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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

In the matter of:

PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY

(Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 & 2)

Docket No. 50-352 50-353

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TAYLOE ASSOCIATES

Court Reporters 1625 | Street, N.W. Suite 1006 Washington, D.C. 20006 (202) 293-3950

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APPEARANCES:

On Behalf of Philadelphia Electric Company:

MARK J. WETTERHAHN, ESQ.
TROY B. CONNER, JR., ESQ.
NILS N. NICHOLS, ESQ.
ROBERT M. RADER, ESQ.
Conner and Wetterhahn, P.C.
1747 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. - Suite 1050
Washington, D.C.

On Behalf of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Governor's Energy Council:

ZORI FERKIN, ESQ.
RALPH J. HIPPERT, ESQ.
Governor's Energy Council
P.O. Box 8010
1625 N. Front Street
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17105

On Behalf of the City of Philadelphia:

MARTHA W. BUSH, ESQ.
HERBERT SMOLEN, ESQ.
Deputy City Solicitor
1500 Municipal Service Building
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19102

Pro se, and on Behalf of Friends of the Earth in the Delaware Valley:

ROBERT ANTHONY
Box 186
Moylan, Pennsylvania 19065

On Behalf of the NRC Staff:

BENJAMIN H. VOGLER, ESQ.
ANN P. HODGDON, ESQ.
NATHENE A. WRIGHT, ESQ.
Office of the Executive Legal Director
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C.

AFPEARANCES: (Continued)

On Behalf of Limerick Ecology .ction:

PHYLLIS ZITZER
Box 761
Pottstown, Pennsylvania 19464

and

CHARLES W. ELLIOTT, ESQ.
Brose and Postwitstilo
1101 Building 11th and Northhampton Streets
Easton, Pennsylvania 18042

On Behalf of Air and Water Pollution Patrol:

FRANK ROMANO 61 Forest Avenue Ambler, Pennsylvania 19002 mm4

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PROCEEDINGS

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JUDGE BRENNER: Good morning.

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4 Mr. Anthony here. I don't think he was planning on being here

Whenever the parties want to do it -- I don't see

MR. WETTERHAHN: Let me inform the Board of the

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this morning. We are prepared to hear the argument on the

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FOE motion to strike the Applicant's structural testimony.

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And whenever he is here, and the parties want to deal with

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that, we're prepared to do it.

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scheduling matter that's been agreed to among the parties.

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If it meets the Board's schedule, the parties have agreed

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to argue the DES Severe Accident Contentions on March 19th

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which would be the Monday, at 1:30, when we reconvene. It

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certainly looks like we will reconvene on the structural

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analysis testimony.

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JUDGE BRENNER: All right. That was always our

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MS. BUSH: Yes, there was just no way to work it

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JUDGE BRENNIR: You better use the microphone,

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Ms. Bush.

schedule.

out this week.

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MS. BUSH: There just didn't appear to be any way to work it out for this week so, since it's the beginning of the week, I'll just change my plans.

JUDGE BRENNER: We'll do it at 1:30, starting at 1:30, in this courtroom on March 19th.

MS. BUSH: Thank you.

JUDGE BRENNER: Are there any other preliminary matters before we pick up the emergency planning contention, at this time?

MR. CONNER: I might note one preliminary matter on the emergency contentions. I think it might be well to show, in the record, that the Applicant's response to these contentions tracks the numbering system suggested by LEA, in its February 5, 1984 letter. And that would explain -- and that the Staff followed the same format, apparently. I think it might be well to have it in here, to indicate why we have these two sets of numbers.

JUDGE BRENNER: I think we all know what the situation was, but now you've got it.

All right. Ms. Zitzer, on LEA, I guess it's -- which is the one involving the Red Cross?

MS. ZITZER: We left off with number VII. And in reviewing the contention, I think that what I would like to clarify is that the contention specifically says that in the Bucks and Chester plans the Letters of Agreement that are in the plans, we feel, are inadequate. And as requested, I did provide to the Board and to PEMA both the Red Cross letter and the other letters as well, which I think clarify why we

have continued, in the rest of the contention, to express our concern. Generally, I would say we feel that the Red Cross Letters of Agreement might be appropriate to deal with any other kind of disaster. And in those kinds of disasters, it certainly would appear adequate. But our concern is with regard to the particular nature of a nuclear incident.

And we think that the Letter of Agreement really needs to reflect that concern. But the contention does attempt to go beyond just the Red Cross Letters of Agreement, with regard to the Letters of Agreement presently in the Berks and Chester County plans, and is not more specific simply because most of the other letters that are there we do not consider to be final letters of agreement. They are general letters that indicate a willingness to work out the arrangements, but they don't yet really -- in our mind -- really constitute formal Letters of Agreement, which is why we haven't submitted more detailed comments on them.

We would expect to see more specific letters in additional revisions of the plan and that is, frankly, why the contention has the additional information in it that it does, with particular regard to the Red Cross Letter of Agreement in the Chester County plan. While the letter -- it's page T-1-7. It's a seven page letter which is entitled Statement of Understanding between the Chester County government and Southeastern Pennsylvania American Chapter of

the Red Cross. While the letter is signed by all three commissioners and a representative of the Red Cross, it is not dated. And just above the signatures, under term of agreement, it does shall say that this agreement shall be reviewed and, if necessary, revised in 1984 and every four years thereafter.

what we particularly were seeking here, was some understanding and some assurance that in the event of a radiological emergency that these same provisions, normally provided by the Red Cross, would indeed be provided. And the only reason we attempted to specify our concern about human response was to indicate that that's a factor we think needs to be considered. And the letter could adequately provide that assurance, if that were addressed.

But we don't feel -- not only the Red Cross

Letters of Agreement, but I think probably -- of maybe even

greater concern -- in the Berks County plan, where the other

Letters of Agreement which are extremely general, particularly

with regard to the RACES and REACT radio-equipped emergency

volunteers, the letters state that they will make emergency

Citizen's Band radio services available to the maximum extent

possible.

Our concern there would be to seek some additional reassurance as to what the maximum extent possible would mean, beacause those volunteers are an absolutely crucial part of

the whole communications system, which are very heavily relied upon.

so again, in general, I think in offering an explanation as to why the contention doesn't specifically delineate a comment about each existing Letter of Agreement, which we don't feel is sufficient, is because we feel that while these are general letters of agreement, that in several of them they indeed reflect that there will be additional details worked out and provided. And when those are forthcoming, they may or may not be adequate. But we don't feel, at the present time, that these existing letters really provide sufficient assurance that there is really a mutually agreed to criteria, as is required in NUREG-0654 A.3.

JUDGE BRENNER: I still don't know what else you want, particularly in the Red Cross letter, given the Applicant's answer that the agreement, with Berks at least -- I haven't read these. I'm just relating the Applicant's answer to you. According to the Applicant, the agreement between Red Cross and Berks County covers man-made disasters, including nuclear incidents. And the Applicant references page T-1-3.

MS. ZITZER: Given the fact that it's almost impossible to read page four of that letter, it's difficult to really make a determination that again sufficient consideration has been given to the special -- what we perceive as

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special nature of a nuclear incident. I've provided the best possible copy to you that I could, but that's the condition of the original.

JUDGE BRENNER: Do you have any basis for believing that the Red Cross -- the Southeast Pennsylvania Red Cross is taking a position that it will not participate in staffing a Mass Care center 20 miles outside the EPZ, in the event of a nuclear emergency at the Limerick Plant?

MS. ZITZER: At the present time I don't, but
I have not consulted with them and I would assume that if
they signed this Letter of Agreement that they believe that
they are able to. We are just concerned about assurance that,
under the special conditions of an alert, or in particular a
radiological emergency, that assumptions -- misassumptions -are not being made with regard to the availability of personnel.

address not just the Red Cross but in particular some of the other particularly crucial volunteers. Particularly, again, the RACES and REACT volunteers. What we're seeking, in the Letters of Agreement, is assurance that under not just a normal emergency but the kind of conditions of a radiological emergency -- but everybody has agreed to and understands what their participation involves. That's all.

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here?

JUDGE BRENNER: Is there any response from the other parties to Ms. Zitzer's statements this morning?

Otherwise, we're ready to move on.

Commonwealth?

MS. FERKIN: Judge Brenner, one response.

JUDGE BRENNER: Better speak up. I've heard some complaints about your voice yesterday from the audience.

MS. FERKIN: One response concerning the Red Cross Chester County agreement. It came to our attention as of this morning, that that agreement has been approved by the NRC and by FEMA, with regard to --

JUDGE BRENNER: FEMA or PEMA?

MS. FERKIN: FEMA, F. Has been approved with regard to the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station. I wanted to make sure that that fact was in the record.

JUDGE COLE: That's the southeastern chapter of Red Cross?

MS. FERKIN: Southeastern chapter, yes.

JUDGE COLE: The same chapter we're talking about

MS. FERKIN: Yes, and Chester County.

JUDGE BRENNER: All right. LEA-VIII. Now this is your contention that voluntary emergency workers will not respond in a radiological emergency. And as I commented before, LEA has an organizational problem. But we've got

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a greater one in starting to try to put together the lack of organization of LEA's contentions. And in discussing the others you kept alluding to this one at some point, including the immediately preceding one.

All right. I think we understand contention. Now if I understand the basis for the contention, it's the testimony in the Three Mile Island restart proceeding, correct?

MS. ZITZER: Yes. Dr. Erikson has also testified in several proceedings. I think what we seek here is an opportunity to provide some expert testimony to make a showing that human response is indeed a factor that must be considered.

But you know, in this particular contention we wouldn't envision really, the volunteers themselves necessarily possibly presenting testimony. But more of an opportunity to provide a basis with some expert testimony as to why this is a factor that should be considered.

The reason we did submit separate contentions on these particular types of volunteers was in that instance to explore their position. But in this particular contention, we seek an opportunity to present expert testimony with regard to the human factors issues.

JUDGE BRENNER: I suppose on the one hand it's always nice to be able to refer to testimony in another

proceeding by expert witnesses which can form a basis for your contention. That's the positive as far as the proponent of the contention is concerned.

However, on the other hand you've got a real problem relying on that testimony for a basis. The problem is it's been litigated before and the decision of the board and the appeal board in that very case was against the result you seek here.

How can you still use that testimony for a basis given those findings?

MS. ZITZER: I think you would have to base that however on this particular circumstance. What we seek to show is not what happened in a different set of circumstances, but why in this particular case, it is a factor that should be considered.

JUDGE BRENNER: If you've read Dr. Erikson's testimony -- incidentally, I think you spelled his name wrong. It's without a "c" in the middle. At least somebody's testimony in that proceeding, I think Dr. Erikson's included.

The point was made that Three Mile Island was a special case, if any case be a special case. And although emergency workers might, for the sake or argument, respond in other areas, Three Mile Island is the area where voluntary emergency workers were most likely not to respond.

The boards there found against that testimony.

And now, if I understand the argument you just made, we should consider this a special case, more special than the Three Mile Island area. And I don't know what the basis is.

MS. ZITZER: The basis, frankly, is the comments we've received from many of the volunteer emergency workers themselves.

JUDGE BRENNER: Although you list examples in the contention, as I understand it, you intend just a broad contention to apply to all emergency workers without any distinction among them.

MS. ZITZER: I think that would be correct, because frankly, I think the specific roles of the volunteers we have attempted to be more specific, to address more specifically in other contentions.

JUDGE BRENNER: That was going to be my next question, where there are emergency workers, you deem particularly important for the success of the plan, be they voluntary or employees, you've got contentions on them.

Am I correct?

MS. ZITZER: Yes, as long as they're admitted, yes.

JUDGE BRENNER: Let me give you a preliminary view. That's just mine and not the Board's so you can respond. My view is, isn't it much more efficient and useful to LEA as well as the Board and the public interest,

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workers where there is a particular concern in the other contentions, in a context in which we can see the importance of those workers doing their job. And contrary, the importance of those workers not doing their jobs. As well as some specific testimony as to whether such workers would respond.

For example, there might be a difference between volunteer bus drivers who are themselves parents, as opposed to telephone operators who are in a telephone facility somewhere and on the job.

And there might be a difference in the efficacy of the plan if certain telephone operators don't report to work, as opposed to certain personnel actually handling the evacuation vehicles.

That situation, as opposed to just some abstract testimony where we get the same witnesses. And I tell you, it's a traveling road show. They have been in other proceedings. And you get the Applicante wheels somebody in, and that person says, in the past people have responded.

Then the Intervenor brings an expert witness in who says, well, the past may be different than the future, because there may be something different about nuclear emergency. And the argument goes back and forth. But it's a very abstract discussion. And if you ask any of those

witnesses anything about the details of these emergency plans, very few of them know much about it.

And what the litigation has come down to is the example I gave you at the outset, at looking at the particular roles of workers.

MS. ZITZER: I would envision any testimony with this contention admitted to be specific to the Limerick circumstance and not just a general discussion of what volunteers do under certain conditions.

But I do share your concern about the need for the testimony to be specific to the roles of people involved. And again, as long as the other contentions are admitted, I would hope that they would present an opportunity to deal with the factor of human response, and whether or not there is reasonable assurance that those roles will be carried out.

Again, we just felt that this was just such an important factor that we wanted to be absolutely certain that we would have an opportunity to explore this in the record.

JUDGE BRENNER: Let me rephrase what I think you just said. And then you can correct me if I'm wrong.

You are saying you want this contention admitted, of course. But if we did not admit this contention, you would want us to make clear that the exclusion of this contention did not mean an exclusion of the issue of whether

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voluntary emergency workers, particular ones, in particular other contentions would perform their jobs.

MS. ZITZER: Yes.

JUDGE BRENNER: Do you have plans to present an expert witness on this contention if it was admitted?

MS. ZITZER: Yes, that is exactly what we would want to do. Part of the difficulty of now specifying who is not knowing when the litigation is going to take place.

We've had general conversations with Dr. Erikson.
We haven't really pursued it any further, because at this
time we didn't know whether the contention would be
admitted, or when the litigation would take place.

But we certainly would intend to present expert testimony.

JUDGE BRENNER: Well, you said you would have particular testimony. You would envision, rather that the litigation, if this contention is written, would focus on the particulars of the Limerick emergency plan?

MS. ZITZER: Yes.

JUDGE BRENNER: Dr. Erikson's testimony does not typically do that. I don't want to say he doesn't look at the plans.

MS. ZITZER: We would not present a witness that wasn't prepared to deal specifically with the Limerick plan, because that's what our concern is.

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end 2.

JUDGE BRENNER: Okay.

MS. ZITZER: We have discussed this with him.

JUDGE FRENNER: Well, the admission of the contention won't turn one way or the other on whether he's a witness or not. I just wanted to get some insight.

MS. ZITZER: I understand your concern.

JUDGE BRENNER: I guess as we did yesterday, we'd like to get the Commonwealth's position if they have one on admissibility of this contention.

Mr. Lammison, as I recall, was a Commonwealth witness it the Three Mile Island Restart proceeding.

MS. FERKIN: With regard to the testimonies of Mr. Lammison, that is cited, Commonwealth acknowledges that Mr. Lammison's point -- with regard to TMI -- was valid. We would state that the emergency planning, following the TMI accident, has been greatly expanded in level of detail and scope. And what Mr. Lammison's point really went to was the need for additional training and education of emergency workers, beyond what was available at the time of the TMI incident.

And we would simply note that training of emergency workers is essentially, at the first level, a municipal responsibility and a county responsibility. And should the counties and municipalities desire additional aid in training and educating workers, PEMA's resources are available.

To the extent that this contention seeks to have the issue of human response litigated, the Commonwealth would not support its admissibility.

JUDGE BRENNER: Well, why not? LEA's position is the plans just assume that all these emergency workers, including voluntary emergency workers, would do their job, without an analysis of their competing roles as parents, and so on.

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MS. FERKIN: And our position is that that kind of allegation is speculative, that the plans provide for agreements with response organizations, to the extent those response organizations are not already required to respond in this kind of emergency. And the allegation is too speculative.

JUDGE BRENNER: Well, isn't it speculative to assume that these voluntary emergency workers will do their jobs also? Which way does the speculation lie?

MS. FERKIN: We have no indication, at this point, that any of the groups of workers, cited by Ms. Zitzer, will not do their jobs to the extent they understand what their jobs are. And that's a training issue.

JUDGE BRENNER: Do you think the issue of whether or not emergency -- voluntary emergency workers will do their jobs, would be admissible in other context, in LEA's proposed contentions? Where they have specific contentions, talking about specific plans and the dependency of those plans on particular emergency workers? Or should we exclude any testimony on whether or not a worker will do the job, simply because there is a provision in the plan that bus drivers will drive buses, for example?

MS. PERKIN: I'm not sure if I understand the question.

JUDGE BRENNER: I understand your position on LEA

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LEA VIII. I'm trying to go beyond that and see whether or not it's a Commonwealth position, that the issue of whether or not voluntary emergency workers -- and I use school bus drivers as an example, but it's only an example -- would do their job and should be excluded from even specific contentions. They talk about the efficacy of school evacuation plans.

That is, if the evacuation plan is approved by the County and the school board, and it relies on school bus drivers, that that should be sufficient and we should not engage in any litigation of whether the bus drivers would actually show up.

MS. FERKIN: Judge Brenner, with regard to specific allegations concerning specific groups of emergency workers, we would not exclude -- we would not argue that those contentions were not admissible. But as this contention is phrased, it is just too broad.

JUDGE BRENNER: Staff did not object to the admission of a contention, so I would like to ask the Staff what litigation they would envision, in terms of the type of testimony the Staff would put on?

MS. WRIGHT: The Staff, unlike LEA, did not envision an examination of the state of mind of people near the Limerick facility, or emergency workers associated with Limerick --

JUDGE BRENNER: I can't hear you. I'm sorry.
Could you back up and start again, please?

MS. WRIGHT: The Staff, unlike LEA, did not anticipate an evaluation of the specific frame of mind of Limerick emergency plan workers, but interpreted their contention to be a consideration — that a consideration of the state of mind of emergency plan workers, in an emergency situation, generally and how people tend to react when there's a real emergency. Whether they do, in fact, vacate the area.

And if there is a propensity to do so, then obviously that would affect the dependability of the plant.

JUDGE BRENNER: Did the Staff have either a particular witness or witnesses in mind? Or if not that, at least an area of expertise of witnesses, which the Staff would put on for LEA Contention VIII, if we admitted it?

MS. WRIGHT: No.

JUDGE BRENNER: I'm trying to understand what kind of testimony the Staff would put on, and I don't yet understand that.

MS. WRIGHT: Apparently at TMI there was testimony about the -- I'm sorry. Apparently there was testimony, at TMI, about the propensity of workers to vacate the area if an emergency occurred. Looking at that, and trying to formulate some -- I think there are psychological studies of people's

emergencies, but the reaction of a human to either stay and assist, as he is committed, or to leave in a panic.

JUDGE BRENNER: How would we relate that, if at all, to the emergency plans around Limerick? If I understand you correctly, you're talking about the abstract argument, in general.

MS. WRIGHT: I'm not sure that it could be anything more than an abstract argument. I did not perceive, in this content of tention, any intent by LEA to examine just the specific state of mind of an emergency plan worker for Limerick.

JUDGE BRENNER: All right. Did the Staff want to add anything to the comments of the other parties, that were made here?

MS. WRIGHT: No.

JUDGE BRENNER: All right. Applicant?

MR. CONNER: Here again, as we said yesterday,

I think this has to be considered inseparably from the

training program. While I have confidence that the people

who say that they will do a job will, in fact, do it when the

circumstances arise, the function of the training program would

be to detect or find people who said no, despite the fact that

I am the volunteer fire chief in one area, I will not do it.

Well, if that were the case, you would find somebody who did.

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Now of course, I'm talking only in the sense of experience we've seen in other cases. And it is the state's plan so we cannot say what the state will ultimately do in this area, in the counties. But I have every confidence that the individuals involved, once they understand what is asked of them, will in fact perform as they have in other cases, as they did at Ginna, as we point out.

JUDGE BRENNER: Shouldn't that type of information be part of the litigation of the merits, then? In other words, the response to the contention would be to focus -- by some parties, presumably in part, that the Commonwealth would be to focus on the training involved in an effort to prove before us that given that training and the understanding that these voluntary emergency workers would get, of what they are being expected to do, that a sufficient number of them would do it such that the plan would work.

MR. CONNER: Here again, it's trying to prove a negative. I mean, how can we say that there are -- I don't know how many there might be, two or three thousand perhaps, volunteer workers. It's very difficult to prove that each and every one of them will, in fact, respond. I submit that the matter is something that if there would be any litigation, it would be after the training. And then if somebody, it turns out -- my hypothetical fire chief -- decides he wouldn't function, then it would be a question of should he be replaced.

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But to speculate now on some psychological testimony that has already been rejected versus persumably some people who know what they are doing, such as Mr. Lammison or such as Civil Defense personnel from other areas, that have had some experience like this, which would generally show — in fact, I guess, universally show that your problem with your volunteers is not that they don't show up, but too many of them show up and have to be weeded out.

We had testimony like that from Kentucky. I just think that at this stage of the game, it would be pure speculation. You would have some psychologists come in and say people won't respond in an emergency situation the way they should, goodness gracious. And we would say yes, they would. And where are we? Nowhere.

So we think that to this kind of a litigation, if you will, would be purely based upon speculation. And if there, in fact, was a problem, this is the kind of thing that would show after the training and after the exercise.

JUDGE BRENNER: Except that part of the contention as I understand it, can be interpreted as saying, well, training and agreements are one thing. But the real situation is something else. How would exercises meet that part of the contention.

MR. CONNER: Well, we could bring in some generals

I guess to say that the troops do go over the top when they
have to. And I think that when a person is properly trained,
that's what he will do.

JUDGE BRENNER: Well, part of the allegation here is you're dealing with people like volunteer school bus drivers, and they're not troops under command, and/or, but I don't want to get into the merits now.

MR. CONNER: If you have a volunteer bus driver,

I think he will say, I will take care of my family first.

Then by definition you get another bus driver.

JUDGE BRENNER: All right. Does anybody else want to add something?

LEA, did you want to respond?

(No response.)

JUDGE BRENNER: Okay. LEA IX. Here again, we're getting into a series of contentions. They may or may not be sequential. I don't remember. But they overlap in the sense that there is not enough resources as a general term to assure that the emergency plans can be implemented.

As I understand LEA IX, although you talk about other resources, the real focus of LEA IX is funding, financial assistance.

MS. ZITZER: Yes, absolutely.

JUDGE BRENNER: Because you have other contentions where you talk about particular resources.

MS. ZITZER: Yes.

JUDGE BRENNER: Just for my own peace of mind and organization, I want to talk about just financial assistance in this one. When we get to your other contentions on particular resources, we'll do that.

MS. ZITZER: Exactly. That's what's intended by the contention.

JUDGE BRENNER: Part of the answer of the Applicant and the Staff are that there is no overall requirement for financial assistance from the utility. And where there are particular problems in the plans, the off-site governmental authorities can work that out.

But we would have no broad authority to just order that the utility fund anything the governmental bodies want.

MS. ZITZER: Our concern is that in order, again to be able to make a determination that the plans can and will be implemented, there is a need, we think, early on in the planning process to assure that the resources available are sufficient to indeed, result in adequate resources to

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not only develop the plan, but to ensure that it will work.

I think in an attempt to provide some more specific information, we did as a supplement file a letter that was sent from Chester County to Philadelphia Electric Company, which we didn't receive until the day after these contentions were due. But had been submitted in September of 1983, which indicated the concerns certainly that Chester County has about funding problems that it is having, not only with regard to particular equipment, both needed at the Chester County EOC, but at the municipal EOC as well.

And also with regard to training expenses.

And we submit that as an attempt to be more specific with regard to why we think it is a problem in this case, I believe there have been some discussions between the county and Philadelphia Electric. I am not, frankly, appraised of what the outcome of that have been.

But we think that frankly, what we are seeing is no resolution to the problem. The county in particular says, well, we don't have the resources to do this. Our EOC is not equipped as it should be to deal with this kind of an emergency.

And generally, the position of the Applicant seems to us to be, well, it's your responsibility. You are supposed to be prepared for whatever kind of an emergency might occur. So, you know, it's your responsibility.

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And we end up with everybody sitting there, throwing their hands up and no resolution to the problem. And we think that it is such a problem that it may well result in -- with particular reference here to the Chester County plan, to the plan itself not being workable, simply because of insufficient resources.

Again, we are seeking some assurance that somewhere these resources will be forthcoming. And we think that it is a very significant problem.

JUDGE BRENNER: What would we litigate factually if this contention was admitted?

MS. ZITZER: I think by the time the litigation occurred, if some resolution had not resulted, to at least in this particular case what are identified as unmet needs and equipment, that from the county's point of view is necessary, in order to be prepared. Whether or not, in the absence of having that equipment the plan itself would runction.

JUDGE BRENNER: Do we have authority, do you think, to order Philadelphia Electric to fund the matters deeded in the plan by payments to the government?

MS. ZITZER: We think that the regulations

provide -- somewhere there needs to be a resolution of the

fact that this equipment and these resources will be available.

And we think that the Board does have the responsibility to

be able to make a determination that these needs will be somehow met. And that the plan will be implementable.

If these needs are not made available, we don't see that a finding can be made that the plan can be implemented. We nope that it will be. We hope that it won't continue to be the problem that it is now.

But again, based on the current state of the plans, and at least the extent of the discussions between the Applicant and particularly Chester County, which is the only specific example we're aware of presently, although we know it's a concern at the municipal level. Particularly with the municipal ECCs being able to operate as they are planned. That matter is addressed later with regard to communications.

For example, telephones. But not only at the county level, but at the municipal level, we see a need for some kind of resolution to this problem. We think that it is the Board's responsibility to assure that those resources will come from somewhere.

We're not saying that necessarily the Applicant must be or should be ordered to provide them. Although I think that in many instances we think that that's going to be necessary.

JUDGE BRENNER: As a practical matter, isn't what your talking about -- doesn't it fall into two areas as far

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as the Board is concerned. One is that where you have particular contention, that the plan does not meet the applicable requirements because of certain -- the lack of certain things, including resources. We would, if the contention is admitted, look at the alleged lack.

And in fact, if the matters are lacking and we agree that the plan cannot be reasonably implemented without it, we will find that there is no adequate plan, absent those resources. Even in the plan otherwise has been approved.

That's one possibility. And you have a few contentions like that. More than just a few. On the other hand, if you don't have a particular contention, isn't it part of the normal planning process of the governmental entities, particularly the risk counties and down to the municipalities, upon which the risk county plans depend, for them in this planning phase to be identifying the things they need. And then deciding whether they can furnish those things themselves or whether they want to go to the state or the utilities or somewhere else and indicate that they don't think they can approve a plan, unless those things are provided.

Isn't that part of the normal give and take of the planning process?

MS. ZITZER: It certainly should be. I am not aware to what extent that has happened. Generally,

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in many instances we are aware, particularly at the municipal level that the resources are totally inadequate to be able to implement the plans and to carry out what is necessary under the condition of an alert, or under anything that might escalate above that.

We are concerned that we don't see any answers forthcoming. And I think that these concerns have been obvious for quite a period of time. Maybe the state can inform us that things have -- or that they're aware of what is going on at the county level. Maybe Applicant can.

But particularly, with regard to the municipal level, we just have seen little resolution to this problem. I would say, we just think, in and of itself it could well be insurmountable if there isn't some progress made. Which at the present time we're just not aware of.

JUDGE BRENNER: My point is that part of your very basis shows that if there's no progress made to use your phrase, that the counties, such as Chester County comes in and says we don't have a plan that we're going to approve yet. And that's as a general matter.

And then where you have particular matters that LEA itself wants to litigate we've got contentions on it.

MS. ZITZER: We do if they are admitted, yes. I believe in most cases. Again, I understand your concern that the contentions should be more specific and that there

may be other areas, other contentions that cover the generally stated concern. Again, the planning is not sufficiently far along to really have any resolution as to the specifics of itemizing what these resources are. And hopefully, that this is a problem that will be resolved as the plans are developed further.

