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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

in the matter of:

CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY and NORTH CAROLINA MUNICIPAL POWER AGENCY No. 3

Docket No. 50-400 OL 50-401 OL

(Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Units 1 & 2)

Telephone Conference

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8403120121 840308 PDR ADDCK 05000400 T PDR JRB: jrb UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3 In the Matter of: 5 CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY and NORTH CAROLINA MUNICIPAL POWER AGENCY Docket No's. NO. 3 6 50-400 OL 50-401 OL 7 Shearon-Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2 8 9 TELEPHONE CONFERENCE CALL 10 1625 Eye Street, N. W. 11 Washington, D. C. 12 Thursday, March 8, 1984 13 A telephone conference call in the above-entitled 14 matter was convened at 11:07 a.m., pursuant to notice. 15 APPEARANCES: 16 Board Members 17 JAMES L. KELLEY, Esq., Chairman 18 Administrative Law Judge Atomic Safety & Licensing Board Pane' 19 Washington, D. C. 20555 20 GLENN O. BRIGHT Administrative Law Judge 21 Atomic Safety & Licensing Board Panel Washington, D. C. 20555 22 JAMES H. CARPENTER 23 Administrative Law Judge Atomic Safety & Licensing Board Panel 24 Washington, D. C. 20555 25

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1 MS. FLYNN: Judge Kelley, let me just tell the 2 court reporter who is with me: 3 I have Dave Fowler, who is a lawyer with CP&L; 4 and Harry Dicus, Eddie McRae and Don Hall, who are legal 5 specialists. JUDGE KELLEY: Okay, thank you. 6 7 MR. BAXTER: Judge Kelley, Tom Baxter, I should do the same thing. 8 9 With me are John O'Neil, Deborah Bowser, Elissa Ridgeway, who are all attorneys here. 10 JUDGE KELLEY: Thank you. 11 Do we have Mr. Reid with us yet? Mr. Reid, are 12 you with us? 13 (No response) 14 JUDGE KELLEY: Apparently not. And we have 15 Mr. Eddleman on a bad connection. 16 I think what I'll suggest in the interest of 17 everybody's time: 18 Mr. Eddleman, you say you can hear me okay, 19 right? 20 MR. EDDLEMAN: Yes, I can. 21 JUDGE KELLEY: The primary purpose of this is for 22 us to deliver a fair number of rulings. We will have an 23 opportunity for questioning and comments at one place or 24 another; and it may be quite important that we hear you, as 25

well as vice-versa at some point. But I think at least to get us going, if you can hear me okay, we are in a Board-announcement mode, so why don't we go ahead on that basis. And if we get an operator back and it's convenient we can try to recall you; we may do that.

Excuse me a moment.

(Pause)

JUDGE KELLEY: I'll try to repeat: we are going to be announcing some rulings. These will be on the record with the reporter transcribing.

And we will provide a copy of this transcript free to all parties since it will be in lieu of a memorandum and order that would otherwise be issued.

What we intend to do is state the rulings today on the record, and we will go over the transcript, of course, as soon as we get it. I expect we will have a few changes, additions, whatever; since it's important that we convey our meaning precisely when we're making rulings.

What we would then propose to do is simply mark-up the transcript, Xerox it, and serve it; so you will hear today what the rulings are. And I hope they will be clear.

(Pause)

JUDGE KELLEY: Mr. Reid, are you on now?
MR. REID: Yes, sir.

JUDGE KELLEY: Okay.

there?

As I said to the others before you joined us, we are on the line this morning primarily to announce some rulings, one or two of which, anyway, is of direct interest to you. And that's what we'll be doing as soon as we get all the lines patched-in correctly.

(Pause)

JUDGE KELLEY: Maybe we should have just packed up and gone to Raleigh.

(Laughter)

(Pause)

MR. EDDLEMAN: I'm here, can you hear me?

JUDGE KELLEY: That's fine, good morning,

Mr. Eddleman; yes.

Can other people hear Mr. Eddleman, also? (Chorus of "yes".)

JUDGE KELLEY: All right. Mr. Reid, are you

MR. REID: Yes, sir.

JUDGE KELLEY: Well, why don't we go ahead. If the voices simply fade-out, then we'll have to do something. But we seem to be more or less in contact, so we'd like to proceed.

We want to cover a rather wide range of matters this morning, just to give you a sort of a quick road map:

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we've got a few miscellaneous procedural rulings; we have a number of rulings on contentions; we have some points to discuss about emergency planning; a point or two about the security plan, status of the various pending summary disposition motions; some comment on the pending health effects issues; and, finally, we'll take some questions and comments from the parties, whether by way of clarification or other points you want raised.

First of all, we have Applicant's motion of January 13, 1984, seeking a protective order to limit disclosure of information about welders employed by the Daniel Construction Company.

Now, only in the last day or two we also got a revised letter.

Do I take it that the proposed revised order is the last progress on this matter, and there remains a dispute between Mr. Baxter and Mr. Eddleman? Is that correct?

MR. BAXTER: Yes, sir.

JUDGE KELLEY: Can't settle it, in other words? You made some progress, but you didn't get it all settled. Very well.

Mr. Eddleman opposes the application for a protective order. He does, however, make a counter-offer of certain restrictions on disclosure of that information that

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he is willing to abide by.

The Staff filed a pleading registering no objection to the motion, but questioning whether the theory advanced for the protective order fits the facts in terms of the deciding cases.

As I said earlier, we have the more recent revised proposed order from the Applicant.

We do appreciate the efforts to settle this.

And it does appear that it didn't get settled. So the Board will now rule.

The motion for protective order is denied, except as noted herein.

Our denial rests basically on what we see as the Applicant's not sustaining their burden of showing need on the facts of this case.

The prospects of reading on trained welders seems to us to be not self-demonstrating. We're not talking about opera singers or quarterbacks; we're talking about people who are not that uncommon.

There is a presumption in favor of availability of information not brought forward in litigation, and we don't think that presumption was overturned in this case.

And we are bearing in mind the cases that were brought to our attention, notably, Wolf Creek.

