21. Provide any revised calculations that include settlement effects.

Response: Ebasco

No revised calculations were made. The original calculations included provisions for differential settlement effects utilizing variable spring constants to provide sufficient conservatism in the strength of the mat to accommodate differential settlements. 22. Is the Phearson memo accurate? What kind of actions has LP&L taken to respond to and resolve his allegations?

Response: LP&L

It is improper to characterize the content of the Phearson memorandum as "allegations." The LP&L and Ebasco QA Reports for basemat placements 6 and 2 include "findings" which are, in technical content, identical to the items listed in the Phearson memorandum, and other findings not included in the Phearson memorandum. To that extent, the Phearson memorandum may be characterized as "accurate," although the proper method of reporting these findings, the formal QA reporting process, was not followed by Phearson.

Since findings essentially identical to the Phearson findings were included in the official QA reports and since the QA reports required formal closure, the Phearson findings were effectively addressed through the formal QA process. These actions were taken regardless of the fact that LP&L was not even aware of the Phearson memorandum at the time corrective action was being carried out.

It is reasonable to conclude that Phearson himself was satisfied that adequate corrective action was taken since, to the best of LP&L and Ebasco knowledge, he did not ever formally report dissatisfaction with the corrective action, or recommend investigation of the quality of placements 6, 1, or 2 during the remainder of his tenure on the Waterford 3 project. Phearson left the project in mid April, 1976, some 4 months after issuance of Stop Work Order 1. 23. Memos of inspectors Hill and Davis, as reported in GAMBIT, stated that they found a broad range of deficiencies in virtually every record package examined and the situation demanded a complete review of all civil/ structural records. What is your response to this allegation?

Response

Messrs. Hill and Davis were document reviewers. Their assigned duty was to review construction records and to identify records deficiencies. Their memoranda identified records deficiencies. The deficiencies documented in their memoranda were appropriately entered into the programmatic process required by the Waterford 3 Quality Assurance Program to assure the proper dispositioning of such deficiencies. As a result of the memoranda, the records review program evolved to include a complete review of all civil/structural records.

Corrective action on deficiencies, identified during the expanded records review program, are now essentially complete. Little physical corrective action has been required. Also, see Response to Question 28. 24. GAMBIT reported that there was falsification on cadweld splices of reinforcing bars. What is LP&L's response to this allegation?

Response: LP&L

See attached Affadavit of Thomas F. Gerrets, dated January 12, 1984.

25. What were the problems in the seven NCR's on QA deficiencies in concrete, as mentioned in the last column on page 28 of GAMBIT, and how were they disposed of?

Note: GAMBIT (p.28) quotes Hill's memo as follows: "These NCR's are each broad in scope and identify multiple deficiencies."

Response: Ebasco

Hill's memo to Czyrko dated June 6, 1983 (Subject: Review of Seismic Class I Concrete Records) references

NCR W3-5563: Fuel Handling Building Bridge Crane NCR W3-5564: Fuel Handling Building Stairs NCR W3-5565: Fuel Handling Building Bridge Crane NCR-W3-5973: Fuel Handling Building Tornado Door NCR-W3-6245: Daily Cadweld Inspection Reports NCR-W3-5997: Clam Shell Filter Blanket NCR-WE-5998: Sample Splice Failure Rates

and describes these NCRs as examples of deficiencies discovered during a "Review of Seismic Class I Concrete Records".

The problems and disposition of these NCRs are as follows:

NCR W3-5563 (Fuel Handling Building Bridge Crane)

This NCR was written against Jane Ogea (trainee who was inspecting bolts on the FHB Bridge Crane on 11/6/79) and states that a trainee cannot implement, evaluate, or report inspections and test results. The disposition called for Ebasco QC to reinspect the questioned areas, Ebasco Engineering evaluated the recommended disposition and revised it to the following: J. Pertuit was to cosign applicable inspections by Ogea. Pertuit was her Level II Supervisor. As a result of this NCR, Pertuit submitted signed testimony dated 7/11/83 stating that he was present and supervised inspections by Ogea and this NCR was closed.

Note that this NCR has nothing to do with concrete or the common mat. It is not broad in scope and does not involve multiple deficiencies.

NCR W-3-5564 (Fuel Handling Building Stairs)

This NCR states that no welding or bolting inspection reports existed for the FHB stairs. The disposition instructs reinspection of bolting and welding. This reinspection was performed by Ebasco QC (Roger West) and was accepted. (Report # C-0032 dated 11/7/83)

Note that this NCR has nothing to do with concrete or the common mat. It is not broad in scope and does not involve multiple deficiencies.

Response: (25 Continued)

NCR-W3-5565 (Fuel Handling Building Bridge Crane)

This NCR is very similar to NCR W3-5563 in that it was written against Jane Ogea because her supervisor, J. Pertuit, neglected to cosign her inspection reports. As a result of this NCR, Pertuit submitted signed testimony dated 7/11/83 that he was present and supervised inspections by Ogea. On that basis, this NCR was closed. The inspections were on the crane reaving on 8/15/79 to 8/22/79.

Note that this NCR has nothing to do with concrete or the common mat. It is not broad in scope and does not involve multiple deficiencies.

NCR W3-5973 (Fuel Handling Building Tornado Door)

This NCR states that 1) inspector D. Noss was not a certified weld inspector, and 2) two welds on the door frame were first rejected and subsequently accepted without additional inspection reports.

The NCR was closed on the basis that both welds had previously passed RT and MT examinations and visual inspection was not necessary. It should be noted that D. Noss was technically qualified, by experience and education, at the time the inspections were performed, and was subsequently formally certified on 8/24/77.

Note that this NCR has nothing to do with concrete or the common mat. It is not broad in scope and does not involve multiple deficiencies.

NCR W3-6245 (Daily Cadweld Inspection Reports)

This NCR states that certain Daily Cadweld Inspection Reports have five (5) inspectors' signatures or initials with noticeable differences which renders their authenticity indeterminate.

The NCR was initially closed, on the basis that documentation was found which showed that the cadwelds were previously inspected and accepted. This closure accepted the cadwelds "As-Is" with no further corrective action.

Subsequently, the NCR was reopened and attachments 9, 10, 11, and 12 were added to the NCR package. These attachments included signed statements by Sam Horton, H. Don Ernst, Nicholas M. Donlick, and Leonard Kaminski giving explanations for the appearance of irregular signatures and confirming their authenticity. (Original documents were soiled in the field and were re-written.) See also the response to Question 13.