But at the present time they are not.

JUDGE COLE: Then what will we litigate?

MS. ZITZER: Well, at that point in time then there wouldn't be a need to litigate the contention. But at the present time, based on the current status of the plans, there is no assurance that a lot of the equipment and in particular at both the municipal EOCs and in Chester County's case, at the county EOC is available.

JUDGE COLE: In Applicant's response to this, they indicated that particularly with Chester County, they were going to provide some assistance in meeting certain of the needs that were specified.

MS. ZITZER: We hope they do.

JULGO COLE: Didn't they say that?

MS. ZITZER: There has been, I believe, a response to this letter, just to Chester County's letter sent out recently. But it in no way indicated that all of the concerns were going to be addressed. Given some time to work that out it may well not be a problem. But the letter

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did indicate that the bulk of the really substantial expenditures, with regard to equipment that the Applicant felt was Chester County's responsibility. And that normally they would need to have that equipment to deal with other emergencies.

And therefore, that it was their responsibility.

We hope this will be worked out. But at the present time given the present status of the plans, it's not. Which is why we had to offer it as a contention. Given more time to work the details out, the differences may be resolved. But presently they are not.

JUDGE COLE: Okav.

JUDGE BRENNER: Does the Commonwealth want to take a position on the admissibility of this coe?

MS. FERKIN: We'd just like to comment that what the Board characterized as the normal planning process is correct. The State depends upon being informed by the municipals and the counties that they lack resources. And at this stage, the State simply doesn't have that information, as to many of the items that are cited in LEA X, for example.

That's all I'd like to say.

JUDGE BRENNER: Do the Staff or Applicant want to add anything to their written response, given the discussion here? Staff?

MS. WRIGHT: No, sir.

JUDGE BRENNER: Applicant?

MR. CONNER: We would emphasize again that we think the correct decision was made by the Board in the Callaway case, which says this is not something that is within the jurisdiction of the Board to consider, as such. Reference was made to the letter that Mr. Boyer sent to Chester County, which points out many things, including the fact that Chester County gets \$229,000 for that particular year, based upon their share of the public utility realty tax, paid to the state, that is shared with the counties.

And that happened to be the amount directly

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attributable to the Limerick facility. So money is, in fact, going to the counties through this public utilities realty tax. The letter offers to provide certain information -
I mean certain equipment to the county, and discusses the fact that there's been a series of meetings and discussions with the county people and Philadelphia Electric. And certain things are promised, certain things will be looked into, and define the needs more correctly.

Stated another way, the Applicant is doing everything we can to carry this forward.

LEA X. LEA X contains a long list which LEA says are examples of items that -- according to LEA -- the emergency plans, in their present draft, state are to be developed.

I guess, to a large extent, this contention, with the particular examples, overlaps some of the contentions we discussed earlier of LEA's overall contention that as long as the plans were to be developed LEA -- or anybody else that doesn't know that the plans will be adopted.

And in this case, it's even worse, because even the draft plans don't indicate exactly what the situation is with respect to the list of items provided.

Do you want to explain the focus of the contention, in comparison to your other contentions, or otherwise add anything?

really trying to make a more -- give the Board a better sense of the fact that so much work remains to be done generally that, based on the present status of the plans, it is -- in our opinion -- impossible to make a finding that the plans can and will be implemented. And the reason we gave so many examples was to try to give a sense of, frankly, how much work

really yet remains to be done.

We are concerned about the plans we gave that
we cited as examples. We gave, in particular, because we
feel that each and every one of these plans -- at least examples
we cited -- is unworkable in its present form simply because
of the fact that so much of the information hasn't even yet
been developed. And what we did attempt to do was, in the
attachments listing the items to be developed, tried to make
specific the reason why -- the reasoning for us feeling that
the plans are not workable, particularly the Borough of
Phoenixville plan.

With that many items still outstanding, there's absolutely no way, and there's not even sufficient information available based on the fact that these many items still are marked to be determined, that we could even attempt at the present time to be specific as to why the plan wouldn't work until more information is available.

We would hope that a lot of these problems will

be resolved and, in general, some of the concerns are addressed in other contentions. But overall, because of the current status of the plan, so much work remains to be done that we find the plan unworkable, particularly with regard to the Montgomery County plan.

There are a few items here -- page 19, after the Phoenixville plan, is the Pottstown Memorial Hospital plan.

Again, Attachment E in the plan is to deal with procedures for medical emergencies involving radiation. And that's marked to be developed by Radiation Management Corporation because of the proximity of that hospital to the site and the need to be prepared to deal with any potential, either on-site problems or problems involving the populus off-site.

That information isn't sufficiently developed to really assure that the hospital personnel will be able to deal with such an emergency. That is a specific concern we have with regard to the Pottstown Hospital.

JUDGE BRENNER: Don't go through all of them.

MS. ZITZER: Okay. Again, just above that, there's no census information to even determine the population that we're trying to plan for. So in order to even go through and determine whether or not we have sufficient staff, equipment, and personnel, it's just very difficult to do that, given the current status of the plan. I really would just appreciate an opportunity, with regard to the Montgomery County plan, to

point out that with regard to the hospital information and the ability to deal with the information about the medical facilities, this is listed on pages 22 and 23 --

JUDGE BRENNER: We've changed the pagination. And the way we've put together our package. Is it Table 5?

MS. ZITZER: Table 6. Table 6 is a listing of the items yet to be developed in the Montgomer County plan.

And they are listed by page number. On page 23, these numbers are at the top, I'm referring to page G-10-1. There's a listing of medical facilities outside the plume EPZ. And the heading indicates that these are hospitals with radiation exposure contamination treatment capability.

However, no information or Letters of Agreement, stating the number of patients that could be treated, is available. All that is there is a listing of the number of beds in the entire hospital and there's absolutely no way to make any kind -- to draw any kind of conclusion about whether or not the number of radiation incident -- radiation -- victims exposed to radiation exposure or having radiological problems, can in any way adequately be treated or provided for.

That is a specific concern we have, with regard to the county plan, because we think that that information needs to be much more specific. And again, given the current status of the plan, as is the case with a lot of the information in the plan, there are lists. There are all kinds of lists

of the firemen, all the firemen, and all the resources in
the whole county. But there is absolutely no way to determine
whether or not the actual role that any of these -- either
individuals that are listed in the plan, or a lot of the
facilities that would be used, particularly in that case the
medical facilities -- is adequate. And we would expect to
see revisions in the county plan that would provide more
information.

But given the large number of items that, frankly, haven't even been developed yet, we find the plan itself unworkable and particularly with regard to the items, which we have mentioned, which I would admit is very lengthy and we did not really intend to overburden the Board, but really felt the need to give a sense of how much outstanding work there was to be done.

JUDGE BRENNER: I think that was a good idea, particularly given the objections to contentions like your LEA II, that they are just general contentions.

MS. ZITZER: At a minimum --

JUDGE BRENNER: I think we understand the contention.

MS. ZITZER: We would seek to be able to litigate our concerns about the particular plans that have been listed here and generally -- well, I would hope that by the time we have litigation, we will have additional revisions of plans that will provide a lot of this information. But I have no

information, at the present time, available to be able to know what we're going to see in any given period of time. And given the absence of that, we felt a need to try to really give the Board an understanding as to the basis for our overall theme, which is that we find the plan simply unworkable because so much work isn't even done.

But yet, at the present time, it's a little difficult to be more specific in many instances. And that's really the purpose of this contention.

JUDGE BRENNER: This is probably an unanswerable question, but I'll ask the Commonwealth anyway. And they can tell me, even if they can't give me a direct answer.

Maybe they can give us a feel for the situation.

Is there some general schedule within which these plans would become much more finalized, even though still short of adoption? Or does that depend on a seriatum review by FEMA and that type of thing?

MS. FERKIN: We are hoping that the plans will -that plans will be finalized to a greater extent then they
are now, prior to the July exercise, depending on hearing
from the municipalities and the counties as to the kinds
of details that LEA has pointed out.

Frankly, some of the details that LEA has pointed out -- I won't get specific -- but it seems that some of them, if they are not supplied by the time of the exercise, might

1 | impede the successful implementation of the exercise.

MS. ZITZER: That's true. That is a concern we have.

JUDGE BRENNER: Did the Commonwealth participate with the parties in the negotiations prior to, and perhaps after, these off-site contentions were filed?

MS. FERKIN: The Commonwealth participated in one meeting. I think it was approximately two weeks before these contentions were filed.

MS. ZITZER: I would add, for the record, at that point in time the contentions were -- there were approximately ten broad, general contentions that didn't have this degree of detail in them. And it was frankly, as a result of that meeting, that we really felt we needed to try to be much more specific with regard to why we felt really the plans weren't far enough along to be more specific than we had in the original first version of the contentions, as we drafted them.

And that's why we went through and tried to provide all these tables and all this informatin.

JUDGE BRENNER: I think you said that a few times already.

MS. ZITZER: I'm sorry.

JUDGE BRENNER: Does the Commonwealth have a position on the admissibility of this contention?

MS. FERKIN: Commonwealth, for the reasons I just

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stated, would not object to the admissibility of the contention. The kind of detail that LEA provides here does provide the sort of information that could be litigated.

Some of it does rise to the level of implementing detail, but some of it does not and does go to the question of whether the July exercise can be implemented.

JUDGE BRENNER: Staff and Applicant objected to
the contention on the basis that although LEA has provided
a long list of particularities, the Staff and Applicant say
LEA has not shown how those particular things would prevent

adequate emergency planning.

And in addition, the Applicant at least stated -- well, we all know that the plans are still being worked on.

I guess I'd like to ask the Applicant and then
the Staff, why is it LEA's burden to now go further and show
that each of these particular things are important to the
workability of the plan, prior to our admitting the contention,
when the very basis for the contention is the plan itself
depends on these things. Except that it is not yet developed
in the plan. Isn't that enough?

MR. CONNER: Let me say two or three things on that. In the first place, the plan of course, is still under development. There's no question of that and has to be followed. Many of these things are covered by implementing procedures, which have been furnished to LEA.

The whole thing must be read in the overall context.

For example, you just pointed out Table G-10 and said that there is no description of anything there. But if you look in the text of the plan, that is simply the hospitals that are to be notified in the event of a general emergency.

In G-10, it does not purport to have a definitive

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description of what the hospitals do. So you have to read the whole total thing.

The main resource for decontamination of radiation workers would be at the hospital of the University of Pennsylvania, which is described also. So you can't just pick something out of a particular table and say, therefore the whole thing is deficient. It must be read together.

And here again, it is the state and counties' plans, we will have to do what we can to bring the whole thing up to speed in time for the exercise, to make sure that the state will be able to testify that there is reasonable assurance the thing can be carried out for the protection of the health and safety of the public.

And we are doing everything we can to bring us to that stage.

JUDGE BRENNER: Well, given that, why isn't the contention admissible? LEA cites, in effect, the very basis that you just stated. That the plans are not developed.

MR. CONNER: I don't think so. I think LEA is more or less taking things out of context. If they came up to something specific, if they said one of the hospitals listed on Table G-10 cannot do what other places say that that hospital is supposed to do, if anything. Then that would be an issue to litigate.

But just in general, to read off a notification

list, and say therefore the plan is inadequate because it's not definitive or descriptive on that table. I don't think helps anybody very much.

JUDGE BRENNER: Is it incorrect -- is LEA's allegation that all these items to be listed and developed in the plans incorrect?

MR. CONNER: I haven't checked it seriatum. But I have no reason to doubt that those are things that are marked in the plan as such. How they are covered in the implementing procedures, I can't say. But I know that some are, to some extent at least.

MS. ZITZER: I'd like to make a comment with regard to implementing procedures. And I won't belabor what we explained in the cover letter to the contentions.

We did the Saturday before these contentions were due, based on a discussion with the Applicant that did confirm there had been implementing procedures available for quite a period of time. We received a big box of them two days before the contentions were due.

I might add however, they were only for the municipal plans, and they really didn't provide any greater detail than was in the current draft plans we had. And we have yet to see implementing procedures for the county plans, which again, might resolve quite a bit of our concern.

But to our knowledge at least based on information

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we have we're not sure that they even exist yet. And if they do, we would appreciate having them.

JUDGE BRENNER: All right. Staff, let me get your position, in answer to my question. Why isn't this admissible? LEA has given specifics. That was your complaint about the general contention. Now they have given you eight or nine pages of specifics. And their basis is the plan itself depends on these specifics and says it's to be developed.

So why do they have to go further in order to have a contention admitted as distinguished from litigation on the contention on the merits?

MS. WRIGHT: Well, the Staff originally objected to the way the original contention reads, is that the emergency response plans don't provide adequate assurance, because much of the plans remain to be developed. Under the Catawba standard, we did not believe that that contention was as specific as it could be, given the fact that LEA did provide approximately 10 pages of tables listing what it felt were unmet needs and items that need to be resolved. And in some instances those identified needs were the subject of other contentions.

The contention was so broad that we did not understand whether they simply wanted the items in the tables litigated, or did they want all items marked to be developed

litigated. And that was our primary concern.

Now as I understand it, LEA is willing to have the tables be the subject of the contention. I presume that that's a correct assumption.

JUDGE BRENNER: We'll ask them in a minute. But what if it is?

MS. WRIGHT: If it is, there are still items in those tables that are the subject of other contentions. And there is a possibility that those items could be merged into the other contentions.

I think we stated the identification of letters of agreements or inadequate staffing are just examples of such concerns.

JUDGE BRENNER: Okay. That's an organizational problem which can be taken care of at a stage beyond this. But won't advance the litigation.

What about the question of admissibility of the contention, subject to curing the organizational problem?

MS. WRIGHT: Curing the organizational problem.

Again, it depends on the particular line item. Just because something is marked to be developed, the Staff still does not understand how that makes the plan inadequate. It depends on the stage of development in our minds.

JUDGE BRENNER: Well, stage of development is that these items are not developed at this time.

MS. WRIGHT: I'm not sure that in some instances they are in initial development, or still working out some particular aspect of a problem. It was just that we did not understand the contention as stated.

JUDGE BRENNER: Ms. Zitzer, what about Staff's inquiry to you. Is that correct that these tables would define the contention, or are they still just examples?

MS. ZITZER: Frankly, I would almost have to say it is some of both. Certainly with regard to these particular plans we provided the information because we felt that in each instance, independent of the rest of the contention, that the plans were unworkable because of the number of items to be developed.

But I think the contention itself, again, given the fact that we have had to file these at the time of the proceeding when we have had to, seeks to make a showing that not only these particular plans, which is a sampling of a couple of municipal plans, a hospital plan, a school plan, a county plan, but they are symptoms of the overall status of all of the other plans as well.

And all of them fit together, frankly, don't fit together and don't render any of the overall plan workable, simply because there is still so much work yet to be done.

It's not just that in these particular instances, this one hospital plan, or this one school plan, or this

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mesh together, in order to provide reasonable assurance that the entire EPZ population at risk will be provided for, that we are unable to make a finding of that given the current status of the plans.

I would just like to add that I would hope that by the time that any litigation might occur that we will have additional information that may resolve a lot of these concerns. But again, given the current nature of the plans, we felt that so much of the information was not yet there, that that in and of itself made the overall emergency plan for the EPZ totally lacking any assurance that it could indeed by implemented.

MS. WRIGHT: Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question?

At what point would LEA's concern about the amount or the percentage of items marked to be developed go away? I guess my concern is, is it because 50 percent of the plan is marked to be developed, or 25 percent of the plan is marked to be developed. Or all items marked to be developed should be litigated. That was our concern.

JUDGE BRENNER: That's not going to be a useful question at this point. Take my work for it.

MS. WRIGHT: Thank you.

MS. ZITZER: We never intended to litigate everything.

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JUDGE BRENNER: It depends on the items is the answer that you're going to get.

(Board conferring.)

JUDGE BRENNER: We want the parties to consider something and discuss it among themselves. And it will come up in the course of other contentions we have not yet gotten to. And also come up as a general matter, including as applied to some contentions we have already discussed.

But it applies to this particular contention,

LEA X, among others, and that's why we'll mention it now.

By way of a little history, and this will bore the parties

who have been with us from the beginning. But let's remember

it expressly in any event.

At the beginning of this case we had off-site emergency planning contentions that were timely filed by LEA and other Intervenors. We deferred ruling on those contentions, because there were, I think in effect, no emergency plans available, or almost none, draft or otherwise. Everybody had the same problem. The Applicant felt it would be prejudiced by having to address the bases or lack thereof, of those contentions because the Applicant didn't have the information available.

But they didn't want the proceeding burdened with the contention that we might admit at that time, if the contention would otherwise be proved to have no bases at the

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time the plans were developed.

On the other hand, the Intervenors had the reverse problem of not having anything at that point, but nevertheless having to file contentions within the time limits at that point, which they did.

So balancing the competing interests, and we thought the Applicant's argument was accurate from the Applicant's point of view. And we sympathized with it. And we also thought LEA's argument was accurate from its point of view and we sympathized with it.

And I think it's fair to say that the Staff and the Commonwealth and the city of Philadelphia, had in effect, the same position. We set further events, particularly the filing of these draft emergency plans by PEMA, the Pennsylvania agency with FEMA as the event when we thought we would certainly have a lot more available upon which contentions could be based.

And I think that proved to be the case, witness the fact that there is a lot more information available now in the form of draft plans and LEA has been able to draft quite a lot of contentions, which -- we will resolve the arguments as to whether they are particular or not. But we certainly can understand reasonably what they are contending in most of them.

However, there seems to be still areas within the

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draft plans -- not unexpectedly I suppose -- where there are things to be developed. The significance of those things to be developed is not ascertainable by this Board at this time.

And in fact, it is probably not readily ascertainable by any of the parties, I will submit, because it is a function not only of the individual items, but of the cumulative nature of the items.

What we are getting to is we think there is a category of contentions upon which we thing we should defer ruling at this time. Now all the contentions, we are not at the stage where we were at the beginning. There are many, many contentions upon which we can decide whether they are admissible or not, although even if ruled admissible there is still more work that can and should be done to organize them and better specify them, which we expect all the parties to be involved in.

But now I am talking about yet a different category, a category in which we defer ruling on the contentions primarily for the reason that further information is anticipated to be developed in the plans.

I don't know if w could set a particular triggering event. We probably could not. But in the interim we could insist, order that the parties go over the particular concerns that the contentions were meant to encompass -- in some cases you have got them -- in LEA X.

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In others you don't -- as the plans are being developed.

And go over, not in argument before us, but in negotiations, the exchange of information as to which items are going to be developed in implementing procedures, or maybe already are in implementing procedures; which items are going to be developed in the plans and so on.

And then maybe at an appropriate future point that the parties can suggest, we would take another look at the situation and see what matters are still in contention, if any, and then be able to address the importance of those items if they are still not developed in the plan.

We raise that now. We want the parties to think about it among themselves, and talk about it over the lunch break. And then some back to us.

LEA X would be one example that we would put in that category. We would ask the parties to consider what other contentions might be put in that category, because otherwise it seems we're going to have the same problem we had at the outset of either ruling on a contention that might be admissible. And then be in the case when really future events will prove that there was nothing to litigate.

On the other hand, perhaps not admitting a contention now, but providing something later for the contention to come back in, such as the further development

of a plan. But we are concerned that that method has some problems in terms of prejudicing LEA's interest, when they have in fact timely filed an otherwise admissible contention now. Which contentions contend lack of specificity is due to the lack of development of a plan, and not LEA's own fault in not specifying. So that's the problem.

It's almost 10:30 now. We will come back at 10:45 based on that clock.

(Recess.)

JUDGE BRENNER: All right. We are on the record

MR. WETTERHAHN: We received a document entitled Response of Anthony/FOE to PECO Supplemental Testimony, filed 2/28/84, yesterday morning. We have reviewed it and find it similar to the one he previously filed, moving to strike Applicant's and Staff's testimony and we believe generally the reasons that we gave in opposition to the previous motion are applicable here.

The first two paragraphs go to the merits of the issue, rather than the admissibility of the testimony. We have discussed not only the legal difference, but we have discussed Applicant's position with regard to the factual assertions in paragraphs one and two. They are simply that as far as the structures are concerned, does it make a difference whether the blasts were considered as part of the design basis or were analyzed after the plant was under construction.

That is the substantive position. However, procedurally, even if correct, it doesn't call for the striking of the testimony.

JUDGE BRENNER: Let's stay with that one point. Maybe that will make it easier for Mr. Anthony. I don't know how you divide it up, but we see three points, basically, in the motion. And that's the first one.

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Mr. Anthony, we agree with the Applicant's position, as just stated by Mr. Wetterhahn. I'm not sure you understand it. I hope you do. The position is this: they don't think it makes a difference, but even if it does, that's the merits and you can ask the witnesses about it. And then, if the questions are not objectionable, you will get answers.

But it is not the basis of a motion to strike and we agree.

MR. ANTHONY: This is just a technical point. This is not, as such, a motion to strike. It's a motion to substitute testimony and the Applicant has already substituted one revision of that testimony, besides the original. And I think we are still calling for further revisions, which go to the heart of the matter of proving that the buildings have a certain structural composition that we don't believe they have established by submitting us the drawings of the design, rather than --

the third point. The first point is your argument, in paragraph one, and including the first sentence of paragraph two of your motion. And that is that you don't see that the Applicant used that U.S. Army manual in the designing of the structures, rather that they are only using the manual to now analyze, or after-the-fact analyze the structures. That's

your first point.

As to that point, it does not support a motion to strike. You can ask questions about how they used the Army manual and you will get answers, to the extent the questions are not otherwise objectionable -- and we'll deal with it on the merits.

So I will rule against you on that one point, in terms of a motion to strike.

Let's get to the second point now, which is what you had started to talk about. You say that there is no evidence that the buildings have actually been constructed in the as built condition, to conform with the design, and we understand your argument. Mr. Wetterhahn, do you want to respond?

MR. WETTERHAHN: As the Board had previously pointed out, discovery had ended. Nevertheless, in the period in which this testimony has been filed, we have provided a number of pieces of material responsive to requests.

With regard to as built drawings, we provided Mr.

Anthony structural drawings of the facility. The term as

built means something very narrow to the engineering firm that

constructs Limerick and I advised, giving some legal advice

to Mr. Anthony, that he ask the witnesses as far as what

as built means to them.

as the facility was constructed as to the date of the issuance of the drawing and how it was to be completed. You cannot have as built drawings until the facility is completed.

What we have provided him is drawings as to what has been constructed has actually been constructed. That is reflected on each of the drawings, noting that field change request -- which are a method of reflecting the as built portions of the facility -- have been changed on the drawing.

I have explained that to Mr. Anthony. So what he has got in his hands is as close to as built as we can give him. So I don't believe that this supports the motion to strike. As I told him, and I will tell the Licensing Board, and I'm sure you will ask the witnesses, there may be construction openings that have not been closed in buildings. Therefore, you cannot say the drawings, as they exist now, show the plant as it will be completed. But once construction will be completed the drawings, as revised, will be the as built drawings.

JUDGE BRENNER: Give me a moment.

(Board conferring.)

JUDGE BRENNER: Mr. Anthony, do you agree that you have got everything that exists, in terms of the drawings, as to how the structures are built? What else do you want at this point?

MR. ANTHONY: Well, I did ask for the aerial photographs --

JUDGE BRENNER: We didn't get to that one, yet.
That's point three.

MR. ANTHONY: I want some proof, and this is what will happen in the hearing. That I will ask for proof that these reinforcement rods were put in where they said they would be put in, that --

JUDGE BRENNER: You're jumping ahead. The basis, as I understand, for your motion to strike is that you think there are drawings in existence that show things -- as you have termed them -- as built, which you have not been given. And your complaint is that you have not been provided information.

Mr. Wetterhahn, on behalf of the Applicant, has argued that you just didn't understand and, in fact, you have been given everything that shows the state of construction to the present state.

MR. ANTHONY: I thought I understood him to say there is no such thing as the as built drawings.

JUDGE BRENNER: That's right. At this time.

MR. ANTHONY: That they don't have any record of what's been put in.

JUDGE BRENNER: In terms of your discovery argument -- that's not what he said, but I don't want to

debate it with you -- in terms of the argument that there is discovery-type information out there, drawings that you have not received, we find that that's not the case and I want to know, before we make that our ruling, whether there is something else that you meant, that we're not understanding, in terms of drawings?

MR. ANTHONY: Well, there certainly are.

JUDGE BRENNER: Existing drawings that you have not been given.

MR. ANTHONY: Drawings that we haven't been given and calculations.

JUDGE BRENNER: There are existing drawings, that you have not been given, that you have asked for?

MR. ANTHONY: Well, I don't want to just keep repeating, but I haven't seen anything -- there is one drawing that was provided to us of a cooling tower which has on it certifed built as shown in this design. It's the only one of the cooling tower drawings that has that on it. There is no other drawing, that has been provided to us, that has anything like that which says certified built as designed by these plans.

JUDGE COLE: I thought Mr. Wetterhahn indicated that they don't do that until such time as the structure is completed. There are some details that are not yet complete. But the drawings that were provided you were accurate, as of

the time they were provided to you, in indicating that the structure as built. Now if that is, in fact, the case, is that not what you need for your purposes?

MR. ANTHONY: How can the stresses on the structures be measured if there are holes in the buildings and those holes are going to be filled at some time? How will the Board or anybody know that those holes will be filled in such a way that they will not be a weak point in the structure?

JUDGE BRENNER: Okay. That gets to the next and larger, more encompassing, point that we wanted to get to. Given the contentions as well as the Board's questions, which stimulated this further testimony on what these structures could withstand, it is our view -- and we are so ruling now -- that the quality assurance type questions, as to whether the structures, in fact, have been built properly by the workmen in accordance with the designs, is not within the contention.

This is not a quality assurance contention.

We directed the focus to the design of the structure, which is the testimony we expected to hear this week, although -- as I discussed preliminarily yesterday -- we've seen other things we did not expect to see. Because we saw some ambiguities that, at least, we did not fully understand at the time, in the FSAR in January when we were litigating this contention in terms of statements as to what overpressures

the structures would be designed to. And having heard the testimony extensively, ad infinitum, on what the blast overpressures would be from the postulated pipeline accidents, we then wanted better assurance that the structural designs in fact considered overpressures of that approximate magnitude.

And beyond that, we wanted to know what the margin would be as an assist for us to determine how much of the detail of the overpressure testimony would be material. None of that involves quality assurance/quality control contentions, as to whether or not those particular structures are as built.

We've had -- that would be a new contention. It would be weighed without any basis, I might add, and it would be late also. This is, in effect -- it's not a Board question because it's in the contention, but it's in effect the particular Board interest, within the contention, that we have focused on. And if there was any doubt as to whether any part of our question involved the quality a surance questions that you are now raising, we want to put that to rest now. It did not.

And for that larger reason, your second point would not form the basis for a motion to strike because it's not material. Beyond that, it seems you've been given all the drawings anyway. But that becomes not material, given our ruling now.

The third point is you want aerial photographs, up to the present, taken during Limerick construction. And I guess we'll ask the Applicant for their response and then turn to you.

MR. WETTERHAHN: Let me touch the other items in the unnumbered paragraph, after two. As I said yesterday, they have been, I believe, mooted. We have provided Mr. Anthony details of the manhole structures and electrical conduit manholes.

JUDGE BRENNER: Those are more as built examples?
MR. WETTERHAHN: Yes.

JUDGE BRENNER: We've already ruled on that.

MR. WETTERHAHN: We have not provided the valve housing and valve pits, since I have represented to him there is nothing safety related in them. I've asked him to confirm that with the witnesses.

With regard to the circulating water pumphouse, the same thing is true. We have provided him structural drawings of the safety related piping that passes underneath, but is not attached to that structure. I asked Mr. Anthony --

JUDGE BRENNER: Let me clarify what I just said. In terms of a discovery-type item, the drawings might be helpful in examination of things that are material to the contention, in terms of understanding the design and so on. What I mean to exclude was the quality assurance/quality

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been followed. So I didn't mean to say that the drawings would be of no assistance to Mr. Anthony in the litigation.

