TOLEDO EDISON

RICHARD P. CROUSE
Vice President
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Docket No. 50-346

License No. NPF-3

Serial No. 1-388

November 10, 1983

Mr. James G. Keppler
Regional Director
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region III
799 Roosevelt Boulevard
Glen Ellyn, IL 60137

Dear Mr. Keppler:

On July 25, 1983, Toledo Edison received IE Bulletin 83-06 (Log No. 1-823) concerning nonconforming materials supplied by Tube-Line Facilities.

The enclosed attachment provides Toledo Edison's response to this bulletin.

Very truly yours,

RPC/CTD

dm d/23

cc: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
NRC Resident Inspector

IE11
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ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1954
SECTION 182a
SUBMITTAL IN RESPONSE
FOR THE
DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION
UNIT NO. 1
FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NPF-3

This letter is submitted in conformance with Atomic Energy Act of 1954 Section 182a in response to IE Bulletin 83-06 (Log No. 1-823). This deals with nonconforming materials supplied by Tube-Line Corporation facilities at Long Island City, New York; Houston, Texas, and Carol Stream, Illinois.

By _____
Vice President, Nuclear

Sworn to and subscribed before me this 10th day of November, 1983.

_____
Notary Public

LINDA L. COSTELL
Notary Public, State of Ohio
My commission expires Feb. 15, 1987

Toledo Edison Response to IE Bulletin 83-06:

Request 3a: Provide a list of the T-L supplied materials and identify the systems in which the materials are installed.

Response 3a: The following Tube-Line materials have been installed in safety-related systems at Davis-Besse Unit #1.

Material	System
4 ea. 6 inch, SA234 WPB, Schedule 80 Caps, Heat #NDUC	Auxiliary Feedwater
2 ea. 6 inch, SA234 WPB, Schedule 80 Tees, Heat #NDLG	Auxiliary Feedwater
16 ea. 3 inch 600 pound, SA105 Flanges Heat Numbers EKP and EVVA	Auxiliary Feedwater

Table 2 of IE Bulletin 83-06 indicates that Davis-Besse was also a recipient of stainless steel materials supplied by Tube-Line. These materials had not yet been installed at Davis-Besse. They have been removed from stock and returned to Capitol Pipe and Steel Company through which they were originally procured.

All other material received from Tube-Line has been installed in non-safety related systems.

Request 3b: Implement a program as discussed in 2b or 2c above.

2b. Implement a program which provides assurance that received materials comply with ASME Code Section III and applicable procurement specification requirements, or which demonstrates that such materials are suitable for intended service. This program should include specific verification that received austenitic stainless steels are in a nonsensitized condition.

2c. Replace fittings and flanges with materials which have been manufactured in full compliance with ASME Code Section III and the applicable procurement specification requirements.

During the 1983 refueling outage, samples were taken from the installed caps and tees. These samples were tested by the Babcock and Wilcox Company for conformance to the material specification. As a result of this analysis, the caps and tees have been certified to be in compliance with ASME Section III Class 2 requirements.

The flanges were replaced during the 1983 refueling outage by new flanges which had been manufactured in full compliance with ASME Code Section III Class 2 requirements.

Request 3c: Provide a basis for continued plant operation if the program requested by Item 3b has not been completed by the time of the bulletin response.

Response 3c: This item is not applicable as a result of the action taken to 3b noted above.

Request: Although the specific details involving the nonconforming materials supplied by T-L may not directly apply for your facility, you are requested to review the general concerns expressed in the bulletin for applicability at your facility. Your response should describe the results of the review, and if the general concerns apply, you should describe the short-term and long-term corrective actions to be taken and the schedules thereof.

Response: Toledo Edison recognizes the safety concerns that the supplier practices described in this bulletin raises.

It is Toledo Edison's opinion that destructive testing on either a sampling or each heat received basis would be the only way in which misrepresented materials could be detected. Such a testing program would require the ordering of extra material of each heat and sending it to a testing lab for destructive testing. Although this program could be set up on a sampling basis, its implementation would be extremely time consuming and difficult to manage. Alternatively, Toledo Edison considers an approach through the ASME survey system to be more practical. In this approach, ASME should be requested to modify their survey system of suppliers to require that a representative portion of material heats be selected and tested under the auspices of ASME to verify the validity of the associated material test report.