NCR W3-5997 (Clam Shell Filter Blanket)

This NCR is very lengthy (about 200 pages) and the NCR addresses 64 individual findings detailed in Attachment 1 to the NCR (copy attached).

Response: (25 Continued)

The NCR was closed after evaluation and satisfactory conclusions by the Site Soils Engineer. The bases for closure are detailed in Attachment IV of the NCR (copy attached).

It should be noted that the purpose of the clam shell filter was to ensure a uniform water pressure under the mat during recharge. Settlement data shows that settlement of the mat has stabilized with acceptable differential settling. Thus, it is concluded that the clam shell filter successfully fulfilled its primary purpose.

NCR-W3-5998 (Sample Splice Failure Tests)

This NCR finds that

- the failure rate in one group of sample splices exceeded the specification limit of 1 failure in 15 consecutive samples.
- 2) splicing was not terminated as required by the specification.
- 3) the cadwelder was not recertified as required by the specification.
- additional samples were not obtained and tested as required by the specification when the failure rate exceeds the specified limit.

The recommended disposition stated that the author of the NCR (G. Hill/ H. Savage) erred (miscounted) and in fact the failure was only 1 in 15, not 2 in 15 as stated. Consequently, it was not necessary to terminate the splicing, re-certify the cadwelder, or take additional samples.

The engineering evaluation agreed with the recommended disposition, but required some additional evaluation (Attachment 5 of NCR-W3-5998) of the test data based on AEC clarification of Reg. Guide 1.10 in AEC memo dated May 15, 1973. (Attachment 6 of NCR-W3-5998) Although we believe the required evaluation was done, it was not properly documented. At the suggestion of Mr. William Crossman (USNRC), this NCR was reopened on 3/14/84 and the evaluation per Attachment 5 of the NCR was performed. We expect the NCR to be expeditiously closed.

Note that this NCR is hardly "broad in scope, involving multiple deficiencies" and the failed sample splices did not come from the common mat. Of four failed sample splices addressed by this NCR, two came from the Fuel Handling Building, one came from a pressurizer wall, and one came from the primary shield wall. 1] 7 1 1 1 1 5 3 Response: 25

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Attachment I - Detailed Description of Nonconformance W3-

- Item I: Compliance of Clam Shell Filter Blanket construction with the Test Fill.
 - A) Description of Nonconformance

Contrary to ANSI-N-45.2, para. 6, The Test Fill Report (Att. III) does not provide specific criteria required by Q.C. in order to verify compliance with requirements of Spec. LOU.1564.482, para. 6.2h or Spec. LOU.1564.482, Attachment entitled <u>Clam</u> <u>Shell Filter Blanket Placement and Compaction Procedures</u>, page 14, top paragraph.

- 1) This condition renders:
 - a) the acceptability of the source of the material actually used during construction indeterminate and
 - b) the acceptability of the compactive equipment actually used during construction indeterminate.
- The absence of quantitative acceptance criteria renders the acceptability of the in-place density test results, for the in-place clam shell, indeterminate. Affects all work.
- B) Description of Nonconformance

Contrary to ANSI-N-45.2, para. 6 and Spec. 1564.482 and Attachment entitled <u>Clam Shell Filter Blanket Placement and Compaction</u> <u>Procedure</u>, the construction work performed on the Filter Blanket uses techniques not provided for during the Clam Shell Filter Elanket Test Fill. These violations, by strip, are as follow:

1) Strip (SH 3/31/83)

- a) Report dated 10/24/75 indicates clam shell was not in place and Gunite was placed on entire horizontal surface of Strip 1. The test fill program made no provision for clam shell compaction, and effect of compaction on shell, on large gunite surfaces. (See Att. II, page 1)
- b) Lift thickness for placement dated 10/28/75 is indicated as 15 ½". Lift thickness for placement dated 10/29/75 is indicated as 15". A lift thickness of 14 ½" maximum is required. Site Soils Engineer review and approval of this modification is not documented on an Ebasco NCR, FCR, or DCN. (See Att. II, pages 5 and 17)

00711 0755

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- 2) Strip 2
 - a) Report dated 2/23/76 does not indicate authority for replacement of gunite with 3 ft. thick concrete wall. There are no concrete inspection records for the concrete as required by Ebasco Procedures QCIP-6 and QCIP-7 and J.A. Jones Procedure W~3ITP-7. Site Soils Engineer review and approval of this modification is not documented on an Ebasco NCR, FCR, or DCN. (See Att. II, page 30)
 - b) Report dated 12/13/75 indicates shell placement in standing water. Site Soils Engineer review and approval for this modification is not documented on an Ebasco NCR, FCR, or DCN. (See Att. II, page 42)
 - c) Report dated 12/15/75 indicates pan vibrator used on entire surface of strip. Site Soils Engineer authorized use on "soft spot" only. Test Fill does not provide for use of hand compactors except for restricted areas. (See Att. II, page 53)
- 3) Strip 5
 - as Report 3, dated 2/10/76 does not indicate authority for replacement of gunite with 3 ft. thick concrete wall. There are no concrete inspection records for the concrete as required by Ebasco Procedures QCIP-6 and QCIP-7 and J.A. Jones Procedure W-SITP-7. Site Soils Engineer review and approval of this modification is not documented on an Ebasco NCR, FCR, or DCN. (See Att. II, page 97)
 - b) Test fill requires 10 passes of a vibratory roller on the clam shell. The Test Fill Report analyses the effect of up to 14 passes on the gradation and permeability characteristics of the clam shell. The inspection records indicate 40 passes of the vibratory roller were applied to this strip. The effect, on the gradation and permeability characteristics, of this overcompaction are indeterminate. Site Soils Engineer review and approval of this modification is not documented on an Ebasco NCR, FCR, or DCN. (See Att. II, pages 98, 103, 105, 108, and 110a)

Item II: Traceability/Location Deficiencies

A) Description of Nonconformance

Contrary to ANSI-N-45.2, para. 18 and ANSI-N-45.2.9, para. 3.2.1, records for the Clam Shell Filter Blanket do not provide sufficient data to accurately locate the individual placement strips by co-ordinates. Therefore, the square footage of the strips (individually) cannot be determined. Testing frequencies are based on square footage of the placement. This renders compliance, with the required testing frequency, indeterminate. (This affects all strips) 31711 3737

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B) Description of Nonconformance

Contrary to ANSI-N-45.2, para. 18, report dated 2/13/76 adds as area to strip 5, the location of which is indeterminate. (See Att. II, page 111)

Item III: Engineer's approval prior to shell placement

A) Description of Nonconformance

Contrary to QCIP-1, para. 6.1, the following placements of shell proceeded without the prior (or subsequent) approval of the Site Soils Engineer documented on Ebasco Form QC-132.