Go ahead.

1 MR. WETTERHAHN: With regard to the aerial 2 photographs, I asked Mr. Anthony -- I guess it now becomes 3 moot -- why he needed them. His answer was he hoped to spot quality assurance deficiencies by looking at an aerial photograph. And I said that's ridiculous. JUDGE BRENNER: If the Commission could do that, 7 they would save a lot of money, Mr. Anthony, just fly over the site and find the defects. 9 MR. ANTHONY: That would be great, but I don't 10 think I said anything of the sort. 11 MR. WETTERHAHN: That's what I will gay that I 12 understood him to mean. I could see no other purpose in this 13 part of the testimony, since he had been provided with 14 accurate drawings of the buildings and the plan for the 15 facility, that I decline to provide that. 16 JUDGE BRENNER: Why do you want the aerial photo-17 graphs? 18 MR. ANTHONY: It's important. Here's one right 19 here --20 MR. WETTERHAHN: That's not an aerial photograph. 21 JUDGE BRENNER: Tell me, why do you want the aerial 22 photographs? 23 MR. ANTHONY: This shows --24

JUDGE BRENNER: Why do you want the aerial photographs?

MR. ANTHONY: To show at what stages the various buildings were built. This is one that happens to show the spray pond in the process of construction, associated with the date then. I would have some idea of what the sequence was.

JUDGE BRENNER: If you want a favorable ruling, Mr. Anthony, you're going to have to help me by answering the questions in terms of the merits of the contention. Why do you want the aerial photographs?

MR. ANTHONY: For one thing, they might show up these holes that Mr. Wetterhahn is talking about

JUDGE BRENNER: That's what Mr. Wetterhahn said, and you said he was wrong.

MR. ANTHONY: The aerial photographs would show them?

JUDGE BRENNER: Do these -- I wasn't paying attention as closely as I should have to your statement,

Mr. Wetterhahn. There are aerial photographs, but you don't want to show them to him, or there are none, or something else?

MR. WETTERHAHN: There are aerial photographs, but they are again expensive to reproduce. And since discovery was over, I saw absolutely no value to going through the expense of providing them.

JUDGE BRENNER: Do you have copies, that the Applicant owns, available and convenient to the hearing room?

MR. WETTERHAHN: I will see if I can round up the latest one or two, if that's what he's looking for, the present status as opposed to a series of them. I will see what I can get.

MR. ANTHONY: I don't need copies. All I would like to see are the ones that are on hand, the series that are on hand.

JUDGE BRENNER: All right. Give us a moment. (Board conferring.)

JUDGE BRENNER: We don't see any need or materiality of the aerial photographs to the contention, in terms of finding holes in the walls. We don't think the aerial photographs would be very helpful on that. Beyond that, we've already said why it's not material.

In terms of the sequence, in which things would be built, we don't understand why that's material, but you won't get that from aerial photographs very efficiently either. If they were material, there are much more direct ways of doing it, namely asking the questions. So it's not material and not necessary.

That's our ruling. Beyond our ruling, and we are not ordering this at all, if there are aerial photographs that are convenient to the Philadelphia area, that the Applicant owns, without going through any expense in copying them, and the Applicant can still maintain control over them,

we see nothing wrong with parties dealing with each other on a courtesy basis and letting Mr. Anthony see the aerial photographs, if he would like to see them.

We're not ordering it, but it's like everything else in life. If it ends up not being a lot of effort and no expense, and it would make Mr. Anthony happy to see the photograph, why not? We'll leave it at that, and it's not a subject we want to hear about one way or the other, again.

MR. ANTHONY: May I express my appreciation for the dourtesy already and the supplying of these documents, which Mr. Wetterhahn has been very cooperative about. And he mentioned discovery, and I would like to correct that, because the Board ordered that there would be no discovery. And just one further --

point. We know it occurred, so I didn't see it necessary to fill it out, but since you came back to it, we ordered no formal discovery period. One of our important considerations in not doing so were the understandings which everybody agreed to on the record—we didn't have to order anybody to do anything, we were pleased about that—of the full exchange of information in support of the testimony and the willingness to the extent reasonable of supplying other informal requests.

I agree with you, Mr. Anthony, Our perception is

that that, in fact, has occurred, subject to the minor disputes that you have not brought to us and which we've ruled on.

MR. ANTHONY: I would like to ask that those be available here in the courtroom, all that material, so it can be used in cross examination. Is that legitimate? It certainly will be necessary.

JUDGE BRENNER: All what material?

MR. ANTHONY: The calculations and the drawings that have been submitted in what's called Discovery 29.

JUDGE BRENNER: Don't you have what you have received on discovery?

MR. ANTHONY: These were all in their document room, which is their material. And I've used it. But in order for it to be here for cross examination, or submitted for cross examination, it will have to be in the courtroom.

MR. WETTERHAHN: We'll bring it.

JUDGE BRENNER: All right. But that's going to be one copy.

MR. WETTERHAHN: That's correct.

JUDGE BRENNER: I'm not going to go through what went through last time, Mr. Anthony, because now you are presumably more educated. We're not going to stop the proceeding every time you have a document the , at the last minute, you decide you want to mark in the _ecord and then

we end up with one copy, and so on. You decide in advance what you want to identify or otherwise move into evidence and somehow get copies made in advance.

At least one copy will be available here and you can use that to have other copies made. But we're not going to stop the proceeding every time to do that.

MR. ANTHONY: No.

JUDGE BRENNER: And that's one purpose for your having to develop a detailed cross examination plan, as every party does, in order to be able to know what you're going to ask. Which reminds me, you owe us a cross examination plan.

MR. ANTHONY: Yes.

JUDGE BRENNER: Yesterday you told me you would have it today.

MR. ANTHONY: I have the copies. Do you need them now?

JUDGE BRENNER: We would like them so we can look at them perhaps over the lunch break, if we want to. Are you going to be here up until the lunch break?

MR. ANTHONY: Yes.

JUDGE BRENNER: All right.

MR. ANTHONY: One word -- I understand what you were saying about the quality control. On the other hand, the Applicant did submit some test cylinder -- cement test

cylinders -- which may be an indication that they are offering quality control or realizing that there's an obligation there.

MR. WETTERHAHN: May I explain? This was just another request by Mr. Anthony for further background, with regard to actual cylinder breaks and we provided him. We're not offering him anything, with regard to actual cylinder breaks.

were -- and I'll state it bluntly -- for the parties just plan not to bother us unless they had to bother us about discovery. We emphasized that very strongly. As a result, it is not surprising that materials would be turned over in discovery that later proves to be not material to the contention, because if it was readily available, we didn't want to have to rule on every single discovery dispute.

So just because material is made available on discovery, that -- by no means -- concerns the relevance or materiality of the material. And that is always the rule, because otherwise you force a party to make extensive and perhaps unnecessary objections in a discovery stage in order to preserve their right. And it's well understood in litigation. And I wanted to state it for you.

I think you can see the common sense reason for that. All right.

I think we have completed the ruling on the motion

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in its entirety for the reasons we have discussed.

MR. WETTERHAHN: I think we have a quick motion, with regards to systems interaction, to be made by LEA.

JUDGE BRENNER: I thought we were going to do it

-- the reason I want to defer it is for the parties to

discuss the full schedule implications of it. Has that taken

place already?

MR. WETTERHAHN: Yes. The parties will not be able to comment, having to check with the witnesses and Bethesda with regard to schedule. So even if we wait until after lunch, we cannot get any --

JUDGE BRENNER: All right. Let's take up the subject then we'll tell you what we want you to do, since we have to do it by rote in this proceeding, apparently.

MS. ZITZER: Limerick Ecology Action has made a decision to withdraw contention I-41, which is the systems interaction contention. And if necessary, I would be glad to provide a written filing of that.

JUDGE BRENNER: No, it's not necessary.

MS. ZITZER: It's primarily due to the complex nature of the contention and the difficulty for LEA, as a volunteer organization, to obtain sufficient technical assistance to really be able to provide any kind of a meaningful pursuit of the contention in the hearings. And we

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had discussed it with the other parties.

It was not until this past Friday that it was clear to us that the city of Phildalphia was not particularly interested in pursuing that contentio . So it as subsequent to that realization that we've come to this decision.

JUDGE BRENNER: All right. Give us a moment. (Board conferring.)

JUDGE BRENNER: All right. We will note and accept the withdrawal at this point. There will be no need for you to file anything in writing.

Now that leaves the hearing week of April 23rd unscheduled. We don't want to leave that hearing week unscheduled. Let me add that we're not available Friday, the 27th of April, but we planned on having a hearing Monday through Thursday of that week. And we want, if at all possible, for something to be scheduled that week.

And one thing that comes to mind is moving up on-site emergency planning, which right now is scheduled for the week of May 7.

MR. VOGLER: Mr. Chairman, will you entertain a comment?

JUDGE BRENNER: I'm raising this for your consideration unless you know what your consideration is already, then you could comment.

MR. VOGLER: We are in the process of contacting Bethesda regarding moving that up. It doesn't look too promising at the moment.

JUDGE BRENNER: All right. The other possibility is -- and we'll discuss this when Mr. Romano is here. And we're supposed to receive his specification by the end of the day today. Of his contention, Roman VI-l involving welding deficiency.

The other option is to schedule that litigation, if there is litigation for that week of April 23rd. Another possibility is April 30th right now is open. The week of April 30th. And that was because in part we couldn't get the Staff to file on-site emergency planning testimony earlier than a hearing for the week of May 7.

It may be that we can schedule Mr. Romano's contention for the week of April 30th and at least pick up one of those weeks. Originally I guess in our own minds we had thought that we weren't too worried about pushing the Staff harder than we did on the week of April 30th because we thought it might well be a carry-over week, if systems interaction was starting on April 23rd.

I think we doubted that systems interaction would be completed in one week. Now that that is no longer in the picture, perhaps there can be a compromise, and maybe the Staff can move on-site emergency planning up to the week of April 30th. I just carefully told you why we didn't push too hard for one week earlier, because we thought it would become moot, and you would have rushed to file the testimony and we wouldn't have gotten to it until the week of May 7th anyway.

But now that is no longer the case. One reason we're so interested in not losing these hearing weeks is that we are available very, very little for hearings in

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June. Very, very little. And if anything gets carried over beyond April and May, it's going to get carried over for more than just a week.

In fact, I guess maybe we might as well tell you now, in terms of your long range plans, that if any hearing time is necessary in June, the only week we will be available in June 18th. And it would start on Tuesday, June 19th.

When I say June, I'm talking about weeks starting in June. We're available June 1st, which I consider that last week in May. June 1st is the Friday.

But going beyond that, the only week in June is the one I just gave you, which is the week of June 18th, but we would be starting on Tuesday, June 19th. And that's another reason why we would ask the parties to look very, very carefully before they decide that we have to let those two weeks go by empty. And remember, we don't yet know what the situation is going to be with severe accidents.

And we have accepted a schedule adjustment by the parties as to when we will take up that subject. But our own mind, in rethinking it, after receiving Ms. Bush's letter, there were reasons in support of handling that this week.

In terms of being able to schedule things faster, in the event any contentions were admitted on that subject.

But of course, that's a function of something out of our control, in part. That is issuance of the Staff's

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final environmental statement.

You might tell us whether that schedule is still in existence, if you know now. Or when you check later Mr. Vogler.

MR. VOGLER: The schedule was firm on Friday, last Friday.

JUDGE BRENNER: Tell me again what that is. By the end of March?

MR. VOGLER: That was the schedule that we discussed at a meeting on Friday.

JUDGE BRENNER: All right. We are ready to get back to the subject of emergency planning. And we will take up the Part 70 license matter immediately after lunch, and that involves LEA as well as Mr. Anthony on behalf of FOE.

All right. We left you with some thoughts on emergency planning before the break. We won't come back to it now. As we said, we'd appreciate the views of the parties after the lunch break. And I quess now, after the Part 70 license matter.

LEA XI is the next one. The contention here is that the school district emergency plans do not have an information -- enough information in them to provide a basis for reasonable assurance that there will be enough buses for the schools in the event of evacuation. And the

contention gives some examples.

I guess my first question is whether you are talking about all school plans, or the ones you list, or what?

MS. ZITZER: I listed this as an example, referring to Montgomery County schools, as is obvious. I believe that the Chester County public school plans do indicate they have enough buses for the public schools. I believe that there is some uncertainty with regard to the private -- no, no, I'm sorry.

Let me start over.

JUDGE BRENNER: I guess my question is, what did you intend to encompass within the contention?

MS. ZITZER: The fact that particularly with regard to Chester and Montgomery County, the plans in their current state, indicate that there aren't enough buses, simply by the fact that in many places, in most places it indicates the number needed. But the item is marked TBD.

And what we tried to do was give examples with regard to the Montgomery County school districts as to the fact that we weren't just talking about a few buses. But that it was a very significant number of buses. And particularly, given the fact that the school district evacuation concepts in each plan specifically state that it is expected that the transportation will be provided to

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move all students inside the EPZ in one lift, would lead us to believe that the planning assumption is that only one trip would be made with each bus.

And therefore, given the fact that there are so many buses, again, marked TBD where it's known where they're needed, given the existing information, it's not possible to make a finding that there is sufficient transportation available to evacuate the school students.

Again, I think this would particularly refer to the school districts in Montgomery and Chester Counties.

I believe that in Berks County that I think the plans do indicate that they do have sufficient buses. But it is a very significant number that other than knowing that it's marked that they are needed and it's TBD, we have no other information available at the present time to know where they're going to come from.

JUDGE BRENNER: So the contention is that for Chester and Montgomery County there's no reasonable assurance that there will be enough buses needed for evacuation of the schools.

MS. ZITZER: Yes.

JUDGE BRENNER: And although you're not sure from reading the plan, part of the scope of the -- of what's in controversy might not be just pure numbers of buses, but rather the assumptions as to how many trips or lifts each

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bus would have to make.

MS. ZITZER: The plans state that it is to be done in one lift. That is one of the planning assumptions. Given that, it is a very significant problem, and I just might add that we are particularly concerned about the school children. This will be in addition to the many hundreds of buses needed for evacuating other segments of the population.

Again, those needs, in addition being marked to be developed. It's literally hundreds of buses, that we just don't know where they're going to come from.

JUDGE BRENNER: But in this contention we're talking about the public school children?

MS. ZITZER: Yes.

JUDGE BRENNER: You're interested in numbers of buses that would be dedicated for the children. You understand there may be other buses but they may be used for other things.

MS. ZITZER: (Nods affirmatively.)

JUDGE BRENNER: Does the Commonwealth have a position on admissibility of this one?

MS. FERKIN: Yes, the Commonwealth supports the admissibility of the contention.

JUDGE BRENNER: Do you know offhand -- I realize

I haven't forgotten what the Commonwealth said yesterday.

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Many of these questions go into detail beyond which you have prepared for this hearing. And if that's the case you can just say so. But if you know, we sometimes get the benefit of further detail.

Is the contention correct that the assumption in the Chester and Montgomery County plans are that evacuation of school children will be handled in one run?

MS. FERKIN: Yes, that's a correct assumption.

JUDGE BRENNER: Let me ask LEA. Isn't this the type of simple, factual contention that can be determined ministerially by counties, in terms of counting buses and number of children, and not be something that a board has to be concerned with in hearing time?

MS. ZITZER: The county plan simply marked refer back to the municipal plans with regard to this information.

And this has planning for several school districts, has virtually come to a standstill because no answers have been forthcoming from the county as to where the buses are supposed to come from.

And I don't think that this Board could make a finding that there is a reasonable assurance that this segment of the population could be adequately protected in the event of a radiological emergency, without having that information available.

JUDGE BRENNER: Okay. The Applicant objected,

saying there's no reason to believe that adequate buses won't be identified and planned for after the plans are developed; is that correct?

MR. CONNER: Yes, sir. We believe that -- of course we're at a stage now where we do not even have all of the municipals need for buses identified. And we understand that when that is completed will be up to the counties to make additional arrangements under contract with private companies, perhaps using PEMA's good offices as may be necessary.

And there is no question that the adequate number of buses must be available before full power operation. And we simply say, we don't need to do that now, as long as the mechanism exists for obtaining that number of buses when the time comes.

Oh, I might note, that the Chairman said something about public schools only. And this, I understand it, applies to private schools as well. And I would note that the attachment on LEA's contention XI here, as I understand it lists only private schools or parochial schools, if that's a distinction to make.

JUDGE BRENNER: All right. So it's all schools.

MR. CONNER: I beg your pardon?

JUDGE BRENNER: Is it all schools?

MR. CONNER: The list does not include all schools

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as I understand it. It lists only parochial schools and the Hill School.

MS. ZITZER: Might I provide a clarification?

The list that is Table 8, which is attached to Contention

number XI, which is marked page 28, is a listing of what

in the plans is marked unmet needs. And this is from each

school district, municipal -- each school district radiological

emergency response plan.

The reason that the private -- that page lists private schools which are the responsibility of the school district within which they are located. And these are the ones that are marked TBD, that no information is available for. Where they are not listed, it means that there at least is some arrangements already known as to what buses would be available.

But these particular examples are simply marked TBD in the plans, so we don't know where these buses will come from.

JUDGE BRENNER: Well, Mr. Conner was in part correct. That I misstated it. Do you intend the contention to go to all the public and private schools in Chester and Montgomery County?

MS. ZITZER: Yes, that's how the plans have been developed.

MS. FERKIN: Judge Brenner, may I make one comment?

Let's get clear that the definition of private school, that

we should be using here, would be a non-profit private

school. Those are the subset of private schools for which

school districts plan.

MS. ZITZER: Thank you.

JUDGE BRENNER: Mr. Conner, one thing you said was that we needn't litigate whether the actual number of buses had been identified as being in existence, so long as the mechanism is in place by which -- and I'm paraphrasing you now -- by which it can be reasonable assured that the buses will be provided at the time they're needed. That is, in a time frame of a possible full power operating license. Is that right?

MR. CONNER: It's my understanding of how the PEMA would plan to operate. I want to make sure that I didn't misstate what I meant. There's no need to litigate that at this point. I also said that before full power operation there would have to be provision for an adequate number of buses available, in the event of such an emergency.

JUDGE BRENNER: Would it be open now to litigate whether or not the mechanisms are in place, to get the buses by that time? I view that as being part of it.

MR. CONNER: I think that's explained in Annex E, as to what the State would do, as I understand it. Here again,

additional buses would be obtained if needed.

JUDGE BRENNER: Ms. Ferkin, can you? You have been volunteered.

do. Perhaps Ms. Ferkin could be more specific on how

I can only give my impression of what I think the State would

MS. FERKIN: Again, it's a general question of where resources are needed. Where does the organization needing a resource go? The school districts identify a need for buses and are to report that reed to the counties. The county plan, in our view, should identify outside sources for buses that it would rely upon if the school district, within the county, lacks the buses. Again, we're dependent upon the county plan, identifying where buses are needed.

And if any available outside scurces, to which it would go to get those buses.

JUDGE BRENNER: Ms. Zitzer, in some sense, LEA XI is really a subpart of LEA X, which was the overall one.

MS. ZITZER: I think, in LEA XI, we're just attempting to be more specific. But certainly --

JUDGE BRENNER: Then the point I was going to get to and ask you is that an indication of this one item that is, buses involving evacuation of school children being of particular concern to LEA? Are you prioritizing this concern, as compared to the long list of other to be developed needs which was in LEA X?

Was there some reason for separating this one out, other than highlighting it?

MS. ZITZER: Probably not, as long as the Board would make a finding that this kind of a problem would be litigatable under Contention X. Certainly, it would apply to the same status of the fact that the needs are not provided.

JUDGE BRENNER: We have the Staff's position in writing. They did not object to the admissibility of the contention. I don't know if the Staff wants to add anything.

MS. WRIGHT: No, nothing to that. But, as Ms.
Zitzer's last statement, we considered this particular
contention a specific contention in the gender of Contention X,
their Contention X. And that's what we meant by objecting
to the general items marked to be developed versus pointing
out a specific item to be marked to be developed, where
there were concerns. That's all. Thank you.

Which also involves school district plans, but another aspect of them. When I give these contentions, as the parties recognize, it's just a paraphrase. I'm not attempting to quote the contention or rewrite it by my paraphrase. But I am attempting to prod the parties to tell us better what the specific focus is.

Contention LEA XII is that the school district

emergency plans cannot be implemented because there is no assurance that there will be enough teachers and staff required to stay at school or with evacuated students. And the basis gives three factors, as to why LEA thinks that's a proper allegation for a litigation, at least.

And one of them is the human response factor, which

I take it is shorthand for the item we discussed before.

Is that correct Ms. Zitzer?

MS. ZITZER: (Nods affirmatively.)

Yes.

A desire to evacuate oneself and one's family first. And three is the absence of clear specific and binding contracts or agreements that the people need it. Teachers and staff will fulfill the assigned tasks needed to protect this especially sensitive segment of the population.

I guess it was that phrase that I had in mind when I asked you about LEA XI. I recalled it, but I had it in the wrong contention.

Staff, I'm not sure I understand the reason for the Staff's position, so let me turn to the Staff, first.

The Staff thinks it's admissible, but on the basis of the third factor only, which is just the agreements. I take it the Staff doesn't think it's admissible, as part of this contention, to talk about the human response of the teachers

and the Staff. And I see that as a contradiction from what I thought the Staff said when we discussed that general contention. Which number? I forget.

MS. WRIGHT: No, the Staff does not perceive it as a contradiction, but simply as a means of reorganizing litigation of the contention. Teachers reactions to an emergency situation could be discussed under the auspices of the other contention. And here we're talking about the absence of Letters of Agreement.

JUDGE BRENNER: Okay. Thank you. That is consistent because the Staff -- the other contention, I'm told, was IFA VIII -- because the Staff supported the admissibility of

MS. WRIGHT: Yes.

JUDGE BRENNER: I wrongly accused you of inconsistency. If LEA VIII were not admitted, would you object to the litigation of LEA XII as including the first two factors also?

MS. WRIGHT: Yes, because if the Board did not consider LEA VIII capable of meeting the specificity and basis requirements, at that point there would be no specificity and basis for it in this contention either.

JUDGE BRENNER: We see a distinction, arguably, between the two, as we discussed before. And I don't want to repeat that whole discussion. The problem we had

preliminarily with LEA VIII was that it wasn't specific

because it just said all volunteer workers. And for the sake

of argument, different volunteer emergency workers may be

more or less important. And in order to evaluate their

role we needed specifics. And over here we have specifics.

I will leave you with that thought.

Applicant objected. You didn't find any of the contentions admissible, did you?

MR. CONNER: No.

JUDGE BRENNER: It's hard to get a quick count, but approximately over four of the contentions anyway, the Applicant thinks is a general attack on the training programs. And I guess that's similar to the position the Applicant took at LEA VIII, that you look to the training and not as to whether or not people will respond.

MR. CONNER: More specifically, the results of the training.

(Board conferring.)

JUDGE BRENNER: I wanted to ask the Commonwealth whether they had a position on the admissibility of LEA XII?

MS. FERKIN: Commonwealth doesn't believe LEA XII is admissible on the basis stated. In the Commonwealth's view, Letters of Agreement with teachers and staff to stay with their students are not required.

JUDGE BRENNER: I think we understand the positions

of the parties on this one. I am seeing nobody jumping to the microphones, so we will go to the next one.

LEA XIII involves plans for private day care centers with 20 to 75 children. Do I have the number right?

MS. ZITZER: (Nodding affirmatively.)

JUDGE BRENNER: The Staff thought the contention was admissible, except for the part of the contention that refers to the psychological effects on children. And Ms. Zitzer, it wasn't clear to me, on reading the contention, as to what you want to litigate under that. I thought that that was just support, for the reasons as to why it was important to have good evacuation or other protective plans for children.

MS. ZITZER: Exactly because it can be such -because problems can result, because of that being a factor.

We think it's important to have a planned response to assure
for adequate protection of the sensitive population. We think
that's a factor supporting the reason why planning needs to
be done for the day school.

JUDGE BRENNER: In the first paragraph you talk about -- in fact, in the first sentence, you talk about day care centers or private day care. Am I correct that that is defined by the second paragraph? That is, you're talking about a private day care center, where there are reasonably large number of children?

MS. ZITZER: Yes, sir.

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MS. ZITZER: Yes.

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JUDGE BRENNER: And not a situation of a small number of individual children?

JUDGE BRENNER: So the contention really would be the first paragraph and then the first two sentences of the second paragraph. And then I can skip down to the references one, two, and three, and still have the same contention?

MS. ZITZER: Yes.

JUDGE BRENNER: Is it correct that, with that understanding, the Staff does not object to the admissibility of the contention?

MS. WRIGHT: Yes, sir. And with reference to the statement that on page 30 that says "If it is, these numbers are not reflected in traffic patterns and control" et cetera, et cetera.

JUDGE BRENNER: I'm sorry?

MS. WRIGHT: On page 30, LEA contends that "If there is a separate plan" -- I presume that that's the "it" they're talking about -- "these numbers are not reflected in the traffic patterns and control if they have other children shipped to host schools, or in the home preparation times, to evacuate (as cited in Appendix 4, NUREG 0654)."

JUDGE BRENNER: I take it, and I'm gaid you raised

that so we can be clear, that if a contention were admitted, along the lines I indicated, that if the proof was put forth by one party that there is an evacuation plan that provides for the parents to come get the children, that it would be open — and this is what discovery, among other things, is all about, so parties can learn in advance what the positions will be, as well as for the development of the draft plans in the particular case of emergency planning, to further divulge information that we don't yet know.

But if that's the case, then it would be open to LEA or another party to show that that won't work because the traffic plans won't permit it and those numbers are not reflected in the traffic patterns. But you think that would not be permissible?

Anytime somebody, on the merits, comes up with a reason in support of their argument, it's open to the other parties -- so long as it's material -- to provide testimony or cross examination as to why the proposed solution won't work. Isn't that true?

MS. WRIGHT: Yes, it is true.

JUDGE BRENNER: What I was trying to accomplish and I was overbroad -- I'm glad you raised it, Ms. Wright.

I was trying to delete any reference to psychological effects on children so there would be no mistake that that was not part of the litigation. I did not mean to delete the other

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point. And that's why a Poard is not capable, at the spur of the moment, of rewriting contentions, as I have just proved.

But I think that other point would be preserved anyway, for the reasons I indicated. But maybe it's best to find inother way of preserving it.

The Applicant objects partly on the fact that there is no basis that there are all kinds of provisions for these types of facilities. Then the Applicant gives examples.

Is that correct?

MR. CONNER: Yes. We again are following the PEMA guidelines which distinguish between various public institutions and private, unlicensed institutions, which are not to be included in the school district plans and are to be handled as members of the general public. We have no choice.

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MS. FFRKIN: Private?

JUDGE BRENNER: Does Commonwealth have a position for it?

MS. FERKIN: Private for-profit schools that will probably include day care centers do not have to be included in the school district's plan. They may develop their own plans.

The municipal plans should list these types of institutions. But, to the extent the institutions that LEA XIII refers to constitute private for-profit centers, they do not have to be included in the school district's plan.

JUDGE BRENNER: Did you intend that conclusion in this contention? All day care centers, whether they be non-profit or private for-profit?

MS. ZITZER: I think that there is some of both.

Obviously, whatever is in the school district plan is already provided for. Our concern is that somewhere planning be done, and that the existing plans for the areas where these facilities are reflect that planning, whether it's a municipality or whether -- it would seem to be that it would need to be incorporated into the local planning.

But at the present time it's not.

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JUDGE BRENNER: Ms. Ferkin, I was going to make that point, too. As I read the contention, it's not keyed to the school plans. It basically says what Ms. Zitzer just said. I should be provided for in plans.

With that and with the clarification you gave,
do you have a view on the admissibility of the contention?

MS. FERKIN: Yes, I don't believe the contention
is admissible.

JUDGE BRENNER: Okay. And why not?

MS. FERKIN: The extent of planning that we're talking about for these kinds of institutions is at most a listing by the municipalities of the institutions that are contained -- of these types of institutions that are located within the municipality. Our position is, no further planning by the local governmental entities has to be accomplished for these kinds of institutions.

