ENCLOSURE

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV

Inspection Report: 50-445/95-05
50-446/95-05

Licenses: NPF-87
NPF-89

Licensee: TU Electric
Energy Plaza
1601 Bryan Street, 12th Floor
Dallas, Texas

Facility Name: Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2

Inspection At: Somervell County, Texas

Inspection Conducted: February 13-17, 1995

Inspectors: William Wagner, Reactor Inspector
David B. Pereira, Reactor Inspector

Approved: W P. Ang 3-8-95
William P. Ang, Chief, Plant Support Branch Date
Division of Reactor Safety

Inspection Summary

Areas Inspected (Units 1 and 2): Routine, announced inspection of the implementation of the licensee's fire protection program, and followup inspection of previously identified items. Inspection Procedures 64704 and 92904 were used as guidance.

Results (Units 1 and 2):

- The licensee's implementation of its fire protection program met its fire protection safety objectives.
- Fire brigade personnel were well qualified, and were maintaining readiness through drills and training.
- Fire watches interviewed were knowledgeable of their fire watch duties, responsibilities, and general program requirements.

- Quality assurance audits of the fire protection program were comprehensive and performed in-depth evaluations. The implementation and effectiveness of the program was confirmed.

- Examples of poor work and maintenance practices were noted during the plant tour. Chainfalls in two fire pump rooms were not secured. An extension cord was observed hanging out of a panel while no apparent work was ongoing. Several bulbs that indicate power status for emergency lighting panels were not lit despite the panels being powered.

Summary of Inspection Findings:

- Inspection Followup Item 445;446/9403-01 was closed (Section 3.1).
- Licensee Event Report 445/9211 was closed (Section 3.2).
- Inspection Followup Item 445/9334-01 was closed (Section 3.3).
- Inspection Followup Item 446/9421-01 was closed (Section 3.4).
- Inspection Followup Item 445;446/9308-02 was closed (Section 3.5).
- Inspection Followup Item 445;446/9505-01 was opened (Section 3.6).

Attachments:

- Attachment 1- Persons Contacted and Exit Meeting
- Attachment 2- List of Documents Reviewed

DETAILS

1 FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM (64704)

An inspection of the licensee's fire protection program was conducted to verify that the licensee had properly implemented and maintained the fire protection program required by the operating license.

2 FIRE PROTECTION/PREVENTION PROGRAM (64704)

2.1 Comanche Peak Fire Protection Requirements

Operating Licenses, NPF-87, issued April 17, 1990, for Comanche Peak Unit 1, and NPF-89, issued April 6, 1993, for Comanche Peak Unit 2, require, in part, that the licensee implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program as described in Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station (CPSES) Fire Protection Report (FPR), up to and including Revision 10.

2.2 Review of Fire Protection Program

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's program as specified in the CPSES FPR, including Revision 9, dated December 14, 1994, and Revision 10, dated February 1, 1995. The effect of the FPR revisions on the adequacy of the fire protection program were evaluated. In addition, the inspectors reviewed the fire protection program implementing procedures listed in Attachment 2.

Revision 9 of the FPR contained the following licensing document change request (LDCR) numbers and description:

94-001: Update FPR Section II-5.3.4 and V Appendix C Deviation 1b to show fire resistant material enclosure for exposed nonessential cables in Room X-115A.

93-006: Revision to FPR Section III for addition of safety injection accumulator vent valves for fire safe shutdown equipment list.

94-002: Revision to FPR Section IV Table 1 to reflect smoke detector additions in Unit 2 rooms; 2-060, 2-051, 2-062 and 2-054.

93-001: Deleted ionization fire detectors 06-06 and 069-07 from FPR Section IV Table 1.

Revision 10 of the FPR included the following LDCRs:

93-005: Updates FPR to reflect new combustible loading for fire zone 128 due to new transformer CP1-EPTRMT-01.