- 1) Strip 1
 - a) Placement on 10/24/75, 10/27/75, 10/28/75 or 10/29/75
- 2) Strip 4
 - a) Placement on 2/13/76 or 2/14/76
- 3) Strip 5

0

0

- a) Placement on 2/5/76, 2/9/76, 2/10/76 or 2/13/76
- 4) Strip 6
 - a) Placement on 3/10/76

Item IV: Certification of Personnel

A) Description of Nonconformance

Contrary to ANSI-N-45.2.6, the following individuals performed inspection without certification to a level and/or to activity.

1) Strip 1

- a) Inspector Kaminski (Jones) (See Att. II, pages 1, 2, 7)
- b) Inspector Phillips (Ebasco) (See Att. II, pages 4, 16)
- c) Technician T. Hazel (Site Test Lab) (See Att. II, pages 20, 22, 23, 24, 26)
- 2) Strip 2
 - a) Inspector Frick (Jones) (See Att. II, pages 37, 36, 50, 53)

3 1 7 1 1 7 5 3

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Item IV: A) 2) (cont.)

- b) Technician T. Hazel (Site Test Lab) (See Att. II, pages 58, 60)
- 3) Strip 3
 - a) Inspector Kaminski (Jones) (See Att. II, page 70)
 - b) Technician T. Hazel (Site Test Lab) (See Att. 1I, pages 81, 83)
 - c) Inspector Eiff (Jones) (See Att. II, page 70)
- 4) Strip 4
 - a) Inspector Frick (Jones) (See Att. II, page 85)
 - b) Technician T. Hazel (Site Test Lab) (See Att. II, page 92)
- 5) Strip 5
 - a) Inspector Frick (Jones) (See Att. II, page 98)
 - b) Inspector Horton (Jones) (See Att. II, page 111)
 - c) Technician T. Hazel (Site Test Lab) (See Att. II, pages 117, 118, 119, 120, 121)
- 6) Strip 6
 - a) Inspector Frick (Jones) (See Att. II, page 126)
 - t) Technician T. Hazel (Site Test Lab) (See Att. II, pages 132, 133)

Itea V: Testing

A) Description of Nonconformance

Contrary to ASTM-D-2167 - '66, in-place density test holes do not meet minimum 0.1 ft³ required test hole size, per Table 2. In addition moisture determination used in computation of in-place density was not performed in accordance with para. 4.4 Instances are as follow:
0 1711 1739

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Item V: A) (cont.)

- 1) Strip 1 (See Att. II, pages 20, 22, 23, 24, 26)
- 2) Strip 2 (See Att. II, pages 58, 60)
- 3) Strip 3 (See Att. II, page 81)
- 4) Strip 4 (See Att. II, page 92)
- 5) Strip 5 (See Att. II, pages 117, 118, 119, 120, 121)
- 6) Strip 6 (See Att. II, page 132)
- B) Description of Nonconformance

Contrary to Spec. LOU-1564.469, para. 5.2 and Spec. LOU-1564.482, page 14, Attachment, which give testing frequencies in terms of square footage of placement for the foundation and filter blanket, the inspection records do not provide sufficient data to determine the square footage of the areas inspected. The compliance of the testing program with the testing frequency is indeterminate. (All strips are affected)

C) Description of Nonconformance

Contrary to ANSI-N-45.2, para. 18 and ANSI-N-45.2.9, para. 3.2.1, the location of all in-place density tests on the foundation and the Clam Shell Filter Blanket are indeterminate. The tests were performed in a three dimensional medium, but were located in only two dimensions. (All tests for all strips are affected) NOTE: Tests for Strip 1 do not fall anywhere within the Nuclear Plant Island as per co-ordinates given compared with co-ordinate grid attached to test report (See Att. II, pages 26, 27) (Test #453, #454, #455)

D) Description of Nonconformance

Contrary to ANSI-N-45.2.9, para. 3.2.1, the in-place density tests on the foundation material cannot be traced to the corresponding Laboratory Moisture-Density Relation Test Report used in conjunction with per-centage of compaction determination. (All foundation tests are affected. See QC-83 Forms containing foundation tests, located in Att. II)

E) Description of Nonconformance

Contrary to ANSI-N-45.2.9, para. 3.2.6, the following test reports (by strip) contain improper changes by unknown personnel. These alterations change test locations or test readings. As determined from the original, at the Site Test Lab, the original entry had been noted on the report contained in Att. II. 0 1711 1750

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Item V: E) (cont.)

- 1) Strip 1
 - a) Form QC-83 for tests 452 thru 461 exists in two distinct versions. The two versions give different hole volumes for Test #452. Percentage compaction is indeterminate. Other differences have been indicated on the reports. (See Att. II, pages 24, 26) These Xerox copies have ink entries by unknown.
 - b) Form QC-83 for tests 486 thru 495 exists in two distinct versions. One is dated 10/28/75, the other is dated 10/29/75. Both are Xerox copies containing ink entries by unknown personnel. (See Att. II, pages 20, 22)

2) Strip 5

- a) Forms QC-83 contain improper changes made by unknown personnel. The changes consist of erasure of original data and entry of new data. The original records, completed in pencil, were reviewed at the Site Test Lab, and, where possible, the original data had been noted on the report contained in Att. II. (See Att. II, pages 117, 118, 119, 120) (This is for dispositioning purposes only.)
- 3) Strip 6
 - a) Forms QC-83 contain improper changes made by unknown personnel. The changes consist of erasure of original data and entry of new data. The original records, completed in pencil, were reviewed at the Site Test Lab, and where possible, the original data had been noted on the report contained in Att. II. (See Att. II, page 133)
- F) Description of Nonconformance

Contrary to the <u>Clam Shell Filter Blanket Test Fill Report</u>, Att. III, the required value of 102 lbs./ft? was not used to compute the percentage of compaction of in-place clam shell.

- 1) Test 800 used 105.0 lbs./ft.3 (See Att. II, page 119)
- 2) Tests 833 thru 837 used 102.7 lbs./ft.³ (See Att. II. pg. 132)

Item VI: Documented Deficiencies without Documented Corrective Action

A) Description of Nonconformance

Contrary to ANSI-N-45.2, para. 18, the records do not indicate corrective action for the following documented deficiencies.

