



Log # TXX-91191
File # 10110
10010
910.3
Ref. # 10CFR50.55(e)

May 31, 1991

William J. Cahill, Jr.
Executive Vice President

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attn: Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555

SUBJECT: COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION (CPSES)
DOCKET NOS. 50-445 AND 50-446
FERRORESONANT TRANSFORMERS
SDAR CP-84-04: SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT

Gentlemen:

On February 13, 1984, TU Electric reported, via letter from R. J. Gary to E. H. Johnson logged TXX-4109, a deficiency involving grounded secondary windings on ferroresonant transformers in Westinghouse safety-related inverters. At the time of the report, there were nine spare transformers in the warehouse and four installed in each Unit, for a total of seventeen Class 1E transformers on site. The corrective action committed to in the letter was to return the transformers to Westinghouse for repair by the manufacturer (General Electric).

On April 4, 1990, TU Electric submitted Licensee Event Report 90-002, by letter from W. J. Cahill, Jr. to NRC logged TXX-90127. The report described a reactor trip and a Source Range Flux Doubling signal which resulted from an inverter fuse failure. During investigation of the inverter fuse failure TU Electric determined that only twelve of the transformers on site in 1984 had been returned to Westinghouse as committed. Three of the five transformers which were not returned are currently installed in Unit 1. Two of these have been successfully high-pot tested in accordance with the test procedure detailed in Westinghouse Technical Bulletin NSD-TB-84-11. The third transformer has been operating since approximately August 1989, and meets the six month operating time specified in NSD-TB-84-11. The two remaining spare transformers have also been successfully high-pot tested.

TE27
110

0 303
9106070320 910531
PDR ADCK 05000445
PDR

400 North Olive Street L.B. 81 Dallas, Texas 75201

This oversight occurred due to the existence of two material management organizations, the Operation Material Group and the Construction Material Group, which served different functions. The five transformers that were not returned to the manufacturer were in the custody of Operation Material Group. Since the two material groups operated differently, the requirement to return the defective transformers was not adequately transmitted to the Operation Material Group. Presently, the Material Management Organization provides an integrated approach and serves both operation and construction which will preclude recurrence of this oversight.

TU Electric concludes that the failure to return these transformers as committed and their subsequent use has no safety significance and is not a separately reportable deficiency.

Sincerely,


William J. Cahill, Jr.

OB/bm

c - Mr. R. D. Martin, Region IV
Mr. M. L. Fields, NRR
Resident Inspectors, CPSES (2)