## TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401 400 Chestnut Street Tower II

August 22, 1983

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II Attn: Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - NRC-OIE REGION II INSPECTION REPORT 50-327/83-12 AND 50-328/83-12 - RESPONSE TO VIOLATION

The subject OIE inspection report dated July 25, 1983 from R. C. Lewis to H. G. Parris cited TVA with one Severity Level V Violation. Enclosed is the response to the subject report.

If you have any questions, please get in touch with R. H. Shell at FTS 858-2688.

To the best of my knowledge, I declare the statements contained herein are complete and true.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

DS Kammer

D. S. Kammer Nuclear Engineer

Enclosure

cc: Mr. Richard C. DeYoung, Director (Enclosure)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

8310250494 831003 PDR ADDCK 05000327 PDR RESPONSE - NRC INSPECTION REPORT NOS. 50-327/83-12 AND 50-328/83-12 D. M. VERRELLI'S LETTER TO H. G. PARRIS DATED JULY 25, 1983

## Item 327, 328/83-12-01

10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criteria XIII requires that measures shall be established to control the handling, storage, shipping, cleaning and preservation of material and equipment to prevent damage or deterioration. The licensee's approved QA program, Topical Report TVA-TR75-1 requires that pipe be stored in accordance with ANSI 45.2.2 (1972) which requires that the ends be capped or sealed.

Contrary to the above, measures to prevent damage or deterioration of pipe were not implemented in that on June 23, 1983 the inspector noted numerous pieces of QA stainless steel pipe in the licensee's storage yard near Huts 2 and 3 and in the Construction Warehouse pipe shed that did not have the ends properly capped or sealed. The pipe near Huts 2 and 3 was maintained by the Construction Warehouse.

This is a Severity Level V Violation (Supplement I). This violation applies to both Units.

1. Admission or Denial of the Alleged Violation

TVA admits the violation occurred as stated.

2. Reasons for the Violation if Admitted

The stainless steel pipe storage problems were a result of lack of manpower to maintain the equipment properly and of storehouse personnel to realize the significance of these requirements.

3. Corrective Steps Which Have Been Taken and the Results Achieved

One June 25 and 26, 1983, a special task force inspected all stainless steel pipe to ensure compliance with AI-11 and ANSI-45.2.2 (1972). All piping was corrected and verified to be capped or sealed to prevent damage or deterioration.

In addition, a section instruction letter was written for Power Stores personnel emphasizing each employee's responsibility to make sure that the storage of stainless steel pipe or tubing complies with AI-11.

- 4. Corrective Steps Which Will be Taken to Avoid Further Violations
  No further action is required.
- 5. Date When Full Compliance Will be Achieved
  Full compliance was achieved on July 1, 1983.