U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

CONTROL BLOCK / / / / (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION /V/A/M/A/S/27 (2) /0/0/-/0/0/0/0/0/-/0/0/ (3) /4/1/1/1/1/ (4) LICENSER CODE LICENSE NUMBER LICENSE TYPE  /0/1/ REPORT /L/ (6) /0/5/0/0/3/3/9/ (7) /0/4/1/9/8/3/ (8) /0/5/1/1/8/3/ SOURCE /L/ (6) /0/5/0/0/3/3/9/ (7) /0/4/1/9/8/3/ (8) /0/5/1/1/8/3/ SOURCE /L/ (6) /0/5/0/0/0/3/3/9/ (7) /0/4/1/9/8/3/ (8) /0/5/1/1/8/3/ REPORT DATE  EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)  /0/2/ / On April 19, 1983, w h Unit 2 in the Refueling Mode, Fire Door S71-18, between /0/3/ / the 2B Emergency Diesel Room and the Turbine Building, would not latch. Since /0/4/ / fire watch was immediately posted the public health and safety were not affect /0/5/ / The degradation of fire doors between the Emergency Diesel Rooms and Turbine /0/6/ / Building due to differential pressure between the areas during diesel operation /0/7/ / is a recurring event. This event is contrary to T.S. 3.7.15 and reportable //0/8/ / suant to T.S. 6.9.1.9.b.  SYSTEM CAUSE CAUSE COMPONENT CODE SUBCODE SUBCODE	(9) ten / ce a / cted./
REPORT SOURCE /L/ (6) /0/5/0/0/3/3/9/ (7) /0/4/1/9/8/3/ (8) /0/5/1/1/8/3/ SOURCE /L/ (6) /0/5/0/0/0/3/3/9/ (7) /0/4/1/9/8/3/ (8) /0/5/1/1/8/3/  EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)  /0/2/ / On April 19, 1983, w h Unit 2 in the Refueling Mode, Fire Door S71-18, between /0/3/ / the 2H Emergency Diesel Room and the Turbine Building, would not latch. Since /0/4/ / fire watch was immediately posted the public health and safety were not affect /0/5/ / The degradation of fire doors between the Emergency Diesel Rooms and Turbine /0/6/ / Building due to differential pressure between the areas during diesel operation /0/7/ / is a recurring event. This event is contrary to T.S. 3.7.15 and reportable /0/8/ / suant to T.S. 6.9.1.9.b.  SYSTEM CAUSE CAUSE CAUSE COMP. VALVE	ce a /
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/0/9/ /A/B/ (11) /E/ (12) /B/ (13) /X/X/X/X/X/ (14) /Z/ (15) /Z/ (16) SEQUENTIAL OCCURRENCE REPORT REVISION	N.
LER/RO EVENT YEAR REPORT NO. CODE TYPE NO.	
(17) REPORT   NUMBER   /8/3 /   /- / /0/3/4 / / / /0/3 / /L/ /- / /0/	
ACTION FUTURE EFFECT SHUTDOWN ATTACHMENT NPRD-4 PRIME COMP. CONTAKEN ACTION ON PLANT METHOD HOURS SUBMITTED FORM SUB. SUPPLIER MANY	PONENT UFACTURE
/B/ (18) /X/ (19) /Z/ (20) /Z/ (21) /0/0/0/0/ (22) /N/ (23) /N/ (24) /A/ (25) /C/1/	/5/ (26
CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)	
/1/0/ / Fire Door S71-18 would not latch because the latch was sticking. The latch	ras /
/1/1/ / lubricated and operation of the fire door tested satisfactorily. Design mod	
/1/2/ / cation to the fire doors between the Diesel Rooms and the Turbine Building a	-
/1/2/ / cation to the fire doors between the Diesel Rooms and the Turbine Building at	-
/1/3/ / being pursued.	-
/1/3/ / being pursued.  /1/4/ / FACILITY METROD OF	-
/1/3/ / being pursued.  /1/4/ / FACILITY METROD OF STATUS 2POWER OTHER STATUS (30) DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION	re / / / ON (32)
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/1/3/ / being pursued.  /1/4/ /  FACTLITY METROD OF STATUS 2POWER OTHER STATUS (30) DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION /1/5/ /H/ (28) /O/O/O/ (29) / NA / (31) / Operator Observation ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) LOCATION OF RELEASE (3) /1/6/ /Z/ (33) /Z/ (34) / NA / / NA	/ / ON (32) on /
/1/3/ / being pursued.  /1/4/ /  FACTLITY METROD OF STATUS 2POWER OTHER STATUS 010 DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) LOCATION OF RELEASE (3/1/6/ /Z/ (33) /Z/ (34) / NA / NA / NA  PERSONNEL EXPOSURES	/ / ON (32) on /
/1/4/ /  FACILITY METROD OF STATUS 2POWER OTHER STATUS (30) DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (31) / Operator Observation (31) / Operator Observation (32) / Operator Observation (33) / Operator Observation (33) / Operator Observation (34) / Operator Observation (35)	/ / ON (32) on /
/1/4/ /  FACILITY	/ / ON (32) on /
/1/3/ / being pursued.  /1/4/ /  FACILITY	/ / ON (32) on /
/1/3/ / being pursued.  /1/4/ /  FACILITY	/ / ON (32) on /
/1/3/ / being pursued.  /1/4/ /  FACILITY	/ / ON (32) on /
/1/3/ / being pursued.  /1/4/ /  FACILITY	ON (32) on /
/1/3/ / being pursued.  /1/4/ /  FACILITY	ON (32) on /

