## OPERATING DATA REPORT

DOCKET NO. 50-416 DATE 2-14-84 COMPLETED BY J. G. Cesare TELEPHONE 601-969-2585

# **OPERATING STATUS**

I. Unit Name Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Unit 1	Notes
2. Reporting Period January, 1984	
3. Licensed Thermal Power (MWt): 191	
4. Nameplate Rating (Gross MWe): 1372.5	
5. Design Electrical Rating (Net MWe): 1250	
6. Maximum Dependable Capacity (Gross MWe): NA	
7. Maximum Dependable Capacity (Net MWe): NA	

8. If Changes Occur in Capacity Ratings (Items Number 3 Through 7) Since Last Report. Give Reasons:

NA

IIA

9. Power Level To Which Restricted. If Any (Net MWe): \_\_\_\_\_NA

10. Reasons For Restrictions. If Any: \_as restricted by O.L. NPF-13 as listed in 3.0 above.

	This Month	Yrto-Date	Cumulative
11. Hours In Reporting Period	744	744	3672
12. Number Of Hours Reactor Was Critical	0	0	995.3
13. Reactor Reserve Shutdown Hours	0	0	0
14. Hours Generator On-Line	0	0	0
15. Unit Reserve Shutdown Hours	0	0	0
16. Gross Thermal Energy Generated (MWH)	0	0	77,388
17. Gross Electrical Energy Generated (MWH)	0	0	0
18. Net Electrical Energy Generated (MWH)	0	0	0
19. Unit Service Factor	NA	NA	NA
20. Unit Availability Factor	NA	-NA	NA
21. Unit Capacity Factor (Using MDC Net)	NA	NA	NA
22. Unit Capacity Factor (Using DER Net)	NA	NA	NA
23. Unit Forced Outage Rate	NA	NA	NA
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24. Shutdowns Scheduled Over Next 6 Months (Type, Date, and Duration of Each):

25. If Shut Down At End Of Report Period Estimated Date of Startup	NA	
26. Units In Test Status (Prior to Commercial Operation):	Forecast	Achieved
INITIAL CRITICALITY	8-14-82	8-18-82
INITIAL ELECTRICITY	4/84	
COMMERCIAL OPERATION	10/84	
PDR ADOCK 05000414		
R PDR		(9/77

#### INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETING OPERATING DATA REPORT

This report should be furnished each month by licensees. The name and telephone number of the preparer should be provided in the designated spaces. The instructions below are provided to assist licensees in reporting the data consistently. The number of the instruction corresponds to the item number of the report format.

- L'NIT NAME. Self-explanatory.
- REPORTING PERIOD. Designate the month for which the data are presented.
- LICENSED THERMAL POWER (MWt) is the maximum thermal power, expressed in megawatts, currently authorized by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
- NAMEPLATE RATING (GROSS MW<sub>e</sub>). The nameplate mower designation of the turbine-generator in megavolt unperes (MVA) times the nameplate power factor of the turbine generator.
- 5. DESIGN ELECTRICAL RATING (NET MW<sub>e</sub>) is the nominal net electrical output of the unit specified by the utility and used for the purpose of plant design.
- MAXIMUM DEPENDABLE CAPACITY (GROSS MW<sub>e</sub>) is the gross electrical output as measured at the output terminals of the turbine-generator during the most restrictive seasor al conditions.
- MAXIMUM DEPENDABLE CAPACITY (NET MWe). Maximum dependable capacity (gross) less the normal station service loads.
- 8. Self-explanatory.
- 9. POWER LEVEL TO WHICH RESTRICTED. IF ANY (NET MW<sub>e</sub>). Note that this item is applicable only if restrictions on the power level are in effect. Short-term tless than one month) limitations on power level need not be presented in this item.

Since this information is used to develop figures on capacity lost due to restrictions and because most users of the "Operating Plant Status Report" are primarily interested in energy actually fed to the distribution system, it is requested that this figure be expressed in MWe-Net in spite of the fact that the figure must be derived from MWt or percent power.

- 10. REASONS FOR RESTRICTIONS. IF ANY. If item 9 is used, item 10 should explain why. Brief narrative is acceptable. Cite references as appropriate. Indicate whether restrictions are self-imposed or are regulatory requirements. Be as specific as possible within space limitations. Plants in startup and power ascension test phase should be identified here.
- HOURS IN REPORTING PERIOD. For units in power ascension at the end of the period, the gross hours from the beginning of the period or the first electrical production, whichever comes last, to the end of the period.