JUDGE BRENNER: Is it not a criterion of emergency planning that special groups of the general public, even if they're classified just as general public, be provided for in emergency plans? And if so, wouldn't this fall into a special group?

MS. FERKIN: Can you define special group any more explicitly?

JUDGE BRENNER: Persons who needed assistance to evacuate because they can't get out on their own, such as

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large groups of school children, or invalids or so on.

MS. FERKIN: May I have a moment, please?
(Counsel conferring.)

MS. FERKIN: Judge Brenner, I'm not sure if I stated my description of what we consider these day care institutions to be very clearly. We consider these day care institutions to be like any other for-profit business. And as such, the municipal coordinator should be aware of these institutions, should review plans that these institutions draw up for themselves, giving any aid that is required.

And I think there's a distinction between what you are terming special groups and how we are characterizing these sorts of institutions.

JUDGE BRENNER: All right. That's your position as to private for-profit day care centers; correct?

MS. FERKIN: Exactly.

JUDGE BPENNER: The contention is not so limited. The contention includes day care centers, whether they're losing money or making money.

MS. FERKIN: Loss of money or making of money isn't the problem --

JUDGE BRENNER: I was being facetious. The not for-profit type day care center. I don't know if there are any. Do you?

MS. FERKIN: I'm not aware at this point.

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WNER: Ms. Zitzer, do you know?

R: There are. I would need some consultation to provide some examples. But there are.

JUDGE BRENNER: The Applicant has referenced some that are included in plans, but of course, the Applicant's reference in the Applicant's view proves that they are being provided for. That's where they got the reference, from the fact that there are plans for them.

But those may only be some of them. I don't know.

MS. ZITZER: There are others. Just give me a moment.

JUDGE BRENNER: We're not going to do it now, we're going to break in a minute. We will come back to this contention after lunch. And one of our questions might be whether you can specify the contention to particular institutions, either now or soon.

MS. ZITZER: Soon certainly. It would be hard to do it right now, just because I would want to be sure that the information was thorough and accurate. But certainly be able to provide that.

JUDGE BRENNER: All right. And identify whether they would be private for-profit or not for-profit.

MS. ZITZER: Certainly.

JUDGE BRENNER: If you know. All right. You tell

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us how soon you could do that after lunch and we will think about whether we want to ask you to do it.

MS. ZITZER: Certainly.

JUDGE BLENNER: Any other comments on this contention? Staff?

MS. WRIGHT: The Staff would just like to point out that in Appendix 4 of NUREG 0654 entitled Evacuation Time Estimates Within the Plume Exposure Pathway, Emergency Planning Zone. Persons in special facilities is included as part of the population segments that shall be considered in determining the number of people to be evacuated. And on page 4-3 of that appendix, it says an estimate for this special population group shall be done on an institution-by-institution basis.

The means of transportation are also highly individualized and shall be described. Schools shall be included in this segment.

The Staff relied on that particular definition of special facility population in determining or assisting in its determination of whether this contention was admissible.

Thank you.

JUDGE BRENNER: Okay. Thank you. Anything further on this contention?

(No response.)

All right, we will adjourn for lunch in a moment,

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and then we will come back to the question we left open

on specification, further specification of LEA XIII. I guess

we will defer it until after the Part 70 argument, so you

will have even a little more time to think about it.

MS. BUSH: Your Honor, this could be off the record.

JUDGE BRENNER: Okay. Tell me the subject first.

MS. BUSH: About what you would encourage the parties to discuss off the record in terms of your deferring a ruling on some of the emergency planning contention issues.

I wanted to ask clarification.

JUDGE BRENNER: Let's do that on the record.

MS. BUSH: My question was, would you envision this to be applicable to the types of issues raised by the city of Philadelphia?

JUDGE BRENNER: I want to be frank. When I made the comments I made, I was not thinking of the city of Philadelphia. I was thinking of LEA's contentions. Don't infer anything one way or the other. But if you see something there that fits in that category, go ahead and put it in that category and participate in the discussions.

If you see something that you think should be in that category, discuss it with the other parties, so that when we get to the contention, and we will get to Philadelphia someday, you can tell us that you think that should be in

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that category also.

MS. BUSH: So basically you would be looking for an agreement among the particular -- I guess it would be the Commonwealth who is developing the plan and the city, if they thought that they might, could without a formal ruling come to some agreement about some of these issues that we raised being included in the plan.

JUDGE BRENNER: Of course we encourage that as to all contentions, even those that we fully admitted at this time. We're open to suggestions as to (a) what are the parties views on the overall concept, and how it might procedurally be implemented. We're addressing the latter point now, and your suggestion is one way to do it. There may be others.

MS. BUSH: One final question. Could we have any kind of estimate as to when we might get to the city of Philadelphia contention? Will it be today or is it likely it won't be?

JUDGE BRENNER: I'm hoping it might be today.

I'm Loping it won't be early this afternoon.

MS. BUSH: Probably would be after 3:00?

JUDGE BRENNER: Yes. Because we're going to be coming back a little later than 1:30 now, as we keep talking.

Yes, it will be -- you want to know if it would be safe for you to come back after 3:00. Is that your

question? 11pb8 MS. BUSH: One of us has a meeting to prepare for. JUDGE BRENNER: You will be safe until after 3:00. MS. BUSH: Thank you. JUDGE BRENNER: You're right. We may not get to it, but I don't want to stop artificially. I'm hoping to get to it. MS. BUSH: Thank you. JUDGE BRENNER: All right. Let's adjourn until 1:40. (Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m., the hearing was recessed, to reconvene at 1:40 p.m., this same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

(1:45 p.m.)

JUDGE BRENNER: All right. We're on the record.

The subject now is what we have loosely referred to as the Part 70 matter, after the numbered section of the Commission's regulations dealing with applications for, among other things -- well, in general, applications for handling and storage of special nuclear material, which would include new -- that is unirradiated -- nuclear fuel for commercial nuclear power plant.

The paper we have in front of us, and perhaps before us, so we'll ask LEA about that in a moment, are as follows. We have a filing from FOE dated February 23rd entitled Application by Anthony/FOE to File a Contention Based on New Matter, i.e. PECO's Application Part 70 to Store Fuel at the Limerick Plant, served 2/21/84.

We also have, from FOE, a one page document dated February 28th, 1934 entitled Addition to Anthony/FOE Application for Contention on New Matter, PECO's Application Part 70, Docket Number 70-2988 to move fuel to site and store 764 bundles of fuel.

When we had received the first of those two documents, we issued an order setting a rapid schedule for answers by the Staff and the Applicant. We received Applicant's answer to both of those documents, although the time was even more shortened with respect to the second document. And

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Applicant's answer is dated March 1st, 1934.

We received an answer to the Staff directive only to the first document, dated March 2nd, 1984. In that answer, the Staff acknowledges just having received the second document from FOE, explains it did not have time to respond in writing, but offers a preliminary, very brief, comment on that second document.

Before arriving here, we thought those were the only documents pertaining to the matter. Yesterday, we received, from LEA, a document entitled Petition to Intervene and Request for Hearing, pursuant to Atomic Energy Act, as amended, January 4, 1983 PL 97-415 Section 12A. And it captioned -- and I'll shorten it here -- In the matter of License Number SNM-1926, License Amendment Application. It's filed dated February 28, 1984 and it's filed, as I said, by LEA through its counsel Mr. Elliot.

It also has a cover letter of the same date, indicating that it was sent to the Secretary of the Commission with copies to the Director of the Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, who is an NRC Staff official, and copies to corporate officials, Mr. Bradley and Mr. Bower, of Philadelphia Electric. I don't know if copies were otherwise sent to the Board. In any event, we did not receive them before arriving here.

First question, is what your intent is, with

respect to the filing, Mr. Elliot? Is that meant to be a separate petition, in a separate proceeding from ours?

MR. ELLIOT: Yes, it is.

JUDGE BRENNER: All right.

MR. ELLIOT: Incidentally, you received your copy from the Staff, rather than from LEA.

JUDGE BRENNER: All right. Did you serve copies on the Board and the parties?

MR. ELLIOT: No, I did not. The only reason for that is because we had perceived it to be an entirely separate proceeding, on a different docket.

JUDGE BRENNER: We disagree with that as a reason for not serving us, even if it's correct, and we will get to that more directly with the Applicant perhaps. We have a standing order, in this case, and I don't remember the exact wording of it, but it was very broad. And we discussed a little bit, and it was basically any correspondence -- we particularly directed it to Applicant and Staff correspondence, but we were talking about any correspondence.

We discussed the reasons way back at the beginning of this proceeding, that it was for the benefit of all parties, as well as the Board, that copies of anything pertaining to the licensing of the Limerick plant -- and it was in that vein -- be served on all the parties and the Board. We have made some exceptions since then and clarified it, with respect

to discovery and so on. But certainly something like this,

a legal pleading in the case -- even if LEA deems it in a

separate proceeding before another body -- it would be

within our order __et a copy of it. So I make that clear

for the future.

MR. ELLIOT: I understand now.

JUDGE BRENNER: Especially since, at present, there is no separate proceeding. If there ever is a separate proceeding established, your filing would be the first filing starting it off.

Have any parties responded to LEA's filing, in any form?

MR. WETTERHAHN: Not, yet.

JUDGE BRENNER: Staff?

MS. HODGDON: We have only just received it, as was just said. It was the Staff that served these. I don't recall when we got it, but not in time --

JUDGE BRENNER: The answer is no?

MS. HODGDON: The answer is no.

JUDGE BRENNER: Okay.

Now the first we learned about the amendment involving an amendment filed by the Applicant, Philadelphia Electric, with respect to an application to store unirradiated nuclear fuel at the Limerick site, was when we received copy of a letter from Staff counsel indicating that it had received

such an amendment. And if I recall the sequence correctly, was at first just serving us just with the cover letter of that amendment. And then, very shortly thereafter, served us the actual amendment. We received the actual amendment on February 21st, 1984. And I guess it was a few days prior to that that we first had some indication of its existence, as I have indicated.

The Application itself is apparently dated approximately January 26, 1984. That might be wrong by a day or so. Am I correct, that the Applicant did not serve that Amendment on the Board and the parties, the January '84 amendment?

MR. WETTERHAHN: That is correct.

JUDGE BRENNER: Why not?

MR. WETTERHAHN: Our position has been, since the original filing, that the Part 70 license was completely separate and apart from the Part 50 license. And that we understood the Board's order, as broad as it was, to cover matters relating to the issuance of the operating license for Limerick.

I think it was clear, or should have been clear, that there was an ongoing -- would be an application for Part 70 license filed.

JUDGE BRENNER: Assuming that you're correct and I'm not disagreeing with it at this moment, that our order

was broad enough to cover all matters relating to the

perating license for Limerick, it's your position that there

was no argument that the filing of that application could be

deemed to be so related?

MR. WETTERHAHN: You can always make an argument that things are related. But as far as --

JUDGE BRENNER: I'm talking about a legitimate position, not just a wild argument.

MR. WETTERHAHN: No, I don't think there's a reasonable argument that the hazards that this Board is looking at in the licensing, would require that this be served, no.

JUDGE BRENNER: Mr. Wetterhahn, your law firm, in another proceeding, lost that very argument before another Licensing Board, before the Zimmer Board. How can you sit here today and tell me that there's no legitimate argument that that license application is related to the operating license for Limerick?

MR. WETTERHAHN: First of all, we -- of course -recognize the Zimmer decision. However, the issue there was
very much different. The issue there is whether the Board had
jurisdiction to modify a license already issued. And that
brought into account 10 CFR Section 2.17(h) and we argued, in
that case, whether the Board has jurisdiction to modify a
license already in existence.

I think it was clear that the holding in that

case is limited to the fact that once the license is issued

the Board might have jurisdiction. While I disagree with

that and would like to, as our pleading indicates, preserve

that question for appeal, that question was never appealed.

But that is not really the question before this Licensing

Board.

And I also believe the basis upon which that Board took jurisdiction was in error.

JUDGE BRENNER: I understand that position. But you lost that position.

MR. WETTERHAHN: As to the question of the Board having jurisdiction over the license, once issued.

JUDGE BRENNER: A predicate for the Board, in that case, exercising jurisdiction under 2.717(b) was the finding that the subject matter was related to the operating license proceeding. Now that obtains, regardless of the chronology of whether the license was first issued or whether the operating license board gets involved before it was issued.

MR. WETTERHAHN: There are other requirements, simply that -- I would agree that a Part 70 license is issued does not give the Board jurisdiction, even under that ruling. But I don't believe that one can have the subject matter jurisdiction from a jurisdictional point of view, under that very limited regulation, until the license is issued.

JUDGE BRENNER: You're changing my question. My question is is it related to the proceeding or not? And I put to you the fact that that question is separate and apart from whether or not jurisdiction is properly invoked, because it meets the other requirements of 2.717(b)?

MR. WETTERHAHN: As I said before, I don't believe that the questions related to a storage of cold fuel are related to the proceeding. I realize that one can make an argument that without having fuel on site, you can't load fuel, and certainly that argument could be made.

But from my point of view, I don't see any relationship or a relationship between the questions on a Part 70 license, for cold storage of fuel, and one having to do with the operation of this reactor.

JUDGE BRENNER: I thought we agreed that precedent had found that the matters were related. Even though it's perfectly proper for you to preserve your rights on appeal, that's not the same as withholding information from the Board which other Boards had found were related to operating licenses.

MR. WETTERHAHN: There was no intent to withhold information. We believe that the requirements of previous cases would be satisfied. And indeed, the Board's requirements, if notification of the issuance of license, was given to the Board.

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JUDGE BRENNER: After the fact?

MR. WETTERHAHN: Contemporaneous with the fact.

JUDGE BRENNER: Notwithstanding the fact that we had a standing order in this case, that all matters related to the operating licensing of the Limerick plant be served on the Board and the parties? You see, we had that requirement in this case, which did not necessarily exist in the other cases.

MR. WETTERHAHN: As I stated before, you have told me now I'm incorrect, but my interpretation was that this was one of the pieces of information necessary for an operating license, but not sufficiently ancillary that we would provide it. I would give you another example. I'm sure we have not provided this Board with information on operator licensing or indemnity correspondence. If the Board is requesting that type of information, we will provide it.

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JUDGE BRENNER: Offhand I don't see why it's not related, but I don't know what particular information you have in mind in those categories. And I don't want to digress now into them.

Is it correct that the original application for a Part 70 license for Limerick was filed in -- I guess it's in June of '83?

MR. WETTERHAHN: I provided a copy of the letter to the Licensing Board dated June 1, 1983. That is the initial application.

JUDGE BRENNER: You provided the letter to us. But the letter is to the director of nuclear material safety and safeguards.

MR. WETTERHAHN: And I will confirm it was not served on the 30ard.

JUDGE BRENNER: Or the parties?

MR. WETTERHAHN: Or the parties.

JUDGE BRENNER: For the same reason you have just indicated, you did not serve the January '84 amendmentj

MR. WETTERHAHN: That's correct.

JUDGE BPENNER: June '83 was after the time we had the standing order in this case also; isn't that correct?

MR. WETTERHAHN: I don't recall. I would assume

that it is.

JUDGE BRENNER: Wel', the case, for your

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recollection, started in approximately September '81, if I recall correctly.

MR. WETTERHAHN: I will take your word. I don't recall when the standing order was. I've heard for the Board, as for information related to this, we didn't interpret it that broadly. Correctly or not, that's the way we interpreted it.

JUDGE BRENNER: Was that a conscious determination made by counsel for the utility, not to serve either the application or the amendment?

MR. WETTERHAHN: I don't recall when I learned about this amendment. But I certainly learned about it before the Board was served by the Staff. And yes, I considered whether to serve it. Or, Applicant considered whether to serve it, and made a decision that it wasn't sufficiently relevant.

JUDGE BRENNER: Who made the decision?

MR. WETTERHAHN: I can't point to an individual.

JUDGE BRENNER: Somebody must have made it.

MR. WETTERHAHN: I'll take responsibility for

JUDGE BRENNER: You didn't consider it, even legitimately arguable, such that you should err in the direction of disclosing possible relevant information?

MR. WETTERHAHN: I thought all the Commission

requirements would be satisfied, including these Board's orders, at the most by sending this Board a copy of the license when issued.

I hope that's responsive.

JUDGE BRENNER: For its part, the Staff obviously received the June 1983 license application. It did not serve a copy of that license application on the Board and the parties. I want to know in the same context the Staff did serve, as I indicated, a copy of the amendment in January 1984. And were it not for the Staff's -- well, you sent us a copy in February. And were it not for the Staff's action we would not have learned of it. We would have preferred to have received a copy sooner than several weeks after. But that's a quibble in the larger context here.

I would like to inquire, however, as to the June 1983 application. Why Staff counsel did not serve that on the Board and the parties?

MS. HODGDON: Staff counsel did not receive a copy of that application and was not aware of its existence until Staff counsel saw the application for an amendment, which we served immediately.

JUDGE BRENNER: You went through the same process we went through of learning about the original June '83 application by inference and reference from the January 1984 amendment; is that correct?

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MS. HODGDON: That's correct.

JUDGE BRENNER: Let me state for the record, that I saw a copy of a special nuclear material license issued by the Staff approximately September 1983, if I recall correctly, which was a Part 70 license, but it was a Part 70 license --I may get the technical terms wrong, but it was solely for radiation sources used in testing I believe, and things of that nature.

When I saw that license, and I saw the Part 70 license, I went through the thought process of thinking to myself, what's this. Not having seen a license application.

But upon reading the license and seeing what it covered, I decided I was not concerned with th€ subject matter. And inferred from that, that that was the only subject of the license application, which the license referenced.

It was only after seeing the amendment application which the Staff provided to us in February 1984 that I realized that the original application also pertained, or apparently also pertained to new, that is unirradiated fuel for the facility. And it was only after receiving a copy of the June 1983 license application yesterday, which the Applicant provided in response to our request that I confirmed that.

That's a long way of saying that when we had just

the amendment before us, we didn't know how much of that was actually new, and how much was in the original application.

Although there were some marginal lines, we weren't sure of the extent to which we could rely on that. Particularly we were interested in seeing, whether the proposal to store unirradiated fuel outside, in what has been termed the new fuel storage area, I believe -- is that the right term,

Mr. Wetternahn?

MR. WETTERHAHN: Yes.

JUDGE BRENNER: We did not know if that proposal was incl ded as part of the June 1983 initial application, or only as part of the January 1984 amendment.

Upon looking at it we confirmed that indeed it was part of the June 1983 initial application. Is that correct so far, Mr. Wetcerhahn?

MR. WETTERHAHN: I gave the Board my only copy of the June 1st, '83 application. So I cannot trace that down. I will accept the Board's word.

JUDGE BRENNER: If you think that document is really relevant to this conversation, I should give you a copy.

MR. WETTERHAHN: I will accept the Board's word for it.

JUDGE BRENNER: Page 2, and it's better to nail it down for the record. It's not a matter of accepting my

word. Page 2 of the June 1st, 1983 application. Under the subsection 1.2.1, fuel storage location, states, "The new fuel will be stored outdoors in the new fuel storage area, which is located on the west side of the plant, within the protected area boundary, as shown in Figure 1.2.1, which is attached here to an incorporated herein.

"The new fuel will be stored here for approximately four months, and then it will be brought to the refueling floor and stored in the spent fuel pool before fuel load."

That's the end of the quote and that's consistent with the amendment also. Staff and Applicant has taken the position that FOE's contentions are late-filed contentions, because basically, if I understand the answers, the information was available at least I now infer the position was, at least since June 1983. And it was subsequent to that time that FOE should have filed such contentions.

Moreover, FOE had an obligation to affirmatively search the local public document room to become aware of the June 1983 application. Is that correct, Mr. Wetterhahn?

MR. WETTERHAHN: I think the June 1, 1983 was the latest that it could have been filed. I think an Intervenor could have reasonably anticipated if the Board is correct in saying that it had jurisdiction. The time to file it would be within the time prescribed by the notice of opportunity for hearing in the operating license stage.

JUDGE BRENNER: Is there something in the FSAR that indicates that a Part 70 license would be applied for for permission to store fuel on-site, in advance of an operating license?

MR. WETTERHAHN: No, that subject is not covered in the final safety analysis report.

JUDGE BRENNER: All right.

MR. WETTERHAHN: However, I don't believe that that fact alone would change the inference that one should have anticipated such an occurrence. I believe such an occurrence has happened in every reactor proceeding, that I am aware of.

I'm not aware of any exception to that rule.

JUDGE BRENNER: Accepting that for the sake of argument for now, the thrust of FOE's contentions in large part is their problem with the fact that the fuel is going to be stored outside. Should they also have inferred that it would be typical -- or at least that Philadelphia Electric would later seek permission to store the fuel outside?

And in advance of any such permission being sought, should have filed a contention saying, if in the future, Philadelphia Electric wants to store fuel outside, that wouldn't be good for the various reasons?

MR. WETTERHAHN: If fuel storage outside were unique to Philadelphia Electric, I would agree with you that

June 1st, '83 or about that time would be the time.

But again, I can't say that I have surveyed the field, but I know of other instances where the NRC has routinely reviewed and approved such storage outside under conditions similar or with fewer conditions than the ones for which Philadelphia Electric Company has applied.

JUDGE BRENNER: Even if that is correct, for the sake of argument, and it's not unique, wouldn't Ar 'icant have opposed such a contention in the say, fall, 1981 time frame as being speculative and premature?

MR. WETTERHAHN: With regard to the exact details.

But I believe that a contention could have been filed. I

have been given, as you may have noticed, a copy of the

Limerick EROL and Chapter 12 talks about environmental

"pprovals and consultation. And one of the items is with

regard to the special nuclear materials license at issue here.

MR. WETTERHAHN: It says, special nuclear material license not yet received -- not received under status. It's one of the separate federal permits, and their status for Limerick generating station. That's all the information it provides.

JUDGE BRENNER: What does it say?

JUDGE BRENNER: Does it say that one has been applied for?

MR. WETTERMAHN: No, it does not. But it is

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certainly implied that before Limerick can load fuel or operate, all these approvals have to be granted.

JUDGE BRENNER: Does it say the fuel will be stored outdoors?

MR. WETTERHAHN: It makes no other statements than the one I have just read.

JUDGE BRENNER: Do you have a date at which that portion was first placed in the EROL?

MR. WETTERHAHN: It shows no change bar, and it therefore would mean that it was filed with the operating license.

JUDGE BRENNER: Does the page have a change indication on the bottom?

MR. WETTERHAHN: No, it does not. That's what I meant by a change bar.

JUDGE BRENNER: Staff, as I had stated earlier, opposed FOE's contentions in part on the basis that they were late-filed contentions. When would they have been timely filed contentions in the Staff's view? When should FOE have filed contentions criticizing in large part the proposal to store the new fuel outside?

MS. HODGDON: Under Catawba I think, timely filed contentions are filed within a certain period of time after the notice of opportunity for hearing, and establishment of a board. And any other contention is late-filed.

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I think the question goes to good cause, and not to whether it is in fact late. I think that by Catawba the Commission acknowledges that such a filing would be late-filed.

JUDGE BRENNER: Do you think the June 1933
license application should have been filed with the Board
and the parties, including Staff counsel, on the basis that
it was arguably relevant to the subject matter of this
proceeding?

MS. HODGDON: Yes --

JUDGE BRENNER: Reasonably arguably relevant. Not just anybody could come up off the street and make any argument?

MS. HODGDON: Yes, I believe so. Had I had any control over the filing, or had I been given a copy of the filing, I certainly would have filed it. However, I must say that what the Staff did, when the Board indicated at the pre-hearing conference in January of '82, that it would like copies of all correspondence between the Staff and the Applicant. What the Staff did was to ask for copies of correspondence between -- licensing correspondence.

In other words, what we gave the Board and the parties was, in fact, only Part 50 licensing correspondence.

And so, we too, were -- I suppose -- not in total compliance with the Board's understanding. I think our understanding was different.

Later than that, we managed to bring in I&E correspondence and we still hadn't realized, I suppose, that we weren't getting, ourselves, NMSS correspondence between

itself and the Applicant. It was the first time, the first indication we had that somebody telephoned and said we have this application. We said, send it to us, and we sent it right along.

JUDGE BRENNER: Isn't that a matter of bureaucratic problems of separation within the Staff and the legal definitions of what's relevant or not.

MS. HODGDON: Definitely, that is a bureaucratic limitation within the Staff. We would have given the Board anything in which we thought they had expressed an interest with regard to this licensing, in the very broad definition of that term.

JUDGE BRENNER: For what it's worth, that Staff office has a memory that doesn't go back several years, apparently. When it was told that, in the context of the Zimmer proceeding, to be alert for Part 70 new fuel applications that might affect Part 50 proceedings.

I will leave that to your own future devices, as the Staff's lawyers.

MS. HODGDON: Yes.

JUDGE BRENNER: Accepting, for the sake of argument, your interpretation of Catawba, Ms. Hodgdon, would that same interpretation apply to a proceeding like this one, where we had a standing order that all relevant information be served?

And assume, for the sake of argument, that the Part 70 license

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application would have fallen within the order. If that's the case, and the Part 70 application was not, in fact, served, would Catawba still apply?

MS. HODGDON: I think Catawba would still apply, except that the good cause -- addressing good cause, it would be somewhat different and this Intervenor expected that he would be given everything that was relevant, even marginably or arguably relavent to this licensing proceeding. And he did not believe that he had to go to the Public Document Room to find it. And therefore, he had good cause. That helps him out on good cause, I think.

I don't believe that it waives the requirement to address the five criteria.

party -- by withhold informatin -- and I'm certainly not ascribing that purpose for withholding yet to the Applicant here. I am just suggesting it for purposes of probing your legal analysis. If that's the case, couldn't a party just withhold information and therefore cause an intervenor to have to meet a higher standard for having a contention to be admitted, by filing the information later? And then the intervenor, for the first time, learns of information that would have been available earlier?

MS. HODGDON: I'm not sure that I'm getting the hypothetical. I think maybe you're asking me two different

things. Couldn't a party, who has information, by withhnolding it until such time as it's very late, escalate the showing that needs to be made on good cause, because it's so late in the day?

JUDGE BRENNER: Yes, I'm asking if that does not follow from your position, that the late knowledge that the Part 70 application existed, applied to new fuel, would cause the five factors to apply, whereas if FOE had found out about that information on a timely basis, those factors would not have applied?

MS. HODGDON: I continue to believe that the five factors are applicable. I believe it goes to the way they are applied. I think that Catawba should be read that way.

When you are dealing with a party deliberately withholding information, which you have posed to me in your hypothetical, then certainly that has to be taken into account.

JUDGE BRENNER: What if it wasn't deliberate, but it was just a crabbed interpretation of what was relevant, even though I'll assume good faith on the part of that party?

MS. HODGDON: If it's not relevant, then it's probably not admissible anyhow.

JUDGE BRENNER: No, the party was wrong.

MS. HODGDON: The party was wrong in determining that it was not relevant and did not serve it because of his

misreading of relevance, did not serve it, not deliberately, the same case.

JUDGE BRENNER: Another question is, the Staff focused on the late filed contention factors. Some of FOE's complaints go to contentions that have been timely filed, or at least admitted in the proceeding. That is the pipeline hazards accident contentions. Why do the late filed criteria apply to those contentions?

MS. HODGDON: To the extent that the FOE's contention goes to the pipeline hazards contention, and it is already included in it, as admitted, as the position the Staff takes in its paper, because fresh fuel would have been on site, will be on site, if an when the application is granted. Then this condition is not different because of the filing of this information, which has only recently become known to FOE.

JUDGE BRENNER: So you say it is, in effect, a different contention?

MS. HODGDON: It would seem to be, within a contention of (3)(a) and (3)(b) as submitted. Without being — the contention, as articulated that way, would have been available to FOE without filing this amendment to the SNM application.

JUDGE BRENNER: If they would have known a, that there was going to be fresh fuel stored on site and b, the

further detail that it would be stored outside.