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Item VI: A) (cont.)

- 1) Strip 1
 - Report dated 10/27/75 does not indicate status of, inpact on, or re-compaction of, in-place clam shell when gunite previously applied, was replaced. (See Att. II, page 2)
- 2) Strip 2
 - a) Report dated 12/10/75 indicates unacceptable trim of gunite and unacceptable removal of surplus material and overspray. Remarks section indicates the wooden stakes were not removed. No corrective action is indicated. (See Att. II, pages 28, 29)
 - b) Report dated 12/12/75 does not indicate adequate corrective action for the 4", compacted lift thickness, clam shell. (See Att. II, pages 36, 42)
 - c) Report dated 12/13/75, first shift, indicates water standing in West half of strip. Contractor allowed to place shell. Site Soils Engineer review and approval of this modification is not documented on an Ebasco NCR, FCR, or DCN. See note by M. Temchin at bottom of page 37 of Att. II. (See Att. II, page 42)
 - Report dated 12/12/75 indicates 5 temporary sumps were dug. There is no indication of subsequent placement and compaction of clam shell in these sumps. (See Att. II, page 33)
 - e) Report dated 12/15/75 indicates "West." area was cut and part of "East" area was filled. This disturbed the surface. Only one pass was applied with a pan vibrator. (See Att. 11, pages 51, 52) NOTE: Refer to Item IE2c for use of pan vibrator on large, non-restricted area.

3) Strip 3

- a) Report dated 12/19/75 indicates "... drainage ditch dug on both sides of Strip 3 ... lined with Mirafi cloth and filled with shell ..." The area identified is indeterminate. Verification of the foundation material exposed is not documented. (The Test Fill makes no provision for compaction of the 2 ft. lift thickness used for this work.) (See Att. II, page 68)
- b) Report dated 12/19/75 indicates "... temp. drainage ditch dug on North side of Strip 3. App. 2 ft. deep and 3 ft. wide. Covered with Mirafi paper and loose clam shell ... No compaction." The area identified is indeterminate. There is no documented evidence of subsequent compaction. (See Att. II, page 69)

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Item VI: A) (cont.)

- 4) Strip 4
 - a) Report dated 2/11/76 indicates unacceptable trim of gunite. This entry has been changed to acceptable by unknown personnel. The acceptability of corrective action is not documented or verifiable. The current status of this work is indeterminate. (See Att. II, page 84)
 - b) There is no record of slope protection for the east two-thirds of the North Wall or on an indeterminate length of the north portion of the East Wall. Length of exposure time of the foundation material to the elements is indeterminate. (Ref. Spec. LOU.1564.482, Attachment, page 12, 2nd. para.)
- 5) Strip 5
 - a) Reports 1 and 2 dated 2/5/76 indicates unacceptable trim of gunite and unacceptable removal of surplus material and overspray. No quantitative description of these deficiencies is given. No corrective action is indicated. (See Att. II, pages 95, 96)
 - b) Report 2 dated 2/5/76 indicates "some" contamination of the clam shell due to overspray. No corrective action is indicated. (See Att. II, page 96)
 - c) Report dated 2/13/76 indicates alternate methods of compaction used are unacceptable (per the Site Soils Engineer). No corrective action is indicated. (See Att. II, page 111)

6) Strip 6

- a) Reports 1 and 2 dated 3/9/76 indicates unacceptable trim of gunite and unacceptable removal of surplus material and overspray. No quantitative description of these deficiencies is given. No corrective action is indicated. (See Att. II, pages 124, 125)
- b) There is no record of slope protection for the West Wall or for approximately 177 ft. of the South, starting from junction with West Wall and moving eastward. Length of exposure time of the foundation material to the elements is indeterminate. (Ref. Spec. LOU.1564. 482, Attachment, page 12, para. 2)

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Item VI: A) (cont.)

7) Strip 2

 a) Report dated 12/12/75 indicates the clam shell filter blanket was penetrated by a "mud spurt" of approximately 120 ft.². There is no indication of corrective action, particularly placing Mirafi over area and subsequent replacement and compaction of clam shell. (Ref. The Clam Shell Filter Blanket Test Fill Report, para. 4.2, page 5 (Att. III to the NCR)) (See Att. II, pages 35, 36)

Based on the deficiencies noted above the acceptability of the Clam Shell Filter Blanket is indeterminate.

1) 1/1 1 1/1 Response: 25

ATTACHMENT IV

ENGINEERING DISPOSITION OF NONCONFORMANCE REPORT W3-5997

ITEM I: Compliance of Clam Shell Filter Blanket Construction With Test Fill:

I-A-1-a - Use As Is:

The test fill for the Clam Shell Filter Blanket was performed on September 10, 1975. The Clam Shell used was supplied by Brothers Construction Inc. (A Giambelluca Construction, Inc.) who was supplying Clam Shell to the site since August, 1974 under temporary purchase order W3-848 (Pg. 133). The purchase specification for P.O. W3-848 required that all clam shell material come from Lake Ponchartrain as shown in the typical supplement #5 to PO W3-848 presented as page 134.

On September 10, 1975, Brothers Construction company was delivering 672 yd of clam shell for general surfacing repair of roads, and laydown yards (pg. 135). Several trucks of shell were taken from this delivery order to build the test fill. All subsequent clam shell used for the construction of the filter blanket was delivered by Brothers Construction, Inc. taken from Lake Ponchartrain as shown in the typical material received report attached as page 136 and on each Ebasco Inspection Report Form QC-93 typically shown on page 4. Therefore, the material used during construction is found to be from the same source as the test fill.

I-A-1-b - Use As Is:

Compaction of the Clam Shell Filter Blanket Test Section was performed by a rubber tire, self propelled, smooth drum vibratory roller imparting a minimum of 10 tons of energy in accordance with the test fill construction procedure CP-203, Section 6.3.4 (Attachment III, Page 3 of 8) and as shown in Clam Shell Filter Test Fill Report, November, 1975 (Attachment III, Photo No. 8).

The compaction of the Clam Shell Filter Blanket itself was performed by an identical rubber tire, self propelled, smooth drum vibratory roller as documented on the Ebasco Inspection Reports (QC-93) typically shown in Attachment II, Pages 5, 33, 72, etc. and in the Waterford Record Photograph #648 dated 3-16-76 showing the roller on the side of strip #6 (pg. 137).