For units in commercial operation at the end of the period, the gross hours from the beginning of the period or of commercial operation, whichever comes last, to the end of the period or decommissioning, whichever comes first. Adjustments in clock hours should be made in which a change from standard to daylight-savings time (or vice versa) occurs.

- NUMBER OF HOURS REACTOR WAS CRITICAL. Show the total number of hours the reactor was critical during the gross hours of the reporting period.
- REACTOR RESERVE SHUTDOWN HOURS. The total number of hours during the gross hours of reporting period that the reactor was removed from service for administrative or other reasons but was available for operation.
- 14. HOURS GENERATOR ON-LINE. Also called Service Hours. The total number of hours expressed to the nearest tenth of an hour during the gross hours of the reporting period that the unit operated with breakers closed to the station bus. These hours: plus those listed in Unit Shutdowns for the generator outz e hours, should equal the gross hours in the reporting perioc.
- 15. UNIT RESERVE SHUTDOWN HOURS. The total number of hours expressed to the nearest tenth of an hour during the gross hours of the reporting period that the unit was removed from service for economic or similar reasons but was available for operation.
- 16. GROSS THERMAL ENERGY GENERATED (MWH). The thermal output of the nuclear steam supply system during the gross hours of the reporting period, expressed in megawatt hours (no decimals).
- GROSS ELECTRICAL ENERGY GENERATED (MWH). The electrical output of the unit measured at the output terminals of the turbine-generator during the gross hours of the reporting period, expressed in megawatt hours (no decimals).
- 18. NET ELECTRICAL ENERGY GENERATED (MWH). The gross electrical output of the unit measured at the output terminals of the turbine-generator minus the normal station service loads during the gross hours of the reporting period, expressed in megawatt hours. Negative quantities should not be used. If there is no net positive value for the period, enter zero (no decimals).
- 19. For units still in the startup and power ascension test
- 23. phase, items 19-23 should not be computed. Instead, enter N/A in the current month column. These five factors should be computed starting at the time the unit is declared to be in commercial operation. The cumulative figures in the second and third columns should be based on commercial operation as a starting date.

- 19. UNIT SERVICE FACTOR. Compute by dividing hours the generator was on line (item 14) by the gross hours in the reporting period (item 11). Express as percent to the nearest tenth of a percent. Do not include reserve shutdown hours in the calculation.
- 20. UNIT AVAILABILITY FACTOR. Compute by dividing the unit available hours (item 14 plus item 15) by the gross hours in the reporting period (item 11). Express as percent to the nearest tenth of a percent.
- 21. UNIT CAPACITY FACTOR (USING MDC NET). Compute by dividing net electrical energy generated (item 18) by the product of maximum dependable capacity (item 7) times the gross hours in the reporting period (item 11). Express as percent to the nearest tenth of a percent.
- UNIT CAPACITY FACTOR (USING DER NET). Compute as in item 21. substituting design electrical rating (item 5) for maximum dependable capacity.
- 23. UNIT FORCED OUTAGE RATE. Compute by dividing the total forced outage hours (from the table in Unit Shutdowns and Power Reductions) by the sum of hours generator on line (item 14) plus total forced outage hours (from the table in Unit Shutdowns and Power Reductions). Express as percent to the nearest tenth of a percent.
- 24. SHUTDOWNS SCHEDULED OVER NEXT 6 MONTHS (TYPE, DATE, AND DURATION OF EACH). Include type (refueling, maintenance, other), proposed date of start of shutdown, and proposed length of shutdown. It is recognized that shutdowns may be scheduled between reports and that this item may not be all inclusive. Be as accurate as possible as of the date the report is prepared. This item is to be prepared each month and updated if appropriate until the actual shutdown occurs.
- 25. Self-explanatory.
- Self-explanatory. Note, however, that this information is requested for all units in startup and power ascension test status and is not required for units already in commercial operation.

**TEST STATUS** is defined as that period following initial criticality during which the unit is tested at successively higher outputs, culminating with operation at fall power for a sustained period and completion of warranty runs. Following this phase, the unit is generally considered by the utility to be available for commercial operation.

Date of COMMERCIAL OPERATION is defined as the date that the unit was declared by the utility owner to be available for the regular production of electricity, usually related to the satisfactory completion of qualification tests as specified in the purchase contract and to the accounting policies and practices of the utility.

