

October 12, 1983

UNITED STATE OF AMERICA  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board

In the Matter of )  
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Locket No. 50-322-OL-3  
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1) ) (Emergency Planning Proceeding)

FEMA RESPONSE TO SUFFOLK  
COUNTY MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY

Suffolk County on September 19, 1983 filed a motion to compel discovery. Specifically, the County sought the production of three documents or series of documents 1/. As to these three documents, FEMA has agreed to produce and has provided to the County the memorandum from Frank Petrone, Regional Director to Louis O. Giuffrida and Jeffrey Bragg. Discussions with the County have indicated that they will also seek to compel the production of five additional documents 2/. In order to save the Board time we have decided to address all seven of these documents at this time.

Two of the documents specifically requested herein involve drafts of letters that were sent by the Federal Emergency Management Agency to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in response to specific requests by the NRC. Copies of these letters were previously provided to all parties. It is evident to all parties that FEMA's policy and position is clearly enunciated in those letters as acknowledged by Suffolk County "these documents set forth FEMA's position ...". The drafts contain the thoughts and opinions of staff. The other five documents contain opinions of staff as well as proposed policy alternatives for the consideration of senior staff. (see Giuffrida affidavit).

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) by its Director, Louis O. Giuffrida, asserts that the documents sought are subject to the provisions of executive privilege.

An agency has the right to seek its own counsel and to freely discuss its policy relative to a response to another agency without having those discussions examined before a hearing conducted by that other agency.

If it is not the intent of this hearing Board to review each and every policy deliberation of FEMA as well as staff opinions then it is obvious that this line of discovery will not lead to admissible evidence.

1/ All drafts of a memorandum for Edward L. Jordan of the N.R.C. from Richard W. Krimm, Assistant Associate Director Office of Natural and Technological Hazards, FEMA dated June 23, 1983 on the subject of FEMA support for NRC Licensing of Shoreham Nuclear Station; all drafts of a letter to William J. Dircks of the NRC from Jeffrey S. Bragg, Executive Deputy Director, FEMA dated August 29, 1983 and the memorandum from Frank Petrone to Jeffrey Bragg and Louis O. Giuffrida.

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The privilege against disclosure of intragovernmental documents containing advisory opinion recommendations, and deliberations is part of a broader executive privilege recognized by courts. The purpose of the privilege is to ensure that the decision makers in government are provided with candid and frank advice.

U.S. v. Capitol Serv. Inc.  
89 F.R.D. 578, 582-583

There is a public policy involved in this claim of privilege for this advisory opinion the policy of open, frank discussion between subordinate and chief concerning administrative action.

Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp v. U.S.  
157 FS 946

The purpose of the privilege for predecisional deliberations is to insure that a decision maker will receive the unimpeded advice of his associates. The theory is that if advice is revealed, associates may be reluctant to be candid and frank. It follows that documents shielded by executive privilege remain privileged even after the decision to which they pertain may have been effected, since disclosure at any time could inhibit the free flow of advice, including analysis, reports and expression of opinion within the agency.

Federal Open Market Committee v. Merrill  
443 U.S. 340, 359-360

The issue is a greater one than just whether Suffolk County shall have access to these seven documents. The question raises for the employees of this agency whether they can freely express their opinions, provide advice and participate in deliberations without fear that these expressions of opinion will become part of the public domain. It is of equal or even greater concern to those individuals in responsible decision making positions that they will receive the full broad range of possible alternative thought available to them. If every time a subordinate expressed an opinion, wrote a memorandum, drafted a letter he knew that these documents would be subject to public scrutiny he may determine not to take such actions. The chilling effect of such a position is untenable. The deleterious impact of such a chilling effect was recognized by Commissioners Ahern and Roberts in the matter of Indian Point.

We understand the concern of the judges on this Board that all relevant material be before the panel.

2/ Those sections of a Briefing Paper on Shoreham prepared by the staff of Region II for Frank P. Petrone, Regional Director detailing his staffs identification of issues and recommendations; Memorandum for Richard W. Krimm from Gary Johnson, Executive Officer in the Office of Natural and Technological Hazards dated June 7, 1983 concerning the response of FEMA to the NRC request of June 1, 1983; Draft letter, never mailed, prepared for signature of Louis O. Giuffrida by the staff of the Office of Natural & Technological Hazards in anticipation of a request by NRC for a FEMA review of the LILCO Transition Plan; Portions of Status Report on Shoreham Nuclear Power Plant dealing with opinions of staff; analysis of a hypothetical question concerning LILCO, New York State and Suffolk County response to an accident at the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station.