Specification requirements in LOU 1564.482, Section 6.2h requiring compatibility of test fill and production compaction equipment type or model refer to generic type or model, such as smooth drum vibratory versus static tandom wedgefoot roller and were compiled with.

I-A-2 - Use As Is:

The Clam Shell Filter Blanket was installed in accordance with an attachment to technical specification LOU-1564.482. This attachment was a direct result of the Clam Shell Filter Blanket Test Report (Attachment III) and is a method specification. It requires a roller type and a number of passes on suitable clam shell. Compliance with this method specification is documented on the Ebasco Inspection Report Forms QC-93 typically shown in Attachment II Pages 5, 33, 72, etc. In place density tests were run for information to be provided to the Site Soils Engineer for review and technical evaluation.

I-B-1A - Use As Is:

The Gunite installed on the west wall of Strip #1 and on the adjacent 3 foot horizontal berm at el -40 Attachment II, page 1 was authorized by the Site Soils Engineer, prior to the placement of Clam Shell at this area. This was done to comply with specification requirements stated in the Clam Shell Filter Blanket Attachment to the technical specification LOU-1564-482 (Attachment III) requiring slope protection of the exposed vertical faces of the final phase IV excavation within 8 hours of excavation. Delays in Clam Shell placement prevented the placement of the shell prior to the guniting; therefore, to protect exposed faces, guniting was approved out of sequence by the Site Soils Engineer. The horizontal surface mentioned was on the EL -40 berm at the top of the vertical face and not in Strip #1 as indicated in the NCR. No effects were realized on the Clam Shell Blanket.

I-B-1b - Use As Is:

The thickness requirements of 10-inch minimum and 14½ inch maximum for the Clam Shell Blanket as defined in the Attachment to technical specification LOU-1564.482 Page 13, "Placement" (Attachment III) were designed for the following reasons:

- 1. The 10-inch minimum thickness was specified to provide the required permeability of the filter blanket.
- 2. The 14½ inch maximum thickness was specified so as not to allow an overthick clam shell layer which could conceivably encroach into the base mat above elevation -47 and effect the concrete cover thickness under the bottom rows of rebar.

Practical experience gained during the actual Phase IV excavation indicated that excavation usually exceeded the elevation -48.25 goal. Over thick shell areas (plus 1-2 inches) were therefore found to be below the elevation of the bottom of the mud mat and not into the area of the structural mat. In cases where thick shell areas were measured, the shell was either shaved or the mud mat thickness was adjusted. In all cases however, the bottom of the Class I foundation mat was kept to El -47.

-3-

The recorded thickness of $15\frac{1}{2}$ " on 10-28-75 (Attachment 2, page 5) and 15" on 10-29-75 (Attachment 2, page 17) are therefore found to be acceptable as is.

I-B-2A - Use As Is:

In localized areas where the permanent vertical faces of the Phase IV excavations caved in, and the gunite slope protection was destroyed, lean concrete backfill was used to reconstruct the vertical face and gunite layer. Since these areas were very localized, and since the lean concrete always provided the strength of the pleistocene clay it replaced and offered a vertical face to form the structural mat against, this backfill procedure was approved and used as necessary throughout the Phase IV excavation operation. The case described in 2-23-76 (Attachment II Page 30) is a typical example where concrete backfill was used for repair without influencing the design of the structural mat. Ebasco procedures QCIP-6 and 7 and J. A. Jones procedure W-STIP-7 covers structural concerete only. Therefore, no FCR or DCN was required for the use of lean concrete as a substitute for soil.

I-B-2b - Use As Is:

A review of the referenced inspection report (Attachment II, Page 42) indicates the possibility of placement of clam shell into standing water however, it is not clearly defined. The record further states that a meeting was held between construction (K. Flanigan) and Engineering (B. Watt) and the Site Soils Engineer (M. Temchin) allowing placement of shell. A review of the technical specification LOU-1564.482, Attachment on clam shell, shows that the only moisture content requirement is after compaction. In-place density tests on this Strip [Attachment II Page 58, Tests 2-3 (670) and 2-4 (671)] indicate moisture contents of 5.5 and 5.7% respectively. Therefore, the after compaction moisture content tests show the shell fill to be acceptable.

I-B-2c - Use As Is:

Note: Refer to page 51 for problem statement, in addition to page 53.

The inspection report referenced in Attachment II, Page 51 is explained in greater detail on page 53. From page 51, it is noted that no new shell was placed, only that localized areas of thick shell on the west half of Strip #2 were bladed to thin sections on the east half of Strip #2. These localized areas were then recompacted by the pan (plate) vibrator. Page 53 clearly indicates that the entire Strip #2 was properly compacted with a large roller. The exception of the localized repair areas which were properly compacted with the pan vibrator to the Site Soils Engineers satisfaction is in accordance with the specification requirements.

I-B-3A - Use As Is:

This is an identical case as described in Section I-B-2a of this NCR. Please see that disposition, which applies in this case as well.

I-B-3b - Use As Is:

In a review of the number of passes placed on Strip #5 clam shell the following understandings were developed:

- 1. Shell placed and compacted 2-9-76 day (Pg. 102-103)
- Thickness checked 2-9-76 night (Pg. 104-105) Notation of 6 passes given in previous shift is in error. Should have read 10 passes
- 3. Shell recompacted with 10 passes 2-10-76 day (Pg. 107-109)
- 4. Survey error in width of Strip #5 lead to the addition excavation of a narrow strip of soil on the south end of Strip #5 (. proximately 8' wide). Clam shell was placed and properly compacted on this narrow strip on 2-13-76 (Pages 110-113).
- Site Soils Engineering approval of the original (narrow strip) was given on 2-11-76 (Pg. 109) prior to the discovery of the survey error.
- Approval was given for the narrow strip on 2-13-76 by the Site Soils Engineer (Pg. 111).

In conclusion, it appears that 20 passes were given to the originally cut Strip #5 which is contrary to the method specification stated in the attachment to LOU-1564.482, requiring 10 passes.

The effects of this overcompaction of the clam shell are found to have a negligible effect on the quality of the final clam shell blanket for the following reasons:

- An extrapolation of the Settlement vs number of passes curve from the Clam Shell Filter Blanket Test Report (Attachment III) presented as page 138, Attachment IV indicates that less than ½" of addition settlement is realized by the application of the addition 10 passes of compaction equipment.
- 2. An extrapolation of the % compaction vs. number of passes curve from the Clam Shell Filter Blanket Test Report (Attachment III) presented as page 139 indicates that approximately 1% additional compaction will be realized by the additional 10 passes of compaction equipment.