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# AVERAGE DAILY UNIT POWER LEVEL

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DOCKET NO.	50-416		
UNIT	<u>1</u> 2-14-84		
DATE			
COMPLETED BY	J. G. Cesare		
TELEPHONE	601-969-2585		

AVERAGE DAILY POWER LEVEL (Mwe-Net)	DAY	AVERAGE DAILY POWER LEVE (MWe-Net)
No Power Generated	17	
	18	
	19	
	20	
	21	
	22	
	23	
	24	
	25	
	26	
	27	
	28	
	29	
	30	
	31	

# INSTRUCTIONS

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. 5.

On this format, list the average daily unit power level in MWe-Net for each day in the reporting month. Compute to the nearest whole megawatt.

## UNIT SHUTDOWNS AND POWER REDUCTIONS

REPORT MONTH January, 1984

DOCKET NO. 50-416 UNIT NAME Grand Gulf Nuclear Sta. DATE 2-14-84 COMPLETED BY J. G. Cesare TELEPRONE 601-969-2585

No.	Date	Typel	Guration (Hours)	Reason?	Method of Shutting Down Reactor <sup>3</sup>	Licensee Event Report #	System Code <sup>4</sup>	Component Code <sup>5</sup>	Cause & Corrective Action to Prevent Recurrence
4 (Cont- inued)	11/09/83	S	744.0	F	1	NA	NA	NA	Continuation of outage following completion of low power testing.
1 2 F: Forced S: Scheduled		ced Reason: eduled A-Equipment Failure (Explain) B-Maintenance of Test C-Refueling D-Regulatory Restruction E-Operator Training & License Examination F-Administrative G-Operational Error (Explain) H-Other (Explain)			Method 1-Manu 2-Manu 3-Auto 4-Other	l: ial sal Scram. matic Scram. r (Explain)	4 Exhibit G - Instructions for Preparation of Data Entry Sheets for Licensee Event Report (LER) File (NUREG- 0161) S Exhibit 1 - Same Source		

## INSTRUCTIONS

This report should describe all plant shutdowns during the report period. In addition, it should be the source of explanation of significant dips in average power levels. Each significant reduction in power level (greater than 20% reduction in average daily power level for the preceding 24 hours) should be noted, even though the unit may not have been shut down completely<sup>1</sup>. For such reductions in power level, the duration should be listed as zero, the method of reduction should be listed as 4 (Other), and the Cause and Corrective Action to Prevent Recurrence column should explain. The Cause and Corrective Action to Prevent Recurrence column should be used to provide any needed explanation to fully describe the circumstances of the outage or power reduction.

NUMBER. This column should indicate the sequential number assigned to each shutdown or significant reduction in power for that calendar year. When a shutdown or significant power reduction begins in one report period and ends in another, an entry should be made for both report periods to be sure all shutdowns or significant power reductions are reported. Until a unit has achieved its first power generation, no number should be assigned to each entry.

DATE. This column should indicate the date of the start of each shutdown or significant power reduction. Report as year, month, and day. August 14, 1977 would be reported as 770814. When a shutdown or significant power reduction begins in one report period and ends in another, an entry should be made for both report periods to be sure all shutdowns or significant power reductions are reported.

**TYPE.** Use "F" or "S" to indicate either "Forced" or "Scheduled," respectively, for each shutdown or significant power reduction. Forced shutdowns include those required to be initiated by no later than the weekend following discovery of an off-normal condition. It is recognized that some judgment is required in categorizing shutdowns in this way. In general, a forced shutdown is one that would not have been completed in the absence of the condition for which corrective action was taken.

**DURATION**. Self-explanatory. When a shutdown extends beyond the end of a report period, count only the time to the end of the report period and pick up the ensuing down time in the following report periods. Report duration of outages rounded to the nearest tenth of an hour to facilitate summation. The sum of the total ontage hours plus the hours the generator was on line should equal the gross hours in the reporting period.

**REASON**. Categorize by letter designation in accordance with the table appearing on the report form. If category H must be used supply brief comments.