We note, however, that Mr. Eddleman has agreed to

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take the information subject to certain restrictions, basically the willingness of the welder in question to have his name disclosed in some public fashion--as an example; the restrictions are all set forth in Mr. Eddleman's response of January 30, 1984.

These restrictions seem reasonable to us. And they do give the Applicant and Daniel some protection, and therefore, our order is that this information is to be turned over subject to the conditions in Mr. Eddleman's response.

Now, in casting our order in this way, these conditions have been referred to as "voluntary." They aren't "voluntary" as far as we are concerned.

We are saying that these restrictions Mr. Eddleman proposes will be binding, gentlemen, in condition of his receiving the information in question.

MR. EDDLEMAN: Yes, sir, Judge.

JUDGE KELLEY: Okay.

Now, we are not reaching the further deposition question.

It seems to us in light of our order and general discussion, there may not be problems of that sort. If there are, then, the party who thinks he needs relief can come to the Board.

But we're not going to try to reach that part and rule on that at this point.

So that is our ruling on that matter.

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Secondly, Mr. Eddleman has a motion dated the

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28th of January to require the Staff to file their filings

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if they are going to be in support of the Applicant's

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summary disposition motions, within ten days of the Applicant's

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deadline for filing.

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We have two Staff papers in our possession,

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dated January 20 and February 21.

We are going to grant this motion in part:

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not in whole, but in part.

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The problem is that the way the schedule works

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as we initially set it up, Mr. Eddleman has to file twice if the Staff supports Applicants in some new and different ground.

Now, that double-filing is not inconsistent with the rule in 2.749, but the Board can alter that practice if the circumstances warrant.

And we didn't focus, frankly, on this particular point when we set up the schedule. We granted some ad hoc relief notably in the context of the health and safety contentions.

But for the future it is our ruling that as to summary disposition motions filed in the future, as to those that are now pending where responses have not yet been filed--and I'll mention them later--our ruling is that

1 the Staff's papers, if they are going to be in support, 2 ought to be filed 20 days after service, just as in the 3 present rule. 4 And that Mr. Eddleman should then be required 5 to file 25 days after service. And the practical effect of this is to give 6 7 Mr. Eddleman an extra five days to address any new matters in Staff's supporting papers. 8 MR. EDDLEMAN: Judge, could I request clarification? 10 JUDGE KELLEY: Okay. I'm not sure if we should 11 question as we go or later; but, go ahead? 12 MR. EDDLEMAN: Well, I want to know whether that's 13 25 days plus 5 days for the mailing or not? 14 JUDGE KELLEY: The rule right now is 20 days 15 after service which means 20 plus 5; right? 16 MR. EDDLEMAN: Um-huh. 17 JUDGE KELLEY: This would mean 25 days after 18 service -- let me pause a minute. 19 (Pause) 20 JUDGE KELLEY: Hold on a minute while I think 21 this out. That's a good question. 22 (Fause) 23 JUDGE KELLEY: 2.749 says, any other party may 24 serve an answer supporting or opposing the motion with or 25

motion and put their factual situation before the Board.

Okay.

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Next we have motion from Mr. Eddleman to withdraw the motion of his of February 20 concerning circuit breaker, a report of circuit breakers.

The motion is unopposed; and it is granted.

Moving into the contention area, we've got a series of rulings on contentions which we will now state:

First of all, focusing on Mr. Eddleman's filing of January 17, 1984, the--to do with amended and deferred contentions on the Staff's SER--we have a separate motion related to that which seeks further deferral of Contention 107.

And we have opposition papers from the Applicant and Staff on both of those matters.

The separate motion on deferring 107 is denied.

And we'll move now into the contentions themselves, including 107.

First of all, 107, the initial contention which lists a number of, well, unresolved safety issues as they relate to Harris; it came initially into the case; it was deferred to the SER. Now there's a motion to defer it further, which we have denied.

There are three additional contentions in the area of unresolved safety issues, 107x, 107y, and 107z.

Now, all three of these three contentions, plus the initial 107, are basically criticisms of the Staff's

analysis of these various kinds of problems.

His contentions, to state again, 107, 107x, y and z, four altogether, are rejected.

As the Staff points out in its opposition, contentions of this kind which basically are directed to the adequacy of the Staff's analysis, are impermissible under an Appeal Board Decision in the Diablo Canyon case; the citation is 17 NRC 777, and particularly pages 806 and 807.

There's one sentence in particular that we would like to quote into this record, because it's important not just for these contentions but for certain others:

The opinion says this at page 807: "Prohibition against a party's enforcing a Staff obligation"--referring to the Staff's obligation to pass on unresolved safety issues--"is in accord with the general principle that in an operating license proceeding, with the exception of certain NEPA issues, Applicant's license application is in issue, and not the adequacy of the Staff's review of that application."

In other words, let us assume that some section of the Staff's SER is deficient in some respect in its analysis, whatever it may be. It doesn't necessarily have to be unresolved safety issues; it can just be a deficient analysis of some issue or other.

That is not the basis for a contention.

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So what if it's deficient? What is at stake here is the applicant's application.

And that principle, it seems to us, is diapositive of the issues we just referred to. We'll apply it to some others and will refer to it in the future.

Next in order on these SER contentions is 173; now this concerns common mode failures on outside power lines.

And we are rejecting this contetnion basically for three reasons:

First of all, once again, it's a fault of the Staff analysis. And that's the approach. It isn't that there's something wrong out there in the real world, there's something wrong in the SER.

And under Diablo Canyon, that's irrelevant.

Secondly, we agree with the Applicants that the common mode failure analysis of offsite power is not required by NRC rules.

Thirdly, it seems to us that this contention is untimely. Certainly this sort of contention should have been advanced at the FSAR stage, which contains much more detailed discussions of offsite ower.

Those are our reasons for rejecting 173.

174 through 177 are seismic contentions. They all in one way or another rest upon the submission of the

United States Geological Service with respect to the significance of the 1886 Charleston earthquake for sites like Shearon-Harris.

We had some difficulties with these contentions as stated, which I will mention; but our decision on them basically hangs on the balancing of the five factors.