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3. An Extrapolation of the gradation vs. number of passes curve from the Clam Shell Filter Blanket Test Report (Attachment III) presented as page 140 indicates that although the surface of the clam shell may undergo some slight additional breakdown from the 3/4" to #16 size screens, no additional - #200 particles will be created which could effect the permeability of the shell blanket.

In conclusion, the overcompaction of the Clam Shell Filter Blanket in Strip #5 created a less compressible, slightly denser blanket without effecting the permeability of the filter which is therefore found to be acceptable.

ITEM II - Traceability/Location Deficiencies

II-A - Use As Is:

The documented sizes of each of the Clam Shell Filter Blanket strips is presented in the geologic mapping report dated February, 1977 Figure No. 1 attached as page 141 in Attachment IV. The square footage of each of the strips is thus calculated to be:

	Number of Tests			
Strip No.	Surface Area ft ²	Required	Actual	
1	267(97.5) = 26,032	6	6	
2	267(58.5) = 15,619	4	4	
3	267(70) = 18,690	4	5	
4	267(48.5) = 12,976 ft.	3	4	
5	267(58.5) = 15,619	4	5	
6	267(47.0) = 12,549		_5_	
	267(380)	24	29	

Review of the above table indicates that each of the six strips had at least the required number of tests and in fact, five (5) additional tests were performed in total.

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II-B - Use As Is:

As previously described in the response to NCR Item I-B-3B, due to a survey error, Strip #5 was cut 8 feet too narrow in the North-South direction. The addition strip excavated on 2-13-76 is documented to be on the South side of Strip #5 (pg. 110) and is documented to be called the "Deyo Strip", and is 8 foot wide (pg. 112).

Item III - Engineer's Approval Prior To Shell Placement

III-A-(1-4) - Use As Is:

In all of the strip placements listed except Strip #1, the J. A. Jones Clam Shell Filter Blanket Inspection Report Form W-SITP-2 was signed by the Site Soils Engineer on the line entitled "Release for Installation and Compaction Obtained Yes X No ."

It is true that the Ebasco Site Soils Engineer Release Form QC-132 From QCLP-1 cannot be found. However, the existing signatures on the J. A. Jones Documentation and the Release on Strip #1 indicate that the engineers approval was given. Refer to the following Site Soils Engineer Releases:

Strip #1	Page 6 & 7	
2	31, 37 & 38	
3	64 & 70	
4	85	
5	98	
6	. 126	

Item IV - Certification of Personnel - Use As Is

Certification of the personnel referenced in this section of the NCR has been reviewed by Ebasco QA, GEO QA, and the Site Soils Engineer. In their responses to this issue, attached in Attachment IV, pages 154 - 159, it is stated that all of the personnel listed in this NCR were qualified to perform the inspection they did, at the time they did them, although Employer Certification did not exist. Therefore, the inspection by these personnel, based on their qualification, is acceptable.

Item V - Testing

V-A-1-6 - Use As Is:

An analysis of the gradation of the compacted Clam Shell After 10 passes indicates that over 90% of the shell is smaller than 3/4 of an inch (page 140) and over 60% of the material is smaller than $\frac{1}{2}$ of an inch.

In accordance with the Site Soils Engineer's interpretation of the intent of Table 2 of ASTM D-2167-67 it is our understanding that a minimum test hole volume ranging from .050 ($\frac{1}{2}$ " material) to 0.075 (1" material) ft' would be acceptable (page 142) using this interpretation all of the 29 clam shell density tests are found to be valid. The variance in the use of minor reduced volume in the size of the density hole has a negligible effect on the test result in this case.

V-B - Use As Is:

As stated in the response to NCR Section II-A, the Clam Shell Filter Blanket Testing frequencies were compiled with using the requirements for density testing of 1 test per 5000 ft² for the foundation materials, 24 tests were required and 27 tests were performed as shown in foundation material property table presented in Attachment IV on page 141.

V-C - Use As Is:

Based upon the geometry of the phase IV excavation, as shown on design drawing LOU 1564-G-489, Section A-A, the elevations of the foundation and clam shell tests are known as follows:

Bottom of Plant Isla	and Material:	-47.00
2-3" Mud Mat	(Avg. 3")	-47.25±
10-14 Shell Blanket	(Avg. 12")	-48.25±

Using this information, elevations recorded on each Ebasco Inspection Report (QC-93) typically shown on pages 32, 65, etc., and the North-South and East-West coordinates on the density tests forms typically shown on pages 81, 132, etc., the three dimensional location of all foundation tests (E1 -48.25) and clam shell tests (E1 -47.25) is found.

Relative to the note on the location of clam shell density tests 453-455, these tests were located properly but plotted on the wrong grid (pg. 27). A second grid was used for the foundation and clam shell testing program locations as typically shown on pages 61, 82 etc. Replotting the density tests 453-455 on this grid, as shown on Attachment IV, page 143 shows these tests to fall randomly within Strip #1 as indicated on page 27.

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V-D - Use As Is:

In accordance with page 9 of the geologic mapping report dated February, 1977, and enclosed in Attachment IV, Page 144, each foundation density test had a proctor test run on the density hole material and surrounding material (50# sample) to determine the exact percent compaction. The results of the in-place density tests and their corresponding proctor tests are presented on the final geologic map presented in Attachment IV, page 141 along with the minus 200 data and the exact location of the test within the appropriate strip. Final acceptance of foundation density tests was made in NCR-W3-193 copy attached as pages 145-149.

V-E - Use As Is:

A general review of all of the changes discussed in this section of the NCR are the result of a review of by testing results performed by the laboratory itself. Although the changes were improperly entered on the test records, it is believed that these changes were performed in the interest of correcting errors detected during quality reviews within the testing laboratory itself and are therefore acceptable.

V-E-1-2 - Use As Is

The following discussion <u>may</u> explain the discrepancy in the volume recorded in test 452.

On the initial density record recorded in the field (QC-83 Pg. 24) a volume of .0736 ft was recorded yielding a density of 85.0 #/ft. Upon review in the lab, on the same day, the inspector noted that the volume of this hole was larger than the two following holes he dug which he may have felt was not true due to his memory of the situation. He therefore adjusted the volume to .0636 ft, a .01 ft adjustment which he believed could have been a reading error on the sight tube on the densometer (pg. 26). This is a possible explanation of the change and if it is accepted or not, this test 452 can be voided without influencing the quality of the shell since it was taken after only 6 passes, and not included in the permanent record of required tests taken after 10 passes.

