

DUKE POWER COMPANY

P.O. BOX 33189
CHARLOTTE, N.C. 28242

HAL B. TUCKER
VICE PRESIDENT
NUCLEAR PRODUCTION

October 13, 1983

USNRC REGION I
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TELEPHONE
(704) 373-4531

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
101 Marietta Street NW, Suite 2900
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Subject: McGuire Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2
Docket Nos. 50-369 and 50-370
LER/RO-369/83-83 and 370/83-47

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Please find attached Reportable Occurrence Reports RO-369/83-83 (Unit 1) and 370/83-47 (Unit 2). These reports concern T.S. 3.7.11, "All Fire Barrier Penetrations (Walls, Floor/Ceilings, Cable Tray Enclosures and Other Fire Barriers) Separating...Portions of Redundant Systems Important to Safe Shutdown Within a Fire Area...Shall Be Operable". This incident was considered to be of no significance with respect to the health and safety of the public.

Note that this incident is related to Facility Operating License No. NPF-9 Section 2.G Report, "Inadequate Fire Barriers", which was submitted September 28, 1983.

Very truly yours,

H.B. Tucker

Hal B. Tucker

PBN:jfw
Attachment

cc: Document Control Desk
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

Mr. W. T. Orders
NRC Resident Inspector
McGuire Nuclear Station

Records Center
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
1100 Circle 75 Parkway, Suite 1500
Atlanta, Georgia 30339

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DUKE POWER COMPANY
McGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION
REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE REPORT NOS. 369/83-83 and 370/83-47

REPORT DATE: October 13, 1983

FACILITY: McGuire Units 1 and 2, Cornelius, NC

IDENTIFICATION: Missed Fire Watch Patrols in the Electrical Penetration Rooms

DESCRIPTION: On September 29, 1983 scheduled fire watch patrols in the auxiliary building electrical penetration rooms (EPRs) were not performed between 0400 and 0500 hours and between 0500 and 0600 hours. Hourly patrols had been instituted in response to Technical Specification 3.7.11 after discovery that a nonfire-retardant material had been installed in the EPRs (reference RO's 369/83-72 (Unit 1) and 370/83-44 (Unit 2)). Unit 1 was in Mode 1 at 100% power and Unit 2 was in Mode 1 at 85% power at this time.

This incident is attributed to Personnel Error, due to neglect by the officer who should have performed the patrols.

EVALUATION: Electrical penetration rooms for redundant trains of cables required for hot shutdown are located in the Auxiliary Building on the 733' and 750' elevations. Various electrical and mechanical penetrations are sealed to maintain a 3 hour fire rating. In areas where the Auxiliary Building abuts the Reactor and Diesel Generator Buildings, the structures are spaced approximately 3 inches apart. This space allows the buildings to move independently during a design basis earthquake. When the concrete was poured compressed cork was installed in the 3 inch gap as filler material.

The presence of this material at McGuire was discovered and reported to the NRC as a deviation from the requirements contained in Unit 1 Facility Operating License NPF-9, Section 2.C.(4), on September 14, 1983.

The Unit 1 and 2 fire barriers were subsequently declared inoperable pursuant to T.S.3.7.11 on September 15, 1983. In accordance with the action statement of the Technical Specification, the area fire detection zones (EFAs 31 and 32) were verified to be operable and hourly fire watch patrols were begun.

Responsibility for these patrols was assigned to the contracted security organization at McGuire, Globe Security. The patrols are performed by the officer who is conducting the Vital Area Patrol. (This patrol verified the integrity of the physical barrier of Vital Areas, including the EPRs.) Officers are assigned to this patrol on a rotating basis every 2 hours.

On September 29, 1983 Security Officer A assumed the Vital Area/Fire Watch Patrol at 0400. He was given the log sheet which documents this patrol by the officer he was relieving. At 0600 when Security Officer A reported to his supervisor at shift turnover, no times for the fire watch patrols in the EPRs had been recorded. When questioned by his supervisor, Security Officer A stated that he had forgotten to perform the fire watch patrols.

Both the security officer involved and Globe Security in general, were cognizant of the requirement to perform the fire watch patrols. But it should be noted that they were not aware that the fire watch patrols were Technical Specification related. Nor were they aware of the severity of failing to perform the fire watch patrols, since their job responsibilities are mandated by the McGuire Security Plan and not by

Technical Specifications. In addition, they receive no formal training concerning Technical Specifications and perform only one other Technical Specification related surveillance (inspection of fire doors).

CORRECTIVE ACTION: All Globe Security shift lieutenants have been given general training in Technical Specifications and particular training in specification 3.7.11, fire barrier penetrations.

Responsibility for performance of the fire watch patrol has been assigned to the sergeant in charge of the Central Alarm Station. (Responsibility will not be changed every 2 hours, as before.) Patrols are now being documented on the Fire Watch Patrol Log as the patrols are conducted. The log is kept in the Central Alarm Station and is reviewed at the end of the shift.

SAFETY ANALYSIS: During the 2 hours that the fire watch patrols were not conducted in the EPRs, other officers entered the rooms while inspecting fire doors between 0500 and 0600. Additionally, the fire zone detectors in the area were all operable, and no fires occurred in the area.

The health and safety of the public were not affected by this incident.