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fuel would be stored onsite within the operating life of the

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JUDGE BRENNER: Before an operating license would

MS. HODGDON: They should have known that fresh

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MS. HODGDON: No. Their intervention is on the

operation of the plant. There are (3)(a) and (3)(b) contentions

which go to the operation of the plant, after the operating

license issues. Therefore, any concern that they might have

with fresh fuel is comprehensible within their contention,

as originally submitted. And should have been so articulated,

JUDGE BRENNER: I understand that. And I

misunderstood it a moment ago. You just explained it. Should

they have known that it would have been stored outside, that

should have so stated at the time.

the new fuel would have been outside?

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MR. HODGDON: I'm not sure that they should have known it. I don't know that their contention shows that it makes a difference.

JUDGE BRENNER: That's a separate point. We're talking about the late filed criteria, whether that should apply.

MS. HODGDON: No. At that time, they could not have known that it would be stored outside, as far as I know.

It frequently is stored outside, but I don't know that they would have done that.

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JUDGE BRENNER: Mr. Wetterhahn, you wanted to add something?

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had our factual predicate correct. I think it's important, with regard to what is being considered, with regard to

MR. WETTERHAHN: I wanted to make sure that we

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Contentions V(3)(a) and V(3)(b). I think, if you read the

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first set of contentions, it refers to storage inside the

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building, when we're talking about storage outside the

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building. Mr. Anthony and FOE is talking not about

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contentions at issue, but the effect of a hypothetical

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railroad blast, which is not encompassed by the contention.

JUDGE BRENNER: You may want to take a look at

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And I think that's important to keep in mind.

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the February 23rd filing, Paragraph 1. I think he has

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that, and what you just said.

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MR. WETTERHAHN: Excuse me?

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JUDGE BRENNER: I think one of his allegations is,

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as you just described it. But I think he also has, in the reference I just gave you, the allegation, not expressly

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stated, that until all the Board has all the evidence and has

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ruled that these structures are built to withstand offsite

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accidents, no fuel can be risked there. And leading to that,

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talks about determining, in evidentiary hearings, whether the

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safety related buildings can withstand overpressures and impacts from offsite actions. And Contentions V(3)(a) and V(3)(b).

MR. WETTERHAHN: I believe that that Item 1 is talking about that part of the application concerning storage inside one of the safety related buildings. Okay? Which would be encompassed within the contention, or could have been.

What I wish to point out, though, is that with regard to the February 28th filing, Item 3 does not talk about the matter at issue before the Board, or only very peripherally, but talks about the TNT railroad car explosion. I believe that is the portion directly expressing outside storage. That is my only point.

And I do think that distinction makes a difference, ultimately.

JUDGE BRENNER I think you're reading one too narrowly, but we'll hear from Mr. Anthony at some point.

What is the status of the Applicant's plans, with respect to this fuel, at this time? In general, to the extent you can tell us publicly?

MR. WETTERHAHN: If the Staff finds the facility, and the outside storage area, is ready, we would expect to bring fuel onsite after about approximately two weeks from now, very general.

JUDGE BPENNER: As of now, Staff, is it correct 1 that the Staff has not found all requirements having been met? 2 3 MS. HODGDON: That is correct. Would you like a status report on that, or do you want a simple answer of that 4 5 is correct? JUDGE BRENNER: Give us a brief status report. 7 MS. HODGDON: I spoke with Monty Connor, who is the --9 JUDGE BRENNER: That's a little more detailed than 16 I need. 11 MS. HODGDON: He's the Project Manager just now. 12 And he gave us a status report. It's very short. 13 They had some problem with QA, which they now 14 find is okay, Quality Assurance. Certain other areas, they 15 are reinspecting, with regard to health physics, the security 16 and fire protection. They are reinspecting now, almost on 17 a daily basis. They find that most of the work has been done. 18 And they will have finished their reinspection shortly. 19 JUDGE BRENNER: In the amendment to the application 20 -- that is, the June '84 amendment, Mr. Wetterhahn. I don't 21 have it in front of me --22 MR. WETTERHAHN: June '84? 23 JUDGE BRENNER: January '84 amendment, thank you. 24 I don't have it in front of me, but the point was expressly

made, to this general effect. No new fuel would be

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stored in the new fuel storage vaults. Do you recall that?

MR. WETTERHAHN: Yes.

JUDGE BRENNER: Is there such a thing as the new fuel storage vaults?

MR. WETTERHAHN: No. This design eliminated the new fuel storage vaults. When it is stored inside, before it is removed from the inner and outer protective shipping containments, it will be stored on the refueling deck, as described therein.

JUDGE BRENNER: Were there ever provisions for the new fuel storage vaults in the plant?

MR. WETTERHAHN: I cannot recall when the design was changed. Let me see if I can get that information for the Board.

Yes, there were originally. But we cannot tell you, now, when the design was changed. Let me make a point though. Every boiling water reactor design, even that includes new fuel storage, usually only includes enough for reload. And I'm not aware of any that would not store some fuel in the manner I have just described, on the refueling deck, just prior to its being inspected.

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JUDGE BRENNER: The refueling deck is inside.

MR. WETTERHAHN: That's correct. I thought that

was --

JUDGE BRENNER: You answered the question. I just wanted to clarify.

MS. MODGDON: Excuse me. I have the application here. May I read the sentence I presume you are asking the question about? I have a question about it.

JUDGE BRENNER: Okay.

MS. HODGDON: Is says, "No new fuel will be stored in the new fuel storage vaults at Limerick," which certainly suggests that they exist.

Did I understand Mr. Wetterhahn to say they didn't?

JUDGE BRENNER: That's the question and answer we just went through, Ms. Hodgdon.

MS. HODGDON: Yes, I know. But I do not understand whether he said they do not exist or exist only in a limited way, because they store only that amount of fuel needed for refueling, and not for original.

JUDGE BRENNER: Okay, that's a good question.

I don't know if it's material, but we'll get the clarification.

MR. WETTERHAHN: There is a space for new fuel storage racks. There are no racks installed. If that makes any difference.

JUDGE MORRIS: But those racks are in the spent fuel pool.

MR. WETTERHAHN: Let me go through the process, perhaps that will help everyone.

The fuel bundles are delivered and will be stored for a short time outside. It's less than the four months schedule. Things have changed.

They will be hoisted up at some point in time

to the refueling deck where they will be stored horizontally.

One or two, I can't tell you exactly, will be opened,

inspected, channeled, and then put in the spent fuel racks,

in the spent fuel pool for Limerick Unit 1.

There are no new fuel storage racks at Limerick.

JUDGE BRENNER: Let me change subjects slightly.

Does the Applicant agree with, I guess, LEA's intent that

we not deal with its amendment application at all, and that

we leave it as its intended status as a petition to start

a separate proceeding?

MR. WETTERHAHN: From a jurisdictional point of view, as I previously stated, we don't believe that the Board has jurisdiction. If it is going to retain jurisdiction over one of these matters as raised by FOE, then certainly it should at least for expedition and to avoid two separate Commission proceedings on the same matter, it should make its intent known to those who would dispose of the petition

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If it's more expeditious to institute another proceeding separate and apart from this one, let's be practical and do it that way.

But I think ultimately, both petitions will have to be heard by the same presiding officer.

JUDGE BRENNER: And who do you think that would end up being?

MR. WETTERHAHN: I don't know. I don't know the Board's schedule. It indicated it had problems, and the Commission has previously taken issues and subdivided them.

JUDGE BRENNER: The Commission has, or the boards on their own have?

MR. WETTERHAHN: I guess it's at the instigation of the boards. I don't know how that worked. I'm not that familiar with cases.

JUDGE BRENNER: You are thinking of -- I think it's Catawba most recently. I'm not sure. And Shoreham. Both cases were at the board's instigations.

MR. WETTERHAHN: I would not be aware -- I'm not aware of how that began.

JUDGE BRENNER: It's not a secret. The notice is so indicated.

MR. WETTERHAHN: But if it were up to the Commission as LEA believes, and I think we believe that's so, I don't

think it would be inappropriate for the Commission to direct who had -- who should consider it, even if this Board had otherwise had jurisdiction over FOE's petition.

JUDGE BRENNER: If we were to hold that we had jurisdiction over FOE's petition, you would want us also to exercise jurisdiction over LEA's. Is that correct?

MR. WETTERHAHN: If the Board so rules, I would have to say it then has jurisdiction over LEA's, yes.

JUDGE BRENNER: There might be a difference between having jurisdiction if somebody seeks that jurisdiction as opposed to forcing somebody to come within our jurisdiction who is content to seek its remedies elsewhere.

2.717(b) recognizes that.

MR. WETTERHAHN: You are correct. But practically specking, I don't think that even if there were questions of jurisdiction that way, and they never sought it, I think the Commission could state, and I would have every reason to believe it would give this Board jurisdiction, or state that even though this Board had jurisdiction over the FOE petition, it should relinquish that jurisdiction.

It might suggest it and might order it. But I believe that would be the outcome. I can't see as a practical matter any other outcome.

JUDGE BRENNER: One problem I have with your approach deals with potential, and maybe it's just potential,

prejudice to LEA. That is if we were to find we had jurisdiction over FOE's filings before us, and for that reason exercised jurisdiction over LEA's filing, because it dealt with similar subject matter, yet the Applicant wants to preserve its right on appeal to argue that we had no jurisdiction, LEA could lose on appeal because we might have been wrong on jurisdiction.

Whereas, if we left LEA alone, it could follow a path by which there may be less question as to jurisdiction.

MR. WETTERHAHN: Well, the Commission could ratify the Board's jurisdiction. There could be many things that happen. And I think the outcome, if LEA does not seek to ask for the Board's jurisdiction would be the same

I can't see any way where the Commission will allow, as a practical matter, jurisdictional questions aside.

It's been known to put jurisdictional aside and to seek the practical answer. And the practical answer is to have one presiding officer take jurisdiction.

JUDGE BRENNER: I guess I would like to get the Staff's view on what we should do with LEA's filing.

MS. HODGDON: First of all, I would point out there was a similar situation in Susquehanna, which I don't believe anybody raised and on which the board found no jurisdiction. And the Commission -- the board found, the licensing board in the operating license proceeding declined

to assume jurisdiction over the materials license proceeding.

When intervenors in the operating license proceeding sought

a hearing on the materials license application, the

Commission --

JUDGE BRENNER: Why didn't the Staff cite that case in its brief?

MS. HODGDON: I don't know. It's an unpublished memorandum of the Susquehanna board. I can give you the cite on that, and I can tell you what the Commission did on it. And that's also unpublished.

JUDGE BRENNER: I'm not familiar with it. Mr. Wetterhahn, I don't recall it being cited in your brief.

Mk. WETTERHAHN: We did not cite that case.

MS. HODGDON: In that case, the Susquehanna board finding no jurisdiction, the Commission in an unpublished order, directed the chairman of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board panel to designate a licensing board to review the hearing requests, and if appropriate to hold a hearing.

The licensing board in the operating license proceeding was designated by the chairman of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board panel, to be the licensing board to hear the materials license proceeding. And that was -- I could give you those cites. None of these were published.

JUDGE BRENNER: Why did the licensing board hold

it had no jurisdiction? Was that a long decision by it?

MS. HODGDON: No. The reason -- these decisions go I think on the grounds of whether the 2.717(b) order has actually issued the order which would give the board jurisdiction. I know that the board in Perry held that didn't make any difference. But in Susquehanna they said there being nothing to tie it to, there being no subject matter related contentions, and there being no order under 2.717(b), they lacked jurisdiction.

JUDGE BRENNER: Do you think that's a correct analysis?

MS. HODGDON: Yes.

JUDGE BRENNER: Aren't there subject matter related contentions here on the basis of (a) the possible argument that the existing contentions are subject matter related.

And even if you disagree with that, (b) there are proposed late file contentions which are subject matter related.

MS. HODGDON: I think that most of the boards -the holding of most boards is that the contentions, the
subject matter related contentions would need to have been
already admitted. And therefore, the unadmitted contentions,
the proposed contentions that relate to the application,
the Part 70 application itself would not give a licensing
board jurisdiction, because they wouldn't be in the proceeding.

JUDGE BRENNER: What's the logic of that as you

see it?

MS. HODGDON: The logic is that unless it's related to something that's already in the proceeding, it rests with NMSS as 2.717 states before that last sentence.

JUDGE BRENNER: So you say you agree with the Susquehanna analysis, which incidentally is a different position than the position the Staff has taken in some other proceedings.

MS. HODGDON: I don't think so. I think that the cases are different. I think the cases are distinguishable.

JUDGE BRENNER: We should decide, based on whether the license is actually issued first?

MS. HODGDON: If it's the order that gives this Board jurisdiction, then the Board certainly can't exercise that jurisdiction until such time as the order issues.

JUDGE BRENNER: What order?

MS. HODGDON: The order 2.717(b). The order that allows the application to be amended.

JUDGE BRENNER: You mean the issuance of a license?

MS. HODGDON: 'The issuance of an amendment.

JUDGE BRENNER: What amendment?

MS. HODGDON: The amendment to SNM license 1926, I believe it is.

JUDGE BRENNER: The Part 70 license. In this case

you?

it's an amendment only because there is the pre-existing license for sources.

MS. HODGDON: Yes, it makes no difference. It may as well have been a license.

JUDGE BRENNER: So we should -- all right. If
you agree with the Susquehanna decision, the Staff would -is it correct that the logical extension of that, as applied
to this case would be that we should find we have no
jurisdiction, allow the parties to petition for a Part 70
proceeding as LEA has done, and now we could advise FOE to
do that also? And the Commission should receive the petitions
and direct the chairman of the licensing board panel to
appoint a hearing hoard to hear that Part 70 case.

Is that what you want us to do?

MS. HODGDON: That certainly is the outcome that would be consistent with Susquehanna. That is what's been previously done.

JUDGE BRENNER: If the same thing happened as happened in Susquehanna, we would be the very same board; correct?

MS. HODGDON: Yes. And subsequently they got it back and I believe found that it had no merit. I don't remember exactly how it came out.

JUDGE BRENNER: And that process makes sense to

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MS. HODGDON: It seems rather a circuitous way to do it. However, to exert jurisdiction at this point, to issue a stay for example, would seem to me that the Board would not have the jurisdiction to do that at this time, in anticipation of jurisdiction attaching by the issuance of that order.

JUDGE BRENNER: Can the Staff issue the license while there are petitions under a separate Part 70 proceeding pending before the Commission?

MS. HODGDON: I don't know whether they can or not. I think probably not, until there is some resolution of that. Certainly the contentions in this proceeding with regard to that would not have kept the order from issuing in one way or another.

I mean, it could be made not immediately effective for example. I mean, if there's no reason that this should not be worked out in some way.

JUDGE BRENNER: What could be made not immediately effective?

MS. HODGDON: The order amending the license to store fuel on-site.

JUDGE BRENNER: Was there a notice issued of proposed issuance of this license, or amendment to a license?

MS. HODGDON: No, these are not noticed. These Part 70 licenses, applications are not noticed. I don't

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know whether the license is -- the applications are certainly not noticed.

JUDGE BRENNER: I asked about a proposal by the Staff to issue such a license. They are not noticed either?

MS. HODGDON: I'm not sure. I don't believe so.

JUDGE BRENNER: Can you cite me the provision that exempts those from noticing?

MS. HODGDON: Well, I don't -- are you asking me whether they're prenoticed or whether they're just noticed at all after issuance?

asking, as you know, the amendment to the Atomic Energy Act, as applied to Part 50 amendments at least, changes the old dichotomy between prenotice and postnotice. And I'm asking — I don't want to a+ ach the wrong label to it, but I'm asking whether there is a similar noticing of Part 70 licenses to ship and store fuel for a commercial nuclear power plant.

I'm not talking about all Part 70 licenses, of which we know there are many, but as to that one category, whether the Staff notices its proposal to issue such a license in advance of issuing the license, which notice is not the same form as the old prenotice. That's why I don't want to use that label.

MS. HODGDON: You mean, insofar as it would seem to offer an opportunity for a hearing on prenotice? But 50-91 is specific, as you noted, to Part 50. And I really --- no, I really don't know.

JUDGE BRENNER: Well, if the Staff didn't notice

it, I think it behooves the Staff -- and I'm not saying the Staff is incorrect in not doing that. But I think it behooves the Staff to cite the provision to us, as to why it didn't have to notice it. Mr. Elliot, what do you want us to do with your petition?

MR. ELLIOTT: LEA does not seek the jurisdiction of this Board. We prefer that the Board refer the matter to the Commission for the appointment of a licensing poard to hear LEA's request for a hearing.

JUDGE BRENNER: And why do you want to proceed that way?

MR. ELLIOTT: We choose the form because we thought, first of all, that was the appropriate procedure to follow, and notice of hearing before this Board involving only Part 50 matters. Secondly, LEA perceived certain advantages to it, in following that course.

JUDGE BRENNER: Do you want to tell us what advantages?

MR. ELLIOTT: I consider that to be a matter of triviledge.

JUDGE BRENNER: You didn't file an application for stay with this petition, as I read the papers?

MR. ELLIOTT: That's correct. We are of the opinion that a hearing must be held on the petition prior to

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1 the issuance of any license.

operating licenses.

JUDGE BRENNER: What do you base that on?

MR. ELLIOTT: The section of the Atomic Energy

Act, which was cited in the heading to the petition. The

immediate effect from this provision, in the Atomic Energy

Act, applies only to operating licenses, amendments to

JUDGE BRENNER: Do you have a copy of that section?

I didn't bring the Act with me. We're talking about amended

Section 12(a).

MR. ELLIOTT: I have one copy.

JUDGE BRENNER: I'll give it right back to you.

I'm familiar with it. I want to check some language.

(Document handed to Board.)

In your -- although you do not seek a stay for the reasons you indicated, I see no claim in your petition stating LEA's position that a license cannot issue unless and until a hearing is held on your position.

MR. ELLIOTT: We think that follows just as a matter of law. We don't think we need to cite -- make specific requests for a matter that follows by operation of law, by virtue of that section of the Atomic Energy Act.

JUDGE BRENNER: Aren't you being pretty subtle, when you know there's a license application and you know the possibility of eminent issue of a license?

MR. ELLIOTT: No. I've read the Act and that's what it seems to clearly state to me.

JUDGE BRENNER: In looking at your petition, can you identify what would be the particular contentions?

MR. ELLIOTT: LEA is not in a position, right now, to delineate the contentions. I think our focus will probably be on the security plan for the protection of special nuclear material of low strategic significance.

JUDGE BRENNER: We didn't see any particular contentions in there, and you're confirming that they were not intended.

MR. ELLIOTT: There were no contentions listed because we considered Part 2 to be applicable, given some period of time within which to file contentions.

JUDGE BRENNER: Because it's a brand new proceeding?

MR. ELLIOTT: That's correct.

JUDGE BRENNER: Is there any practical reason why you couldn't have been in a position to file contentions at the time of your February 28 filing?

MR. FLLIOTT: Because we just received the request for amendment and the application. We haven't seen it before.

(Board conferring.)

JUDGE BRENNER: Mr. Anthony, am I correct that you want us to exercise jurisdiction over your applications?

MR. ANTHONY: I am very well satisfied with the

Board so far.

JUDGE BRENNER: That's not the consideration either way.

MR. ANTHONY: Yes.

JUDGE BRENNER: As long as we're all here, let's go ahead and talk about the particular complaints by FOE, since it has filed what it views to be contentions, setting aside -- for the moment -- what our views might be on jurisdiction.

Let me back up on jurisdiction for one moment.

If I ask the Applicant its views on this particular point,

I have forgotten your answer. And if so, I apologize in

advance. I understand that you don't want us to exercise

jurisdiction inconsistently. If we exercise jurisdiction over

FOE, you want us to deal with LEA's filing.

MR. WETTERHAHN: I think that's a little too
strong. I think I agree with the Board that a courtesty
copy to the Board does not give them jurisdiction, if LEA
does not seek its jurisdiction. What I would expect the
Board to do, as a practical matter, is inform the Commission
-- or whoever the Commission has delegated in this instance -who will be considering it, of the fact that there are two -there is a possibility of two separate presiding officers.

And I would expect that the Commission -- I would ask the Board to give that person its recommendation and then

the presiding officer -- hopefully the Commission, who has jurisdiction, would decide who has the final right to hear both contentions. So I don't think that the Board can enforce jurisdiction over LEA, because this matter has not been addressed to it.

But I would suggest there are practical things it could do to eliminate the dichotomy.

JUDGE BRENNER: Okay.

Mr. Anthony, what I would like to do is to put aside, for the moment, any of your contentions which might bear on your existing V(3) (a) and V(3) (b) and come back to that at the end.

Taking the original filing first, the February

23, 1984 filing, we want to discuss primarily the bases and

specificity of the contentions which would apply, be they

timely filed or late filed. And in addition, we want to talk

a little bit about the significance of the contentions, which

we view as being pertinent to the consideration of whether or

not the proceeding would be delayed. That is, if the proceeding

would be delayed.

The counterbalance is how significant is the issue?

And I won't get into detail, why we think that is inherent
in our view. It might or might not become important,
depending on how other considerations apply to each individual
issue.

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In paragraph two of the February 23 filing, you say that the new fuels -- I'm paraphrasing -- that the new fuels should not be shipped and stored at the site, because the Staff is in the process of -- as you say -- "ascertaining verification" from the Applicant that the plant has been designed and constructed in accordance with the regulations and the FSAR commitments.

And until that's been accomplished, no fuel storage can take place.

Now as I understand, that you don't have anything particularly wrong with the plant. You're just saying the Staff is still in that overall review process and it should be completed before new fuel is shipped to the site.

MR. ANTHONY: I have everything wrong with the plant, Judge Brenner. It was a violent shock to me to receive notice of this application. There have been citizens groups attempting to protect the public interest for years now ---

JUDGE BRENNER: Mr. Anthon, can you answer my question? What do you think is particularly wrong with the plant, as it might affect the new fuel storage, within your paragraph 2 there?

MR. ANTHONY: If fuel is to be moved into the building, I don't think the building has been proved to be safe to have fuel in it.

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JUDGE BRENNER: Now, if there were particular problems with the building, isn't that a contention that could and should have been advanced on a timely basis, several years ago? Because that concern is not related solely to the fuel. It would be a general concern that there's something wrong with the building, right?

MR. ANTHONY: Well, from what I've heard this afternoon, it appears that citizen advocates are supposed to be all-seeing, all-knowing, are supposed to anticipate and, my God, can we do that? The best we can do is to falter along and try to represent the public interest and fight millions of dollars worth of legal fees and tons of paper and still we are criticized because we haven't filed in time or that we haven't done what we're supposed to do to anticipate what PE is going to do.

And right now, I am anticipating are they moving in fuel today? I don't know.

my questions, and it's not going to help you if you continue not to answer my questions. Number two is, we just got a status report, in your presence, within the last helf hour, as to the status of the fuel, so let's stay with the pertinent comments and not digress.

I will give you one more chance to answer my question. If you have a particular problem with something

about the building, and that's all you've told me so far, isn't that something that would pertain -- whether or not they are going to ship new fuel on the site? And if so, shouldn't that have been the basis for a timely contention, several years ago?

MR. ANTHONY: No, I don't think so.

JUDGE BRENNER: Why not?

MR. ANTHONY: I don't think I could have known.

JUDGE BRENNER: What is it about the building, that you now know, is unsafe, and what's the basis for it, that you could not have known several years ago?

MR. ANTHONY: I didn't know about the cranes, for one thing, that they haven't been certified.

JUDGE BRENNER: That's another paragraph. We'll get to that one.

MR. ANTHONY: I don't yet know about the airlock. I don't know anything about the structures.

JUDGE BRENNER: Okay. You mentioned the crane. It's paragraph 3. Let's get to it, since you want to.

Your basis -- well, in paragraph 3. this is still of the February 23, 1984 filing, you say the NRC Staff has recently raised questions about the qualification of the Limerick overhead cranes for handling nuclear fuel, since they do not have the required load safety factor. And until that has been solved, no fuel should be brought to the site.

MR. ANTHONY: Right.

JUDGE BRENNER: In looking at the SER --

MR. ANTHONY: Excuse me. It's not the SER. The Staff is correct, that it's the other reference.

JUDGE BRENNER: It's the letter?

Once again, we don't have a copy of that letter before us. What is the reference?

MR. ANTHONY: The reference is to -- I believe it's the February 2nd -- I have it here somewhere.

JUDGE BRENNER: Can somebody lend us a copy of that letter?

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MS. HODGDON: I just want to be sure I have the right thing.

MR. WETTERHAHN: February 2nd.

JUDGE BRENNER: Well, tell us what it is that is that is the basis for this paragraph, Mr. Anthony, even if you don't have an exact date handy.

MR. ANTHONY: It's February 2nd, technical evaluation control of heavy loads.

MS. HODGDON: Phase II?

MR. ANTHONY: Page 16. "It was indicated that none of the lifting devices meet the requirements of ANSI N14.6-1978, because they do not use twice the normal design safety Tactors."

JUDGE BRFNNER: All right. The reference -- it's a letter dated February 6, to Philadelphia Electric from the Staff. It encloses a draft technical evaluation report for Limerick, which was developed by the Staff's consultants based on the responses of the Applicant to the Staff's generic letter, involving control of heavy loads, Phase II.

And it encloses the report entitled, Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants, Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2, Phase II. And it's prepared for the Staff under contract by EG&G Idaho, Inc.

That's one thing in front of us. The other thing that we have looked at, and I want to find out what the

the Staff for Limerick, Section 9.1.5 which deals with overhead heavy load handling systems. And it indicates that as part of long term item related to unresclved safety issue 836, control of heavy loads near spent fuel. And I emphasize the title, some further work need by done.

And that work should be done prior to startup,

after the second refueling outage. That section of the SER

in turn references an Appendix G, which is technical evaluation

report prepared for the Staff on that subject.

I had the excerpt from Appendix G at one time.

I don't have it with me now. But the open item referred to in the SER, which is dealt with in Appendix G involves a concern of the control of heavy loads on your spent nuclear fuel, as the title indicates. And beyond that, the concern was for items weighing over 10,000 pounds, as I recall.

And I would like to ask the Staff what the connection is between the reference in the attachment to the letter that Mr. Anthony just made, as compared to the SER item. And are we talking about something that is the same or different? And what is this item that is being talked about in the attachment to the February 6, '84 letter?

MR. WETTERHAHN: Mr. Chairman, I think that there's another section of this February 6th letter which is pertinent, and that is page 20, Section 2.3.3.c. EG&G

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conclusions and recommendations.

The first sentence reads, "The Applicant has met the intent for compliance for all lifting devices, except for the refueling shield and the Fuel Pool Stop logs."

Therefore, are we not only talking about conditions which are not applicable until after the second refueling. We're talking about loads which are not contemplated by the application.

As I recall the new fuel application, it calls for lifts of not more than six containers. Each container weighing approximately 1900 pounds. We're talking about 125-ton crane during the lifting. And you can calculate the safety factors from there.

So, even this February 6 document, even if it applied, there's no applicability to this contention. It doesn't support it.

JUDGE BRENNER: All right for the moment. Mr. Anthony, I lost the page that you referenced in that attachment. Could you give it to me again, please?

MR. ANTHONY: It is page 16. I would like to reference, too, the table on page 24, which reactor building overhead crane is noted non-conforming. Page 16 is paragraph 4, I believe.

JUDGE BRENNER: All right. Staying with the Applicant, what is that reference paragraph on page 16 all

about

MR. WETTERHAHN: As I understand it -
JUDGE BRENNER: It's the one that Mr. Anthony
quoted into the record before.

MR. WETTERHAHN: The Applicant does not -- since this crane was constructed before this, does not use a 200 percent proof load. It uses 150 percent. So we're talking about 125 times -- it doesn't use the 200 percent which is recommended by the standard which came after the construction of the crane.

But still, considering the case that we have here, that does not cause any problem, because the lifting weights are so small compared to the load capacity of the crane.

JUDGE BRENNER: What's a Fuel Pool Stop log for the record?