94-003: Updates FPR Section IV to correct errors in fire detection instrumentation and spray/sprinkler and hose systems tables.

The inspectors verified that the LDCRs described in Revisions 9 and 10 of the FPR were added to the FPR. The inspectors noted no problems with the implementation of the changes.

2.3 Plant Tour

The inspectors visually inspected various areas of the Comanche Peak Unit 1 and Unit 2 safeguards and auxiliary buildings to verify the proper installation, operability, and maintenance of plant fire protection features. The inspectors noted the following:

- Fire protection equipment, such as hose reels, hoses, detectors, and fire extinguishers were in excellent material condition, and were being maintained.

- Fire brigade equipment was staged at two convenient assembly areas and was in excellent condition. The fire equipment included personal protective equipment such as turnout coats, boots, gloves, hard hats, emergency communications equipment, portable lights, and portable extinguishers. All fire equipment was in excellent condition.

- The fire protection systems and equipment in the fire pump rooms appeared to be in good material condition. However, two separate chainfalls in separate pump rooms were not secured as noted in the third pump room.

- Emergency lights were available and in operable condition on the safe shutdown access and egress routes. The emergency lights were maintained as noted from surveillances reviewed by the inspectors. However, six emergency light panel boxes did not have their green lights lit to indicate that the boxes were energized. The licensee was informed of the noted condition. The licensee subsequently replaced the bulbs.

- The fire protection equipment in the cable spreading rooms for both units, the main switchgear room for Unit 2, and the Unit 1 Train A diesel generator, appeared to be in good material condition. Housekeeping was being properly maintained and no transient combustible material was noted.

- An electrical extension cord running from the top of a non-safety related main steam safety valve flow monitor panel CP1-EIPRLV-39 was observed by the inspectors. No apparent work was observed in the vicinity of the panel. The licensee was informed of the noted condition. The licensee indicated that the electrical cord was left over from previously accomplished work. The licensee had the extension cord removed from the cabinet.

- Housekeeping was well maintained in general plant areas. No excessive buildup of transient combustible materials was noted.

2.4 Fire Protection System Walkdown

The inspectors performed a walkdown of the firewater supply system. All valves inspected were in their proper positions. Firewater pumps and equipment were operable and well maintained. An adequate volume of water was stored in the two firewater supply tanks. Valves for the water supply piping to the fire pump houses were in the correct positions. The inspectors noted that chainfalls were not secured in the rooms containing diesel driven fire pump X-05 and the motor driven fire pump X-04. The chains were located adjacent to instrumentation for the diesel fire pump and the motor driven fire pump. The inspectors considered the unsecured chainfalls to be a poor work practice. The inspectors notified the licensee, who promptly secured both chainfalls.

2.5 Fire Suppression for Control Room Emergency Filter Units

During discussions with control room operators, a recurring problem with the control room (CR) emergency filter units was identified. When the fire suppression isolation valves were opened, after performing maintenance work on the butterfly valves to the CR emergency filter units, water leaked past the butterfly valves and flooded the charcoal filter units several times in the past. The charcoal filters had to be replaced when this occurred. Since 1991, several charcoal filter replacements had to be performed. Operations management consequently decided to close the fire suppression isolation valves, thereby preventing water from reaching the butterfly valves. During the inspection, the fire suppression system was not in its normal automatic initiation mode because the isolation valves were shut. An operator had to manually open the fire suppression isolation valves to activate the system. The butterfly valves were still in the automatic mode and would open on high temperature in the filter units. This condition distracted the operators because of the alarmed state of the fire protection panel. In addition, the fire suppression system was in a degraded condition since it was no longer in automatic initiation condition.

The inspectors discussed the above noted concern with the fire protection supervisor. The licensee informed the inspectors that plant modification (PM) 94-0047 would modify the fire protection system at the CR charcoal filtration units in the auxiliary building. The modification would install deluge valves which would isolate the butterfly valves from pressurized water. The modification, scheduled to be completed in late fall of 1995, would prevent water from leaking past the butterfly valves and wetting down the charcoal filters.