As to the contentions, themselves, quite apart from the five factors, we couldn't accept them as they are; because, once again, they are attacks on the Staff analysis. And we've made clear, I think, why we don't see that as a basis for a contention in an operating license proceeding.

Secondly, they allege various failures of the Staff to perform various investigative duties, as set forth in 10 CFR Part 100, Appendix A. While the appendix printing is not as clear as it might be in that regard, it has been held, and we believe those duties are not imposed on the Staff; they are imposed on the Applicant.

And we would cite in that connection a decision in the San Onofre licensing case, California Edison, San Onofre Nuclear Station, 15 NRC page 71 and 74.

Now, we wanted to register those two points. But apart from those two points, the five factors come into play.

And we went through this balancing exercise and

on the question of good cause, which really is a question of timeliness, we think it's a close call.

We don't believe that a party ought to be charged with knowledge of a meeting just because the meeting got noticed in the <u>Federal Register</u>. Really information in the public domain has some limits. Similarly, we have our doubts about the relevance of the Catawba SER for this case.

However, for the draft SER in this case, January of '83, and while it didn't include the text of the USGS evolving position on the Charleston quake, it referred to it; and it set forth, we think, enough of the parameters of this whole matter that an Intervenor interested in litigating the trial of an earthquake as it relates to Shearon-Harris was on notice to come forward with a contention in this area, without waiting until now.

So we come out that the good cause factor, factor-one, the timeliness factor, if you will, lays slightly against Mr. Eddleman, because of the druft SER.

Passing to factors number two and four, which can conveniently lumped together: number two is other means by which an intervenor can present or have his views heard; four refers to being represented by another party--we don't believe that--we think those two factors weigh in favor of Mr. Eddleman in this sense:

I can't point to anything in the way of other

means except for a possible petition; and the only other party presumably would be the Staff. Both of those arguments were looked at by the Appeal Board fairly recently--rejected in their decision in ALAB 747 concerning the WOOPS facility.

We don't see those as cutting against this contentions and back in the opposite direction. We might add, however, that we don't regard these two factors as being as weighty.

Now, the next factor is the ability of the proponent of the late contention to make a substantial contribution to the resolution of this issue. And, again, we want to underline the WOOPS case and call it to the attention of all the Intervenors, in case they haven't seen it.

It imposes a rather significant burden on an Intervenor who wants to come in late.

I'll just read the one sentence:

Because of the importance of the third factor which initially addresses this criteria, it should set out with as much particularity as possible the precise issue it claims to cover, identify its prospective witnesses and summarize their proposed testimony"--

We think identification of witnesses is especially important in this kind of a contention. It's a little bit like the health effects dispute, in a way; there's just not

an awful lot of people around who know that much about health effects.

And, similarly, there aren't that many seismologists who are available to anybody--Intefvenors or anybody else.

We don't have, in connection with this proffered contention any proposed seismologist. At least two of us here on this Board have set through two very lengthy seismic hearings, and know from personal experience that a party can't litigate a seismic case without a very good person helping you out.

We think the contribution weighs heavily against this contention.

Finally, the delay factor: and this is related to what we just said about the complexity of these issues. We think that allowance of seismicity in this case at this point would delay this case very substantially if it were to be litigated in any detail and if anybody were to learn anything; the issues are very complex with a lot of ramifications. And they are not something you an deal with easily. That is a firm negative in balancing the five factors.

And when we do that, we see the balance is against the four proposed seismic contentions, No. 174, 5, 6 and 7; and we reject it on that basis.

No. 178 and 179 are as to the Transamerica-Delavalle, Incorporated, diesel generators that either have been or are being installed at Shearon-Harris.

We note first that these contentions as drafted rest on what we will call generic considerations, not facts which are unique to Shearon-Harris diesels.

By that we mean insofar as they allege, for example, as they do, problems in quality assurance at TDI manufacturing place, the vendor's work place; and the same kinds of things that TDI generators at other plants have, the 15 or so that do have them at the moment.

Secondly, we would note that we don't see them as untimely; they are not untimely. This whole business just came to the surface really in the past several months.

Boards like this one have only been letting them in and rejecting them on the merits for the past three months. And that we don't see as a factor affecting admission.

But we do think it's significant that these are generic contentions in the sense I have described. You may or may not be aware of the fact that the Catawba Board recently rejected two contentions of this type and conceded it was a difficult, close, question; and referred them to the Appeal Board.

And that referral is pending before the Appeal

Board. Staff is going to be in the position of telling the Appeal Board what it, the Staff, thinks ought to be done about these matters later on this month. And that's one thing that we would like to see an answer on.

But we perceive and as the records of these various cases will tell you, the Staff has an ongoing program to investigate the problems associated with the TDI diesels; and it's moving ahead fairly rapidly. It seems doubtful to us that if we had a contention in on this subject right now that anything very useful would happen anyway.

So we are going to defer ruling on these two contentions until further Board order.

We are not keying that to a particular date or event, but we are deferring it in light of ongoing matters with the intention of reviewing it again as more light is shed on the situation.

So that's our ruling on 178 and 179.

Number 180 has been argued, and we think persuasively, as redundant to a portion of Joint Contention 7; and we are rejecting it on that basis as presumably the same point can be made on Contention 7.

Number 181--this is the last in that particular pleading--has to do with control room design review. On that one we agree with the Staff, that this contention --I'll just quote the Staff: "The contention should be

rejected now. If the information presented by Applicant and reviewed by Staff contained some specific inadequacies they should be raised at that time Mr. Eddleman receives the pertinent information."

Those are rejected as premature.

Next I'll mention and then pass on, but we have two deferred con entions in the environmental area with regard to the draft impact statement and which were deferred to the final; and by number they are Eddleman 85b and Eddleman 8f3.

And we focused on them to some extent, but I'll just add at this point, health effects matters said it before, and we'll have a couple of things to say about it a little later-we are going to issue a memorandum and order separate from this oral series of rulings.

And what we intend to do is include in that memo and order rulings on 85b and 8f3.

Next, a series of contentions on the safety
parameter display systems and opposition pleadings from both
the Applicants and Staff to these contentions.

