



Brunswick Steam Electric Plant P. O. Box 10429 Southport, NC 28461-0429 March 7, 1984

FILE: B09-13510C SERIAL: BSEP/84-0523

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Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II, Suite 3100 101 Marietta Street N.W. Atlanta, GA 30303

> BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNIT NO. 2 DOCKET NO. 50~324 LICENSE NO. DPR-62 SUPPLEMENT TO LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 2-80-113

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

In accordance with Section 6.9.1.9b of the Technical Specifications for Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Unit No. 2, the enclosed supplemental Licensee Event Report is submitted. This report was originally distributed on Feburary 22, 1984, Serial BSEP/84-0359; however, portions of the report were inadvertently omitted during the distribution. The report, which is in accordance with the format set forth in NUREG-0161, July 1977, is being redistributed in its entirety.

Very truly yours,

Clint

C. R. Dietz, General Manager Brunswick Steam Electric Plant

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MTA/mcg/LETCG2

Enclosure

cc: Mr. R. C. DeYoung NRC Document Control Desk

> 8403150186 840307 PDR ADOCK 05000324 S PDR

11-111	LICENSEE EVENT REPORT Update Report
	CONTROL BLOCK:
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CON'T	REPORT L 6 0 5 0 - 0 3 2 4 7 1 2 1 1 8 0 8 0 2 2 2 8 4 9 SOURCE 60 61 DOCKET NUMBER 68 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80
10101	EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)
[0]2]	During normal outvertrunce, to was appended to 7201518 had dual opena
03	control inerting inlet isolation valve, 2-CAC-V48, model No. 7501518, had dual open-
04	close position indication. The valve was then shut and disarmed to ensure the closed
0 5	position and was declared inoperable as required by technical specifications.
06	Technical Specifications 3.6.3, 6.9.1.9b
0 7	
0 8	80
	SYSTEM CAUSE CAUSE CODE CODE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE SUBCODE SUBCODE LC LE LC LE LC LA LC LV LE LV LE LV LA LE LC LE LC LD LC
7 8	9 10 11 12 13 13 18 19 20 REVISION
	ID LER/RO EVENT YEAR REPORT NO. CODE TYPE NO. 10 REPORT 8 0 1 1 3 1 1 1 32 1 1 32 1 32 30 31 32
	ACTION FUTURE EFFECT SHUTDOWN HOURS 22 ATTACHMENT NPRD-4 PRIME COMP. COMPONENT MANUFACTURER
	$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$
10	The cause was determined to be a defective limit switch, model OP-AR microswitch. Also,
	an incorrect solenoid valve and a defective actuator diaphragm were found. The limit
	switch, solenoid valve, and diaphragm were replaced. 2-CACV48 was then stroked per
	the ISI program and deemed acceptable. No further action regarding this event is
1 3	nlannad
1 4	9 NETHOD OF 80
16	TATUS SPOWER OTHER STATUS (30) OISCOVERY DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)
	ACTIVITY CONTENT AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY 35 LOCATION OF RELEASE 36
7 8	Image: Construction of the second s
17	0 10 10 3 Z 38 NA
	PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER DESCRIPTION (4) JE22
7 8	9 11 12 80 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)
1 9	
7 8	PUBLICITY AS BUD DESCRIPTION 45 9403010135 NRC USE ONLY
2 0	9 10 PPK NA 68 69 30 5
	NAME OF PREPARER Mary T. Allen PHONE 919/457-9521

LER ATTACHMENT - RO #2-80-113

Facility: BSEP Unit No. 2

Event Date: 12-11-80

The dual indication on the subject valve resulted from a defective limit switch. A bound lever arm or contacts that would not open are the most probable failure modes. After installing a new limit switch, acceptance testing revealed that the ASCO two-way solenoid on the discharge of the diaphragm was found to be a normally closed valve instead of a normally open valve. A review of Work Request & Authorization forms from 1974 to the present could not reveal when this solenoid was installed.

In addition, the diaphragm in the actuator was defective. Since this diaphragm was designed as a replaceable part, the failure is attributed to normal wear and tear. This defective diaphragm, in conjunction with the incorrect solenoid, would have permitted the valve to close on loss of air or power as designed.

The defective limit switch and diaphragm were replaced. Since an environmentally qualified ASCO two-way normally open valve can no longer be obtained, the solenoid was replaced with a modified three-way normally closed solenoid valve (P/N NP-8320A185E-3NC) under Plant Modification 82-177. Port 2 was plugged, allowing the valve to act as a two-way normally open valve. The valve was then stroked in accordance with the requirements of the ISI program and was acceptable.

Since the diaphragm is a replaceable part and expected to wear out, there are no actions to prevent recurrence. The limit switches are part of the IEB 79-01B program and will be replaced with environmentally qualified switches per the 79-01B schedule. Postmaintenance/ISI testing will help detect such problems in the future through excessive stroke times and failure to operate prior to returning to service.

The Unit No. 1 CAC-V48 was checked and verified to operate correctly. Other systems and valves were not checked since the problems would be noted in long stroke times, failure to open or close, and dual indication, which would be identified by periodic testing.