2.6 Training

Fire Brigade

The inspectors reviewed the readiness of CPSES personnel to prevent and fight fires. The fire brigade composition, qualifications, and training were

reviewed. In addition, manual fire fighting equipment and protective clothing availability and operability were inspected.

The CPSES fire brigade consisted of five individuals per shift. No members of the fire brigade were assigned positions as licensed reactor operators, or senior licensed reactor operators.

The inspectors reviewed training records for six fire brigade members. The inspectors determined that personnel were trained in initial fire brigade training classes and requalification classes. All members of the fire brigade received safety-related systems training. This training included the effects of fire and fire suppressants on the plants safe shutdown capability.

In addition, practical fire fighting training was accomplished at the local fire department training's facility on an annual basis. The fire brigade performed quarterly fire drills. Annual physical examinations were conducted on all fire brigade members. The training courses were repeated over a two-year period covering topics such as fire hazards, fire behavior, and fire fighting strategies and procedures.

The inspectors' review of the training records indicated that the fire brigade members were well trained. The fire brigade members were maintained in a requalification program.

The inspectors interviewed six fire brigade members. The fire brigade personnel interviewed were knowledgeable of the fire brigade program requirements, specific locations of safety equipment in the plant, and understood the effects of fire on the safe shutdown capability of the units.

The inspectors concluded that training provided to the fire brigade met the FPR requirements and was comprehensive.

Fire Watches

The licensee had a specific training program for individuals who were assigned fire watch duties. The inspectors reviewed the fire watch training document TRA-104, Revision 9 to determine the adequacy of the training. Instruction in conducting a fire watch was provided. Types and classification of fires were included in the training. The training included the correct selection and use of portable fire extinguishers and actions to be taken in event of fire.

The inspectors interviewed selected members of the roving fire watches that were assigned and were performing fire watch duties. All members were knowledgeable in the classes of fires, and the type of fire extinguishers used for each class of fire. In addition, fire watch personnel interviewed were knowledgeable of their station fire watch duties, responsibilities, and general program requirements.

The inspectors reviewed selected fire watch logs required by station administrative Procedure STA-729, Control of Transient Combustibles, Ignition Sources and Fire watches, Revision 6. The inspectors observed no discrepancies in the reviewed fire watch logs, Form STA-729-3.

Licensed Operators

The inspectors interviewed six licensed operators to evaluate their understanding and knowledge of the fire protection program. All six of the licensed operators interviewed were familiar with the duties, responsibilities, and general program requirements for the fire brigade personnel and for fire watches.

2.7 Surveillances

The inspectors reviewed surveillance records, listed in Attachment 2 of this report, to verify that fire detection and suppression systems met operability testing requirements. In addition, the inspectors reviewed the records to ensure that the surveillances had been satisfactorily performed at the required frequencies.

No discrepancies or deficiencies on the data forms were identified. The licensee conducted their fire protection surveillances at the required frequencies.

2.8 Effectiveness of Licensee Controls

The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of the licensee's controls in identifying, resolving, and preventing problems with the fire protection program. The inspectors reviewed Quality Assurance (QA) Audit Report QAA-94-101, "Operations Fire Protection Program," performed January 7 through February 11, 1994. The audit was performed to assess the effectiveness of the CPSES fire protection program. The audit included a review of programmatic controls, transient combustibles and ignition sources, training and qualification of personnel, fire watches, flammable/combustible material and compressed gasses, impairments, fire protection equipment/system condition and fire preplan instructions.

The inspector's review of the audit indicated that it was comprehensive in scope. The audit performed in-depth evaluations of the fire protection program.