And I'll read just a short st lement from our approach for now, as follows:

Contentions 169 through 172 concern the safety
parameter display systems for the Harris facility. Both the
Arplicants and Staff urge rejection of these contentions on

the grounds that they rest on incorrect premises and reflect a lack of understanding of the function of the SPDS systems.

Applicant's and Staff's pleadings are fairly detailed and are generally persuasive.

The Board's present inclination is to reject these contentions.

We recognize, however, that the questions are relatively complex and that a reply from Mr. Eddleman might disclose a valid contention among those now before us.

Mr. Eddleman may, accordingly, file a brief reply to the Applicant and Staff reply responses by March 20, 1984.

This is not, however, an opportunity to submit new or revised contentions.

Get that, Mr. Eddleman?

MR. EDDLEMAN: Yes, Judge.

JUDGE KELLEY: All right.

A response, if you want to make one, by March 20; but focus on what's before us now.

And I might just add that in talking about the function of the SPDS systems you might take into account what is mandated by Commission regulations as opposed to what is the Staff's view. There are a lot of documents cited there, cases.

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But that's there if you want to take the opportunity.

Okay.

The next is Eddleman proposed Contention 161, having to do with safe shutdown systems failure.

We are rejecting this contention.

The original form of 161 lacked specificity.

And the Board, at the Applicant's alternative suggestion, allowed a revision, an opportunity for revision of 161 by Mr. Eddleman, to provide some specifics based on some changes Applicants had for that system. And the information was provided basically.

Three, that the Applicant's and Staff's proposition say that revised 161 doesn't really take into account those changes; that it's the same contention that was before us before; it's no more specific.

We think that's right.

There is an added allegation in there about Criterion 22, but we also agree that that's not timely. It wasn't in the initial one, and we weren't holding this over for new contentions.

So on those bases, we reject 161.

We have three contentions, Eddleman 164, 165 and 166, concerning spent fuel shipping cans.

These contentions I think encompass both

release of radioactive material during accidents and the possible criticality of the steel wall of the cask.

Staff and Applicant opposed this on various grounds, including lack of jurisdiction, that they constitute an attack on Commission regualtions, lack of specificity.

The cask in question has been found to comply with the applicable provisions of 10 CFR Part 71 and has been licensed by the NRC.

The contentions make no claim as to the inadequacy of either the licensing process or as to the Staff analyses that have been performed.

I think in view of the separate licensing process for containers, the contentions do lack specificity.

More fundamentally, however, we are rejecting these contentions on jurisdictional grounds. They are addressed primarily to the safety of shipment of spent fuel in Licensee's facilities in Brunswich and Robinson and Shearon-Harris.

We agree with the recent holding of the Catawba Licensing Board that we lack jurisdiction over safety aspects of such shipments.

I cite in that connection Duke Power Company at 16 NRC page 167, and at page 172.

The next point concerns--Mr. Eddleman had a financial concerns qualification contention in the case,

which we rejected because of the Commission's rule as to that requirement.

And we recently received a motion from Mr. Eddleman.

I mention in light of the provision of the appeal in New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution--I believe Mr. Eddleman's motion was filed before the Commission issued its Statement of Policy on January 27, 1984, which has been given to us and also served on us by Applicant and Staff in response to Mr. Eddleman's motion for reinstate-

ment.

It is clear to us that the Commission's Statement

of Policy expects Boards to abide by the rule that is given before the Court.

The second paragraph I'll just read quickly:

"In response to this decision, the Commission intends to

conduct an expedited financial qualification rulemaking to

address the problems which the Court perceived in the

Commission's present rule. The Commission understands from

the Court's order that the mandate will issue no later than

45 days from the date of the Court decision, i.e., not

before March 23, 1984. Until then the present rule remains

valid; therefore, the Commission directs Atomic Safety and

Licensing Boards and Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal

Panel to continue treating the rule as valid. The

Commission expects to complete an adequate response to the D. C. Circuit's decision before it issues its mandate."

So, we have been told to proceed as before pending any different actions.

This necessitates our denial of Mr. Eddleman's motion.

Next we have a motion from Dr. Wilson to withdraw his Contention 3. This motion enjoins the Staff's unqualified support. We didn't hear from anyone else.

Granted.

Dr. Wilson, I believe at this point, doesn't have an active contention in the case. I think he had some in the deferred emergency planning case, a contention; and he may well have more--it depends on what we have recently received.

We regard him in that sense as a party to the case; but he has so far as we are aware, no active contentions at the moment.

Passing to--still in the general area of emergency planning, and we have some other comments--first on the contentions, No. 157 and 151; we deferred in our order of last fall.

One of them had to do with human factors and the so-called TSC.

We recently received a filing from the Applicants

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about that subject. It's not germane, but they supplied the information.

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medical personnel, and that was supplied.

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Our approach, then, is going to be this: we are going to be focusing very soon on emergency planning

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contentions generally; and we are going to leave these two,

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157 and 151, even though they are technically on-site

contentions, we are leaving them deferred for the moment.

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And I would say this, if any of the Intervenors

The petition asked for the names of offsite

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have any comment they want to make on the Applicant's

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human factors discussion re: No. 157, or the now-identified

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doctors, concerning 151, do so at the time you file--

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make comments at the time you file your proposed contentions

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on the offsite plans; and we'll take them into consideration.

Now, as to the offsite contentions, we looked at

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And then we'li decide what to do with 157 and 151, probably at the same time we decide the offsite

our calendar in light of the intermission date as planned;

--have all the Intervenors received the covering letter of

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contentions.

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Have they got that?

February 28, enclosing emergency plans?

(Chorus of: "Yes.")

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JUDGE KELLEY: Fine, thank you.

Going back to our old timing formula, it was 30 days following receipt in order to file contentions; and it was 15 days following receipt of contentions to file responses. That happens to coincide fairly well with a previously-scheduled prehearing of May 1 in which we'd hear some argument on these things and any replies people wanted to make.

But according to our calendar calculations, contentions would be due on April 3rd, which is--that calculus is 5 days for the mailing plus 30, makes it April 3rd.

And the same approach, responses due on the 23rd of April.

And, again, that is our mechanical application as we understand if of what we said before.