METHOD OF SHUTTING DOWN THE REACTOR OR REDUCING POWER. Categorize by number designation

"Note that this differs from the Edison Electric Institute (EEI) definitions of "Forced Partial Outage" and "Scheduled Partial Outage." For these terms, EEI uses a change of 30 MW as the break point. For larger power reactors, 30 MW is too small a change to warrant explanation. in accordance with the table appearing on the report form. If category 4 must be used, supply brief comments.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT #. Reference the applicable reportable occurrence pertaining to the outage or power reduction. Enter the first four parts (event year, sequential report number, occurrence code and report type) of the five part designation as described in Item 17 of Instructions for Preparation of Data Entry Sheets for Licensee Event Report (LER) File (NUREG-0161). This information may not be immediately evident for all such shutdowns, of course, since further investigation may be required to ascertain whether or not a reportable occurrence was involved.) If the outage or power reduction will not result in a reportable occurrence, the positive indication of this lack of correlation should be noted as not applicable (N/A).

SYSTEM CODE. The system in which the outage or power reduction originated should be noted by the two digit code of Exhibit G - Instructions for Preparation of Data Entry Sheets for Licensee Event Report (LER) File (NUREG-0161).

Systems that do not fit any existing code should be designated XX. The code ZZ should be used for those events where a system is not applicable.

COMPONENT CODE. Select the most appropriate component from Exhibit I - Instructions for Preparation of Data Entry Sheets for Licensee Event Report (LER) File (NUREG-0161). using the following critieria:

- A. If a component failed, use the component directly involved
- B. If not a component failure, use the related component e.g., wrong valve operated through error: list valve as component.
- C. If a chain of failures occurs, he first component to mulfunction should be listed. The sequence of events, including the other components which fail, should be described under the Cause and Corrective Action to Prevent Recurrence column.

Components that do not fit any existing code should be designated XXXXXX. The code ZZZZZZ should be used for events where a component designation is not applicable

CAUSE & CORRECTIVE ACTION TO PREVENT RECUR-RENCE. Use the column in a narrative fashion to amplify or explain the circumstances of the shutdown or power reduction. The column should include the specific cause for each shutdown or significant power reduction and the immediate and contemplated long term corrective action taken, if appropriate. This column should also be used for a description of the mator safety-related corrective maintenance performed during the outage or power reduction including an identification of the critical path activity and a report of any single release of radioactivity or single radiation exposure specifically associated with the outage which accounts for more than 10 percent of the allowable annual values.

For long textual reports continue narrative on separate paper and reference the shutdown or power reduction for this narrative.

Docket No. 50-416 Date: 2-14-84 Completed By: J. G. Cesare Telephone: 601-969-2585

#### OPERATING DATA . PORT SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

## Major Changes to Radioactive Waste Treatment Systems

- 1. Design Change Package (DCP) 83/278 Waste Metering Pump Modification
  - A. Summary of 10CFR 50.59 Considerations

The design change described below does not involve the reduction of safety margins. No significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated is involved nor is the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated created. The postulated worst case failures (radwaste tank rupture and piping leaks) analyzed in FSAR Section 15.7.2 and 15.7.3 are considered to envelope the occurrence and consequence of postulated accidents due to this design change.

The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report will not be created because: All potentially radioactive portions of the waste transfer pump subsystem are located within the radwaste building, and designs were developed in accordance with the related guidance in Branch Technical Position ETSB 11-3 of NRC Standard Review Plan 11.4. Therefore, use of the waste transfer pump subsystem will not result in releases which differ from those previously predicted in FSAR Sections 15.7.2 and 15.7.3 nor will there be a change to the maximum exposure to an individual in the unrestricted area.

The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for Technical Specifications will not be reduced because: The design change does not change the limiting conditions for operation, applicability, actions, or surveillance requirements as defined in the basis for Technical Specifications 3/4.11.1, 6.12, 6.13, and 6.15.

B. Reason for Change

The vendor supplied waste metering pumps are presently located on elevation 124'-3 3/4" of the Radwaste Building directly beneath the waste holding tanks. The space beneath each waste holding tank measures approximately 10' x 12' x 3'. Because of the piping, equipment, and valving placed in these spaces, access for maintenance is severely restricted even for one man. Radiation buildup over a period of time in the components and piping located in the cubicle will produce high background radiation levels. Therefore, the space restrictions and high background radiation levels beneath the waste holding tanks result in a virtually unmaintainable equipment arrangement.