MR. WETTERHAHN: It's a piece of concrete and structural steel that I think separates the fuel pool once refueling has been completed, from the reactor area.

(Board conferring.)

JUDGE BRENNER: All right. And the pertinence to this report is the Fuel Pool Stop logs. I don't know how many there are. But that's something that would have to be lifted by the crane during certain operations; correct?

MR. WETTERHAHN: Let me give you the weights.

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JUDGE BRENNER: Is my premise correct? The reason that's mentioned is that something heavy that would have to be lifted by the crane during certain operations?

MR. WETTERHAHN: 120,000 pounds for the stop logs. JUDGE BRENNER: The refueling shield is a heavy item also, isn't it?

MR. WETTERHAHN: That's correct.

JUDGE BRENNER: Do you know about how heavy?

MR. WETTERHAHN: 100,000 pounds.

JUDGE BRENNER: Staff, we'd like to get your view on both the items referenced by Mr. Anthony in that letter, and also the SER items that I referenced in the context of the application for new fuel at the site.

MS. HODGDON: They don't seem to be related.

JUDGE BRENNER: I can't hear you, I'm sorry.

MS. HODGDON: They don't seem to be related to the concern about new fuel at the site.

JUDGE MORRIS: Ms. Hodgdon, I'm still a little bit in limbo. It appears, and we haven't had a chance to study the papers, but it appears from the discussion here that the overhead crane is not fully qualified for operation at Limerick. Is that correct?

MS. HODGDON: It's not fully qualified for all operations as I understand it.

JUDGE MORRIS: Is in qualified for some operations?

MS. HODGDON: It's apparently qualified for some operations, yes. But not for full operation. That is, full plant operation throughout the life of the plant.

However, my answer saying that it was not related to the storage of new fuel on-site, is that the Staff doesn't understand how this contention is related to the new information.

JUDGE MORRIS: Aren't the operations that are qualified defined somewhere?

MS. HODGDON: I believe so, in the SER. I mean,
I think that the reservation about the overhead crane is
stated in the SER, for which it's not qualified.

In other words, for what it's not qualified is stated in the SER, yes.

answers a little bit, and the written material which we just had a chance to glance at might very well infer what you say is apparently true. But, I'm trying to find out whether specifically, the movement of fuel as proposed by Philadelphia Electric has been reviewed by the Staff and approved by the Staff with the overhead crane in its current condition.

MS. HODGDON: The reason I don't understand your question is that I don't know whether you're asking me a question about the movement of the new fuel under the

license amendment, or whether you're asking me about the movement of fuel once the plant is licensed to operate.

So I don't know whether you're asking me about the overhead crane or about the reactor enclosure crane.

JUDGE MORRIS: I'm asking only about those activities which are addressed in the applications for the amendment, and the contentions based thereon. Namely, the lifting of the new fuel for this first operation.

Has this operation been reviewed and approved by the Staff for the overhead crane? Or are you telling me now that the overhead crane will not be used for this operation?

MS. HODGDON: I believe -- is that my understanding?

MR. WETTERHAHN: The overhead crane and the reactor
enclosure crane are one and the same, and they will be
utilized for this lift. This minor lift, may I add.

MS. HODGDON: I'm sorry. I misunderstood then, the contention with regard to that. I did not understand that this crane would be used in relation to the lifting of this fuel.

overhead concern -- concerns about the overhead crane were not the concerns -- in other words, under Part 50, this part of the Staff that had the concerns about the overhead crane was not communicating -- there were two separate applications

is the answer.

I don't know whether NMSS has reservations about the use of the crane to lift the fuel.

JUDGE MORRIS: That leaves me totally uninformed about whether the Staff has reviewed the use of the overhead crane for the movement of this fresh fuel for the first time operations.

MS. HODGDON: No. I do not know.

JUDGE BRENNER: Based on the status report you gave us before, the Staff is reviewing matters relating to this Part 70 license application on a daily basis, I believe you stated.

MS. HODGDON: I was told by the region that they had expressed certain concerns --

JUDGE BRENNER: Was my summary correct on the status?

MS. HODGDON: Yes, it is correct. However, our conversation did not include the overhead crane. And there is paper, a memorandum here which we gave to the Board which says what their concerns are. And I don't believe that it mentions the overhead crane.

JUDGE BRENNER: I don't have the memorandum in front of me. We did receive it from the Staff and I read it. I don't recall any mention of the overhead crane either. You can tell us if that proves -- if our memories

prove to be incorrect.

But for now I agree with you. It doesn't mention the overhead crane. A general question is, is the Staff going to issue safety evaluation of some sort, evaluating this amendment to the Part 70 license, which seeks permission to ship and store new fuel at the site? And if so, are they going to look at the proposed lifting of the fuel by the crane among other things? Look at it in the sense of at least commenting on it one way or the other.

MS. HODGDON: I don't know the answer to that, but I will find out.

Let me also add that the Staff's paper concerning these items merely addresses the fact that FOE did not state so that the Staff could understand it, what FOE's concern was. And not that there did not exist a concern or a basis for concern.

MR. WETTERHAHN: May I make two points, Your Honor?

JUDGE BRENNER: Let me just close the loop on that last one, then we'll get to you, Mr Wetterhahn.

We would like to know sooner rather than later
whether a safety evaluation is going to be issued of this
application, at some point in advance of issuing the application
at least as to all items completed at some point. Even if
there are still some items open. And if so, when that

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might issue.

MS. HODGDON: We will try to get that information this afternoon.

JUDGE BRENNER: I wanted to ask Mr. Anthony, what the items which he referenced and the additional items which we on our own added have to do with lifting the new fuel, given the concerns for spent fuel and the weights, relative weights involved.

What's the basis for the contention involving the lifting of new fuel weighing 10,000, say 15,000 pounds, as compared to concerns as to whether 125-ton crane has margin to lift 120,000, or 100,000 pounds? And the more pertinent concern as to lifting over spent fuel, which of course does not exist at this time.

MR. ANTHONY: If the crans doesn't meet the standards it's supposed to meet, I don't see how any regulatory body can approve it being used. For whatever weight it was being used for, it doesn't meet the requirements. To me it's another indication of something going wrong in the process.

We've heard quite a nice example this afternoon, of a new fuel vault that's in the drawings, that has never been even subjected to contracts. And this is what I'm getting at. This could be an as built drawing, handed to me, and the vault never existed.

JUDGE BRENNER: Mr. Anthony, you are just not answering my questions. I'm sure it's not purposeful on your part. Take my advice, if you don't answer the questions, we will infer that you don't have an answer, so it behooves you to try to answer the questions.

The concerns that we just went through, in the document that you referenced, and in the SER, which we referenced, appear not to be related to lifting new fuel in an area where there will be no spent fuel to worry about, particularly when the weights involved will be 10 to 15,000 pounds, as distinguished from weights in the neighborhood of 100,000 pounds and up. Particularly when the concern is listed in this document, as we read it, is that the margin for 125 ton crane may be only 150 percent instead of 200

percent.

MR. ANTHONY: It's obvious I'm not a mechnical person. If a stop log weighs 120,000 pounds, that would cause quite a smash if it dropped.

JUDGE BRENNER: And what is the concern, as to what it would smash?

MR. ANTHONY: Well, the rods are going to be stored on the floor. That crane picks up 120,000 pounds and, for some reason, it isn't qualified or isn't guaranteed that it can carry that. And it is moving over this fuel stored on the floor. I think there could be serious consequences if it lets go.

JUDGE BRENNER: Over the new fuel?

MR. ANTHONY: Right.

JUDGE BRENNER: That's a different concern than the one I understood earlier, from your written filings.

Mr. Wetterhahn, what heavy loads would be moved over the new fuel?

MR. WETTERHAHN: You realize that this is also new to me, and I don't want to make any misstatement before the Board. I will give you my present understanding.

JUDGE BRENNER: I'll give you a chance to check it, if you want.

MR. WETTERHAHN: I would appreciate checking it before I make the statement, but let me make a couple of

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general observations.

JUDGE BRENNER: All right.

MR. WETTERHAHN: I don't think, at least as far as this issue is concerned, a safety evaluation is necessary. Additional safety evaluation. The Staff has issued its Safety Evaluation Report with regard to the lifting of heavy loads. That has been in existence since August of 1983.

JUDGE BRENNER: Although it didn't include the items in the Attachment to the February 6th, 1984 letter, as I read the SER.

MR. WETTERHAHN: My reading may be wrong, but there are two phases. I don't think the fact that Phase 2 has not been completed would preclude or is saying that the Staff is precluding the lifting of the loads which must be lifted for the first two refueling outages. That's my interpretation.

But in any event, the Applicant was supplying information which didn't even have to be submitted until sometime in the future, in order to take care of matters as soon as it can. And it shouldn't be penalized for that.

In any event, the loads that we're talking about, and the application says at most six assemblies will be lifted, each let's say 2,000 pounds. That's 12,000 pounds --

JUDGE BRENNER: We've been through that. He changed the contention. The written contention, that we have been discussing up until his last comment states, as I read

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before, the NRC Staff has recently raised questions about the qualification of the Limerick overhead cranes for ha lling nuclear fuel. And we don't see any basis for any concern, with respect to the crane lifting the fuel itself. We've been through it. Mr. Anthony did not come with any remotely credible answer.

However, what he did come up with, and which we are now asking about, he's saying okay, the fuel doesn't weigh much. But are you going to lift anything very heavy over or near the new fuel, such as the reactor spent fuel stop logs, which he had never heard about probably prior to this discussion?

MR. WETTERHAHN: I'm getting advice from the back. JUDGE BRENNER: You'd better tell them to keep quite while I'm giving you advice.

MR. WETTERHAHN: I will. I would like to check that during the break.

JUDGE BRENNER: I understand you want to check that and we'll give you an opportunity. I wanted to note I think that was not what was stated in the written contention, but he stated orally and we asked you for the answer, your views on whether or not a safety evaluation is necessary. You can make those views now, do whatever you want to. We asked the Staff if they're going to do one.

It may be, that if something has already been

reviewed, the evaluation as to that one item can be no more than a reference to the fact that it's been reviewed. And the triangle may apply as to whether or not they can handle the loads for lifting the fuel, or a determination for some other reason, that a particular thing doesn't have to be evaluated.

But I don't know if they're going to evaluate the lifting of other potential heavy loads over the new fuel. You want to check it? That will be something they can check, too, at some point. Maybe there's no basis. Maybe none of these things get lifted while the fuel is out on the refueling floor. I don't know. Maybe the procedural stops, that are talked about in the SER procedural, or otherwise are in fact in place in the area where the new fuel is stored. I don't know that either, at this point, so we'll leave you with the question.

Ms. Bush, you have been here patiently. I don't think we're going to get to the City's contentions today.

I do hope to get back to LEA's contentions, since it's the subject of offsite emergency planning. You decide for yourself whether you want to be here.

MS. BUSH: I will probably stay, but call my colleague and tell him he doesn't have to return.

JUDGE BRENNER: That's up to you and your colleague.

Mr. Wetterhahn?

MR. WETTERHAHN: I noticed Mr. Romano is here.

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Perhaps we can just physically get his contentions before the break.

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JUDGE BRENNER: Welcome, Mr. Romano. I imagine you are here to give us the specification of your Contention

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VI-1. All right. Did you have any other purpose in being

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here today? Is there anything else -- is there anything

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you wanted to tell us orally today?

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MR. ROMANO: No, I don't think so.

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JUDGE BRENNER: All right. What we would like

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to do, later this week, is to get to some matters pertaining

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to your interests, including the specification that we are

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going to be receiving today, including the discovery disputes

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and including -- I hope -- the asbestos contention.

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MR. ROMANO: The what?

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JUDGE BRENNER: You filed a new contention relating

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to asbestos. We had asked the parties to talk with you and

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work in a mutually convenient time -- as long as it's this

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week -- not later than Friday morning. That's acceptable

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to us. So you work it out. And we also need some time,

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of course, to review your specification. And so we will take

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that today and we will see you at some time, later this week, at your convenience. Okay?

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MR. ROMANO: Yes.

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JUDGE BRENNER: We will break now and come back

at 3:45.

(Recess.)

Index

JUDGE BRENNER: Back on the record.

We left the heavy subject of overhead cranes before. Let me point out the obvious. The new concern is -- we heard earlier for the first time -- doesn't apply to fuel, so long as it's outside for the time period of some months that the Applicant contemplates. That states the obvious.

Going beyond that, did you come up with an answer to our question, Mr. Wetterhahn?

MR. WETTERHAHN: I'm still waiting to see the type of controls, with regard to moving heavy objects over new fuel. I'm sure it's going to come up later and I think it's applicable here, too. Let's take the worst case, to move a stop log or other heavy object over the new fuel, while it's on the refueling deck. It comes down and crushes the boxes. There's nothing at all which would one, cause a criticality accident or any way that there could be any offsite exposure. Or even onsite exposure.

It's a matter of fuel is expensive and that's the only conceivable problem. And this is a theme that we have stated throughout our answers. Even were the accident to occur, Intervenor-Petitioner here has never stated how there would be a health and safety problem. As I tried to point out, that new fuel is benign with regard to health and safety offsite dose.

And given the accident, I can't conceive -- and certainly the Intervenor has not shown how the health and safety of the public would be affected.

JUDGE BRENNED: You're right that it's going to come up. In face, we might as well get to it. It's pertinent to some of the things we've already discussed, although there are some other things more pertinent, and that's why we left what you just stated out of the discussion until now. It is pertinent.

Let's turn to the February 28th filing by FOE in which FOE states its concern that the fuel will be subject to natural hazards, such as tornados and electrical storms.

Fuel will be subject to the hypothesized railway car explosion. I guess we could add in the postulated pipeline accidents.

MR. WETTERHAHN: I would rather not add that in.

JUDGE BRENNER. Well, let's add it in for now.

The point I wanted to get to is it's Applicant's position that if all those things happen, there is no danger from any violation of the integrity of this new, unirradiated fuel.

Is that right?

MR. WETTERHAHN: Even if the integrity of the inner and outer containers were violated, there is still no health and safety problem.

JUDGE COLE: You say it's an economic issue, rather

than a health and safety issue?

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MR. WETTERHAHN: Yes, for new fuel.

JUDGE BRENNER: You were very careful in your answer. You said inner and outer containers of the -- I don't know what to call them. They are not casks. Shipping --

MR. WETTERHAHN: They are shipping containers which are qualified to the same requirements, as far as normal transport, hypothetical accidents, as are spent fuel casks. Excuse me, the same drop test, the 30 foot drop test, et cetera, as fuels. The same kind.

There's a 30 foot drop test. There's an immersion test. There's dropping on a pin, which are similar to spent fuel casks.

JUDGE MORRIS: Mr. Wetterhahn, when you say there's no health and safety question, what standard do you have in mind to make that decision?

MR. WETTERHAHN: Initially, I'm talking about health and safety of the public. That is offsite dose. There's absolutely no chance and I don't believe that there's any chance of any dose, even in the immediate vicinity, under any conceivable circumstances.

JUDGE MORRIS: Are you saying absolutely zero dose or are you saying something like Part 20 limits, or some fraction of Part 20 limits?

MR. WETTERHAHN: I don't think it would even

approach Part 20 limits.

JUDGE MORRIS: I assume, in that answer, you are postulating crushing of the fuel itself. Is that correct?

MR. WETTERHAHN: Yes.

JUDGE BRENNER. Is it fair to say the Staff took, in essence, the same position in its answer?

MS. HODGDON: Yes.

JUDGE BRENNER: Is that the type of thing that might be discussed in an evaluation by the Staff of the application?

MS. HODGDON: By application do you mean in response? I'm not sure that that's normally done. However, I think it's well known what the conditions are for not causing criticality.

JUDGE BRENNER: We're not talking solely causing criticality. You heard the exchange before.

JUDGE BRENNER: Do you know if that's going to be evaluated, in any written evaluation issued by the Staff as part of its review of this Part 70 license amendment application?

MS. HODGDON: Yes, and other accidents --

MS. HODGDON: I will make it a point to find out this afternoon exactly what will be evaluated by the Staff in its review of the Part 70 amendment application and report back tomorrow or later today, if possible.

JUDGE BRENNER: We'd also be interested in the timing of any such evaluation, as compared to the timing of any potential issuance of a license.

MS. HODGDON: I will report on that also.

JUDGE BRENNER: Mr. Wetterhahn, there's something I meant to ask you at the outset. Why is the fuel going to be stored outside for -- obviously when it first gets onsite, it has to be outside for some finite period of time. But why for several months?

MR. WETTERHAHN: As I understand it, it will not be ready for inspection -- it's not longer a matter of several months. I think it's a matter of four or five weeks now. And I believe there is some minor construction going on. It was felt better to keep it outside until they are ready to begin the process of taking it out of the containers, examining it and then putting it in the spent fuel pool.

JUDGE BRENNER: Why not just hold off on receiving it until the facility is ready to put it inside?

MR. WETTERHAHN: It's an economic matter.

JUDGE BRENNER: In terms of any potential stay considerations, as the only reason?

MR. WETTERHAHN: Yes, sir.

JUDGE BRENNER If we found that some of these contentions had any validity, with respect to the fuel being

outside -- that's a big if at this point -- given what you have indicated the consideration is, is it more efficient to just change the proposal and not store the fuel, for any length of time, outside as distinguished from litigating such contentions on the merits?

MR. WETTERHAHN: I would have to look into it.

It depends on what the Board means by outside. If it means inside a safety related structure -- I would have to look at it. Of course, we would examine that as an alternative.

Certainly if we could put it someplace inside and alleviate eight contentions, we would certainly do that.

JUDGE BRENNER: Well, as you propose it not, you would keep it outside and then move it inside to the refueling floor, correct?

MR. WETTERHAHN: Yes, sir, on a piecemeal basis.

JUDGE BRENNER: Right.

MR. WETTERHAHN: Enough to keep -- enough to have the people be able to inspect it and channel it on an efficient basis.

JUDGE BRENNER: But that doesn't take several weeks, does it? The reason for the several weeks is because of construction activities, right?

MR. WETTERHAHN: It's also, as I understand, a delivery problem. It takes a while, once you begin the process, to receive all the fuel. So it's a matter of

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Stockpiling it as it is received. You just don't call the General Electric Company and say deliver all these burdles. There are a number of truckloads involved. They do it over some period of time. And this is the period of time which would allow the beginning of storage and then the checking out of the fuel on a routine basis.

JUDGE BRENNER: But you don't have to leave the first arrivals outside until the last arrivals get there, before you can move it inside, isn't that correct?

MR. WETTERHAHN: There are many other considerations,

I understand, which can be adequately addressed for outside

storage. I think this is also a matter of Staff review.

Okay? The Staff has said if you want to receive these things on the schedule that you are proposing, we don't have time to complete our review as to the additional requirements inside. And therefore, in effect, has said store it outside.

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JUDGE BRENNER: But you were proposing to store it outside as early as the initial application in June '83.

MR. WETTERHAHN: That was an alternative available to the company. Again, we don't believe cutside storage causes any problem, or is unique to the Limerick plant.

JUDGE BRENNER: I know that's your position. But we're taking it beyond that for the sole purpose of discussion at this point.

And I didn't understand your last reason that it was being stored outside for some extra length of time beyond that then might otherwise be necessary due to the Staff's purposes. If as far back as June '83 when you had no reason to know what the Staff's review schedule problems might be, you indicated it would be stored outside for four months.

MR. WETTERHAHN: It's a matter of scheduling the activities. Again, you want to leave yourself some alternatives. Yes, if some of the final things that are happening are happening on the refueling floor, you want to leave an alternative available.

These take up a lot of area. There are 764 bundles, which take up a lot of area. Therefore, prudence dictates that you at least have an area ready that will store all of them, if and when they are delivered.

I'm not saying it couldn't be done. But it

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probably was looked at and found as the most efficient way to do it, and yet meet all the Commission regulations.

JUDGE BRENNER: Incidentally, I multiplied the description of the number of piles in the configuration of the shipping containers and did not get 764 bundles of fuel exactly, on the assumption that there would be two bundles per container. But maybe my assumption is wrong. But it was close to 764 I will grant you that.

Is it two bundles per container?

MR. WETTERHAHN: Yes. Some piles may not be quite as high. The final ones.

But there will be 764 eventually. That is the correct number.

JUDGE BRENNER: Including spares?

MR. WETTERHAHN: There are no spares planned.

JUDGE BRENNER: All right. You say there's no basis for any concern that there would be any radiation danger from a violation of the integrity of the new fuel. What would you say to the possible argument that here Mr. Anthony has identified some phenomena, which we know could take place because they are analyzed in terms of the safety of the plant. That is tornados, the railway car accident. And he would also add his postulated pipeline accidents to his contention.

MR. ANTHONY: Let's not forget earthquakes, please.

That's not in there.

JUDGE BRENNER: Well, I've forgotten it because it's not in here, so let me finish this discussion. And that would be enough of a basis for him to say these phenomena exist. But you haven't analyzed it.

And if it's true that there's no basis for any belief that there would any health and safety danger, as distinct from economic problems with the fuel being affected by such phenomena, shouldn't the Applicant show that there is no basis, as opposed to just sitting back and saying, FOE has not shown the basis?

MR. WETTERHAHN: I believe that -- I don't think one can equate the things that you look at for operation with the storage of new fuel. I don't think that you can attribute the fact that there is an inventory buildup of fission products, which has the potential to cause an accident. That is what you're looking at in operation.

We have unirradiated fuel. I don't think this
Board has to turn its mind away from the laws of basic

physics and the way that these reactors operate. The fact
that without a startup source, you can't get a fission.

The lack of -- the lack of any problem is inherent in the Commission's requirements regarding the fuel storage.

This fuel, as I pointed out in my response, this fuel can be handled. It is not required to be underwacer. There are

no fission products. There's a criticality analysis. I believe the Applicant has borne its burden of proof with regard to this matter.

I don't think we have to start and reanalyze the laws of physics. As an example, there is a supposition that the overhead electrical wire which could somehow break would cause a criticality event is somehow ridiculous. I think the Board can recognize these facts, in looking at this new fuel analysis.

JUDGE BRENNER: All right. What about theft and sabotage, which Mr. Anthony, on behalf of FOE mentions in one sentence? This is in the February 28, 1984 filing, the last sentence of the numbered paragraph number, the fuel will be at risk of theft and sabotage since PECO does not have sufficient safeguards in out-of-doors storage.

MR. WETTERHAHN: Without getting into the -- I think that's a general assertion without foundation. He has shown no qualifications, not shown any expertise, or not given any indication as to why this is so.

We are in a fenced off area, and security will be provided.

JUDGE BRENNER: I guess we'd like to know what the Staff, if anything, looks at with respect to theft and sabotage also for this license application. As long as your going to make the inquiries, Ms. Hodgdon.

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Mr. Wetternahn, I think I interrupted you. I didn't mean to.

MR. WETTERHAHN: There is a plan for the protection of this fuel, which is not -- which is indicated in the application but has not been forwarded, which does meet the requirements of the Commission.

Again --

JUDGE BRENNER: I thought that was the case, but I didn't want to supply it of my own knowledge. I wanted to get the confirmation from the Staff.

MR. WETTERHAHN: There is the page which physically recites that fact. That it is omitted from both the 1983-1984 version.

JUDGE BRENNER: It's outside, but it's within the security area is what you're saying.

MR. WETTERHAHN: There is a special security area for this fuel. It is not the same security area as for operation.

JUDGE BRENNER: And each container weighs 1900 pounds, you say? Or is that each rod?

MR. WETTERHAHN: 1865, 1900 pounds.

JUDGE BRENNER: Jumping to FOE's other filing,
February 23rd filing, item 4, Mr. Anthony on behalf of FOE
says you need an approved off-site emergency plan before you
can do this. As I understand the answer, of at least the

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Applicant as I recall, and maybe the Staff also, the position was you did not need an off-site emergency plan for low power license. Ipso facto, you certainly don't need one to ship new fuel on-site in advance of a low power license.

Is that right?

MR. WETTERHAKN: That, in addition to the fact that Part 70 for this type of application does not call for such an off-site emergency plan.

JUDGE BRENNER: I think you referenced a particular section of Part 70. And I don't have it before me. Could you give me that again?

MS. HODGDON: We did.

MR. WETTERHAHN: I think it was the Staff.

JUDGE BRENNER: Could you give me that please, Ms. Hodgdon?

MS. HODGDON: 10 CFR 70.22 and 70.23 lists the types of facilities for which physical security plans are required. And this type of license -- for this type of license it's not required.

70.22(i).

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JUDGE BRENNER: I guess I don't see a capital I or a Roman I for 70.22.

MS. HODGDON: We have a footnote 3 there. 70.22 lists the types and applications that require emergency plans to be in place before a license can be issued.

JUDGE BRENNER: You're talking about (i)?

MS. HODGDON: Yes, I'm talking about i. I'm not sure which that is. I'll look it up.

JUDGE BRENNER: We'll look at the section. I don't think that section applies to what we're talking about, but I'll look at it more closely later.

MS. HODGDON: The point is that it doesn't.

MR. WETTERHAHN: By its absence.

MS. HODGDON: The point is that it doesn't, yes, because all Part 70 licenses that require emergency plans -excuse me, as a physical security, I meant emergency plans, are listed and this one isn't. And therefore, it doesn't.

JUDGE BRENNER: I see. Thank you.

MS. HODGDON: It is i, little i, like "h, i."

JUDGE BRENNER: Mr. Anthony, Staff and Applicant argue that you haven't shown any basis for belief that anything unsafe could happen to new fuel, given the physical nature of new fuel, ir on which we can take notice as a known physical fact. And you have not shown anything otherwise.

MR. ANTHONY: Well --

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JUDGE BRENNER: They're willing to smash the fuel open, hypothetically of course, and say nothing is going to happen.

MR. ANTHONY: Of course, there's the question of disintegration of the cladding outdoors --

JUDGE BRENNER: They're willing to break the cladding open and they'll say there's no health and safety danger.

MR. ANTHONY: And I don't know how much uranium oxide dust comes off from fuel. I do know the Supreme Court has made a decision recently, which granted relief to Karen Silkwood's family. And it wasn't for nothing. was handling fuel.

JUDGE BRENNER: She was handling plutonium.

JUDGE COLE: That's a different material.

MR. ANTHONY: But maybe --

JUDGE BRENNER: Do you understand that? She was handling plutonium in a fuel fabrication facility. It was a weapons facility.

MR. ANTHONY: Well, the Supreme Court has broadened that to include liability for all companies that handle radioactive materials, as far as I know.

JUDGE BRENNER: I don't understand how that relates to the point of what is your basis for us to believe that there

is any health and safety danger from new unirradiated fuel, uranium oxide.

MR. ANTHONY: Well there are many references to protect this fuel to criticality in this application.

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JUDGE BRENNER: That's right. You don't want it to get critical outside.

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MR. ANTHONY: That's why they have all these precautions in here and they don't have them there for nothing either. There must be a possibility that it could get critical, or else there wouldn't be a discussion of it in this application.

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JUDGE BRENNER: So your argument is because the application discusses why it's not possible for the fuel to get critical outside, that there must be something to worry

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about? MR. ANTHONY: Something to worry about that there

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is the possibility of criticality. Now I'm not a scientist and can't tell you how that would happen, but I believe there is the possibility and I was interested to hear the attorney for the PE to specifically say it's a matter of economics. And what does economics for PE have to do with the possible injury to the public?

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JUDGE BRENNER: That's not an accurate characterization of the context in which he made that statement, Mr. Anthony, but I don't want to get into the debate. I just

want to note that. You're not being accurate. And when you are not accurate, whether it be purposeful or not, it leads to digressive discussions.

MR. ANTHONY: Economics was the word he used, was it not?

JUDGE BRENNER: That part is accurate. I said the context in which you then applied it was inaccurate.

MR. ANTHONY: And the application has a provision for \$1 million worth of insurance? Is that just to cover the cost of the fuel without any thought of the risk, I wonder?

I wonder. I'd like to know.

JUDGE BRENNER: I don't know either.

MR. WETTERHAHN: I can tell you.