Anybody have any problem with those dates?

(Chorus of: "No.")

JUDGE KELLEY: Okay.

MR. EDDLEMAN: Judge?

JUDGE KELLEY: Yuh?

MR. EDDLEMAN: I don't have a severe problem with them, but, you know, I've been disfunctional for a couple of weeks.

JUDGE KELLEY: How are you doing? Are you well? Are you "re-functional"?

MR. EDDLEMAN: No, fir, my capacity factor is still limited. I'm better than I was. I've been able to get out and around, and I taught two yesterday. But I'm not in real good shape.

I don't know, let me just say: I might need to slip something like April the 7th or something like that.

JUDGE KELLEY: Well, I tell you what: why don't we treat it this way.

April is, you know, a month off; and I appreciate you've been ill. And you and I have talked a couple of times--quite ill, as a matter of fact--but I think we'd like to set it on the 3rd, taking into account your mentioning now that you may have a problem; and then we can take it into account then if you need more time.

MR. EDDLEMAN: Okay.

JUDGE KELLEY: Okay? Let's do that. We'll have those dates.

I think I mentioned before, we had a May 1 date for health effects prehearing. And I'll have some more to say about health effects in a few minutes.

But since that's on the rails and one of the things we'll do there is talk about emergency planning. And we said May 1, but if we have to take more than a day to cover it, everything that's before the house, then we'll do that.

But we'll have a better idea of how long it will be I think a little bit later.

Turning to the subject of security plans, we have a motion for reconsideration on a contention concerning--it's called "liaison with local police."

Now, we are in the area of so-called "safeguards" information; but I think we can say what we've got a say this morning without imposing any safeguards informat on.

It's going to be kind of short and sweet.

But we do want to make a ruling on that motion for reconsideration.

We are denying the motion for reconsideration.

In the main the arguments being made were considered before.

It appears some language in our opinion which gives the phrase "literal compliance with the rule,"--which in retrospect may have been a little bit ambiguous.

When we said that we did not mean to imply full compliance had been shown. We used "literal" in the sense of really "narrow".

And our ruling proceeded on a somewhat broader reading of the rule.

I think that that's all, strictly speaking, we have to say; because I think that we've covered those arguments pretty much the first-time around.

If the parties feel that further explanation is necessary, then we can consider that. But we for our part don't think so.

That then brings us to a short discussion on the schedule for the security plan litigation:

I am looking now at a proposed schedule that was sent to us in early February by Carrow. It has on the second page a proposed schedule for remainder of hearings on security plans.

And it lists a number of dates. And I gather all parties have been privvy to developing this schedule, and we are agreeable to it.

Our comment now is that what you have here may be okay, but we would like to see it simply accelerated a little bit. And we think it can.

So that we would at least be in a position if we need to have a hearing on one or more of these issues, that we can do it in about June.

And we suggest it in part because a couple of contentions that were not very long ago in the case, I understand have been negotiated and are out. So it is our impression that what is now in the case is not all that broad, and might be moved somewhat more quickly than you had previously suggested.

What I would like to do is this: just taking

your proposed dates and we made a few changes; and I'd like to have those of you participating in this particular 2 litigation to mull this over a bit and see whether our 3 4 proposal isn't feasible. 5 And, Ms. Flynn, are you the pretty litigator for 6 the--MS. FLYNN: Yes. 8 JUDGE KELLEY: Is Runkle there? MR. RUNKLE: Yes, sir. 10 JUDGE KELLEY: I gather that you and Mr. Carrow sort of worked out this schedule; right? 11 MR. RUNKLE: Yes, sir. 12 13 JUDGE KELLEY: And I guess Mr. Barth. If you have in front of you that schedule I am 14 referring to--15 (Chorus of: "Yes.") 16 JUDGE KELLEY: Well, let me just do this, let me 17 read off the proposed alternate dates. 18 I am not asking you to react to it right now, 19 but you might think about it a bit. You might discuss it 20 among yourselves and if it's workable, fine. And if it's 21 not workable then we can discuss it some more. But let me try this on you: 23 Down three notches, where it says Board ruling 24 on requests for reconsideration -- that's today, March 8th. 25

what should be done about security in view of what remains. 2 And rather than calling you, I can put it in front of everybody that we pretty much agree with the 3 4 schedule you suggested, sir. 5 JUDGE KELLEY: Well, that's fine. I'm not particularly prone to--if the other 6 parties want to think about it a little bit, that's okay with 7 8 us. Want a little time to think it over, 9 Mr. Runkle? Ms. Flynn? 10 MR. RUNKLE: It sounds pretty good to me. I have 11 to just check those dates. 12 JUDGE KELLEY: You mean the precise dates? 13 MR. RUNKLE: Yuh. I mean, there's only the one 14 contention left. 15 JUDGE KELLEY: Yuh. 16 What aobut it, Ms. Flynn? 17 MR. EDDLEMAN: It looks good to me, also. 18 Why don't Mr. Runkle and I just confer, and 19 we will confirm if this is all right. 20 JUDGE KELLEY: Fine. Thank you, that's fine. 21 Okay. 22 Now, next we'd just like to go over the sort of 23 status review of some six different motions for summary 24 disposition. 25

1 In two or three cases they are outstanding 2 motions, or some question has been raised; and I think we 3 can address all those points. 4 MR. REID: Mr. Kelley? 5 JUDGE KELLEY: Yes? MR. REID: This is Daniel Reid. I have a meeting 6 right now, I am afraid I'm going to have to sign-off. 7 JUDGE KELLEY: Well, hold on just a second. 8 9 (Pause) Mr. Reid? 10 MR. REID: Yes? 11 JUDGE KELLEY: Contention No. 44, change 44, 12 now that was also similar and the same as Eddleman 132, 13 I think. 14 MR. REID: Right. 15 JUDGE KELLEY: We got an opposition from 16 Mr. Eddleman. 17 Did you make a filing? 18 MR. REID: No, sir. 19 JUDGE KELLEY: Okay. That answers the question. 20 Okay, well, thanks. I think what remains on 21 here is not stuff you are directly involved in; but I'll be 22 sending you a copy of the transcript anyway. Okay. 23 Goodby. 24 Okay, back to motions for summary disposition.