V-E-1-b - Use As Is:

The Density Test Record on page 20 is a field copy dated 10-28-75. Due to a significant number of changes and noted recorded in the field, the form was rewritten for clarity on the following day (page 22 10-29-75) and a recording error in density test 495 in volume (8.01 ft⁻) was corrected. In addition, foundation proctor valves were inserted in the proper boxes and percent compactions were calculated. The form shown on page 22 a corrected record and superceded the form on page 20 and is acceptable as is.

11/11 1215

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V-E-2a, 3A - Use As Is:

A review of these records indicates that in several places, data was erased and changed. In all cases, corrected data appears to be consistent with other data recorded in this strip. It can only be concluded that these changes were made on the spot by the inspector for the purpose of correcting errors in recording the data. Example; page 118 test number 751 changed to 752; Test 748 location E6-84N changed to 74N.

Although these changes were documented improperly the corrected data is consistent with the valves of unaltered test data on the same strip and is therefore considered to be acceptable.

V-F-1 & 2 - Use As Is:

On page 119 of Attachment II the note at the bottom of the page indicates that in the inspectors opinion (due to a local compaction operation by the hand operated plate compactor) the clam shell was broken to a greater extent than normal. In this case the increase in Lab Standard Density from 102 to $105\#/Ft^3$ was more severe on the % compaction calculation and is considered to be conservative and acceptable.

In a similar manner, the use of a clam shell maximum proctor valve of 102.7#/Ft³ instead of 102.0#/ft³ on page 132 could only yield a slightly lower % compaction and is therefore considered acceptable.

Item VI - Documented Deficiencies Without Corrected Action

VI-A-la - Use As Is:

As per the NCR response to Section I-B-la and I-B-2a, the replacement of gunite is outside of the neat line of the Class I excavation and above the shell blanket. This type of operation was performed so as not effect the quality of the in-place shell blanket. Even if minor effect were realized on the surface of the shell blanket, this area (10' wide) is so localized that effects on the permeability of the shell will be negiglible.

VI-A-2a - Use As Is:

The wooden stakes referred to in inspection reports for gunite in Strip #2 page 29 and 29 are in the 3 foot horizontal gunite berm at El -40 at the top of the Class I vertical face. They are outside of the Class I area and although it was preferable to remove these stakes after guniting, in some cases they were left in place to support the gunite facing without any effect on the quality of the slope protection.

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VI-A-2B - Use As Is:

The defective shell thickness shown on page 36 (12-12-75) of Attachment II was corrected as stated on page 42 (by blading shell from the west half of the strip). The final thickness of 9½ inches is documented on the inspection report attached as page 41 with the statement "OK on 12-12-75". The East half of Strip #2 was reviewed by the Site Soils Engineer the following day on 12-13-75 and found acceptable for mud mat placement as documented on page 45 of Attachment II.

VI-A-2c - Use As Is:

As per the inspector's notes on page 42 of Attachment II, in a decision between the Site Soils Engineer and the Construction Superintendent, clam shell was placed in standing water (in order to preserve the condition of the foundation materials which would continue to swell and then dry and crack if left uncovered). In place density tests performed on the West half of Strip #2 numbered 670 and 671 (pg. 58) indicate that at the time of final compaction the standing water had drained away and moisture contents of 5.5 and 5.7% were realized compared to a maximum allowable moisture content of 20%.

VI-A-2d - Use As Is:

A review of the documentation from Attachment II pages 32 through 53 indicate that in two locations on the South half of the East half of Strip #2contained saturated localized spots of foundation silts. Upon compaction of the Clam Shell Blanket, water from these silt foundation materials was vibrated to the surface of the shell rendering the shell compaction unacceptable. Five shell drainage sumps were excavated and pumped to remove excess water. Upon further compaction, foundation silts pumped up through the shell causing a small localized "MUD" pocket. The sumps were backfilled with shell and recompacted with a plate vibrator (pg. 37) and the mud pocket was allowed to relieve its hydrostatic pressures for a day (pg. 36). Similar liquification problems of the foundation silts were noted and treated (pg. 46) on the West half of Strip #2. Final approval of the entire strip was given by the Site Soils Engineer on 12-15-75 as stated on page 45 & 53 noting hand compaction of mud pocket areas and that the sumps adequately compacted and approved.

VI-A-2e - Use As Is:

The understanding of the cut and fill operation documented on pg. 51 of Attachment II is as follows:

0 0 / 1 1 0 / 1 3

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12-13-75	- day Cut & Fill +2 passes	Pg. 42
12-13-75	- Night 4 passes	Pg. 43
Total So	Far 6 passes As Per	Pg. 46
12-14-75	- Day Remainder of 6 passes	Pg. 47, 48

This documentation indicates that the original Clam Shell Filter Blanket was compacted with twelve passes prior to the cut and fill operation documented on page 51. The inspection report on page 51 indicates that only one inch of material was moved and that the plate compaction of this one inch of loose material was found acceptable by the Site Soils Engineer as documented on page 53 approving the entire Strip #2.

VI-A-3a, 3b - Use As Is:

Based upon the problems documented in Strip #2 concerning liquification of the foundation silts during compaction, drainage ditches were cut along the North and South lengths of Strip #3. This is partially documented on page 69 of Attachment II. The drainage ditches were 2 foot deep and 3 foot wide, covered with Miraff; Filter cloth and filled with shell. The normal Clam Shell Filter Blanket was then placed on top of these ditches (acting as foundation material) and due to their narrow size needed no special compaction since compaction to a reasonable density would be achieved during Clam Shell Filter Blanket Compaction Operations.

This same drainage scheme was used in Strip #5 and is adequately documented as to location and geometry on page 100 of Attachment II which is typical for Strip #3 as well.

VI-A-4a - Use As Is:

No special knowledge is known of how this change was made. Documentation available indicates that gunite placement on the West third of the North Wall of Strip #4 originally need to be trimmed. Later during the shift, the gunite was trimmed and the original form entry was changed by J. S. G. or D. S. G. or MR "X" (unknown).

Since the gunite was later inspected and accepted by the Site Soils Engineer prior to clam shell placement (page 85, Attachment II) on 2-13-76 and since the gunite is not a Class I material and is documented to be structurally thick enough the gunite, as placed should be considered to be trimmed back in an acceptable manor.

