

CONTROL BLOCK: 

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 ① (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

CON'TEVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

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CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

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NAME OF PREPARER Jesus Arias, Jr.

PHONE: 305/245-2910 X-200

#### Additional Cause Description and Corrective Actions

The other valve (4-891A) was returned to the open position following completion of the monthly periodic surveillance test of the 4A pump.

The total time that the Containment Spray System was isolated did not exceed 50 and 1/2 hours. For the duration of the incident, all the normal and emergency containment coolers were available. On 9-24-83, the locked valve list had been verified to be correct.

A series of corrective actions were delineated. These are:

- 1) A flow path verification of all safety systems on Unit 4 was performed following the discovery and results showed all safety systems to be correctly aligned.
- 2) The Operations Supervisor-Nuclear proceeded to personally discuss the incident with all operating shifts (except vacationing personnel).
- 3) As part of the long term corrective actions, all the locks associated with the flow path of the Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) were upgraded to a different level. The Plant Supervisor-Nuclear must issue the key to these locks. In addition, and to further differentiate between the units, new lock tumblers were ordered so that when installed, only Unit 3's key will open Unit 3's lock and Unit 4's key will open Unit 4's locks. The locks for the different units will also be color coded (Red-Unit 3 and Green-Unit 4) with locks on common system valves to have a different color from that of either unit. Also, signs clearly labeling Unit 3 or Unit 4 will be posted appropriately throughout the auxiliary building.
- 4) A clearly defined set of guidelines has been established so that independent verification is performed in conjunction with procedural valve manipulation.
- 5) Additional training on how to properly execute clearance orders, hang tags, initial the clearance, etc., as well as how to perform independent verification procedure will be given to all Operations personnel.

USNRC REGION II  
ATLANTA, GA



FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

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October 18, 1983  
PNS-LI-83-670

Mr. James P. O'Reilly  
Regional Administrator, Region II  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
101 Marietta Street N.W., Suite 2900  
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 251-83-16

TURKEY POINT UNIT 4

DATE OF OCCURRENCE: OCTOBER 4, 1983

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 6.9.2.a.6

CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM

The attached Licensee Event Report is being submitted in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9 to provide prompt notification of the subject occurrence.

Very truly yours,

J. W. Williams, Jr.  
Vice President  
Nuclear Energy Department

JWW/NWG/js

Attachment

cc: Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement (40)  
Harold F. Reis, Esquire  
File 933.1 TP

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