Also, the inspectors reviewed nuclear overview department (NOD) field notes (FNs) and nuclear overview evaluations (NOEs) listed in Attachment 2 of this report. The inspectors concluded that the quality assurance audits, observations, and assessments of the fire protection program were being adequately conducted. These audits covered fire brigade training and qualifications, fire door operability, assessment of industry operating experiences on CPSES fire protection program, emergency lighting, fire protection equipment maintenance, transient combustibles, and impairments.

2.9 Conclusions

The inspectors concluded that within the areas inspected, the licensee was implementing an effective fire protection program.

3 FOLLOWUP - PLANT SUPPORT (92904)

3.1 (Closed) Inspection Followup Item 445;446/9403-01: Electrical Extension Cord under Fire Door

3.1.1 Original Inspection Followup Item

An electrical extension cord was discovered under closed fire door S1-19A. The licensee initiated a fire impairment permit and a roving fire watch in accordance with their fire protection program. The inspectors identified the routing of the extension cord under the fire door as a potential fire and safety hazard, and an example of poor work practice.

3.1.2 Activity During this Inspection

The inspectors interviewed senior licensee management who indicated that they had re-emphasized precautions and management expectations regarding this matter to their staff immediately after the item was identified. During plant tours performed by the inspectors, no impairments of this type were observed. In addition, the inspectors did not identify similar impairments during their review of licensee audits and surveillances.

3.1.3 Conclusion

The inspectors concluded that the licensee had taken appropriate corrective actions to assure that electrical extension cords would not be routed under fire doors.

3.2 (Closed) Licensee Event Report 445/9211 : Failure of Thermo-Lag Fire Barrier Endurance Tests

3.2.1 Original Followup Item

A voluntary Licensee Event Report Number 92-011 was issued on July 2, 1992, to document that the failure of Thermo-Lag fire barrier endurance tests resulted in some raceways being declared inoperable.

3.2.2 Activity During this Inspection

The inspectors discussed the item with the licensee. The licensee informed the inspectors that Design Modification 92-77 upgraded the installed Thermo-Lag on small conduits and wide cable trays in Unit 1. The modification was completed in March 1994.

3.2.3 Conclusion

Further inspection to determine the adequacy of the installed thermolag will be performed during a planned future inspection. In the interim, associated open inspection items will be combined and the individual items closed. The inspection followup item will be combined and tracked by Inspection Followup Item 445;446/9505-01.

3.3 (Closed) Inspection Followup Item 445/9334-01: Acceptability of Licensee Thermo-Lag Tests

3.3.1 Original Followup Item

This inspection followup item was opened pending completion of the licensee's Thermo-Lag test report, and review and approval by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

3.3.2 Activity During this Inspection

The licensee responded to this item in their letter TXX-94092 addressed to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, dated March 24, 1994. The letter enclosed Engineering Report ER-ME-067, Revision 3, "Evaluation of Thermo-Lag Fire Barrier Systems," which described the qualification of the Thermo-Lag fire barriers.

3.3.3 Conclusion

Further inspection to determine the adequacy of the installed thermolag will be performed during a planned future inspection. In the interim, associated open inspection items will be combined and the individual items closed. The inspection followup item will be combined and tracked by Inspection Followup Item 445;446/9505-01.

3.4 (Closed) Inspection Followup Item 446/9421-01: Thermo-Lag Deficiencies Disposition

3.4.1 Original Followup Item

The licensee had developed a draft action plan to disposition and correct identified fire barrier discrepancies. The licensee had not completed their assessment of the discrepancies nor determined what further actions would be taken concerning the remaining Unit 2 installations. This item was opened to review the final disposition of the identified deficiencies and the licensee's final resolution of the remaining Unit 2 installations.

3.4.2 Activity During this Inspection

During this inspection the licensee informed the inspectors that they had not completed their detailed assessment of the discrepancies and had not

determined what additional actions would be taken concerning the remaining Unit 2 fire barrier installations.