December 20, 1982

JPC

U. S. Muclear Regulatory Commission Office of Inspection and Enforcement Region V 1450 Maria Lane, Suite 210 Walnut Creek, California 94596-5368 LER

161-82/52

EVENT DATE 82/13/

EVEN REVD DATE 82/230 SP

Attention:

Mr. R. H. Engelken, Regional Administrator

Dear Sir:

Subject:

Docket No. 50-361 30-Day Report

Licensee Event Report No. 82-152

San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2

This submittal is in accordance with the reporting requirements of Section 6.9.1.13.b of Appendix A to Facility Operating License NPF-10. It describes a reportable occurrence involving Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.3.3.6 associated with Accident Monitoring Instrumentation. A completed copy of LER 82-152 is enclosed.

While in Node 3, at 2010 on November 21, 1982, the daily surveillance testing in accordance with procedure 5023-3-3.21.1 was in progress. Due to loss of process flow, as indicated by radiation indictor 2RI-7872-1, the Condenser Evacuation System radiation monitor (wide range) was declared inoperable. Action Statement 22 of Table 3.3-10 associated with this inoperable monitor results in an undefined action requirement due to a typographical error in the Technical Specifications. Correction of this Action Statement has been requested in License Amendment Application 15 and the action taken was as defined in that application (i.e. either restore the inoperable monitor to operable status within 7 days, or be in hot shutdown within the next 12 hours).

S beequent investigation revealed that the monitor problem was attributable to a faulty velocity probe associated with the monitor. The faulty probe was replaced and the monitor declared operable in accordance with SO23-3-3.21.1 at 1705 on November 24, 1982. Discussions with the probe manufacturer indicate that this failure is infrequent and, therefore, this is considered an isolated event. No further corrective action is warranted at this time.

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R. H. Engelken December 20, 1982 There was no impact on plant operations or the health and safety of plant personnel or the public as a result of this event. If there are any questions regarding the above, please contact ma. Sincerely, H. B. RAY STATION MANAGER LIMayweather: VM Enclosure: LER 82-152 cc: A. E. Chaffee (USNRC Resident Inspector, San Onofre Unit 2) U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Inspection and Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Management Information and Program Control Institute of Nuclear Power Operations