VI-A-4b - Use As Is:

Although missing documentation is indicated in the placement of gunite on Strip #4, the Strip #4 was released for clam shell placement by the Site Soils Engineer on 2-13-83. Completed gunite slope protection is indicated in Ebasco Record Photographs #607 (West Face And West Half of the North Face), #620 (Entire East Face) and #624 which indicates a portion of the East half of the North face of Strip #4. Copies of the photo's are attached as page 150 of Attachment IV and originals are available from the site photographer.

VI-A-5a - Use As Is:

Review of the inspection reports on the gunite placement of both faces of Strip #5 dated 2-5-76 (pages 95 & 96, Attachment II) indicates that the overspray gunite was not trimmed off. The same day, the Site Soils Engineer and Field Engineer approved the strip for clam shall placement (pg. 98). This indicates that either the overtrim was removed or it was located in a spot (example the outer edge of the 3' horizontal berm on El -40) that would not affect the Class I clam shell blanket or structural foundation mat. Therefore, the overspray is found to be acceptable without removal.

IV-A-5B - Use As Is:

As in the discussion above, without the adequate documentation, it can only be assumed that the gunite contamination of the clam shell along the West wall of Strip #5 was on the small amount of shell exposed on the Southwest Corner Strip #3 under the mud mat. This is believed to be the case since Clam Shell Placement in Strip #5 itself did not start until 2-9-76 - 4 days after the placement of the gunite slope protection (pages 102-108, Attachment II). In all strips excavated, clam shell in the common excavation face (in this case, the South edge of Strip #3 is the North edge of Strip #5) was cut back to key the new shell into the existing shell blanket if the filter cloth was not present. Although not documented for Strip #5, this was a required construction operation, documented on the QC-93 form under the heading "KEYING" on page 1 of the form.

Review of this item on pages 102, 104 and 107, indicates that the localized nature of this contamination (3' from the West wall in the Northwest corner) by the documented entry "None". Keying was not required for this strip when the filter blanket itself was placed. Therefore, it is believed that the small quantities of contaminated clam shell were removed and replaced and found acceptable by the Site Soils Engineer on 2-11-76 (pg. 109, Attachment II).

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VI-A-5c - Use As Is:

A review of the Clam Sheil Filter Blanket Inspection Report for the "DEYO" strip added to the South side of Strip #5 (pg. 111, Attachment II) indicates that the Site Soils Engineer approved the compaction of this Strip (Line 8) and indicated that alternate methods of compaction were not used (Line #9). The "DEYO" strip was cut after most of Strip #5 was already finished due to a survey error. The original planned size of Strip #5 (55') was originally cut to 50' wide and then expanded by 8' to a total width of 58'. The 3' oversize (58' compared to 55') was specified so as to allow for normal compaction of this strip by the 12 ton rubber tire, vibratory smooth drum roller which is 8' wide.

The "No" on Line 9 is a statement that alternate methods were not used. This strip is therefore found acceptable.

VI-A-6-a - Use As Is:

As stated previously in responses to similar portions of this NCR the gunite is not a safety related material. In this case (pg. 124-125 Attachment II) the Class I Clam Shell was not in place when the gunite was placed. The trim and overspray indicated are primarily associated with gunite placement at the top of the vertical face on the El -40 berm. Therefore, no impacts on the Clam Shell Blanket or Structural Foundation Mat can be realized by the lack of trimming activities on the gunite slope protection. Signatures by the Site Soils Engineer and the Field Engineer (pg. 126, Attachment II) indicate that the minor trimming activities documented on 2-9-76 were indeed performed and approved prior to the placement of Clam Shell the following day.

VI-A-6b - Use As Is:

Record photographs #648 (3-16-76), #650 (3-18-76), #662 (4-2-76) and #666 (4-2-76) located on the strip key plan (Attachment IV Pg. 151) and shown on pages 152 and 153 show the presence of the gunite slope protection in question. Although there exists at the present date, no documentation on its placement, it is known to exist and Clam Shell Filter Blanket Placement against it was found to be acceptable and approved by the Site Soils Engineer on 3-12-76 (pg. 130, Attachment II).

VI-A-7 - Use As Is:

As per the discussion presented in this response to the NCR for section VI-A-2d. The corrective action for the "Mud Spurt" was found to be acceptable by the Site Soils Engineer and approved on 12-15-75.

26. What were the problems of soils, waterstops, cadweld splices, and the placement of concrete, as mentioned in the third column on page 22 of GAMBIT, and how were they resolved?

Response:

The GAMBIT article did not identify the specific "records packages" which contained the alleged deficiencies. However, it is known that Hill generated the NCRs addressed in Question 25 which pertain to these subjects.

The "soils documents" referred to by GAMBIT are probably those addressed by NCR-W3-5997 (about 200 pages pertaining to the clam shell filter blanket). Each of the 64 findings are detailed in Attachment I to NCR-W3-5997 and are summarized in the response to Question 25. Each of the 64 findings were resolved by the Site Soils Engineer in Attachment IV of NCR-W3-5997.

The cadwelding problems referred to are probably those documented in NCR-W3-5998 also addressed in Question 25.

The waterstop problems were generally gouges or nicks which were repaired. Waterstops are not Class I items; their function is to prevent inleakage of groundwater thereby minimizing the amount of water related through the Waste Management System.

The concrete placement problems were addressed in Question 9.

27. Do the allegations described in Phearson's memo and the Gambit article reflect generally what happened during the construction of the mat? If yes, how would these non-conformance of QA/QC requirements affect the structural integrity of the mat? If not, identify those allegation which are unfounded and the basis thereof.

Response: LP&L

See response to Questions 9, 11, 14, 22, 24, 25, 26 and 28.

28. In light of the allegations, documented NCRs, and QA/QC deficiencies, what has LP&L done or what does LP&L intend to do in order to resolve the allegations and deficiencies?

Response

LP&L letter W3K84-0629, copy attached, provides a summary LP&L response to allegations regarding Waterford 3 quality. The general LP&L conclusions included in W3K84-0629 are as follows:

- 1. The allegations did not uncover any significant new information regarding Waterford 3 quality.
- Deficiencies in the physical and records quality of Waterford 3 have been and are being addressed under the programmatic requirements of the Waterford 3 Quality Assurance Program.
- LP&L has exerted extraordinary efforts in the resolution of deficiencies.
- 4. The general tone of the allegations, and the insinuations that LP&L motives are questionable, are totally erroneous.
- Continuing Waterford 3 activities in the Quality Assurance areas are designed to redouble LP&L confidence in Waterford 3 quality.