JUDGE BRENNER: I don't think it matters for the determination of whether there's a basis for these contentions.

MR. WETTERHAHN: It's a requirement, in the Commission's regulations, that insurance coverage be received.

JUDGE BRENNER: All right.

MR. ANTHONY: Excuse me. Does that cover -- is that supposed to measure the risk of criticality?

JUDGE BPENNER: We're getting digressive here.

MR. MORRIS: Let me interrupt. Mr. Wetterhahn, is that health and safety insurance, or property damage

insurance?

MR. WETTERHAHN: I'm going to have to check it, but I believe it's in addition to the property. I believe that's the Price-Anderson type public liability insurance.

JUDGE BRENNER: Mr. Anthony, I guess one we didn't ask you about particularly, you talked about electricity activating the fuel, either electrical storms or the electrical cables on the site. What is your basis -- what do you mean by activation of the fuel and what's your basis for believing that electricity could do whatever you mean by activation of the fuel? It's a new one on us.

Did you just make it up, or did you have some basis for it?

MR. ANTHONY: Well, do I need to say again that I'm not a nuclear scientist?

JUDGE BRENNER: Did you just make it up or did you have some other basis for it?

MR. ANTHONY: I've seen electrical storms. I even worked in an electrical substation --

JUDGE BRENNER: You didn't answer my question.

MR. ANTHONY: I derived it from my past experiences. It isn't a scientifically based contention, in that respect. But I've observed natural phenomenons and I have observed high tension wires.

JUDGE BRENNER: You've observed electrical storms

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and high tension wires. And from that you derived the fact that fuel could be "activated?"

MR. ANTHONY: I know severe things can happen when lightning strikes high tension wires and possibly wires can fall and the towers can fall. So -- granted there's lots of protection for these high tension wires, and yet there is the potential.

JUDGE BRENNER: Potential of what?

MR. ANTHONY: And underground cables can explode, can short circuit and explode, so there is the possibility, just as inside the building with the dropping of a bar or -- even if they were transporting the cover of one of those reactor vessels, which is even heavier, there is a potential for electrical storm causing a severe weight to fall or an underground explosion happen. They are possible. They would bring an impact on the fuel.

JUDGE BRENNER: And then what would happen?

MR. ANTHONY: Well, that I don't know. I don't know what produces criticality. All I can go by is the fact that it is discussed here and is a possibility and is provided for by these safeguards in the application.

JUDGE BRENNER: Okay.

MR. ANTHONY: Supposed safeguards.

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JUDGE COLE: So you say in item number 3 of your February 28th letter, with disastrous consequences for the whole metropolitan area. These consequences that you refer to there would be those that might be associated with criticality of the fuel.

MR. ANTHONY: Yes. And as I say, I don't know whether there's any possibility of some kind of leakage from the fuel other than that. But I think that would be the principal risk. But there might be contamination in other ways.

And I see provisions in the application for the health officers to be testing this. I believe they are testing it for these low level radiations or whatever, the kind of contamination would come from the fuel itself.

JUDGE BRENNER: You wanted to say something, Ms. Hodgdon?

MS. HODGDON: I was going to say that I have copies of ALAB 334 which addresses what causes criticality. And I would give Mr. Anthony a copy, and also everyone else.

JUDGE BRENNER: We have a copy because you cited that one in your brief.

MS. HODGDON: I will give Mr. Anthony a copy. I think that will be useful.

(Document handed to Mr. Anthony.)

MR. WETTERHAHN: Let me catch up to a couple of

questions asked by the Board. In reverse order, easy ones first.

10 CFR, Section 140.13 --

JUDGE BRENNER: Excuse me, Mr. Wetterhahn. Ms. Hodgdon, in this sea of paper I can't find my copy. I have it somewhere. So if you have an extra one I'll take it.

MS. HODGDON. These are only part of it.

JUDGE BRENNER: We've read it.

(Document handed to Board.)

MR. WETTERHAHN: 10 CFR Section 140.13 does require the \$1 million, and it is, as I stated, financial protection.

JUDGE BRENNER: We know it's financial protection.

The question, and I'm not sure it's material, is whether

were the property or liability --

MR. WETTERHAHN: Financial protection means public protection. There's additional, yes.

MR. ANTHONY: A drop in the bucket.

MR. WETTERHAHN: There's additional --

JUDGE BRENNER: Mr. Anthony, I don't let other people talk when you're talking.

MR. ANTHONY: All right. I apologize.

JUDGE BRENNER: I'm sorry, Mr. Wetterhahn. Go

ahead.

MR. WETTERHAHN: I was complete on that. With

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regard to the question the Board asked before the break, regarding control of heavy loads, there's two aspects. As I previously noted, once the fuel has been inspected and channeled, it's stored in the spent fuel pool. There are interlocks which prevent the crane from moving over the spent fuel area with any heavy load on it.

That is really more designed to protect the spent fuel when generated. But it would protect that spent fuel and spent fuel racks. With regard to that spent fuel which is on the floor, administrative control would prevent heavy loads from being lifted over it.

JUDGE BRENNER: So the first part, the interlocks over the spent fuel pool, they're physical interlocks.

MR. WETTERHAHN: That's correct.

that I referenced before, which according to the SER was a longer term item beyond the second refueling that it was concerned with? Because I thought there was kind of a general discussion and it related to heavy loads. But I thought it discussed something similar to adminstrative controls of lifting heavy loads. Maybe my recollection is wrong.

What in particular is left open in the SER as related to lifting of heavy loads, which concededly the SER said need not be resolved until after the second refueling?

MR. WETTERHAHN: I believe it would be the need

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for any additional requirements after that time with regard to the lifting of two types of things. And that's all.

I believe that the Staff found it satisfactory to make all necessary lifts up to that point.

JUDGE BRENNER: And the two types of things are the two things referenced in the attachment to the letter we talked about?

MR. WETTERHAHN: Yes. But as I understand it, that would not prevent the crane from lifting these two things during the first and second refueling.

Let me just tell you. The crane is rated for 125 tons. Before you lift a load, a very heavy load, it will be tested to one-and-a-half times that value.

What else the Staff wants I can't tell you. But it will be tested and capable of lifting a load of 120,000 or 100,000 pounds before that load is lifted.

JUDGE BRENNER: It's difficult for me to tell from reading Section 9.1.5 of the SER what else it is that the Staff says need be done, although admittedly it says it doesn't need to be done until the second refueling outage.

And I can't tell whether the things in there are related to, or the same as the further margins for lifting the -- I guess it was the spent fuel shield -- not the spent fuel shield,--

MR. WETTERHAHN: The stop logs.

JUDGE BRENNER: Yes. The refueling shield and the Fuel Pool Stop logs. I don't know if the items in this letter are something else in addition to the SER, or whether they're the same things.

I don't know if we need know for purposes of deciding the contention on this Part 70 license. But that was a question I asked. You haven't answered it.

MR. WETTERHAHN: Anything more I would say would be speculative, and probably better ask the Staff what they meant.

JUDGE BRENNER: That's what I'm going to do.

I can't tell from reading SER Section 9.1.5 in the fine
manner in which it is written as to just what it is that
the Staff is talking about here, other than it relates to
heavy loads.

There's something else the Staff wants. They
don't want it until after the second refueling outage. I
don't know what it is. Admittedly, I did not read Appendix
G which is referenced. Appendix G to the SER very carefully.
I scanned it.

If you can enlighten, Ms. Hodgdon, I would be appreciative.

MS. HODGDON: Mr. Vogler has gone to inquire of the author what it means, of the project manager.

JUDGE BRENNER: Okay. I think we would like the

answer again. I don't know if it's material to our determination, but we would appreciate checking.

Mr. Elliott, I know you don't want us to reach out and assert jurisdiction over your pleading, and we may or may not agree with that view on your part. But in the event we don't, or in the event we are the very same board later after some very circuitous procedural steps are followed, given the discussion we have had, and the Applicant and Staff's argument that there is no basis for any concern with respect to public health and safety from even a postulated violation of the integrity of this new, unirradiated fuel, what is it that LEA is worried about? Because you have filed no contentions so we don't know.

What would be your basis for any health and safety concern?

MR. ELLIOTT: What we intend to do is examine the application and test it against the regulations and the regulatory guides. We haven't had an opportunity to do that yet. Counsel's assertion, you know, are subject to test.

JUDGE BRENNER: Do you have any present basis for believing those assertions are incorrect?

MR. ELLIOTT: The Staff's report that was served on the parties in the case that there is a problem with procedures. And it's my understanding that the security plan

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opportunity to see the security plan, so we're in absolutely no position at all to even comment on the adequacy of that plan.

JUDGE BRENNER: But you had no existing contentions in this case involving a security plan; correct?

MR. ELLIOTT: That's correct.

JUDGE BRENNER: Are you worried about the security plan only if the fuel is outside, or even if the fuel is inside?

MR. ELLIOTT: I'm not sure. I don't think we're prepared to create a distinction of that right now. What we intend to do is to review the plan against the requirements for protecting special nuclear material of low strategic significance, whether those requirements apply within the building or without the building, it's our intention to ascertain the Applicant's compliance with them.

JUDGE BRENNER: The reason I ask this, in anticipation of a potential argument that somebody who didn't want you to have a contention might raise. That if you are talking about physical security as it applied to the fuel inside, that's no different than a contention that you could have and should have raised at the beginning of the proceeding involving physical security of the plant. Which would be even more important if you had irradiated fuel in an

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operating facility. Either in the facility or the spent fuel pool or both.

MR. ELLIOTT: That is true. But our position is that given our filing as petition to intervene on a new application, the requirements with respect to late filed contentions are not applicable.

JUDGE BRENNER: Even as to contentions that could have and should have been filed at the beginning? As opposed to anything new keying from particular provisions of an application to store new fuel.

MR. ELLIOTT: If a person, if a member of the general public would come in and establishing standing to intervene in the SNM license proceeding, they would have had the right to file contentions applicable to that license amendment application.

LEA doesn't see why its participation will confer any lesser rights than what a general member of the public with standing would have in the circumstance.

JUDGE BRENNER: Well, you've got standing. The question is, now that you've got standing, what particular issue would you want to litigate and what's the basis for it?

You want to think about it?

MR. ELLIOTT: The point that you seem to be making is applicability of standard regarding late filed

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shouldn't have any less rights than a member of the general public coming in and seeking to intervene in that license application amendment proceeding.

JUDGE BRENNER: Okay. I didn't understand that.

The counter-argument to that is, that's right and we'd apply the same standards to them, too. They should have come in at the beginning of the operating license proceeding, if they were concerned about the security plan as applied to facilities inside the plant.

MR. ELLIOTT: It's not clear to me that the security plan applicable to Part 70 was required to be filed with the Part 50 operating license proceeding.

If in fact the security plans were identical, then I think you are correct. But the plan I am referring to is the Part 73.67 plan.

going to make is as follows: it may be true that the Part 50 license security plan, once it is adopted and implemented, would encompase any concerns with respect to anything inside the facility, whether it be new fuel, spent fuel, or fuel in the core. But at this point in time, in advance of the adoption and implementation of the Part 50 security plan, there's no reasonable assurance that a security plan, adequate to the new fuel, is in place.

MR. ELLIOTT: That may also be true.

JUDGE BRENNER: What was the provision you just cited, 73 --

MR. ELLIOTT: 73.67.

JUDGE BRENNER: You cited, in your petition, the Section 12(a) of the amended Atomic Energy Act, Public Law 97-415, for which the party has made the disadvantage. It was your copy and you have it back before you now, but my recollection of the Act and my recollection of my quick reading before -- which may be incorrect -- is that the wording applies to notice of amendment to an operating license. Is that the wording? You can give me the exact quote, if you want. I think you will find it in the first or second indented paragraph.

MR. ELLIOTT: The language states "In any proceeding under this Act, for the granting, suspending, revoking, or

amending of any license or construction permit, or application of transfer or control, and in any proceeding for the issuance or modification of rules and regulations dealing with the activities of licensees" et cetera. That section conferring the right to a license is applicable to all licenses under the Act.

The limitation, with respect to operating license is the following section, which talks about the power of the Commission to make immediately effective amendments to operating license.

JUDGE BRENNER: Yes. And how does the limitation read? That's the provision I had in mind?

MR. ELLIOTT: That section reads "The Commission may issue and make immediately effective any amendment to an operating license, upon the determination by the Commission that such an amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, notwithstanding the pendancy before the Commission of a request for a hearing from any person."

JUDGE BRENNER: Are you arguing that for a Part

70 license or amendment, the Commission cannot suspend
prenotification upon such a finding?

MR. ELLIOTT: My reading of the Act tells me that the power of the Commission to issue a license prior to the completion of the hearings, while there is a pending request for hearing, that that power has been expressly withheld from

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the Commission. The power granted is limited to amendments to operating licenses.

JUDGE BRENNER: If we were to agree with you legally, at this point, you are saying that if you were given time to file contentions with bases and specificity, as is required, what you want to look at is the physical security plan?

MR. ELLIOTT: That is one of the things we will be looking at.

JUDGE BRENNER: Well, what else would you look at if we were to find that there is no basis for believing that there is any public health and safety danger from violation of the integrity of the fuel by phenomena, such as the type talked about by Mr. Anthony, or any others, as long as the fuel is still within the control of the Applicant on the site?

MR. ELLIOTT: The other identified and more specific concern I can identify now is that the Commission's regulations require a monitoring system that Philadelphia Electric Company is seeking an exemption from. We have not yet seen the proferred justification for that exemption.

JUDGE BRENNER: Do you recall, offhand, what monitoring system that is? Or I can ask the Applicant if they know.

MR, ELLIOTT: I think I can give it to you.

JUDGE BRENNER: Do you have a reference in the

1 application?

MR. ELLIOTT: The system is required, by 10 CFR Section 70.24.

MS. HODGDON: (a).

MR. ELLIOTT: Thank you.

JUDGE BRENNER: Is that a criticality monitor that you're talking about?

MR. ELLIOTT: It's a monitor to determine a dose rate, whether it's limited to a criticality event I'm not certain.

JUDGE BRENNER: The heading of 70.24 is criticality accident requirements.

MR. ELLIOTT: The regulation requires that the monitor be in place. As I say, PECO is seeking an exemption, based -- I assume -- on the same arguments its counsel is making here. We have not had an opportunity to review the application to determine whether the exemption is appropriate.

JUDGE BRENNER: Well, there's a last sentence in 70.24(a), which may or may not apply, regarding the fact that such a monitor is not required when special nuclear material is being transported, when packaged in accordance with the requirements of Part 71 of this Chapter. But I won't get into what "being transported" mean or does not mean right now. Or what the requirements of Part 71 are.

Mr. Wetterhahn, is Mr. Elliott correct, that the

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Applicant, in one of these applications -- either the original or the amendment -- is applying for an exemption from the requirements of 70.24?

MR. WETTERHAHN: I can't recall specifically, but it's been my experience that most Applicants do ask for this exemption because of two reasons. First of all, when it is stored outside it is never removed from the shipping container and that provides the protection against criticality. Second of all, when it is being inspected there is a procedural limit, as stated in the application, to removing more than a certain number of elements from the shipping containers at once.

And that has been analyzed and shown not to present a criticality hazard. And on that basis, it is the usual practice to request an exemption from that part.

JUDGE BRENNER: And when it's in a spent fuel pool under water, by the express provisions of that section, criticality --

MR. WETTERHAHN: That criticality has been analyzed in the application, that the prevention of criticality — that is really the basis for the design of the spent fuel pool. It considers new fuel in its most reactive state and then analyzes to assure that it cannot achieve criticality.

JUDGE BRENNER: Does Staff know whether that statement, by Mr. Wetterhahn, is accurate?

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MS. HODGDON: Yes. And also, the Staff is aware -- knows, is aware that the Applicant has applied for an exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 70.24(a).

JUDGE BRENNER: Is that in the June 1983 application or the January 1984 amendment?

MS. HODGDON: It must be in the June because I read the January and don't find it. And in any case -
JUDGE BRENNER: How do you know it's there, then?

MS. HODGDON: Because I'm told that they have applied for it and I have read the one that I have, which is the January. Therefore, I think I'm allowed an inference that it's in the June. At least they have told me that it's been applied for.

They saw that outside storage and exemption from the monitoring requirement is -- has been granted to licensees who have applied for outside storage in the past.

JUDGE BRENNER: It's on page 13, over to page 14, of the June 1st, 1983 application. I don't have the January '84 amendment with me, but as I recall the format of that amendment, it's in a format that is cumulative. That is, it would include anything still applicable from the original application, plus any modifications by additions or deletions.

So if such application is still extant, it presumably should be in both documents.

MS. HODGDON: I will try to find it.

JUDGE BRENNER: Maybe, if they didn't change the section numbers in the June application, it's Section 2.2.6, entitled Exemption.

MS, HODGDON: It is there. It's on page 22. 2.2.6, Exemption.

JUDGE BRENNER: You want to be careful before you say something isn't in the document, right?

MS. HODGDON: Yes, I do. I read it and I was mistaken. The application is there.

JUDGE BRENNER: If we're going to rely on counsel's representations in this proceeding, those representations had better be more accurate in the future then they have been in the past. This is just a minor matter, but I want to make the point. We're not here engaged in idle conversation.

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All right, I think we have heard everything we can hear at this point. The Staff was going to check for information. You have?

MR. VOGLER: We have.

JUDGE BRENNER: All right.

Do you want to give it to us, Mr. Voyler? Let me get it from the person who talked from the source of information.

MR. VOGLER: I talked, with regard to your first series of questions, I talked to the responsible official in NMSS. And the answer, the broad answer, is yes they do conduct a safety evaluation. It will be a written review. They have already issued one review for storage outside the plant and on the site.

It was short and simple -- and I'm quoting him -- because, in their opinion, there is no safety significance.

They are now evaluating the unloading and the storage of the new fuel in the storage area and that will take a little bit longer. He said perhaps a month to a month and a half.

JUDGE BRENNER: Are we going to be blessed with a copy of this evaluation?

MR. VOGLER: Yes. Before the safety review is issued, it will be sent to the Office of the Executive Legal Director for concurrence by Staff counsel.

JUDGE BRENNER: I'm sorry. I thought you said

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one already issued for the outside storage.

MR. VOGLER: He said it's gone, but there are no safety significance. And I'm quoting.

The last thing he said --

JUDGE BRENNER: Let me stop you there. Is this another item that we have not received a copy of?

MR. VOGLER: Nor has the Staff.

JUDGE BRENNER: What's going on?

MR. VOGLER: I don't know. We'll get back on that.

JUDGE BRENNER: When was it issued?

MR. VOGLER: It may be internal. I don't know, but we can find out.

They do not notice, Judge Brenner, these matters because, in the opinion of the gentlemen I was talking to, there is no requirement that they be noticed.

JUDGE BRENNER: Well, that's nice.

MR. VOGLER: I'm relating the conversation.

JUDGE BRENNER: But you're the lawyer. I asked for this before. Is there a legal reference that you want to supply us, as to why there is no requirement to notice this?

MR. VOGLER: It must be in Part 70. We will find

it.

JUDGE BRENNER: All right.

MR. VOGLER: With regard -- well, I'm done with NMSS. I've talked to the Project Manager with regard to the

overhead crane, which was your second issue. The Staff will conduct another safety evaluation of the overhead crane and will publish that when the safety evaluation is completed.

If it is not completed before the operating license is issued, there will be a license condition presented,

governing its use.

In any event, the evaluation -- the safety evaluation -- of the overhead crane will not go beyond the second fuel load or Phase 2.

The letter that we discussed earlier today, publishing the results of the Staff's contractor for results of his investigation were put out for comment.

JUDGE BRENNER: One thing we asked about, and it might have been while you were already out, Mr. Vogler, I don't remember -- we looked at the SER that we referenced earlier, and this is the existing SER for Limerick, Section 9.1.5, Gverhead Heavy Load Handling Systems -- I. don't want to repeat the whole thing, Ms. Hodgdon can fill you in.

But the gist of it is, in reading that, we can't tell what it is the Staff is talking about in terms of what further need be done, even though we recognize the conclusion is that it isn't needed to be done -- whatever "it" is -- until after the second refueling.

MR. VOGLER: I'll find out for you.

JUDGE BRENNER: But if you can find that out tomorrow. I'm sorry we got to it after you went out for the initial inquiry. I had forgotten that we had that question coming up, or I would have included it in the same sequence for you.

We can't figure out precisely, in simple terms, what that section is talking about, other than the obvious subject of course of overhead heavy load handling systems.

I will note, as I did before, that it references Appendix G, which I read -- but not carefully. And maybe the answer is in there.

But I looked at the portion of Appendix G that purported to talk about an open item and I had trouble matching up exactly what was involved, other than 10,000 pounds or over. So what is it that the overhead handling systems don't have now, that the Staff wants them to have after the second refueling and --

MR. VOGLER: By the second refueling.

JUDGE BRENNER: Startup after the second refueling.

MR. VOGLER: Okay.

JUDGE BRENNER: And whether the items in the attachment to the letter, which was sent to Philadelphia Electric for comment, are the same items as raised in the SER. They don't appear to be. That is, the lifting of the shield and the stops, Spent Fuel Pool Stops.

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MR. VOGLER: What items were in the letter of February 6th?

JUDGE BRENNER: There were two items in the attachment. We have discussed what they are. I don't know if those are the same items that are of concern in the SER or if that is yet something else now.

MR. VOGLER. You also want to know where the report is on their review for the storage of the fuel? This is back to NMSS. I'm just touching base here.

JUDGE BRENNER: Yes, and if you can get a copy, we sure would like to see it. Maybe there is a telecopy here.

MR. VOGLER: And where is the requirement that no notice --

JUDGE BRENNER: That's for you.

MR. VOGLER: We'll find that out.

JUDGE BRENNER: The same question to the Applicant. We want to get that tomorrow morning, what the requirement is for noticing of proposed issuance of the license, or in this particular case amendment for a license being applied for here. There's got to be something somewhere that talks about whether it's required to be noticed in advance or not.

You've told me here that it has not been noticed. And I don't want somebody's opinion that it wasn't important.

I want the legal support for it.

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MR. VOGLER: I understand.

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JUDGE BRENNER: I'm not taking a position that

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that's wrong. I just want the legal citations.

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MR. WETTERHAHN: I want to research it further,

but I would draw the Board's attention to 16 CFR 2.103.

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JUDGE BRENNER: 2.103, I haven't the vaguest idea

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what that is.

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MR. WETTERHAHN: 2.103 is entitled action on applications for byproduct source, special nuclear material and operator licenses. And by excluding -- well, I draw the

Board's attention to that. We can discuss it tomorrow.

JUDGE BRENNER: All right. We will read it.

I have got, as you can see, the revised -- as of January '83 -- version of the regulations with me. I'm cognizant of the fact that we're talking about an area here that has been the subject of recent legislation and I believe action by the Commission, either by regulation or otherwise, in tersms of noticing of amendments as a general subject.

I'm not saying noticing of Part 70 amendments necessarily. We're talking about the Sholly Amendment and so on. So my version of the Regs and pre-existing section may or may not still be applicable in light of the present regulations.

MR. WETTERHAHN: Mr. Chairman, I would note, I

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have a loose leaf version put out by the Commission and it states the section was last changed at 47 Federal Register 57446.

JUDGE BRENNER: That's an old one. That's December '82 then. I've got that one included.

All right. But there may be other provisions involving the Sholiy Amendment procedure and Congressional action and the section 'a) of the Atomic Energy Act that Mr. Elliott cited.

All right. Give us a few moments at this time.

Does any party have another comment on the Part

70 argument so far, because subject to what we left for

tomorrow just now, we think we have heard it all.

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MR. ELLIOTT: In light of that, I'm just wondering whether or not my presence will be required tomorrow on this subject.

JUDGE BRENNER: We will get into the noticing requirement. We will do it without you if you are not here, but you may want to be heard. It is going to affect your argument more than anybody else's.

MR. ELLIOTT: My only problem is having to comply with discovery requirements in another aspect of this case.

I have answers to interrogatories that are due Friday, and every day that I am here is another day that I can't deal with that.

JUDGE BRFNNER: Which contention?

MR. ELLIOTT: On-site emergency planning.

JUDGE BRENNER: Have you worked out your specification or possible deletion of some of those contentions?

MR. ELLIOTT: That is a parallel process.

JUDGE BRENNER: We are going to take a few minutes right now. You were going to have the Applicant and the other interested parties receive that by the close of business Friday, is that the schedule now/

MR. ELLICTT: I'm not certain whether that was received date or mailing date. I hope it is a mailing date,

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because if it is a received date, I am already in trouble.

JUDGE BRENNER: I don't remember. I am not saying it is, I just don't remember, but most of our discovery dates were received dates. But, I don't remember what is involved here.

We are going to take a break for a few minutes.

I don't want to recess yet, we may come back and do nothing
but recess, but I am not sure yet.

We will make it ten minutes. Why don't you discuss what the considerations are of you getting that into the Applicant's hands on some day later than Friday. Say, Monday. Maybe you can work it out.

(Recess)

JUDGE BRENNER: All right, we are back on the record.

Go ahead, Mr. Anthony.

MR. ANTHONY: I just didn't want to leave the subject of -- we have discussed inside, with an accident of something dropping on the fuel. But I don't want it to be left out that there could be such an accident outdoors, and that could happen from, as I mentioned, an electrical tower falling, it could happen from an airplane crashing. And if that happens, the containment, inner containment could be fractured, uranium oxide dust could be released to the community. And it is not a slight thing.

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Right in today's paper, there is a reminder of the uranium tailings that are poisoning people every day. So this is a really live public hazard.

JUDGE BRENNER: All right.

We are prepared to make a partial ruling now.

It is going to be subject to certain other things which are affected by the information we have asked the parties to come back with tomorrow.

First of all, we think we have jurisdiction over contentions which are related to or affected by the Part 70 application -- that is the case whether the contentions are old contentions or whether the case is as to new-filed, late-filed contentions. And it doesn't matter for purposes of 2.717(b) jurisdiction applying common sense to the purpose of that jurisdiction, whether the contentions are early or late, or whether the contentions are filed when the application is filed, but before the license issues, or as the license is imminent, or after the license issues, which of the contentions are valid. Only causes the unnecessary procedural problems for every ody of stay considerations.

The bases for jurisdiction are the two cases we cited in our preliminary order, the Diablo Canyon Commission decision CLI 76-1. I won't repeat the cite, it is in our written order. But it is Footnote 1 of that decision as applied by the Zimmer Licensing Board, 10 NRC 226 1979. The

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case which Mr. Wetterhahn and I are familiar with. And that is a 1979 Licensing Board decision.

We have looked at the Susquehanna unpublished decision dated May 20, 1981. Based on our recollection -- and our recollection may be faulty -- but based on our recollection of what Staff counsel said the case stood for, we don't believe that was an accurate description of what the case said, in the one paragraph on page 29 of that unpublished decision dealing with that situation.

Regardless -- well, let me read what that decision says, and our view is we are not going to follow it if it stands for what thee Staff said it stands for.

But it says:

"The Applicant has a pending application for a license under Part 70 to receive, possess, store, inspect and package for transport nuclear fuel bundles/assemblies. There is precedent in the Commission's proceedings for Licensing Boards to assume jurisdiction over this application once it is filed, and there seems to be ample justification where the receipt of these unirradiated fuel bundles/assemblies and their storage on the refueling floor of the reactor building relates closely with one or more contentions."

I will stop there for a moment on the quote. We

agree with that, and we think that is consistent with what we just said. The case cites no precedent, and we have cited the precedent we are relying on. Given the March 1981 date of the decision, we will assume that that Board had in mind the very same precedent.

The paragraph in the Susquehanna unpublished decision goes on to state:

"However, imasmuch as the grant of an operating license negates the necessity for Part 70 license, the Board declines to assume jurisdiction of this proceeding at the present time. At present the Board intends to concentrate on expediting the hearing process on the operating license application."

Board had in mind. If it was true that the Part 70 license issuance was imminent, then we don't understand the Board's reasoning there because it is a non sequitar. If they say that jurisdiction should be affected where it affects — in its words "relates closely with one or more contentions," then the fact that it is going to concentrate on the Part 50 proceeding is okay, only if you assume the Part 70 license isn't going to issue until after its adjudication.