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These are not in any particular order. I'll walk through them.

These are all motions by the Applicant for summary disposition.

The first one is 83-84, and we got the motion from Applicant and Staff. Eddleman had a question about the timeliness of this position. And I spoke with him, I was talking to him about some other matter. But the point came up, and I think we avoided ex parte discussion because the point was in dispute and I simply told him I thought it was timely and he'd be required to respond.

We had one motion for summary disposition and the way we set up the schedule, it said motions by a certain date, and responses by a certain date; and it appeared that the schedule could be read to suggest one only got one bite at the apple so far as summary disposition motions are concerned.

I think if we really focused on that, we would have made it clear; and that that isn't necessarily the case; particularly in light of the postponement of the January hearing there's time to go through another round of summary disposition motions. And the Applicants want to do that.

There's an interest if we can resolve things that way in doing just that.

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So, now, our prior schedule says--plus that, it might even have been somewhat misleading--I think it's timely; and our ruling is that it is timely and Mr. Eddleman should respond.

Now, I did leave open--I told Mr. Eddleman this-when we made that ruling there's a question of what the due-date ought to be.

I suggested to him and I think Mr. Baxter, too, that they negotiate some date. I don't know when they're goign to be able to do that.

MR. BAXTER: Judge Kelley, we agreed on March

JUDGE KELLEY: That's just fine.

MR. BAXTER: I also wanted to ask, Judge, whether the Board had received, as we did just this morning, Mr. Eddleman's motion to declare Applicant's motion on Contention 15aa untimely? It seems to me to raise basically the same thing.

JUDGE KELLEY: I don't believe I have the motion.

I think Mr. Eddleman mentioned this to me before, and the question did strike me somewhat--well, as long as we're on the phone, we ought to speak to it.

MR. EDDLEMAN: Judge, if you have the paper, you're welcome to go ahead and rule on it. But I think you

should read what I filed. There are some differences and I laid them out in my motion. It was in the express mail packet that I sent to you yesterday.

JUDGE KELLEY: You know, it could be, for all I know, it's in another part of the building; and I haven't seen it yet today.

Okay.

We can wait on that.

But as to 93-84 we've got a date of March 19th.

Now, just mentioning two others: 44-132, it's the same motion. The TLD motion, thermoluminescent dosimeters; those two we have pleadings on; and they stand submitted to the Board. And we will be ruling on them.

I might say as to all of these motions for summary disposition, we don't contemplate an oral ruling.

We expect to issue a memorandum and order. We might consolidate some of the , but there will be a written ruling.

The next one is Applicant's filing on Joint Contention No. 5. That's dated the 27th.

We don't have any opposition or supporting papers due at this point. I'll just mention we made this earlier ruling about the staggered system, so that our ruling about the Staff filing after 20 days plus service, and Mr. Eddleman's 25 plus service—to file.

Now, 15aa would be in the same schedule, and

Mr. Eddleman advises that he's got a motion on the way, probably here.

And, well--we'll consider that. I mean, you know what we said on 83a-4; we'll consider the motion and focus on the argument before we make a ruling.

I gather, Mr. Baxter, we'll get a response from you on the motion.

(No response)

Is Mr. Baxter still with us?

MR. BAXTER: Yes.

JUDGE KELLEY: Now, the other thing that we have on summary disposition motions is No. 65, Eddleman 65.

The Staff has filed in support of that.

And there's a dispute between Mr. Eddleman and the Applicant and Staff to some account, I guess, about whether they are entitled to finish covering before he has to file in response.

And our disposition is he shouldn't have to. We have an answer from Applicant disputing that position.

Mr. Eddleman has asked by way of relief to move that he be given until 15 days following the second round of discoveries.

Now, the Applicants have a counter-motion which would be to the effect that if we grant Mr. Eddleman's

motion, we should extend the time to answer discovery requests. It's kind of a preservation of the status quo motion essentially, because if we hadn't gotten around to ruling on Mr. Eddleman's motion until now, that time would have gone past.

We are going to grant both motions, Mr. Eddleman's motion, Mr. Baxter's motion.

We are also including in the grant of Mr. Baxter's motion the same relief for the Staff with regard to their obligations to answer to discovery.

And the result of all that follows:

Discovery requests are deemed to be served today, the day we're making this ruling.

This means that the answers and/or objections are to be served by March 23rd, the time allowed by the rule.

Now, beyond that, we have a standing directive to the parties to try to negotiate differences; and we'll just restate it here:

On any differences between Mr. Eddleman and the Applicant, they should seek to negotiate those differences by, say, March 30th. That's a little early maybe.

April 6th.

Try to work it out.

MR. EDDLEMAN: I'm sorry, Judge Kelley, could you

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go over those dates one more time? 2 JUDGE KELLEY: As your motion is formulated the 3 discovery reugests would be deemed to be served today. That being so, under the rule your answers would 5 have to be served by the 23rd. And we are saying that any differences between 6 the parties you should seek to negotiate by April 6th. Now, if come April 6th, you've got outstanding 8 differences, let me know, the whole Board or some portion 9 thereof will initially hear out what the differences are. 10 But we'll try to work it out as quickly and as 11 informally as we can and rule if we need to. 12 What I am saying, gentlemen, is this whole 13 business of motions to compel and answers and all the rest 14 --let's try to short-circuit that. 15 If you've got differences you can't negotiate, 16 just let us know, and we'll sewhat we can do. 17 Then, finally, Mr. Eddleman's answer would be 18 due 15 days after the discovery round is complete, say. 19 I can't give a specific date for that, obviously; but that's 20 the game plan. 21 Now, we stated in our ruling a few words as to 22 why: 23 It is true, as the Applicants point out, that the 24

NRC rules don't prohibit filing summary disposition motions

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on discovery; and there's at least one case on point.

We think the Board could put some restrictions; we didn't here, not explicitly.

This precise issue hasn't come to a head until now, and we suspect that the question of filing summary disposition before discovery is over, is academic, an exception of the emergency plans area.

We can talk about that when we talk about emergency plans at the next prehearing.

