

CONTROL BLOCK:

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 (1)

0	1	0	H	D	B	S	1	2	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	0	-	0	0	3	4	1	1	1	1	4			5		
7	8	9					14	15											25	26									57	CAT	58
LICEN		SEE CODE						LICENSE NUMBER										LICENSE TYPE													

0 1 7 8

REPORT SOURCE

60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80

L 6 5 3 4 6 7 1 6 8 3 8 1 1 4 8 3 9

DOCKET NUMBER

EVENT DATE

REPORT DATE

02 (NP-33-17-75) On 10/6/83 at 1600 hours, a security officer found Door 203, Auxiliary

03 | Building Central Stairway Access Door, 565' level, propped open by a small air hose and

0	4
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 extension cord. Since Door 203 is a fire door the unit entered the action statement of


05 Technical Specification 3.7.10. On 10/12/83 at 0945 hours, an operator found Door 108,







06 | Access Door to the Detergent Waste Drain Tank Room, open. The unit entered the action.

07 | statement of Technical Specification 3.6.5.2. There was no danger to the health and

08 safety of the public or station personnel.

SYSTEM	CAUSE	CAUSE	COMP	VALVE
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[illegible]

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 The cause of these occurrences were personnel errors. Although there is sufficient

[1][1] clearance for Door 203 to close completely with the hose and cord running under it,

[1][2] | apparently someone passing through the door kicked the air hose in such a manner to

1 3 prevent the door from closing. The person(s) responsible for leaving Door 108 open

1 4 could not be determined. For each occurrence, the door was closed, removing the unit
7 8 9 from the action statement. 20

FACILITY STATUS		% POWER	OTHER STATUS	METHOD OF DISCOVERY	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION							
1	5	E	(28)	0	4	0	(29)	NA	A	(31)	Found by Station Personnel	(32)
7	8	9	10	11	12	13			45	46		

ACTIVITY CONTENT
RELEASED OF RELEASE

1 6 2 33 4 NA

7 8 9 10 11 44

AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)

NA

LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)

45 80

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES										
NUMBER		TYPE		DESCRIPTION						
1	7	0	0	0	37	2	38	NA		

PERSONNEL INJURIES		NUMBER		DESCRIPTION	
1	2	3	4	5	6
				40	NA

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PDR ADDCK 05000346
S PDR

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY		(43)
TYPE	DESCRIPTION	
2	NA	

ISSUED DESCRIPTION (45) PUBLICITY

DVR 83-144 & 147 NAME OF PREPARER Jim Hansen/Lynn Richter

PHONE: 419-259-5000, Ext. 566/369

TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY
DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT ONE
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-33-83-75

DATE OF EVENT: October 6, 1983 and October 12, 1983

FACILITY: Davis-Besse Unit 1

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE: Fire Door 203 and Negative Pressure Boundary Door 108 found open

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: On October 6, 1983, the unit was in Mode 1, with Power (MWt) = 1109 and Load (Gross MWe) = 313. On October 12, 1983, the unit was in Mode 1 with Power (MWt) = 1380 and Load (Gross MWe) = 405.

Description of Occurrence: On October 6, 1983, at 1600 hours, a security officer found Door 203, Auxiliary Building Central Stairway Access Door, 565' level, propped open by a small air hose and extension cord. Since Door 203 is a fire door, the unit entered the action statement of Technical Specification 3.7.10.

On October 12, 1983, at 0945 hours, an operator found Door 108, Access Door to the Detergent Waste Drain Tank Room, open. Since Door 108 must be closed to maintain shield building integrity, the unit entered the action statement of Technical Specification 3.6.5.2.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence: The cause of these occurrences was personnel error. For the first occurrence, the Maintenance Weld Shop was responsible for placing the air hose and electrical cord under the door. Although there is sufficient clearance for Door 203 to close completely with the hose and cord running under it, apparently someone passing through the door kicked the air hose in such a manner to prevent the door from closing.

The person(s) responsible for leaving Door 108 open cannot be determined.

Analysis of Occurrence: There was no danger to the health and safety of the public or station personnel. Fire suppression systems are located in the area of Door 203.

In addition, the closure of Door 108 ensures that the Emergency Ventilation System (EVS) can provide a negative pressure within the annulus between the shield building and containment vessel. Door 108 opens in a manner such that in the event of an EVS actuation, Door 108 would be closed by the differential pressure.

Corrective Action: Upon discovery of each occurrence, the door was immediately closed, removing the unit from the action statement. For the first occurrence, Maintenance was contacted, who removed the air hose and extension cord. Standing Order No. 30, "The Blocking of Penetration Fire Barriers, Fire Doors, and Negative Pressure Boundary Doors" will be

TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY
DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT ONE
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-33-83-75
PAGE 2

rewritten to include guidance under what conditions door obstructions can be established. The Maintenance Supervisors will review Standing Order No. 30 with their personnel.

A Technical Specification change request has been written to revise Technical Specification 3.7.10 as requested by NRC letter, Log No. 609, Fire Protection Standard Technical Specifications.

Failure Data: A previous occurrence of open fire doors due to personnel error that has been reported within the last year was reported in Licensee Event Report NP-33-83-52 (83-042).

Previous occurrences of open negative pressure boundary doors due to personnel error that have been reported within the last year were reported in Licensee Event Reports NP-33-82-65 (82-054) and NP-33-82-70 (82-057).

LER #83-055

DMB



November 4, 1983

Log No. K83-1551
File: RR2 (NP-33-83-75)

Docket No. 50-346
License No. NPF-3

Mr. James G. Keppler
Regional Administrator, Region III
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
799 Roosevelt Road
Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137

Dear Mr. Keppler:

LER No. 83-055
Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Unit 1
Date of Occurrence: October 6, 1983

Enclosed are three copies of Licensee Event Report 83-055 which are being submitted in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9 to provide 30 day written notification of the subject occurrence.

Yours truly,

Terry D. Murray
Station Superintendent
Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station

TDM/ljk

Enclosures

cc: Mr. Richard DeYoung, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Encl: 30 copies

Mr. Norman Haller, Director
Office of Management and Program Analysis
Encl: 3 copies

Mr. Walt Rogers
NRC Resident Inspector
Encl: 1 copy

NOV 14 1983

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