EXHIBIT A


	CONTROL BLOCK: 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE	ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)
7 8	9 LICENSEE CODE 24 15 LICENSE NUMBER 1 - 1 0 1 0 13 1	
7 8	SOURCE 60 61 00CKET NUMBER 68 69 EVENT DATE	
10121	EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES 10 10n 9/26/83, with the unit at 100% power, it was determined that Battery 2011	had failed its quarterly
10131	lance test, rendering it technically inoperable. The quarterly test was sta	
10141	Ireadings had indicated that 5 cells were out of specification in that they d	eviated by more than 0.05 volts
1 2 1 5 1	I from initial acceptance test data, the worst being 0.08 volts. The as found	
10161	Inized as a limit specified in Technical Specification (T.S.) 4.8.2.3.2.b.1;	
! 0 7	Specification 3.8.2.3 (b) were not taken within the time allowed by the Limi	
10181	Itherefore, General Specification 3.0.3 became applicable. The reactor was s	
1 0 1 9 1	SYSTEM	COMP VALVE SUBCODE SUBCODE
17 R	EVENT YEAR SEQUENTIAL OCCURRENT NUMBER 1 21 22 23 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	TYPE NO 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
TAI	TION FUTURE EFFECT SHUTDOWN ACTION ON PLANT METHOD HOURS SUBMITTED FORM A 18 1 X 19 1 A 120 1 A 121 1 0 2 1 1 6 122 1 Y 123 1 N 36 37 40 41 42	The state of the s
11101	CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 27 The cause of the battery degradation was determined to be normal aging couple	
1111	lequelizing charges were not sufficient in duration. An investigation was con	
1121	10perations personnel involved to determine why the voltage deviation was not	
11131	Ication (T.S.) limit, thereby causing the LCO to be exceeded. It was determine	
11141	linadequate exchange of information between the shift supervisor and the maint	
1 1 5 1 7 8 A	FACILITY STATUS	SCOVERY DESCRIPTION
	9 133 1 2 134 1 NA 135 1 NA 44 45	36 80
1 1 7 1 7 8	PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION 1 0 1 0 137 1 Z 138 1 NA 9 11 12 13 ERSONNEL INJURIES	[39 80
	NUMBER DESCRIPTION 1 0 1 0 1 0 140 NA 9 11 12 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE DESCRIPTION 1 Z 142 NA	80
2101	PUBLICITY ISSUED DESCRIPTION 1 N 144 NA 9 10 .	NRC USE ONLY 145 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 80
	NAME OF PREPARER. Dan Moeggenbeing	PHONE: (501) 964-3100
9310180	0189 F31010	



ARKANSAS POWER & LIGHT COMPANY POST OFFICE BOX 551 LITTLE ROCK, ARKANSAS 72203 (501) 371-4000 October 10, 1983

2CAN1Ø83Ø5

Mr. W. C. Seidle, Chief Reactor Project Branch #2 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region IV 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000 Arlington, Texas 76011



Subject: Arkansas Nuclear One - Unit 2

Docket No. 50-368 License No. NPF-6 Licensee Event Report No. 83-044/01T-0

Gentlemen:

In accordance with Arkansas Nuclear One - Unit 2 Technical Specification 6.9.1.8.b, attached is the subject report concerning degradation of Battery 2D11.

Hery truly yours,

John R. Marshall Manager, Licensing

JRM: RJS: s1

Attachment

cc: Mr. Richard C. DeYoung
 Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

Mr. Norman M. Haller, Director Office of Management & Program Analysis U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 LER No. 50-368/83-044/01T-0

Occurrence Date: 09/26/83

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE COMSEQUENCES (Continued)

to cold shutdown within the time requirements of General Specification 3.0.3, and subsequently entered the refueling outage. Upon evaluation of the significance of the battery cell voltage deviation, it was determined that the battery would have performed its safety function. In addition, redundant Battery 2012 was available for service. This event is reportable per T.S. 6.9.1.8.b. Other LER's regarding battery cells were (50-368) 82-013, 82-016 and 82-020.

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (Continued)

factors include:

The maintenance technicians did not recognize the deviation as a T.S. limit.

The surveillance procedure did not identify the limit as a T.S. limit.

3) The procedure did not specify the information to be conveyed to the shift supervisor. 4)

Prior T.S. training given to the maintenance technicians regarding battery surveillance was not effective. The electrical maintenance supervisor, who was first notified of the deviation by the maintenance technicians, was unfamiliar with the surveillance procedure. (Note: The regular electrical maintenance supervisor was not on site.)

After it was recognized that the T.S. limit and LCO were exceeded, the unit was brought to cold shutdown as required by General Specification 3.0.3. The battery was placed on equalizing charge for an extended time. Subsequent battery readings indicated certain cells were varying in and out of specification. As a result of an engineering evaluation of battery performance, 4 cells were replaced to provide additional assurance that the specification limit of 0.05 voltage deviation from initial acceptance data would not be exceeded. At the time of this report, the battery has not been declared operable pending further required testing. Regarding the failure to comply with T.S. 3.8.2.3 (b), the following corrective actions

- As of 10/1/83, all limits in surveillance procedures in the plant's Master Test Control List are being treated as though they are T.S. limits. If a limit is exceeded, it is to be formally reported via a Report of Abnormal Condition to allow prompt operability assessment. This will remain in effect until such time as the surveillance procedures are reviewed and determined not to contain T.S. limits, or the procedures are revised to adequately inform the user of T.S. limits and instruct the user of his immediate responsibilities. The review of procedures will be documented and subsequently reviewed by the Plant Safety Committee. Revised procedures will be reviewed by the Plant Safety Committee. Management and supervision were required to review the above requirements for reporting out of specification conditions as well as individual responsibilities with their workers before they have performed a surveillance after 9/30/83.
- 2) Long term corrective actions will contain the following elements:
 - Surveillance procedures will be reviewed and revised to assure that the method of collecting data and comparing it to limits is standardized, that the procedure steps flow in a logical manner, and that adequate QC requirements are built into the procedure.
 - Training for all departments on technical specifications which apply to their discipline will be conducted. The SRO training program will be reviewed in the area of technical specifications to ensure it is thorough enough in light of this problem.
 - An investigation is being conducted of the apparent breakdown in administrative controls which resulted in the occurrence of this event. After the investigation is concluded, additional corrective actions will be taken in this area.