We agree, of course, that the deposition discovery rules are to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment. The deposition-discovery process serves to advance the stage at which disclosure can be compelled and thereby serves to reduce the possibility of surprise. But in regard to these two documents there is no surprise, as the agency has clearly stated its position in the two letters that were forwarded to the NRC and which have been provided to all the parties to this proceeding while the additional five documents contain the opinions and counsel of staff to senior policy makers.

Discovery, like all matters of procedure, has ultimate and necessary boundaries. As rule 26(b) provides, limitations come into existence when the inquiry touches upon the irrelevant or encroaches upon the recognized domains of privilege.

The cases that do argue for compelling disclosure of intra-governmental memoranda rests on an examination of whether the production of the contested document would be injurious to the consultative functions of government that the privilege of nondisclosure protects. Therefore, only memoranda or parts of memoranda consisting of compiled factual material contained in deliberative memoranda and separable from its context would generally be available for discovery by private parties.

The demand for these documents seeks to lay bare the discussion and methods of reasoning of public officials. Nothing is alleged by the County to suggest any need for production of the documents to establish facts.

It cannot be "all communications to the head of department are to be produced and made public whenever a suitor in a Court of justice thinks that his case requires such production." *Beatson v. Skene*, 5 H. & N. Exch. Rep., at 851 4 Moore's Federal Practice 1175. *Walling v. Comet Carriers*, D.C. 3 F.R.D. 442; *Walling v. Richmond Schreww Anchor Co.*, D.C., 4 F.R.D. 265, 269; *United States v. Kohler Co.*, D.C., 9 F.R.D. 289, 291; *Pacific-Atlantic S.S. Co. v. United States*, 4 Cir., 175 F.2d 632, 637. Cf. *Bank Line v. United States*, 2 Cir., 163 F.2d 133; *Leen v. President of the Executive Council et al*, 1926 Irish Report 456, 462 et seq.

It is necessary therefore to consider the circumstances around the demand for this document in order to determine whether or not its production is injurious to the consultative functions of government that the privilege of non-disclosure protects.

The Government's present motion is hotly contested, but implicit in the claimants' position is the realization that production must be restricted to materials "not privileged". All parties recognize, too, that privilege for this purpose exists or not according to common acceptations in the law of evidence. Immunity from production based on privilege is neither broader nor narrower than it would be in the normal trial context.

All that needs to be decided, is that, as documents integral to an appropriate exercise of the executive's decisional and policy-making functions, they are immune from the disclosure the claimants seek.

"Executive privilege is a phrase of release from requirements common to private citizens or organizations" 3/ - an exemption essential to discharge of highly important executive responsibilities. While it is agreed that the privilege extends to all military and diplomatic secrets, its recognition is not confined to data qualifying as such. Whatever its boundaries as to other types of claims not involving state secrets, it is well established that the privilege obtains with respects to intra-governmental documents reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated.

It is evident that the Agency, to function adequately, must depend heavily upon candid exchanges of ideas, not only among its own staff but also particularly because of the institutional nature of its decisions, with other agencies who interests are involved.

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3/ - Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. United States, 157 F. Supp. 939, 944, 141 Ct. CL 38(1958).

18-"Government, operating as it does through a hierarchy of agents, must have the benefit of their full, free advices." U.S. v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 25 F.R.D. 485, 489 (D. N.J. 1960).

Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena  
40 F.R.D. 318



The judiciary, the courts declare, is not authorized "to probe the mental processes" of an executive or administrative officer. This salutary rule forecloses investigation into the methods by which a decision is reached, - 4/ the matters considered, 5 the contributing influences, 6 or the role played by the work of others-7 results demanded by exigencies of the most imperative character. No judge could tolerate an inquisition into the elements comprising his decision 8 - indeed, "[s]uch an examination of a judge would be destructive of judicial responsibility" 9 - and by the same token "the integrity of the administrative process must be equally respected".

We agree with the government's contention that it was not the function of the court to probe the mental processes of the Secretary in reaching his conclusions.

Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp v. U.S.  
157 FS 946  
Morgan v. U.S.  
304 U.S. 1, 18

"Just as a judge cannot be subjected to such a scrutiny, compare Fayerweather v. Ritch, 195 U.S. 276, 306-307, 25 S. Ct. 58, 49 L. Ed 193, so the integrity of the administrative process must be equally respected. See Chicago Bd. Q. Ry. Co. v. Babcock, 204 U.S. 585, 593, 27 S. Ct. 326, 51 L. Ed 636. It will bear repeating that although the administrative process has had a different development and pursues somewhat different ways from those of courts, they are to be deemed collaborative instrumentalities of justice and the appropriate independence of each should be respected by the other

U.S. v. Morgan  
307 U.S. 183, 313 U.S. 409

The County clearly states in its motion that they seek "contrary views if any exist". The County is seeking that which executive privilege is specifically designed to protect, the advisory opinion and thought processes of the staff.

The cerebrations and mental processes of government officials, leading to admittedly proper exercises of power, can never be a factor in a judicial proceeding and, therefore, need not be disclosed." 10

The starting point is the Director's affidavit describing the general characters of the documents in dispute and expressing his view as to the harm consequent upon their exposure the Court can and should weigh, in the gravest manner possible, his considered judgment as to the impact of the production sought upon the public interest. 11

4 - United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 422. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. United States, supra note 12, 157 F.Supp. at 946-947.

5 - See Fayerweather v. Ritch, 195 U.S. 276, 306-307, 25 S.Ct. 58, 49 L.Ed. 193 (1904); DeCubra v. Rogers, supra note 23, 189 U.S. at 122, 23 S.Ct. 519.

6 - Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co. v. Babcock, 204 U.S. 585, 593, 27 Ct. 326.

- 7 - United States v. Morgan, *supra* note 23, 313 U.S. at 422, 61 S.Ct. 999; Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. United States, *supra* note 12.
- 8 - See United States v. Morgan, *supra* note 23, 313 U.S. at 422.
- 9 - United States v. Morgan, *supra* note 23, 313 U.S. at 422, 61 S.Ct. at 1004
- 10 - Rosee v. Board of Trade, 36 F.R.D. 684, 689 (N.D.111.1965). See also Totten v. United States, *supra* note 13.
- 11 - Capitol Vending Co. v. Baker, 35 F.R.D. 510 (D.D.C.1964); Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. United States, *supra* note 12, 157 F.Supp. at 944; Pollen v. Ford Instrument Co., 26 F.Supp. 583, 585 (E.D.N.Y. 1939)

The claimants have had access to all of the Government's communications with outsiders, as well as to nearly all intra-government materials relating to the actual draft of the Argonne review.

What are retained are intra-government memoranda and interdepartmental communications composed wholly of opinions, recommendations and deliberations relating to legal and other determinations. There is an obvious distinction, in terms of necessity for inspection, between documents of this character and those which contain facts. 12

The basic fallacy in the claimant's approach results from the fact that they endeavor to exploit what they consider to be weaknesses in the Government's case without making any real case of their own. At best, the only position they can sustain is that, notwithstanding the strong showing made by the Government, there remains a speculative possibility that something to which they may legitimately be entitled is withheld. It is not, however, incumbent upon the government to negate all the possible uses production of the retained documents might serve; the requirement is that the claimants make a showing of necessity sufficient to outweigh the adverse effects the production would engender. 13

Disclosures would only result in an invasion of important interests, causing dire public consequences without any apparent discovery benefit to the claimants.

The claimants argue strenuously that the documents in questions should be submitted to the Court with a view to its determination through in camera inspection as to whether their production should be compelled. The Government, with equal vigor, contends that such a procedure would in the circumstances be unnecessary and improper, and urges that the privilege be sustained without further ado.

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12 -O'Keefe v. Boeing Co. 38 F.R.D. 329, 336

13 - See United States v. Reynolds, *supra* note 7, 345 U.S. at 10-11, 73 S.Ct 528; Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. United States, *supra* note 12, 157 F.Supp. at 946-47.

As Reynolds holds, a court may not properly require an in camera inspection as a matter of course before accepting a claim of executive privilege. And neither Reynolds nor succeeding decisions can be read to support a contention that such an examination is to follow automatically in cases where no military or diplomatic secrets are involved. On the contrary, they make it clear that an in camera examination should be afforded only where a suitable occasion therefor sufficiently appears. 14

In camera inspection in executive privilege cases is appropriate where it appears with reasonable clarity that the party seeking production is entitled to access to some of the materials demanded. Examination in this type of situation enables the separation of what should be disclosed from what should be revealed. Again, it may be that the balance between competing needs for confidentiality and disclosure cannot be made without analysis of the disputed data. 15 Here the inspection enables the weighing to be done in the privacy of the judge's chambers. In each situation, however, a need actual or potential, for production adequately appears, and the examination affords the means for fulfilling that need.