If that was the factual circumstance there, then that paragraph makes sense and it is consistent with our

ruling.

If that was not the factual circumstance, then we decline to follow the ruling because we don't follow the logic of it.

The Applicant has also cited the Perry

Licensing Board proceeding -- incidentally, it has been

published. The Applicant published the slip opinion version.

The Perry decision is in the matter of Cleveland Electric

Illuminating Company. It is a Licensing Board decision,

18 NRC 61, issued July 12, 1983, LVP 83-38.

I am paraphrasing now -- the Board made the same point I attempted to make orally here, that in terms of the jurisdictional question it makes no difference whether the Part 70 license has merely been applied for, or has issued.

The case also holds that -- all right, that takes care of the jurisdictional point.

In terms of whether the contentions are latafiled or not, the Perry case states that it would consider
the late-filing criteria as to new contentions coming in,
stimulated by the application for the Part 70 license,
because it should have been known by Intervenors from the
beginning of the case that new fuel would have to be stored
on the site at some point.

The case also went on to discuss and analyze

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whether or not there was any new material in the application of the Part 70 license which would not have been apparent as a matter of general intuition, which Intervenors should have had at the beginning of the case.

We think that it is debatable whether the reasoning of that Board is fully correct, even as to the general proposition. While it may be true that an Intervenor can generally, and should generally assume that new fuel will be shipped to the site and inspected and prepared for use at some point in the preparation of the facility if an operating license is issued, it is not necessarily true that an Intervenor should assume at the beginning that that permission would be granted in advance of a grant of a Part 50 license, at least a low-power license.

So, an Intervenor should not assume when it reads the FSAR and the reviews that will be conducted, that new fuel will be shipped to the site in advance of the completion of those reviews.

So we would disagree with Perry on that aspect of the point.

Number two, even if Perry is correct as to that general point, it, as we said, keyed on whether there was new information in any license application.

In this case, Perry certainly does not go this far,

and we would not go so far even if we agreed with its general proposition, as to say that an Intervenor at the beginning of the case should further assume that new fuel would be stored outside for some extended period of time, of at least weeks and maybe months prior to being moved inside.

Now whether or not that creates any concerns is another matter. We are merely talking about the source of a contention.

Furthermore, another reason we would not follow Perry, even if we agreed with it, as applied to this case, is because we think it was a violation of our standing order in this case, for the Applicant not to have served its June 1983 application on the Board and the parties.

That application, had it been served and received, would have started the clock running for contentions to have been filed which deal with outside storage, at least, from June 1983.

Our order was broad enough to include matters related to the licensing of Limerick facility, and we this this is arguably -- reasonably arguably a matter related. And even if one were ultimately to conclude it is not related on a jurisdictional question, even though we decided otherwise, it was certainly a close enough question where it was material that should have been served.

The consequence of not serving that material is later being able to claim that a party is late. We consider it a serious violation of our requirements, particularly since the precedent exists which Applicant's counsel, individually and as a firm is well familiar with in terms of what is related.

We, nevertheless consider it a crabbed interpretation at best, especially given the discussion that the determination was consciously made.

We expect any close calls -- and I don't have to cite the precedent that exists on the Commission for that -- but any close call as to whether matters are related to the licensing of this facility, those documents wher there are external correspondence; that is applications to the Staff, correspondence from the Staff, between the Staff and the Applicant would be served immediately on the Board and the parties.

Let me digress for a moment. The Applicant indicated other areas in which it had not been serving correspondence. We cannot tell from the description what is in it, but it certainly is arguably relevant to the licensing of this facility, and should have been served. And, I don't know how much is involved, but it should be served in some fashion. Now, if it is a lot of material,

perhaps the compensation can be a listing and description of what it is. If it is not a lot of material, perhaps it should be the material itself.

We will let the Applicant judge in the first instance as to how it wants to catch up on the matters. You mentioned operator licenses, which certainly sounds pertinent to the licensing of the facility.

And you mentioned indemnity provisions, which certainly sounds pertinent to the licensing of the facility.

We do not draw the line as to what might clearly be within an admitted contention, or within our jurisdiction. We went over the reasons long ago and you have now got one of the reasons in front of you. Where something is arguable, we didn't want to find out late in the case that an Intervenor had an interest in it, even if we later find that that interest should not be dealt with for one reason or another -- be it jurisdiction or merits.

Here we are in that very situation we tried to avoid because our order was not followed.

Enough about that.

Staff, you better straighten out your Part 70 operation, and any other operation of the Staff in terms of serving correspondence on the Board and the parties, presumably through Staff counsel, but whatever mechanisms

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you desire. We care not one whit as to the bureaucratic separations within the Staff. As far as we are concerned, the Staff is one body, one party before us.

Staff has to straighten out its own internal communication problems.

For the reason that the application was not served, and that Intervenors, including FOE and LEA had a right to rely on the reasonable proposition that anything pertinent to the licensing of this facility, relevant to the licensing of this facility would be served to them, they had no obligation to constantly visit the Public Document Room to see if anything new had been filed that week.

Incidentally, I didn't ask if the application has even been filed in the Public Document Room because it is not pertinent now, given our determination.

If it had not been, you have got even less of an argument. That is, the Applicant has even less of an argument.

If we were to apply the late-filed criteria to these contentions under the Staff's approach -- that is, even though the document should have been served, that goes only to the good cause, and we should nevertheless apply the other factors. We would find against both LEA and FOE on all their aspects, because even though they have good cause for the late filing, they have the other factors on

balance that would weigh against them.

I won't go through them all, but basically it would be; ability to contribute to the record, and whether or not it would delay the proceeding. And, we would add, as counterbalanced by anything significant.

On our own, we see nothing of significant concern in the allegations that would balance that. But, that is not the main basis for our ruling we pointed out in case anybody wants us to know.

However, it is our view that the late-filed contention criteria should not apply in a situation where our orders were not being complied with. This does not require a finding of willfulness on our part, and we make no such finding in terms of what legal definitions might exist for willfulness, and for your benefit I want to make that very clear, Mr. Wetterhahn. We are just talking about the factual circumstance that it was not filed.

We are not inquiring into anybody's state of mind at all. It is just our view now that it should have been and was not for the reasons we indicated.

But, given that, we would not apply the late-filed criteria, we would just deal with them as timely contentions.

Thatpart is not going to be important, because when we look to the contentions, even considering them timely contentions -- and of course, some of the contentions are the

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existing contentions as FOE would now have us apply them to the situation of the fresh fuel.

We see no bases at this time -- and it is going to be subject to certain things we will get to in a moment. But, we see no bases whatsoever -- staying primarily with your allegations, Mr. Anthony--for any reasonable belief that there, A, would be a potential for criticality. Just that potential for criticality when you have new fuel being stored in the fashion it is going to be stored in both outside and inside, to get critical is just not a credible contention.

So, there is no bases whatsoever, and we so find now.

In terms of other possible safety implications involving radiological releases caused by damage to this low enriched uranium oxide fuel pellets within the unirradiated new fuel rods of the type proposed for Limerick. We also see no bases for that. And all of the contentions depend on some harm being caused by this damage to the fuel.

However, we don't want to stop there, we want to go further. We see no bases set forth by you. In argument you have set forth no bases. But, we want to, before we rule definitively on the absence of bases -- and we are still at the bases stage -- we want to go further and make very sure our ruling is correct. The agency precedent is

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nothing different, our own expertise -- I speak of that collectively, and in fact excluding myself on this Board -- is that it is not -- that there is no credible basis for assuming any harm to the public from any such releases.

Nevertheless, we want to get affidavits from the Applicant and the Staff on that point. Again we are talking about bases. The contentions are not admitted, we are not talking about summary disposition.

We want to make sure we are correct. We think we are correct, we want to make sure.

The affidavits would be to discuss whether or not there would be any violation of the regulatory requirements both onsite and offsite for radiation releases. We are not talking about doses, we don't want a health effects analyses. You have got the releases in the regulation, I guess Part 20 and Fart 50 are the primary ones -- Part 100, I mean. I won't state definitively whether those are them or not, whether Appendix I is relevant or not. I haven't considered it. You can consider it. Arguably not. We are talking about an accident here. But I will let you determine that.

In any event, what the affidavit should address is whether or regulations -- there is a credible potential for violat the regulations applicable to onsite and offsite releases from an accident in the event

of an accident to the low-enriched uranium oxide fuel pellets in the unradiated new fuel rods for Limerick from any credible accident.

Now we have excluded criticality. You don't have to address criticality. That was based on our own knowledge, as well as the Commission precedent -- I guess it is particularly Appeal Board precedent cited by the Staff in the Diablo Canyon proceeding, which is ALAB 334.

Do you have the cite, Ms. Hodgdon?

MS. HODGDON: 3, NRC 809, 818, 819, 1976.

JUDGE BRENNER: Thank you.

We would give FOE and LEA, if it wishes -although so far we are primarily dealing with the area of
FOE -- an opportunity to respond to those affidavits, but
we want to get them down in a timeframe and rule prior to
the shipment of this fuel to the site.

We are not issuing a stay at this time because we don't think that is going to be necessary, given the timeframes we have heard.

MR. ANTHONY: Could I ask --

JUDGE BRENNER: Wait.

But you come back tomorrow morning and suggest a timeframe. We want the affidavits, we want a short timeframe, so we probably want simultaneous affidavits from the Applicant and the Staff, and then a one-week response

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time from the date of receipt by the other parties.

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another week, but parties can think about it and get

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back to us.

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Mr. Anthony, I want to get to LEA's area of

So, what we would suggest is a week and then

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interest.

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MR. ANTHONY: I just wanted to ask that you

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consider a stay.

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JUDGE BRENNER: We are not issuing one. Nobody

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formally applied for a stay before us, and we have not

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formally decided whether the stay criteria would apply, and

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that is where it stands.

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MR. ANTHONY: I would like to ask for one now.

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Should I ask in writing?

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JUDGE BRENNER: You want to ask for one now?

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MR. ANTHONY: Yes.

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JUDGE BRENNER: It is denied for the reason that

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we don't have to address at this time whether or not we

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should issue a stay, given the circumstances. And, it is an

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old court black-letter law that you don't have to issue

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injunctions and stays unless you have to. And we don't

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have to now.

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You wouldn't be on very solid ground if you

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forced us to rule today, I will tell you that, given

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everything we have just said.

There is a serious question as to whether the stay criteria would have to apply, given what we have aid about the absence of the following of our prior orders in this case. And let me leave it at that.

But, it is logically a complex question, and even without that factor, as the Zimmer Board alluded to in passing, at least, there are arguments both ways as to whether the stay criteria should apply to this type of situation. Of course, even if the lesser criteria applied, you might not be in better shape, Mr. Anthony.

But let's leave it at that and not have to face it.

As of now, our order still exists that we are to be informed in advance, prior to any fuel shipment. Once we get the schedules tomorrow for the affidavit, I am going to extend that order to the fact that there be no fuel shipments until we have ruled on the bases requirement for the contentions -- either confirmed our own views, or we found that we couldn't confirm them after receiving and considering the affidavits.

And we would probably leave it that way. But somebody can suggest a different formulation if they want to.

We are talking about a two-week timeframe for the affidavits, and then a ruling more or less, and then ruling in the next week or so thereafter, more or less. .

All right. As to LEA, we are not ruling on whether or not LEA is correct in its argument that this amendment had to be pre-noticed. And as such, unless and until that happens, LEA has an absolute right to file contentions after that notice and basically start from the beginning.

First, come in with your expression of interest, which you have done, and then be given a later opportunity to file contentions. We are not ruling on that.

We want to hear some more on that tomorrow, and then we will decide whether we have to rule on it at all, and if so, when.

However, subject to a possible ruling in your favor on that question by us or some other body, our ruling now is that you have advanced no contention with bases or specificity which we should consider before us. You have alluded generally to the security plan. However, we understand you haven't seen the plan. Nevertheless, you have cited nothing specific or with bases to give this Board reason to believe that there is a problem, or going to be a problem once the plan is finally approved by the Staff with respect to security.

Security plans of this nature exist. And for us to stay the process with the possibility that LEA, if it were given the opportunity to examine the security plan,

could find something it didn't like about the security plan, is not the normal course of events for the process.

You should have come in promptly with particular contentions once you received notice of the proposal to store new fuel at the site.

We agree that you didn't receive that notice until February. You then came in promptly, but you didn't come in with anything specific.

We didn't stay with that. We asked you what you would have in mind later, and what you said is, you need to look at the plan. And we appreciate your argument, but we reject it in terms of what is required by an Intervenor at this point, at least, even keyed from the February filing.

And, had you given us some reasonable indication of some problem with bases and specificity, we might have given you time to perfect it. But, you did not do that.

The one specific item you did come up with was the exemption for the criticality monitor. We see no bases to admit a contention that that's a problem, given our discussion already as to criticality.

It is our collective experience that that type of exemption has been given in the past, in essence on the bases that Mr. Wetterhahn described. We are not saying it

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is typical. We don't know.

But it has been given in the past. The reasons

were logical to us, given our views on lack of bases as

to criticality and the lack of application of the very

regulation that was cited while the fuel was in transport;

partially because it is in the shipping containers, partially

because you don't have the configuration of criticality.

But given the application for storage in other cases and this one, that is one thing -- if nothing else is looked at, the one thing that is looked at is where that fuel is stacked and stored in terms of criticality consequences.

of course the Staff is going to examine the exemption and either grant it or deny it on its bases. But we see no bases that the criticality monitor is required, which is my inference what such a contention would be, because we see no bases for criticality.

MR. ELLIOTT: May I respond on two matters?

JUDGE BRENNER: Yes.

MR. ELLIOTT: One is that clearly our filing did not contain specified contentions because that was not the purpose of the filing. The filing was a request for hearing and notice of intervention.

JUDGE BRENNER: Right, we understand that.

MR. ELLIOTT: Also, that the filing was rot filed with the Board at all.

JUDGE BRENNER: I understand that.

MR. ELLIOTT: The copy you have was given to you by the Staff. And you appear to be assuming jurisdiction over a matter that you haven't formal notice of, but which LEA is not even seeking jurisdiction over.

JUDGE BRENNER: I understand. I was going to get to that in a minute.

MR. ELLIOTT: The second point was with respect to particularized contentions on the security plan. The contentions must necessarily be based upon the contents of the security plan. And it is simply impossible for

Intervenors to file contentions on the contents of a document which it has not seen.

Now I don't see what conceivable showing LEA could have made with respect to a document that it has no knowledge of the contents of.

JUDGE BRENNER: We understand that argument. And we have accepted that argument as applied to emergency plans, as you know well, because we saw enough at the beginning to know that there are in fact problems, unless things are worked out right with things as complex as emergency plans for off-site emergency planning.

And you gave us the area of concerns right at the beginning of the case to the extent you could on emergency planning. And we have gone through this whole process that I won't repeat on emergency planning.

MR. ELLIOTT: And we will do that when we have an opportunity to file contentions.

JUDGE BRENNER: Okay. I understand your position. We contrast that with the area of security plans for new fuel which we consider a much less complex matter, in which there's no reason for us on our own to believe that there is going to be any problem with respect to the adoption and implementation of a security plan for new, unirradiated fuel, given the nature of what we're dealing with here.

Now, if you had shown us something specific, we

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were certainly willing to say, okay, you have shown us something with bases and specificity. But on a speculation that you might find something with security plan, we're not going to admit a contention and hold up the proposal to ship and store that fuel on that basis. Which we would consider a speculative.

Admittedly, we were applying our own administrative collective expertise view as to bases. It is our view -- well, I haven't discussed this point with the other Board members. Let me state my view.

Bases requires a common sense application. There's no simple standard for bases. When you are dealing with an area where you know that there is some potential for an Intervenor's contention to be correct and have merit, but the Intervenor cannot state more bases now because there is more information yet to come. We would apply a lower standard of bases, as we did for the emergency plan.

Bases, as applied in the particular context, it's a reasonable balancing. Where you're dealing with something where we have no reason to perceive any problem will occur, given the Staff and the Applicant working on the area, and given the nature of the area. We would say you're going to have to show us some particular concern before we will assume that something with bases and specificity can be arrived at. And that's the way we have applied it.

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MR. ELLIOTT: It's not my intention to belabor the point.

JUDGE BRENNER: It's getting late and I want to get to your other point. You disagree with us. I know that.

MR. ELLIOTT: Well, bases must be found in the found. The bases must be found in the plan. And if I haven't seen the plan, then I can't provide bases.

You are imposing an impossible standard.

JUDGE BRENNER: I guess for the reasons I attempted to articulate, and perhaps at a quarter of six, after a long day I did not do it very effectively.

We do not think, as applied to the security plan, on-site security plan for new fuel storage that it is a necessary prerequisite for you to have access to the plan before you can decide there is some problem for which you have a concern. What we find, in effect, is that you have no present tangible concern. You just want to look to see if you're going to have concerns. And that is different than the position you had on emergency planning.

And it's not the standard by which we would hold up this application. If you find something later, you can move to suspend the license, or amend the license, or whatever. That's a possibility.

Now you may, if you have problems getting access to a plan to find such a thing, that may be. But I'll tell

of security plans. But there is a balance in a democracy between -- in my view, between allowing any number of people access to sensitive information, such as security plans for a nuclear facility or some aspect of it on the bases that they may find something in there that they don't like.

Now that's different than the admitted and adjudicated many times in the Commission precedent, right of an intervenor to have access to a security plan, provided certain requirements are met that there's assurance that the information will be protected, where there is a bases for a contention. But it's a balance.

So where you've gct something to litigate, you're entitled to look at the plan with the safeguards. But where there's nothing in the offing, just to wait until you look at the plan and moreover to open a plan up to scrutiny by an outsider such as yourself, would not in my view, be warranted.

Now that's a general proposition, and as a lawyer

I know you'll understand it's no reflection on yourself or

LEA. That's not a ruling for the future, that there be

no condition under which you should be entitled to protective

access to look at the security plan, because we're not at

that point.

If there's a problem there and you want to argue

that you should have access before us or some official that you deem more appropriate, you can make that argument.

But we see no reason to state now that you should get the plan now. And we should wait and see if you can file a contention before we decide anything with respect to this Part 70 license.

In terms of your other point, you haven't filed this before us. And it's none of our business, in effect, in terms of ruling on it. You were courteous in giving it to us, and that's where the matter stands.

Subject to the prenoticing aspect, which we will discuss tomorrow, which may or may not affect our jurisdiction, that's another possible ramification of it. Subject to that, we think it makes sense for us to exercise jurisdiction over your filing, given rulings on the arguments before us, which we have just made.

We felt we are capable and in a position to make the rulings and we made them. The reason we think it makes sense is as follows. If we are wrong on jurisdiction, the only consequence will be -- and I'll tell you in a moment how we're going to provide procedurally for this to be effectuated.

The only consequence will be that a body wiser than ourselves will tell us that we should not have done that. And they will then notice a proceeding and appoint

a board. It has been the practice in past cases to appoint for obvious reasons the very same board hearing the Part 50 application to hear the Part 70 application. The Board's familiar with the parties, the case and the circumstances.

We see no reason why we could not be such a board, although we don't make the determination. If it occurs that way, it will be right back to us and we will make the determination we just made. If it goes to another board, they will have the benefit of our view and they can follow it or not follow it, as they see fit.

Either way, you are not set with our decision, and that gets me to the next point. This decision in our view is appealable at this time. I haven't looked through all the regulations and I'll be a little more specific on that tomorrow with the help of the parties. And I'd like the advice of the parties tomorrow as to whether I'm correct that it's appealable.

The Zimmer board said it was. But we want to hear the parties as to whether it is. If that's right, you can go to the appeal board right now and argue that we shouldn't have accepted jurisdiction.

Now, you may also want to argue in the alternative,

I assume you would, that even if we had jurisdiction we made
the wrong decision because you should have been given further
opportunity after having access to the security plan to form

contentions.

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If you want, you can seek a stay as part of your appeal. We will issue a notification as soon as we can, but I don't know to whom. Probably to the appeal board and the Commission telling them what action we have taken here. Telling them that you have still got your petition pending. We're not going to physically reach out and bury it.

We think we have ruled on it, nothing further need be done. But if the parties disagree, if anybody disagrees they can sua sponte tell us we're wrong. But you better not depend on that. If you think we're wrong, you've got a responsibility it seems to us to file the appeal with the appeal board. If there's not appellate right, we'll refer the ruling. We'll get you a rapid appeal somehow.

MR. ELLIOTT: Thank you.

JUDGE BRENNER: But I think you probably have an appellate right. It seems a final action as to the particular Part 70 license application. That's why I think it's appealable. So you can appeal us on the jurisdictional question as well as on the question of whether you should have been given additional time to file a contention.

Now because of the time frames involved, we issued an oral ruling here. Now in terms of your appellate rights, we don't think they would start until the time of

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our written confirmation of this ruling.

What I'm trying to say, LEA, is that you can have it both ways. If you wanted more time to file an appeal and a request for stav. your time won't be cut off until the proper amount of time after our written ruling.

However, you don't have to wait until our written ruling to file the appeal, if you want to get up right away on a stay or something else. You may even be able to do it faster than we can do our notification, but that's okay.

And we will leave it up to you.

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Mr. Anthony, if we're right that it's appealable, we think it's appealable by you as well as LEA, although you don't have the jurisdictional question, perhaps happily for you. But you've got the other matters. That is our exclusion of your contentions.

Now let me add one thing. The exclusion of the contentions is subject to confirmation of our preliminary view that there were no bases as we have discussed. That applies to FOE more than LEA, although some of that was our feeling of bases for the security plan, too.

I am giving some advice here and I always get in trouble when I give unsolicited advice. It seems to me LEA won't have an appealability problem. I'm waiting for a ruling on bases, because it doesn't directly affect our ruling on LEA's petition.

You have been denied without respect to the bases we're waiting for, confirmation of bases in the affidavit, so you can get up on appeal right away, if we're right about the appeal. Otherwise, we'll refer it up right away. We won't wait for the affidavit, so you can get up on the jurisdictional question and the question of whether you needed a contention.

Now we may amend some of what we said here today, when we hear about the prenoticing requirements tomorrow. I don't know what affect that might have, so whatever we say 1 is subject to that.

It is also subject to what we hear about the heavy loads. We don't think that's going to have any effect, given our rulings on the bases as we gave it, that there will be no public health problem from damage to the uranium oxide fuel pellets involved here. But we want to hear about it, nevertheless, tomorrow.

Mr. A. hony, I don't know whether you'll have an appeal problem or not, until we rule on the bases, because technically we have not formally excluded your contention.

But if the lack of bases, that we believe exists, is confirmed in the interest of public health of safety, we just want to make sure we're right -- we're quite sure we're right, but we want to make absolutely sure the contentions are not excluded.

So whether or not an Appeal Board would deem it right for you to file an appeal now, until we confirm or do not confirm our feeling of the bases, I don't know. But that's all I can do for you on that.

MR. ANTHONY: Could I ask if the Staff is still working on and is still required to do a safety evaluation?

JUDGE BRENNER: We didn't issue an order requiring them to do anything other than the affidavit we asked for.

We asked them what evaluation they were doing. They said they were doing one. They said there's a written one which may

be internal, external. They're going to provide copies.

From now on, in this case, there are going to be copies

provided of anything relevant, because the next time this

comes -- which I hope is never -- that is the question of

relevant documents being served, we've had this precedent here.

So if, arguably, any clarification of a prior order was necessary, that clarification has now been given.

MR. ANTHONY: I guess I'm not quite clear, as to whether -- when the Staff issues their safety evaluation -- whether or not there will be a chance for me to renew the question and file contentions?

JUDGE BRENNER: I doubt it, because we have found that they probably have no bases, subject to the confirmation of the affidavit. And the reason we said they probably have no bases is because there's just going to be no public health problem from unirradiated new fuel, uranium oxide pellets.

And that's why we're getting the affidavits from the Staff and Applicant, just to make sure. Now whether those affidavits are more detailed than the normal safety evaluation might be, or whether they'll come out in advance of the completion of their safety evaluation, I don't know. But we're going to rely on what we ask for, and that's what we think we need to make the decision we made.

Now if something unexpected comes up in the evaluation, I'm certainly not clairvoyant, we can deal with

if and when it comes up.

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MR. ANTHONY: And I will be allowed time to respond to the affidavits, with whatever expert testimony

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I can muster?

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JUDGE BRENNER: You're talking about in response. You don't have to have an affidavit in response. You can

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respond with anything. You're better off with an affidavit.

We've discussed this many times in the case. Yes, but

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we're setting time frames, as I've indicated. We haven't

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set them exactly. We'll set them tomorrow morning.

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MR. ANTHONY: Are you able to look at tomorrow's schedule now?

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JUDGE BRENNER: We have got to finish these emergency planning contentions, because we have some rulings to make, if not here then next week or as soon as we

Any disagreement with that?

(No response.)

can get to it back at the office.

We didn't expect the Part 70 matter to come up when we scheduled things this week. We didn't expect a 'nt of things to come up that have come up. Beyond that, t emergency planning contentions are important, on the part of you and the persons advancing them. They're important from the point of view of the persons opposing their admission and it is helpful for us to get the views of the parties.

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It's not an efficient process, but it's an important process to us. And we are going to go through them so that we are sure we understand the positions of the parties and the contentions. And if we lose efficiency to that process, so be it. It's too important.

We have the week of the 19th to finish up things we don't finish up this week. And presumably, we will be able to finish up the structural analyses testimony, if we don't finish that this week.

That's the best I can say. We're going to go back to the emergency planning contentions tomorrow.

MR. ANTHONY: Have you any idea whether I personnally should be here tomorrow morning?

JUDGE BRENNER: Mr. Anthony, I understand why you make the request. You have to look at it from my point of view. I'm not going to promise you that nothing will up tomorrow, that you may later think will affect your interest. And in fact, the first thing we're going to do tomorrow will be on the Part 70 matter, although it affects LEA's aspects more than yours, it could have some effect on your position, too.

After that, we're going to go to emergency planning.

If it doesn't take us all day, I want to go -- we still have
the structural testimony. I don't know what arrangements
were made between Mr. Romano and the other parties, to take

up his matters either. Presumably, the parties will tell
us at some point. But that's the best I can do.

The possibility is you can come here in the beginning and then leave, when we get into the emergency planning contentions, but leave word where you can be called in advance that we're going to get to the testimony. That has worked before.

We're sympathetic, but I can't make the promise for the reasons I indicated.

MR. ANTHONY: I appreciate that.

JUDGE BRENNER: Anything else?

MR. WETTERHAHN: With regard to Mr. Romano's testimony, Mr. Romano would prefer to start --

JUDGE BRENNER. Not testimony.

MR. WETTERHAHN: I'm sorry. Mr. Romano's argument with regard to Contention VI-1. He would prefer to start Thursday afternoon immediately after lunch. Is that correct?

MR. ROMANO: Correct.

JUDGE BRENNER: That's fine with us.

MR. ROMANO: Then I don't have to be here tomorrow?

JUDGE BRENNER: If that's a convenient time for you -- we wanted you to pick a convenient time this week because we had flexibility.

All right. Usually we start approximately 1:30. You better assume that we're going to start at 1:30 on

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Thursday, maybe a little later, but that's the typical time.

All right. Thank you all for your time and patience. It's been a long day for us. I'm sure it has been for you, too. And we will pick up at 9 o'clock

(Whereupon, at 6:00 p.m., the hearing was recessed

to resume at 9:00 a.m. on Wednesday, March 7, 1984.)

CERTIFICATE OF PROCEEDINGS

This is to certify that the attached proceedings before the NRC COMMISSION

In the matter of: LIMERICK GENERATING STATION, (Units 1 & 2)

Date of Proceeding: Tuesday, 6 March 1984

Place of Proceeding: Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

were held as herein appears, and that this is the original transcript for the file of the Commission.

Mimie Meltzer
Official Reporter - Typed

Officiad Reporter - Signature

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