

## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Fort Calhoun Station Unit No. 1										DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 8 5					PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 2		
TITLE (4) Auxiliary Building Crane Interlocks Bypassed																	
EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)				REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)							
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES N				DOCKET NUMBER (5) 0 5 0 0 0				
0 1	2 2	8 4	8 4	0 0 1	0 0	0 2	2 2	8 4					0 5 0 0 0				
OPERATING MODE (9) 1		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5: (Check one or more of the following) (11)															
POWER LEVEL (10) 1 0 0		20.402(b)				20.405(c)				50.73(a)(2)(iv)				73.71(b)			
		20.405(a)(1)(i)				50.38(a)(1)				50.73(a)(2)(v)				73.71(c)			
		20.405(a)(1)(ii)				X 50.38(a)(2)				50.73(a)(2)(vii)				OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 365A)			
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)				X 50.73(a)(2)(i)				50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)							
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)				50.73(a)(2)(ii)				50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)							
		20.405(a)(1)(v)				50.73(a)(2)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(ix)							
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																	
NAME Alan W. Richard, Supervisor-Technical Fort Calhoun Station										TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE 4 0 2 4 2 6 - 4 0 1 1							
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																	
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC							
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)										EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		MONTH	DAY	YEAR			
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)										X NO							
ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single space typewritten lines) (16)																	
Technical Specification 2.11(2) states the following:  The Auxiliary Building crane shall not be used to move material over irradiated fuel in the fuel storage pool. If the crane interlocks are inoperable or bypassed, the crane operation will be under the direct control of a supervisor.  The hooks on the Auxiliary Building crane cannot travel over the Spent Fuel Pool unless the travel interlocks are bypassed by means of a key switch on the crane. Contrary to Technical Specification 2.11(2), the crane supervisor left the Spent Fuel Pool Area while the key was still in the interlock bypass switch in the bypassed position. When the Quality Control inspector at the job site discovered that the crane supervisor had left, he immediately called for another crane supervisor. Approximately twenty minutes elapsed between the departure of the first crane supervisor and the arrival of the second. At no time during this period was the crane operated inside the interlocked zone over the Spent Fuel Pool. The certification of the crane supervisor who failed to maintain proper administrative control of the key was withdrawn. The incident and its significance were discussed with the individual by plant supervision. The training and certification of crane supervisors was reviewed and was found to be adequate with regard to this incident.																	
8403050124 840222 PDR ADOCK 05000285 S PDR																	

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## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1) Fort Calhoun Station, Unit No. 1	DOCKET NUMBER (2)  0 5 0 0 0 2 8 5 8 4	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
		84	001	00	02	OF	02

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 308A's) (17)

Technical Specification 2.11(2) states the following:

The Auxiliary Building crane shall not be used to move material over irradiated fuel in the fuel storage pool. If the crane interlocks are inoperable or bypassed, the crane operation will be under the direct control of a supervisor.

Operating Instruction OI-HE-2 on normal operation of the Auxiliary Building crane lists the following precaution:

If the crane interlocks are inoperable during crane use, or if they are defeated by means of the bypass key, the crane must be under the administrative control of a certified/qualified Crane Supervisor.

Certification of Crane Supervisors includes training on Technical Specification 2.11 and Operating Instruction OI-HE-2.

The hooks on the Auxiliary Building crane cannot travel over the Spent Fuel Pool unless the travel interlocks are bypassed by means of a key switch on the crane. Contrary to Technical Specification 2.11(2) and Operating Instruction OI-HE-2, the crane supervisor left the Spent Fuel Pool Area while the key was still in the interlock bypass switch in the bypassed position. Before leaving the area, the Crane Supervisor had verified that the crane was out of the interlocked zone over the pool. When the Quality Control inspector at the job site discovered that the Crane Supervisor had left, he immediately called for another crane supervisor. Approximately twenty minutes elapsed between the departure of the first crane supervisor and the arrival of the second. The Quality Control inspector knew the provisions of Technical Specification 2.11(2) and Operating Instruction OI-HE-2 and understood the basis for the administrative requirement on the interlock bypass key. The crane operator was also aware of the basis for the administrative requirement. However, neither the Quality Control inspector nor the crane operator were certified Crane Supervisors. At no time during the absence of a Crane Supervisor was the crane operated in the interlocked zone over the Spent Fuel Pool. This incident occurred on January 22, 1984 at approximately 1330 hours. The personnel error was a cognitive error and was contrary to approved procedures.

The certification of the Crane Supervisor who failed to maintain proper administrative control of the key was withdrawn. The individual is an engineer employed by the Omaha Public Power District. The incident and its significance was discussed with the individual by plant supervision.

The training and certification of crane supervisors was reviewed and was found to be adequate with regard to this incident.

The Fort Calhoun Station was operating at 100% power at the time of the incident.

**Omaha Public Power District**  
1623 Harney Omaha, Nebraska 68102  
402/536-4000

February 22, 1984  
FC-037-84  
LIC-84-041

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Document Control Desk  
Washington, D.C. 20555


Reference: Docket No. 50-285

Gentlemen:

Licensee Event Report  
for the Fort Calhoun Station

Please find attached Licensee Event Report 84-001 dated  
February 20, 1984. This report is being submitted per  
requirements of 10 CFR 50.73.

Sincerely,

  
W. C. Jones  
Division Manager  
Production Operations

WCJ/JCB:jmm

Attachment

cc: Mr. Richard P. Denise, Director  
Division of Resident, Reactor Project  
& Engineering Programs  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Region IV  
611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000  
Arlington, Texas 76011

INPO Records Center  
Mr. E. G. Tourigny, Project Manager

SARC Chairman  
PRC Chairman  
Mr. L. A. Yandell, Senior Resident  
Inspector  
Fort Calhoun File (2)

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