

December 16, 1983

W3K83-1975 Q-3-A35.07.94

Mr. John T. Collins Regional Administrator, Region IV U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000 Arlington, Texas 76012

REFERENCE: Telecon between C. N. Hooper (LP&L) and R. Stewart (NRC IV) of November 18, 1983

Dear Mr. Collins:

SUBJECT: Waterford SES Unit No. 3

Docket No. 50-382

Significant Construction Deficiency No. 94
"Chemical Volume Control System (CVCS)

Heat Trace Temperature Drift"

First Interim Report

In accordance with the requirements of 10CFR50.55(e), we are hereby providing two copies of the Interim Report of Significant Construction Deficiency No. 94, "Chemical Volume Control System (CVCS) Heat Trace Temperature Drift". This item was previously identified as PRD No. 131.

Very truly yours,

T. F. Gerrets

Quality Assurance Manager

TFG: CNH: VBR

Attachments

cc: Director
 Office of Inspection & Enforcement
 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
 Washington, D.C. 20555
 (15 copies)

8312290350 B31216 PDR ADDCK 05000382 S PDR Mr. John T. Collins December 16, 1983 W3K93-1975 Page 2

cc: Director
Office of Management
Information and Program Control
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

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Records Center
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
1100 Circle 75 Parkway, Suite 1500
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# INTERIM REPORT FOR SIGNIFICANT CONSTRUCTION DEPICIENCY NO. 94 "CHEMICAL VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM (CVCS) HEAT TRACE TEMPERATURE DRIFT"

## INTRODUCTION

This report is submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.55(e). It describes a deficiency with the safety related heat tracing controllers.

This problem is considered reportable under the requirements of 10CFR50.55(e). To the best of our knowledge, this problem has not been identified to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission pursuant to 10CFR21.

#### DESCRIPTION

The safety related heat tracing controllers were exhibiting the inability to remain in calibration over a period of time. This is a result of the controllers sensitivity to changing ambient conditions.

#### SAFETY IMPLICATIONS

The safety related heat tracing controllers' failure to hold its' calibration could result in deviations from the Technical Specification requirements to maintain minimum boration line temperatures, if left uncorrected.

### CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

CIWA No. 83D592 was initiated to track and document this deficiency.

The vendor (Raychem) has provided a modification to prevent the safety related controllers from "drifting" out of calibration. In light of the above facts, it is necessary to thermally connect the terminal block to the sensor. This will be accomplished by turning the Temperature Control Module (TCM) sensor to the opposing circuit board face. (The High Temperature Module (HTM) are already installed in this manner.) Also, required is installation of a heat sink to the terminal block and insulation about the sensor. The heat sink will allow changes in ambient to be transmitted to the terminal block. This will ensure the sensor reading terminal block temperature. The insulation will provide a stable environment for the sensor and guard against sensing rapid ambient temperature changes. This work will be performed by LP&L under andor supervision using vendor provided parts. The vendor is also issuing a way drawing showing this modification.

An update or final report will be submitted to the USNRC on or before March 1, 1984.