

NRC FORM 366
(7-77)

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: _____ (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

01 | M | I | P | A | L | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | _____ | 5
 7 8 9 14 15 25 26 30 57 CAT 58

CON'T
 01 | L | 6 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 5 | 5 | 7 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 8 | 3 | 8 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 3 | 8 | 3 | 9
 7 8 60 61 68 69 74 75 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

02 | On two occasions, fire inspection tours of the Engineered Safeguards Rooms
 03 | were not completed within the required hourly period. In a separate occur-
 04 | rence, a fire inspection tour of cable penetration room was not completed
 05 | within the required hourly period. The fire tours were being conducted as
 06 | compensatory measures for the loss of fire barrier generation integrity per
 07 | TS 3.22.5.1. Reportable per TS 6.9.2.b(2). No threat to public health/
 08 | safety resulted. The plant is shutdown for refueling.
 7 8 9 80

09 | Z | Z | 11 | X | 12 | Z | Z | Z | Z | Z | 14 | Z | 15 | Z | 16 | _____ |
 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 18 19 20
 17 | LER NO REPORT NUMBER | 8 | 3 | _____ | SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. | 0 | 6 | _____ | OCCURRENCE CODE | 0 | 3 | _____ | REPORT TYPE | L | _____ | REVISION NO. | 0 | _____ |
 21 22 23 24 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
 ACTION TAKEN | X | 18 | FUTURE ACTION | X | 19 | EFFECT ON PLANT | Z | 20 | SHUTDOWN METHOD | Z | 21 | HOURS | 0 | 0 | 0 | 22 | ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED | Y | 23 | NPRD-4 FORM SUB | N | 24 | PRIME COMP SUPPLIER | Z | 25 | COMPONENT MANUFACTURER | Z | 9 | 9 | 9 | 26
 33 34 35 36 37 40 41 42 43 44 47

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

10 | The first occurrence was caused by the failure to adequately communicate the
 11 | significance of timely completion of fire tours. The second occurrence was
 12 | caused by personnel error. Procedures have been revised to emphasize timely
 13 | fire tour completion. Additionally, start and completion times of tours
 14 | will be communicated via radio for improved monitoring.
 7 8 9 80

15 | H | 28 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 29 | NA | 30 | A | 31 | Routine Review | 32
 7 8 9 10 13 14 44 45 46 80

16 | Z | 33 | Z | 34 | NA | 35 | NA | 36
 7 8 9 10 11 44 45 80

17 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 37 | Z | 38 | NA | 39
 7 8 9 11 12 13 80

18 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 40 | NA | 41
 7 8 9 11 12 80

19 | Z | 42 | NA | 43
 7 8 9 11 12 80

20 | N | 44 | NA | 45
 7 8 9 10 80

NRC USE ONLY

JGKeppler, Administrator
Palisades Plant
ATTACHMENT TO LER 83-68
November 3, 1983

A review of fire inspection tour activities revealed that required hourly fire inspection tours of the Engineered Safeguards Rooms were late on two occasions. The fire tour due at 0445 on October 3, 1983 was conducted 8 minutes late. The fire tour of the same area due again at 0553 on October 3, 1983 was conducted 4 minutes late. The inspection tours of the Engineered Safeguards Rooms were being conducted on an hourly basis as compensatory measures for the loss of fire barrier penetration integrity per T.S. 3.22.5.1.

The fire tours are normally conducted by security personnel, however, due to high levels of surface contamination in the area from construction activities, the use of respirators was required. Radiation Protection Technicians were temporarily assigned the responsibility of completing the hourly fire tours for this area since they were already qualified for respirator use.

In transferring this responsibility to the technicians, the significance of completing the fire tours at intervals of 60 minutes or less was not adequately communicated, resulting in two inspections being several minutes late. A revision to the Fire Protection Implementing Procedures has been completed which emphasizes the responsibility of timely fire tour completion. The occurrence was determined to be reportable on October 11, 1983.

In separate occurrence on October 25, 1983, the hourly fire inspection tour of a Cable Penetration Room was not completed within the required time period. Personnel error has been determined as the primary cause. Security personnel were assigned the responsibility for completing this tour, per T.S. 3.22.5.1, however, investigation indicates that no security officer was assigned to perform this particular tour. Upon discovery, a tour was immediately conducted, resulting in the hourly requirement being exceeded by 6 minutes. The incident occurred at shift change.

To prevent recurrence, a practice will be initiated whereby the start and completion times of all fire tours will be communicated via radio to the security dispatcher. The dispatcher will log the times and thus be cognizant of the actual performance of the fire tours.

DMB



Consumers
Power
Company

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November 3, 1983

James G Keppler, Administrator
Region III
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission
799 Roosevelt Road
Glen Ellyn, IL 60137

DOCKET 50-255 - LICENSE DPR-20 -
PALISADES PLANT - LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 83-68 (FAILURE TO COMPLETE HOURLY
FIRE TOURS)

Attached please find Licensee Event Report 83-68 (Failure To Complete Hourly
Fire Tours) which is reportable to the NRC per Technical Specification
6.9.2.b(2).

Brian D Johnson
Staff Licensing Engineer

CC Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement
NRC Resident Inspector - Palisades

Attachment

NOV 8 1983

OC1183-0005A-NL02

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