

BEFORE THE SECRETARY OF THE COMMISSION
OF THE UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

DOCKETED
USNRC

'83 OCT 24 P12:19

IN RE: THE MARBLE HILL NUCLEAR)
OPERATING STATIONS, UNITS 1 & 2)

DOCKET NOS. STN -50-546 OFFICE OF SECRETARY
STN -50-547 HEARING & SERVICE
BRANCH

SAVE THE VALLEY'S PROVISIONAL CONTENTIONS

1. Integrity of concrete in safety-related structures is not assured.

This follows from the testimony on quality control in the "Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations, House of Representatives, Ninety-Sixth Congress, First Session, November 27 & 28, 1979".

2. Reverification of concrete integrity in safety-related structures resultant from the 1979 work-stoppage in these areas is called into question by alleged falsification of quality control records.

3. The integrity of electrical work performed by Commonwealth Lord - Joint Venture and other subcontractors is not assured. Specifically that proper category 1 material has not been used in hangers and other installations pursuant to and in conformity with relevant NRC and national professional installation regulations.

4. There has been non-conformity with the NRC and relevant regulations respecting the documentation of electrical work, exposed by the January, 1983 cessation of work in safety-related areas and raising important questions. (See Contention 3).

5. Neither Public Service Indiana (PSI) nor the staff has presented a meaningful assessment of the risks associated with the operation of the Marble Hill facility including, and over and above, the non-compliance in safety related structures noted in Contentions 1 to 4, the staff still seems to regulate upon the basis of the Rasmussen Report although in view of the Lewis Committee findings these led NRC to withdraw official reliance on that prior report. The Commission has stated that it "does not regard as reliable the Reactor Safety Study's numerical estimate of the overall risk of reactor accident". (NRC statement of Risk Assessment and the Reactor Safety Study Report (Wash - 1400) in Light of the Risk Assessment Review Group Report, January 18, 1979.) The withdrawal of NRC's endorsement of the Reactor Safety Study and its findings leaves no technical basis for concluding that the actual risk is low enough to justify operation of Marble Hill.

6. There is no basis for concluding that the design of Marble Hill provides protection against so-called "Class 9" accidents. There is no basis for concluding that such accidents are not credible. The staff has conceded that the accident at Three Mile Island (TMI) falls within that classification. Therefore, there is not reasonable assurance that the Marble Hill facility could be operated without endangering the health and safety of the public. (See also Contention 5, supra.)

7. No adequate evacuation plans for Marble Hill exist. Neither on the Indiana side nor on the adjacent Kentucky region across the Ohio River from Marble Hill are there credible plans for evacuation systems. Moreover, the example of events at TMI showed the inadequacy of NRC emergency planning requirements. Plans for evacuation should be based on worst-case analysis of the potential accident

consequences of a core melt with breach of containment (Contentions 1 & 2 are relevant here). Public health and safety requires that prior to the operation of Marble Hill there be in place an effective, well publicized and tested plan to evacuate the public in the event of such an accident. There is no adequate emergency plan for evacuation of Marble Hill based on a weather-dependent worst case analysis of the potential consequences of a core melt with breach of containment.

8. No adequate plans exist for all of the areas which could potentially be at risk in a nuclear accident. Since studies of the AEC-NRC (including WASH-740) indicate that radiation releases could impact as far as 100 miles, and in light of the fact that radiation releases, airborne and through ground water, from the accident at TMI impacted far beyond the EMZ, emergency plans for Marble Hill must take account of an area within a radius of 100 miles from the plant site. This area includes, within the State of Indiana, Bloomington and Columbus, and in Kentucky, Louisville, each being substantial population centers.

9. Common mode failures have not been adequately addressed by NRC or PSI. As one specific example, because of the nearness of the New Madrid fault with its known potential for earthquake behavior, there is a legitimate question concerning the ability of Marble Hill to maintain its structural integrity in the event of this common mode occurrence.

10. No adequate assurance has been given by PSI and NRC that the electrical systems in safety-related areas are mechanically sound. A Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) sent to PSI by NRC, February 2, 1983, gives the public some information on the type, depth and extent of the problems verified by NRC during the special inspection they conducted January 24-28, 1983. CAL mentions that "the stop work encompasses fabrication and installation of electrical auxiliary steel; cable tray and conduit hangers; and cable tray and exposed conduit". The word 'fabrication' herein suggests, in the light of non-conformance in documentation (Contentions 3 and 4), that the quality of materials as well as of the electrical work may be unknown. We recall here that one of the major problems in the Brown's Ferry accident originated in the cable trays.

11. Inherent in the nuclear fission process is the production of a high flux of neutrons. This flow of neutrons causes some transmutations to occur within the metal structures of all nuclear plants. Because this inherent problem has not been adequately addressed by NRC, the Marble Hill plant must not be allowed to operate.

12. PSI has had in "storage" many of the safety related components of proposed reactors. These components are in some respect out of date and should not be mounted in the Marble Hill reactor units.

13. The NRC Steam Generator Status Report of February, 1982 (SECY 82-72) acknowledges that no effective solution has been found for prevention of steam generator tube degradation whence we contend that Marble Hill should not be allowed to operate.

14. The Westinghouse D-Series models of steam generators proposed for Marble Hill have had excessive vibration problems which can impair generator tube integrity. These which lead to derating (at the least) of the generators, thus increase the effective cost of the plant. Further, they impair the safety of the plant, and require that such equipment not be installed at Marble Hill.

15. It would be imprudent to license another nuclear plant to operate and the technology of decommissioning, and its cost, has been demonstrated on a large reactor, and until there is provision for ultimate disposal of its radioactive wastes.

Save the Valley reserves the right to add, subtract and/or modify the above list of Contentions and respectfully submit to the NRC that same are being filed today because time may be of the essence.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

The undersigned certifies that on this 21st day of October, 1987, the above cause to be mailed by certified mail - return receipt requested the above cause The Valley's Provisional Contentions.

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