3.4.3 Conclusions

Further inspection to determine the adequacy of the installed thermolag will be performed during a planned future inspection. In the interim, associated open inspection items will be combined and the individual items closed. The inspection followup item will be combined and tracked by Inspection Followup Item 445;446/9505-01.

3.5 (Closed) Inspection Followup Item 445;446/9308-2; Tracking Fire Protection Commitments

3.5.1 Original Followup Item

This inspection followup item was opened to track the licensee's commitments to review the high impedance fault study for Unit 1; implementation of hardware modifications to prevent fire induced failure of safe shutdown motor-operated valves; additions and relocation of detectors and sprinkler heads; performance of a formal root cause evaluation of the emergency light failures; performance of preventive maintenance procedures on 100 percent of the Unit 2 safe shutdown emergency lighting prior to entering Mode 4; dedication of ladders and tools required to support Procedure ABN-803B; completion of the engineering analyses for untested Thermo-Lag configurations; and upgrading of safe shutdown emergency lighting batteries. These commitments were docketed in licensee correspondence dated December 23, 1992, and January 15, 1993.

3.5.2 Licensee Actions in Response to this Item

The high impedance fault study, Calculation No. EE-0008-715 Rev. 1, was completed and provided to NRC Region IV by licensee letter TXX-93301, dated September 3, 1993. The letter stated that any planned hardware modifications necessitated by this reanalysis were planned no later than the completion of the next available outage of Unit 1 to support the changeout of any breakers requiring upgrade.

The additions and relocations of detectors and sprinkler heads were documented on LDCRs. The LDCR Numbers and associated description were as follows:

93-001 Deleted ionization detectors 069-06 and 069-07 from the FPR, Section IV, Table 1, Page 11.

93-005 Updated FPR to reflect new combustible loading for Fire Zone 128 due to new transformer CP1-EPTRMT-01.

93-006 Revised FPR Section III for the addition of safety injection accumulator vent valves to fire safe shutdown equipment list.

94-001 Updated FPR Section II-5.3.11 & V to show fire resistive material enclosure for exposed non-essential cables in Room-15A.

94-002 Revised FPR Section IV Table 1 to reflect smoke detector additions in Unit 2 rooms.

94-003 Updated FPR Section IV to correct errors in fire detection instrumentation and spray/sprinkler & hose systems tables.

One Form No. 93-000123-00-00 was written to perform a formal root cause evaluation of the emergency light failures.

Work Order Numbers 3-93-330334, 449, 474, 481, 483, 484, 486, 668, and 671 , were issued to perform preventive maintenance procedures on 100 percent of the Unit 2 safe shutdown emergency lighting prior to entering of Mode 4 of Unit 2.

Operations Department Work Instruction No. OWI-203, Section 6.3.8 was revised to include "Emergency Use Only" ladders and tools are properly controlled to ensure their availability as done in Unit 1.

Specific Unit 2 Thermo-Lag configuration laboratory test results were provided to the NRC by licensee letter logged TXX-93023, dated January 19, 1993. Attachment 5 provided Engineering Report ER-ME-082, Revision 2, dated January 19, 1993, "Evaluation of Unit 2 Thermo-Lag Configurations."

3.5.3 Activity During this Inspection

The inspectors reviewed the actions taken by the licensee to ensure that they met their commitments as docketed in licensee correspondence, dated December 23, 1992, and January 15, 1993. The inspectors verified licensee actions by reviewing work orders, One Form No. 93-000123-00-00, operations work instruction, LDCRs, and specific letters sent to the NRC addressing the impedance fault study and Thermo-Lag configuration laboratory test results.

3.5.4 Conclusion

The inspectors concluded that the licensee had completed the actions necessary to meet the commitments docketed in licensee correspondence, dated December 23, 1992, and January 15, 1993.

