RECEIVED Washington Public Power Supply System P.O. Box 968 3000 George Washington Way Richland, Washington 99352 (509) 372-5000 Docket No. 50-397 REGION VIKE November 16, 1983

G02-83-1067

Mr. J. B. Martin Regional Administrator U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region V 1450 Maria Lane, Suite 210 Walnut Creek, CA 94596

Subject:

NUCLEAR PROJECT NO. 2

10CFR50.55(e) REPORTABLE CONDITION NO. 286 LINEAR INDICATION ON CONTAINMENT WELD PADS

Reference:

Supply System letter GO2-83-925, dated October 14,

1983, C. S. Carlisle to J. B. Martin

In accordance with the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e), your office was informed by telephone of the subject potentially reportable condition and the referenced letter transmitted an interim report. This condition has been determined to be not reportable. The attachment hereto provides our rationale for this determination.

If there are any questions concerning this matter, please contact Roger Johnson, WNP-2 Project Q.A. Manager, (509) 377-2501, extention 2712.

G. C. Sorensen, Manager Regulatory Programs

HAC/tmh Attachment

cc: Mr. W. S. Chin, BPA Mr. N. D. Lewis, EFSEC

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WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM NUCLEAR ROJECT NO. 2 DOCKET NO. 50-397 LICENSE NO. CPPR-93

10CFR50.55(e) CONDITION #286
LINEAR INDICATION ON CONTAINMENT WELD PADS

FINAL REPORT

Description of Deficiency

A sample of attachment welding to the containment vessel made under Contract 213 was re-examined by magnetic particle testing (MT) as part of the reinspection performed under the Quality Verification Program. This MT examination identified linear indications in the toe on the pad side of the 3/8" peripheral fillet weld attaching a 2"x65"x60" weld pad to the containment. The pad is located at elevation 524', azimuth 18°, in the drywell. Subsequent MT examinations were performed on the peripheral welds on all similar pads attached to the containment in the drywell (19 pads). Similar linear indications were found in these welds.

Safety Implication

Fracture analyses performed showed that the calculated critical flaw sizes for all shell locations were greater than reference flaw sizes determined from a review of the inspection data. The potential for fracture of the containment shell, under the assumptions of worst case loading, lower bound toughness and reference flaw sizes does not exist. Similarly, since the attachment welds (pad to shell) can tolerate very large flaws, the potential for beam seat separation under worst case loads does not exist.

Therefore, it is concluded that if the underbead cracks had gone undetected, they would not have adversely affected the function or safety of any plant component. This item is concluded not to be reportable under 10CFR50.55(e).