The installed metering pumps are relatively high maintenance components and frequent access to the pump seals will be required depending on service demands. Maintenance history for these pumps at GGNS indicates that the reliability of the metering pumps is not adequate for a single-pump-tank arrangement. Additionally, the radwaste building floor drain and equipment drain filters cannot be decoupled from the waste holding tanks; thus the metering pumps must operate reliably to maintain filter operation. Although dependence on the use of the waste solidification system is greatly reduced as a result of installing permanent piping to transfer wastes to a contract solidification system (DCP-82/650) described in AECM-83/670, dated November 3, 1983, implementation of DCP-82/650 has resulted in increased service demands and dependence on the installed metering pumps.

#### C. Detailed Description of the Change

This DCP replaces the installed solid radwaste system "metering" pumps with centrifugal "transfer" pumps and relocates the pumps from the waste holding tank rooms at elevation 124'-3 3/4" to rooms directly below the tanks at elevation 118'-0". Relocation of the metering pumps and associated valving to elevation 118'-0" below the concrete slab at elevation 124'-3 3/4" will result in improved maintenance access and correspondingly will minimize service times and maintenance-incurred exposures. Replacement of the metering pumps with centrifugal transfer pumps will resolve equipment reliability concerns and increase system processing capacity to coincide with increased service demands.

Since the original solidification system is no longer used, the primary function of this system is to transfer the contents of the waste holding tanks (normally liquid radwaste precoat filter backwash) to the mobile solidification station in the railroad bay. Three centrifugal transfer pumps will be provided, each of which will normally take suction from its respective tank and either discharge to the same tank for recirculation of the tank contents, or to a common sampling or discharge manifold. Cross-connect lines will be provided between pump suction and recirculation lines to improve system flexibility. Any of the three pumps will be capable of taking suction from, and discharge to, any of the three tanks. This arrangement will permit transfer of tank contents from one tank to another, and will provide more than adequate operational flexibility in the event that any given pump is inoperable. Although the common discharge manifold is designed for single pump operation, this will not prohibit use of another pump in a different mode of operation; that is, recirculation, tank sampling, or transferring one waste holding tank's contents to another waste holding tank.

D. Response to GGNS Technical Specification 6.15.(1.d), (1.e), (1.f), and (1.g)

Since this change involves only waste storage and transfer considerations and does not impact waste processing capabilities or effluent releases, predicted releases of radioactive materials in Jiguid and gaseous effluents and/or solid waste quantities should

not differ as a result of this change. Accordingly, expected maximum exposures to an individual in the unrestricted area and to the general population are also unaffected by this change. Since this subsystem is contained within the radwaste building, any potential for radiological consequences due to equipment failure is encompassed by the existing, and still limiting, tank failure analyses presented in the FSAR. Shielding of components and routing of associated piping is consistent with the design radiation zones and ALARA principles. Therefore, no additional exposure to plant operating personnel is anticipated as a result of this change.

#### 2. Design Change Package (DCP) 83/277 Radwaste Clurry Sampling Subsystem

A. Summary of 10CFR 50.59 Considerations

The design change described below does not involve the reduction of safety margins. No significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated is involved nor is the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated created. The postulated worst case failures (radwaste tank rupture and piping leaks) analyzed in FSAR Section 15.7.2 and 15.7.3 are considered to envelope the occurrence and consequence of postulated accidents due to the design change.

The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report will not be created because: All potentially radioactive portions of the radwaste slurry sampling subsystem are located within the radwaste building, and designs were developed in accordance with the related guidance in Branch Technical Position ETSB 11-1 of NRC Standard Review Plan 11.2. Therefore, use of the waste slurry sampling subsystem will not result in releases which differ from those previously predicted in FSAR Sections 15.7.2 and 15.7.3 nor will there be a change to the maximum exposure to an individual in the unrestricted area.

The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for Technical Specifications will not be reduced because: The design change does not change the limiting conditions for operation, applicability, actions, or surveillance requirements as defined in the basis for Technical Specifications 3/4.11.1, 3/4.11.3, 6.12, 6.13, and 6.15.

B. Reason for Change

The radwaste slurry sampling subsystem is required to provide an indirect method of obtaining a representative sample for lOCFR 61 Waste Classification Analysis and to ensure plant operating personnel exposures are maintained at minimal levels consistent with ALARA guidelines.