3.6 (OPEN) Inspection Followup Item 445;446/9505-01: Thermo-Lag Deficiencies

One LER and two previous Inspection Followup Items regarding Thermo-Lag deficiencies were reviewed during the current inspection. The items were combined as one new Inspection Followup Item, 445;446/9505-01, and the previous items were closed in paragraphs 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4. The specific items were:

- Licensee Event Report 445/9211 (Section 3.2)

  The failure of Thermo-Lag fire barrier endurance tests resulted in some raceways being declared inoperable.

- Inspection Followup Item 445/9334-01 (Section 3.3)

  Completion of the licensee's Thermo-Lag test report, and review and approval by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

- Inspection Followup Item 446/9421-01 (Section 3.4)

  Final disposition of identified fire barrier deficiencies and the final resolution of the remaining Unit 2 installations.

ATTACHMENT 1

1 PERSONS CONTACTED

1.1 Licensee Personnel

*C. Terry, Group Vice President, Nuclear Production
*N. Paleologos, Vice President, Operations
*D. Moore, Manager, Operations
*D. Kross, Manager, Operations Support
*J. Barker, Manager, Mechanical Engineering
*W. Grace, Manager, Safety Services
*R. Bird, Jr., Manager, Nuclear Planning
*R. Lancaster, Manager, Plant Support
*J. Ayres, Manager, Plant Support Overview
*D. Buschbaum, Manager, Technical Compliance
*S. Harvey, Manager, Shift Operations
*R. Wakeman, Supervisor, Operations Fire Protection
*M. Smith, Supervisor, Plant Support System
*J. Soileau, Supervisor, Maintenance Training
*T. Marsh, Supervisor, Nuclear Engineering/Operations
*O. Bhatty, Coordinator, Licensing
*C. Locke, Senior Engineer
*C. Beckett, Consulting Fire Protection Engineer
*D. Sandlin, Fire Protection
*D. Heintz, Industrial Safety Trainer
*C. Beerck, Senior Maintenance Analyst
*W. Scott, Senior Fire Protection Technician
*B. Brown, Coordinator, Operations Fire Protection
*J. Roberts, Senior, Fire Protection Technician
*D. Fisher, Senior, Fire Protection Technician

1.2 NRC Personnel

*D. Graves, Project Engineer
*W. P. Ang, Plant Support Branch Chief

*Denotes personnel that attended the exit meeting.

2 EXIT MEETING

An exit meeting was conducted on February 17, 1995. During the meeting, the inspectors reviewed the scope and preliminary findings of the inspection. The licensee indicated that they understood the inspection findings. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any information provided to or reviewed by the inspectors. Proprietary information is not included in this inspection report.

ATTACHMENT 2

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED:

1. TRA-104, "Fire Protection Training," Revision 9, November 17, 1992.

2. STA-722, "Fire Protection Program," Revision 4, March 26, 1993.

3. STA-723, "Fire Protection Systems/Equipment Requirements," Revision 2, February 24, 1994.

4. STA-727, "Fire Brigade," Revision 2, June 17, 1994.

5. STA-729, "Control of Transient Combustibles, Ignition Sources and Fire Watches," Revision 6, January 11, 1995.

6. STA-738, "Fire Protection Systems/Equipment Impairment," Revision 4, September 29, 1993.

7. MSE-P2-7702, "Fire Protection Control Panel CP2-EIPRLV-33 Test," Revision 1, November 7, 1994.

8. Fire Protection Report, Section IV, Revision 6, July 31, 1992.

9. ABN-803A, "Response to Fire in the Control Room or Cable Spreading Room," Revision 3, November 22, 1993.

10. Quality Assurance Audit QAA-94-101, "Operations Fire Protection Program," performed during the period of January 7 through February 11, 1994, dated February 25, 1994.

LIST OF SURVEILLANCES REVIEWED:

1. MSE-P2-7702, "Fire Protection Control Panel CP2-EIPRLV-33 Test," Revision 0, data packages, dated June 20, 1994, and December 26, 1994, for the Safeguards Building Elevation 810 Train A Switchgear Room Fire Protection Panel 2-LV-33.