In camera inspections of documents claimed under this privilege should be a last resort U.S. v. Reynolds 345 U.S. 8-11 U.S. v. Nixon 418 U.S. 714-15

We recognize, that balanced against this, is the Board's own duty to fulfill its own obligation. We have therefore provided these documents in a sealed envelope to the Board. It will be their determination if the facts call for in camera inspection.

That no such occasion is presented in this case is amply demonstrated, without plowing old ground, by brief reference to previous discussion. The claimants have not shown that they are or could be entitled to the documents the Government still retains. The Government, on the other hand, has made a substantial showing that everything that is withheld falls well within the scope and protection of the privilege, and it satisfactorily appears that the balance on disclosure or secrecy is decidedly in its favor. It is clear, too, that the claimant's projected investigation into the Government's decisional and deliberative processes is legally impermissible.

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14 - Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. United States, supra note 12; Walled Lake Door Co. v. United States, supra note 15. See also Capitol Vending Co. v. Baker, supra note 36.

15 - See Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. City of Burlington, 351 F.2d 762, 767-771 (D.C.Cir1965)

As the material the County is seeking is not relevant, subject to privilege and in that the County has not made the requisite showings for the production of these additional documents the County's motion should be denied.

Respectfully submitted

*Stewart M. Glass*

Stewart M. Glass  
Regional Counsel



UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Before The Atomic Safety And Licensing Board

-----:  
In the Matter of :  
Long Island Lighting Company :  
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1) :  
-----:

AFFIDAVIT OF  
LOUIS O. GIUFFRIDA  
Director, Federal  
Emergency Management  
Agency

LOUIS O. GIUFFRIDA, hereby declares:

1. I am the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), an agency of the executive branch of the Federal government. I make this declaration in support of the Agency's Response to Suffolk County's Motion to Compel Discovery.

2. Executive Order 12148 charges the Director, FEMA, with establishing policy for and coordinating all civil emergency planning and assistance functions for Executive agencies. On December 7, 1979, the President, directed that FEMA assume lead responsibility for all offsite nuclear emergency planning and response.

Notwithstanding the procedures which may be set forth in 44 CFR 350 for requesting and reaching a FEMA administrative approval of State and local plans, findings and determinations on the current status of emergency preparedness around particular sites may be requested by the NRC/FEMA Steering Committee and provided by FEMA for use as needed in the NRC licensing process. These findings and determinations may be based upon plans currently available to FEMA or furnished to FEMA by the NRC.

3. Pursuant to a request from the NRC dated June 1, 1983 FEMA arranged for a review of the LILCO Transition plan and transmitted the results of that review to the NRC by letter dated June 23, 1983.

4. Suffolk County seeks the production of the following documents:

- a) All drafts of a memorandum for Edward L. Jordan of the N.R.C. from Richard W. Krimm, Assistant Associate Director Office of Natural and Technological Hazards, FEMA dated June 23, 1983 on the subject of FEMA support for NRC Licensing of Shoreham Nuclear Station.
- b) All drafts of a letter to William J. Dircks of the N.R.C. from Jeffrey S. Bragg, Executive Deputy Director, FEMA dated August 29, 1983.
- c) Those sections of a Briefing Paper on Shoreham prepared by the staff of Region II for Frank P. Petrone, Regional Director detailing his staffs identification of issues and recommendations.
- d) Memorandum for Richard W. Krimm from Gary Johnson, Executive Officer in the Office of Natural and Technological Hazards dated June 7, 1983 concerning the response of FEMA to the NRC request of June 1, 1983.
- e) Draft letter, never mailed, prepared for signature of Louis O. Giuffrida by the staff of the office of Natural and Technological Hazards in anticipation of a request by NRC for a FEMA review of the LILCO Transition Plan.

- f) Portions of Status Report on Shoreham Nuclear Power Plant dealing with opinions of staff.
- g) Analysis of a hypothetical question concerning LILCO, New York State and Suffolk County response to an accident at the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station.

5. I have personally examined the above documents and have concluded that their production would be contrary to the public interest. These documents are being withheld from discovery at my direction as they consist of intra-departmental memoranda and communications containing opinions, recommendations and deliberations pertaining to decisions that the Federal Emergency Management Agency was required to make in response to requests from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

As the executive in charge of the overall operations of the agency, I assert that these documents are subject to the protection of executive privilege. The production of these documents will have a chilling effect on the ability of this agency to receive in written format the comments, concerns and opinions of our staff.

