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Jack L. Wilson
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September 6, 1991

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Gentlemen:

In the Matter of	)	Docket Nos. 50-327
Tennessee Valley Authority	)	50-328

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SQN) - DOCKET NOS. 50-327 AND 50-328 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSES DPR-77 AND 79 - TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION (TS) 3.3.3.8 - SPECIAL REPORT 91-13

The enclosed special report provides details concerning the inoperability of the fire detection instrumentation in Fire Zone 352 for the lower compartment cooler area. The zone will be out of service until the next outage of sufficient duration. This report is being submitted in accordance with TS Action Statement (b) of Limiting Condition for Operation 3.3.3.8. The commitment made in this report is listed in Enclosure 2.

If you have any questions concerning this submittal, please telephone M. A. Cooper at (615) 843-8924.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

J. W. Wilson

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Enclosure
cc: See page 2

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ENCLOSURE 1
SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SQN)
SPECIAL REPORT 91-13

This special report is being made in accordance with Action Statement b of Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.3.3.8 because of the inability to repair inoperable fire detector(s) within 14 days.

On July 27, 1991, at 1715 Eastern daylight time with Unit 1 operating in Mode 1 (100 percent power, 2235 pounds per square inch gauge, and 578 degrees Fahrenheit), LCO 3.3.3.8 was entered when a trouble alarm on Fire Protection Panel 0-L-629 was observed. An investigation into the situation revealed that a fire detector in Fire Zone 352 had apparently malfunctioned. Fire Zone 352 is for the lower compartment coolers located inside the Unit 1 containment. The zone contains four detectors; a failure of any or all of these detectors results in receipt of the trouble alarm. Technical Specification 3.3.3.8 requires that all four detectors be operable.

An hourly monitoring of the containment air temperature was established in compliance with Action Statement 3.3.3.8.a. Fire suppression capability is still available through manual initiation by operators. Because of ALARA (as low as reasonably achievable) considerations during power operations, the inaccessibility of the detectors has prevented a repair or replacement attempt. The detectors in the affected zone will be restored to operable status during the next Unit 1 outage of sufficient duration. A determination of the exact cause of the detector's inoperability cannot be determined until that time.

SQN will remain in LCO 3.3.3.8 and the hourly lower containment temperature monitoring will be continued until the fire zone detectors are returned to operable status.

ENCLOSURE 2

Commitment

The detectors in the affected zone will be restored to operable status during the next Unit 1 outage of sufficient duration.