Until then, we're just going to take it case-bycase. We've only got one case, we think, of this kind of problem.

And I think in view of the fact that Mr. Eddleman has gone ahead, he's filed his discovery questions; they are before you; in view of the fact that the schedule will accommodate finishing this round; we think that's the way in fairness it ought to be done.

So that is that ruling.

Turning next to the question of health effects, and the Board issued its rulings in this area in January.

We have since received motions for reconsideration and clarification and the like from all interested parties, including the Applicant and Mr. Eddleman, the Joint Intervenors by Mr. Eddleman.

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In this regard, earlier as we said, we intend to issue a memorandum and order fairly shortly, hopefully in ruling on the various papers before us. Given the general complexity of this whole matter, we don't think it's appropriate to try to address this in oral fashion, as we've done with the other matters.

But we do think we should tell you a couple of things, so that you will be aware of it, first:

We had expressed our intention to call Dr. Goffman as a Board witness, as you know, our earlier discussions with him indicated his interest and some availability.

We regret to say that Dr. Goffman now advises us that he is not available for that purpose, at least in that general time frame of summer.

And, therefore, we don't intend to call him.

Moreover, we don't have any plans to call any Board witness on this subject.

And that has implications for our earlier position, and we spell them out in our order; but I thought you'd be interested in knowing that fact.

Secondly, the Board was rather embarrassed to discover that we had completely omitted any ruling on Contention 2d. And this was an inadvertence on our part. And one that we will cure in the order.

I'll pause a moment.

(Pause)

Lady and gentlemen, that takes us to our outline for this morning so I'll go around the engineering table and see what you have.

Mr. Baxter?

MR. BAXTER: I don't believe I have questions, Judge Kelley.

But I had prior to this conference attempted to prepare my own list of matters that were pending before the Board. And I just wanted to raise two, which I am sure you are not prepared to discuss; but just to make sure-

JUDGE KELLEY: I'm happy to have you do that.

There are a lot of matters in this case, and I have no doubt that we have just demonstrated our capacity for inadvertent omission.

(Laughter)

So why don't you tell us what we've missed?

MR. BAXTER: The two I have are Mr. Eddleman's

Section 2.758 petition to waive the Commission's legal

power in alternative energy sources rule.

JUDGE KELLEY: Yes.

MR. BAXTER: In a ruling last fall on summary disposition of Eddleman's 64f, the Board requested briefs from the parties on whether or not tto condition the license

to provide for additional hearings on spent fuel shipping casks.

JUDGE KELLEY: Yuh.

Is that it?

MR. BAXTER: Those are the only two I have; yes.

J!DGE KELLEY: Let me ask a question of you and

Mr. Eddleman:

We've some work on 2.758, the petition; I wish we'd done more, obviously.

But one thing that's occurred to us, since those papers were filed, if my memory serves, it, too, has been cancelled; right?

MR. BAXTER: That's correct.

JUDGE KELLEY: Do the parties think that a brief mail filing now of how, if at all the cancellation of Unit 2 affects the argument—I'm not suggesting we reopen the whole thing; it was a big effort in the first place. But on the other hand we at the Board now are lookign at the matter and addressing it.

Do you see it, Mr. Eddleman, as a subject that's worthy of some further work?

MR. EDDLEMAN: Judge, I could give you, I think, some pretty short words. I think I can handle it in about two pages. I'd be glad to.

I think that it does affect the argument some.

And I'd be glad to do that.

Also, I should tell you that in the package you are receiving is a motion to allow filing of an affidavit of Dr. Blackburn, which concerns the economics on this.

JUDGE KELLEY: Okay.

Well, you think something short might be useful.

Mr. Baxter, any thoughts?

MR. BAXTER: Our initial response went to what we thought was a legal deficiency in Mr. Eddleman's whole approach. I don't think it will be affected by that, but we'll respond.

JUDGE KELLEY: I see your point. I understand what you are saying.

MS. MOORE: Judge Kelley, our position was also a legally-based position, and I don't believe that the cancellation of Unit 2 affects that position at all.

JUDGE KELLEY: All right.

Well, tell you what, Mr. Eddleman, if you want to do something short, but file something before the prehearing on May 1st, that would be fine. And if you want to speak to it briefly at the prehearing, that's okay, too.

MR. EDDLEMAN: Okay, Judge.

JUDGE KELLEY: Thank you.

Now, Mr. Eddleman, any questions or other points to raise on your part?

MR. EDDLEMAN: Yes, sir.

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I need to tell you that I was not in compliance

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with your order on negotiations re: 9, 11 and 132c2; but

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I realized this morning I was not. And I contacted

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Mr. O'Neill for the Applicant. I read off the objections

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to him, and he agreed to negotiate further with me once

he sees them in writing, which is a position Applicants have

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often taken in the past.

I gather from what you are saying about

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Dr. Goffman being not available that we don't need to make

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any response to the arguments Applicant and Staff raised

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against having him?

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I did want to ask clarification:

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Is it possible for us to subpoena him?

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(Laughter)

JUDGE KELLEY: I don't know.

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MR. EDDLEMAN: Well, the reason I ask this,

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Judge, is that a long time ago I contacted him.

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JUDGE KELLEY: Yuh?

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MR. EDDLEMAN: This was before the Board had

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done anything, so far as I know, back sometime in '82. I

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don't have notes on it here.

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But I talked to him. And he said that he was

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unwilling to appear -- period -- you know, an unconditional

thing. It wasn't that he was hostile to the Intervenors or

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anything like that; he was just unwilling to appear.

And so that was the reason we didn't bother to contact him about being a possible witness.

But in light of these Board orders and so on, if he's not willing to appear voluntarily, I'd like to know -- there's something in the rules about being able to subpoena a witness?

JUDGE KELLEY: Well, there are provisions for subpoena of witnesses; that's true.

There's some ramifications in your question that I am not sure that we want to read right off the tops of our heads.

What concerns me a little bit is the question of has there been a substantial showing made? You asked for that. And as far as Dr. Sternglass, and our reaction was that I didn't think that was going to educate us, listening to him; and that's pretty much what we said.