2. MSE-PO-5306, "Emergency Lighting Unit Inspection," Revision 5, data package, dated August 8, 1994, for the Control Building Elevation 830 6 Volt DC Battery Operated Emergency Lighting Power Unit X-118.

3. MSE-PO-5306, "Emergency Lighting Unit Inspection," Revision 5, data package dated, December 8, 1994, for the Auxiliary Building Elevation 778 6 Volt DC Battery Operated Emergency Lighting Power Unit X-133.

4. PPT-PX-3603, "Fire Hydrant CPX-FPFEHY-03 Yearly Flow Test," Revision 0, data package, dated August 29, 1994, for the Yard Area Fire Hydrant X-03.

5. PPT-PX-3604, "Fire Hydrant CPX-FPFEHY-04 Yearly Flow Test," Revision 0, data package, dated August 29, 1994, for the Yard Area Fire Hydrant X-04.

6. PPT-PX-3605, "Fire Hydrant CPX-FPFEHY-05 Yearly Flow Test," Revision 0, data package, dated August 29, 1994, for the Yard Area Fire Hydrant X-05.

7. PPT-PX-3606, "Fire Hydrant CPX-FPFEHY-06 Yearly Flow Test," Revision 0, data package, dated August 29, 1994, for the Yard Area Fire Hydrant X-06.

8. OPT-220-4, "Fire Suppression Water System Operability Test Flow Path Valve Position Verification," Revision 4, data package, dated December 12, 1994.

9. OPR-22-6, "Fire Suppression Water System Accessible Valve Cycling (Valves with Tamper Switches)," Revision 1, data package dated, May 14, 1994.

LIST OF NUCLEAR OVERVIEW EVALUATIONS (NOEs) AND NUCLEAR OVERVIEW DEPARTMENT (NODs) FIELD NOTES (FNs):

1. NOD-FN-94-10, dated February 28, 1994, "Modification Closure Activities."

2. NOD-FN-94-12, dated March 2, 1994, "Fire Protection Panel X-LV-30 Test."

3. NOD-FN-94-64, dated April 19, 1964, "Fire Protection Inservice Leak Test."

4. NOD-FN-94-65, dated April 26, 1964, "Design Modification Review Group Observation."

5. NOE-EVAL-94-000021, Operations QA Audit Report QAA-94-121, "Personnel Training and Qualification Program."

6. NOE-EVAL-94-000013, ISEG Assessment Report No. IAR 94-06, "Region IV NRC Inspection Report."

7. NOE-EVAL-94-000022, ISEG-FN-94-20, dated March 21, 1994, "Industry Operating Experience Report (IOER) Activities."

8. NOE-EVAL-94-000088, ISEG-FN-94-132, dated May 12, 1994, "One Form 92-82 (Emergency Lighting)."

9. NOE-EVAL-94-000099, ISEG-FN-99-81, dated May 2, 1994, "Work Control and Special Processes."

10. NOE-EVAL-94-000177, ISEG-FN-94-176, dated June 17, 1994, "Corrective Maintenance of Fire Protection Equipment."

11. NOE-EVAL-94-000220, ISEG-FN-94-121, dated May 25, 1994, "Spillage from Fire Protection Valve."

12. NOE-EVAL-94-000241, ISEG-FN-94-212, dated September 2, 1994, "CPSES Brigade Activities."

13. NOE-EVAL-94-000251, ISEG-FN-94-234, dated September 23, 1994, "Fire at Old Work Control Center."

14. NOE-EVAL-94-000380, ISEG-FN-94-347, dated November 29, 1994, "Fire Drill 94-17."

15. NOE-EVAL-94-000385, dated November 30, 1994, "Transient Combustibles/2RF01."

16. NOE-EVAL-94-000399, dated December 15, 1994, "Conduct of Maintenance/Housekeeping."