C. Detailed Description of the Change

This DCP provides for the addition of a radioactive waste slurry sampling subsystem for the Liquid and Solid Radwaste Systems at GGNS. Isolok M-57-A sampling devices and peripheral accessories

(i.e. automatic controller, etc.) will provide an indirect method of obtaining slurry samples, in lieu of grab sampling, from the Reactor Water Cleanup Tank (RWCU), Phase Separator Decay Tanks, the Spent Resin Tank, the Evaporator Bottoms Collector Tanks, the Waste Holding Tanks, and the new Condensate Phase Separator Tanks. Design considerations and methods employed in the subsystem design to maintain ALARA radiation exposures include, but are not limited to the following:

- Operator exposure to radiation from other components (i.e., waste collector tanks, pumps, valves, etc.) containing radioactive material, at the point where the sample is collected, will be reduced by providing shielded remote sampling stations. Exposure of personnel to radiation from the sample and the sample station will be reduced by providing shielding between the components that constitute radiation sources and the receptor.
- 'ing equipment containing 2. Potential doses to personnel a radioactive sources has been r <sup>4</sup> by limiting, to the extent practicable, dead spaces or traps components where radioactive material may accumulate. To prevent radioactive accumulations in slurry piping, flow velocities will be kept as high as feasible to prevent settling of solids, piping will be butt welded without backing rings, and protrusions into the piping will be eliminated to the extent practicable. Accumulations of crud or other radioactive materials that cannot be avoided within equipment or piping will be reduced by providing features that will permit condensate and demineralized water flushing.
- 3. The need to decontaminate equipment and cubicles has been reduced by taking measures to reduce the spread of contamination from the source. Such measures include the use of stainless steel sample sinks routed to local drains and the use of sealants on surfaces where contamination is anticipated.

The design change also provides for installing heat tracing and insulation on the sample lines from the Waste Holding Tanks and the Evaporator Bottoms Tanks to prevent crystallization of waste solids.

D. Response to GGNS Technical Specification 6.15, (1.d), (1.e), (1.f), and (1.g)

Since this change involves only sampling devices and interface piping for the sampling of wastes and does not impact waste processing capabilities (except to increase flexibility) or effluent releases, predicted releases of radioactive materials in liquid and gaseous effluents and/or solid waste quantities should not differ as a result of this change. Accordingly, expected maximum exposures to an individual in the intrestricted area and to the general population are also unaffected by this change. Since all of the equipment and piping is contained within the radwaste building, any potential for radiological consequences due to spills is encompassed by the existing tank failure analyses presented in the FSAR.

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Use of the sample devices will inherently incur exposure to plant operating personnel. Based on the anticipated sampling frequencies (i.e., twice per week at 10 minutes per sample) and the design configuration, a 25 mr/month exposure is anticipated. Since a grab sampling system requires more intimate personnel contact than the new design configuration, a net reduction in exposure to plant operating personnel will result from use of the slurry sampling subsystem.



February 15, 1984

NUCLEAR PRODUCTION DEPARTMENT

Mr. Richard C. DeYoung, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555

Attention: Document Control Desk

Dear Mr. DeYoung:

SUBJECT: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Unit 1 Docket No. 50-416 License No. NPF-13 File 0260/L-835.0 Monthly Operating Report AECM-84/0071

In accordance with 10CFR50.36, Mississippi Power & Light Company (MP&L) is providing twelve copies of the Monthly Operating Report (MOR) for Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Unit 1 for January, 1984, (Attachment).

The attached supplement to the MOR provides detailed information pertaining to two proposed design changes to the GGNS-1 radioactive waste treatment systems. This information is provided in accordance with Section 6.15.1 of the Technical Specifications. These changes were reviewed and approved by the Plant Safety Review Committee on January 6, 1984, in accordance with the requirements of Section 6.5.1 of the Technical Specifications.

The 10CFR 50.59 safety considerations summarized in the attached supplement will receive a detailed review by our Nuclear Safety & Compliance Section in preparation for the annual report on 10CFR 50.59 safety evaluations.

If you have any questions or require additional information, please contact this office.

Yours truly,

Dale

Manager of Nuclear Services

GWD/JGC:sad Attachment

cc: (See Next Page)

Member Middle South Utilities System

## MISSISSIPPI POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

AECM-84/0071 Page 2

cc: Mr. J. B. Richard (w/a) Mr. R. B. McGehee (w/o) Mr. T. B. Conner (w/o) Mr. G. B. Taylor (w/o)

Mr. J. P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator (w/a)
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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101 Marietta St., N.W., Suite 2900
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Chief (w/2) Office of Resource Management U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555