Are we now to--I don't know what your showing might be in the light of the possibility of your subpoena of Goffman--I don't know: I raise the question; I'm not sure about the answer.

MR. EDDLEMAN: Well, Judge, I just wanted to raise the question, too.

In other words, we tried to get witnesses. We didn't really consider Dr. Goffman to be a possibility

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because he told us flat-out that he didn't want to appear.

And we didn't want to drag him in there against his will under those conditions.

But, having seen the Board's order, it says, well, gee, Goffman's the best witness you can get; and you know, under the circumstances he was going to voluntarily appear, we didn't feel like we should do anything.

But now it looks like there's a whole different face on it.

JUDGE KELLEY: He was saying maybe to us before, with interest; and now he's saying no.

Presumably we could subpoen him, too; but frankly, we don't want to because our feeling is that an unwilling witness who wants to be doing something else is not very helpful.

You can't direct him to prefile testimony, that's for sure.

MR. EDDLEMAN: Well, Judge, I understand that, and if we subpoenaed him, I guess we'd prefile his book.

JUDGE KELLEY: I guess, Mr. Eddleman, I hadn't thought about it. And for all I know, we would get objections from other parties to the whole idea.

(Laughter)

I'm not prepare to morning to give you anything more than a very prelimitary reaction to the thought.

JUDGE KELLEY: Our general approach has been

amendments; and I want to know what triggers it?

Is it triggered when you send it to the Staff?

Or does it get triggered when you send me a copy of the

FSAR amendment?

MR. BAXTER: Your getting copies of the information sent to Staff that they request; it may later end up in the FSAR; you will see it first--

MR. EDDLEMAN: Okay.

So what you are saying is, when you send it to the Staff, that's the trigger?

JUDGE KELLEY: Oh, you mean the 30days?

MR. EDDLEMAN: Yes, sir.

JUDGE KELLEY: Yuh, when you get it.

MR. EDDLEMAN: Right. Okay.

MR. BARTH. Mr. Kelley, Mr. Treby has joined us. He's the Assistant Chief Hearing Counsel in the hearing section; and you asked if something new has transpired on the environmental qualifications; Mr. Treby would like to address that.

JUDGE KELLEY: Okay.

MR. TREBY: What I would like to bring to the Board and parties' attention is that the Commission issued a Policy Statement on environmental qualifications dated March 1, 1984.

They state this statement of policy is intended

to explain the Commission's response to the D. C. Circuit's remand. The remand is the case of the Union of Concerned Scientists versus the Commission, et al., at 711 Fed 2nd 370, and to describe other related actions the Commission will take until the conclusion of the rulemaking proceedings, which the Commission intends to initiate by an accompanying notice of proposed rulemaking.

JUDGE KELLEY: Well, that's background on what's going on generally with environmental qualification; right?

MR. TREBY: That's right.

MR. EDDLEMAN: Is that something the Staff can make available to the parties?

MR. BARTH: I will send it to all the parties.

JUDGE KELLEY: Did you get your questions in,

Mr. Eddleman?

MR. EDDLEMAN: Yes, sir, that was what was on my list.

JUDGE KELLEY: Okay.

MS. FLYNN: May I just make a point on that?

The proposed rule in the policy statement affects plants that are already licensed, as I understand it. I don't believe that has any direct bearing on operating license applicants.

JUDGE KELLEY: Okay. I confess I don't know, haven't read it.

Mr. Runkle, any questions, comments?

MR. R'NkLE: I do not have either questions or comments, your honor.

JUDGE KELLEY: Okay.

(Pause)

Mr. Reid left us.

Mr. Barth, you had one point; do you have other questions?

MR. BARTH: For the Staff, your Honor, we have no more questions. Thank you.

JUDGE KELLEY: Okay.

JUDGE CARPENTER: I'd like to give the parties a little bit of perspective on the unavailability of Dr. Goffman.

Our prior information was that he would be available.

In December, Dr. Goffman indicated to me that he was involved in a case involving not a nuclear power plant, but the effect of radium-painted instrument dials in Kansas--which has occurred in a particular facility. So he was involved in that proceeding, and also had a commitment to a publisher to submit a manuscript for a book.

And those were the bases for his feeling that he couldn't be available for several months.

And just to give you the perspective, I spoke with him last Friday, and it turns out that his anticipations that his progress in the proceeding where he's a witness, and also his progress in meeting his commitments which I presume are not legal, but certainly are binding on him to finish the book by some prescribed date--both of those milestones have slipped.

I just want to explain to all the parties, that's the reason for Dr. Goffman's unavailability.

It wasn't a matter of his changing his mind, just that physically he's not able to participate in the proceedings.

JUDGE KELLEY: Okay. I don't think we have anything else.

If there's nothing else on hand, I'll just say we'll do a mark-up probably of the transcript and mail out copies to you, so you'll have it with changes we're going to make; but I don't think you'll get that until the later part of next week.

So if anything happens in the meantime you have knowledge of it; we've been over it; and we expect the rulings of today to be enforced; but you will have it for your files, a copy of the transcript setting all this forth.

MR. EDDLEMAN: Judge one thing did occur to me:

Does the Board have any objection to the Joint Intervenors contacting Dr. Goffman and seeing when, you know, if ever, he might be able to appear? JUDGE KELLEY: No. Got an address? MR. EDDLEMAN: Yes, I can find it, Judge. JUDGE KELLEY: Okay. If there's nothing else, we'll say goodby and we'll be looking forward to a prehearing seven weeks from now. Goodby. (Chorus of" "Goodby, thank you.") (Whereupon, at 12:45 p.m., Thursday, March 8, 1984, the telephone conference was adjourned.)

CERTIFICATE OF PROCEEDINGS

This is to certify that the attached proceedings before the NRC COMMISSION

In the matter of: CP&L AND NCMPA No. 3, SHEARON-HARRIS

Date of Proceeding: Telephone Conference, March 8, 1984

Place of Proceeding: Washington, D. C.

were held as herein appears, and that this is the original transcript for the file of the Commission.

JAMES R. BURNS, JR.

Official Reporter - Typed

Officia@ Reporter - Signature