Louis O. Giuffrida, Director  
Federal Emergency Management Agency

DATED: Washington, D.C.  
October ,1983

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD

In the Matter of

LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY

(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station,  
Unit 1)

Docket No. 50-322-OL-3  
(Emergency Planning)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that copies of "FEMA RESPONSE TO SUFFOLK COUNTY MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY" in the above-captioned proceeding have been served on the following by deposit in the United States mail, first class or, as indicated by an asterisk, through deposit in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's internal mail system, or as indicated by two asterisks by hand or telecopier, this 12th day of October, 1983:

James A. Laurenson, Chairman\*\*  
Administrative Judge  
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D.C. 20555

Ralph Shapiro, Esq.  
Cammer and Shapiro  
9 East 40th Street  
New York, NY 10016

Dr. Jerry R. Kline\*\*  
Administrative Judge  
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D.C. 20555

Howard L. Blau, Esq.  
217 Newbridge Road  
Hicksville, NY 11801

Mr. Frederick J. Shon\*\*  
Administrative Judge  
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D.C. 20555

W. Taylor Reveley III, Esq.\*\*  
Hunton & Williams  
P.O. Box 1535  
Richmond, VA 23212

Jonathan D. Feinberg, Esq.  
New York State Department of  
Public Service  
Three Empire State Plaza  
Albany, NY 12223

Cherif Sedkey, Esq.  
Kirkpatrick, Lockhart, Johnson  
& Hutchison  
1500 Oliver Building  
Pittsburgh, PA 15222

Stephen B. Latham, Esq.  
John F. Shea, III, Esq.  
Twomey, Latham & Shea  
Attorneys at Law  
P.O. Box 398  
33 West Second Street  
Riverhead, NY 11901

Atomic Safety and Licensing  
Board Panel\*  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D.C. 20555

Atomic Safety and Licensing  
Appeal Board Panel\*  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, DC 20555

Docketing and Service Section\*  
Office of the Secretary  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D.C. 20555

Spence Perry, Esq.  
Associate General Counsel  
Federal Emergency Management Agency  
Room 840  
500 C Street, S.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20472


Herbert H. Brown, Esq.\*\*  
Lawrence Coe Lanpher, Esq.  
Karla J. Letsche, Esq.  
Kirkpatrick, Lockhart, Hill,  
Christopher & Phillips  
1900 M Street, N.W.  
8th Floor  
Washington, D.C. 20036

Eleanor L. Frucci, Esq.\*\*  
Attorney  
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board  
Panel  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D.C. 20555

James B. Dougherty, Esq.  
3045 Porter Street, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20008

Stewart M. Glass, Esq.  
Regional Counsel  
Federal Emergency Management  
Agency  
26 Federal Plaza  
Room 1349  
New York, NY 10278

Lucinda Low Swartz, Esq.  
Pacific Legal Foundation  
1990 M Street, N.W.  
Suite 550  
Washington, D.C. 20036

  
David A. Repka  
Counsel for NRC Staff



COURTESY COPY LIST

Edward M. Barrett, Esq.  
General Counsel  
Long Island Lighting Company  
250 Old County Road  
Mineola, NY 11501

Mr. Brian McCaffrey  
Long Island Lighting Company  
175 East Old Country Road  
Hicksville, New York 11801

Marc W. Goldsmith  
Energy Research Group, Inc.  
400-1 Totten Pond Road  
Waltham, MA 02154

David H. Gilmartin, Esq.  
Suffolk County Attorney  
County Executive/Legislative Bldg.  
Veteran's Memorial Highway  
Hauppauge, NY 11788

Ken Robinson, Esq.  
N.Y. State Dept. of Law  
2 World Trade Center  
Room 4615  
New York, NY 10047

Leon Friedman, Esq.  
Costigan, Hyman & Hyman  
1301 Franklin Avenue  
Garden City, NY 11530

Mr. Jeff Smith  
Shoreham Nuclear Power Station  
P.O. Box 618  
North Country Road  
Wading River, NY 11792

MHB Technical Associates  
1723 Hamilton Avenue  
Suite K  
San Jose, CA 95125

Hon. Peter Cohalan  
Suffolk County Executive  
County Executive/Legislative Bldg.  
Veteran's Memorial Highway  
Hauppauge, NY 11788

Mr. Jay Dunkleberger  
New York State Energy Office  
Agency Building 2  
Empire State Plaza  
Albany, New York 12223

Ms. Nora Bredes  
Shoreham Opponents Coalition  
195 East Main Street  
Smithtown, NY 11787