

DMB

February 23, 1984

Docket No. 50-373

Docket No. 50-374

Commonwealth Edison Company

ATTN: Mr. Cordell Reed

Vice President

Post Office Box 767

Chicago, IL 60690

Gentlemen:

Due to a reproduction error the attachment to our January 31, 1984 letter was missing the odd numbered pages. Please find enclosed a complete copy of the Federal Emergency Management Agency LaSalle Nuclear Power Station Final Exercise Report.

We are sorry for any inconvenience this error may have caused you.

Sincerely,

C. J. Paperiello

C. J. Paperiello, Chief
Emergency Preparedness and
Radiological Safety Branch

Enclosure: As stated

cc w/encl:

D. L. Farrar, Director
of Nuclear Licensing

G. J. Diederich, Station
Superintendent

R. H. Holyoak, Project Manager
DMB/Document Control Desk (RIDS)

Resident Inspector, RIII

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DATE	2/23/84	2/23/84	2/23/84				



Federal Emergency Management Agency

Washington, D.C. 20472

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PRINCIPAL STAFF			
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Edward L. Jordan
Director, Division of Emergency Preparedness
and Engineering Response
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

FROM: *Richard W. Krimm*
Richard W. Krimm
Assistant Associate Director
Office of Natural and Technological Hazards Programs

SUBJECT: Final Exercise Report for the LaSalle Nuclear Power Station
Offsite Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise
conducted July 12, 1983

Attached is the final exercise report for the joint radiological emergency preparedness exercise conducted on July 12, 1983, at the LaSalle Nuclear Power Station. This exercise was small-scale for the State of Illinois and full-scale for LaSalle County. Grundy County, Illinois, did not participate in this exercise because of an agreement between FEMA Region V and Grundy County officials. Grundy County participated in a full-scale capacity at the Dresden radiological emergency preparedness exercise on September 14, 1983. This report cites that the State of Illinois and LaSalle County demonstrated the capability to protect the public in the event of a radiological emergency at the LaSalle Nuclear Power Plant.

Although there were deficiencies observed at the exercise, they did not detract from the overall demonstrated capability to protect the public. The attached schedule of corrective actions has been submitted by the State of Illinois. Based on the exercise and the State's corrective actions, we cannot identify any impediments to protecting the public in the event of an accident at the LaSalle Nuclear Power Station. Therefore, the "350" approval will remain in effect.

If you have any questions, please contact Mr. Marshall Sanders, Acting Chief, Technological Hazards Division at 287-0179.

Attachment
As Stated

JAN 23 1984

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Federal Emergency Management Agency

Region V One North Dearborn Street, Room 540, Chicago, IL 60602

Re: 11/11

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Associate Director, Office of Natural
and Technological Hazards

Attention: Robert Turner

FROM: *for Dan Benoit*
Wallace Weaver, Chairman
Regional Assistance Committee

SUBJECT: La Salle Final Exercise Report Corrective Actions

Attached are the corrective action statements to the La Salle Final Exercise Report for the July 12, 1983, exercise. We believe the method and schedule of corrective actions is reasonable and logical.

Also attached is a copy of our letter to Illinois.

As a result of the exercise and the State's corrective actions, we cannot identify any impediments to protecting the public in the event of an accident at the La Salle Nuclear Power Station. Therefore we recommend the 350 approval remain in effect.

Attachments

Criteria E. 7 (Notification Methods and Procedures)
The following inadequacy was identified:

The EBS instructional prescribed messages from the plans were used when the State ESDA recommended protective actions. The first message indicated sheltering out to two miles when the State recommendation had been to evacuate out to two miles. Both messages, as released to EBS, did not describe the areas involved or outline evacuation routes. All specific information should be included in instructional EBS messages in synchronization with prompt alerting and notification systems sirens.

ESDA Response

The EBS instructional prescribed messages from the LaSalle plan allow for description of areas involved as well as delineation of evacuation routes. The incorrect selection of messages and the improper descriptions contained in the messages indicates a need for further training. This training will be provided during the 1984 annual training and exercise.

Criteria M.1 (Recovery and Re-entry Planning and Post Accident Operations)
The following inadequacy was identified:

The re-entry phase was delayed at the County due to a communication problem relating to the new NARS form. Adding space on the NARS form to clearly identify re-entry would alleviate a delay.

ESDA Response

The NARS form contains a space indicating "Recovery/Re-entry." Recovery being a function of the utility and DNS, and re-entry being a function of State, County and local organizations. Training has been given in LaSalle and Grundy Counties, and the new NARS form was in place effective October 1, 1983.

Reid 12/13/83 RLS



Federal Emergency Management Agency

Region V 300 South Wacker, 24th Floor, Chicago, IL 60606 (312) 353-1500

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Associate Director, Office of Natural
and Technological Hazards

Attention: Megs Hepler

FROM: Acting Chief, Technological Hazards Branch

SUBJECT: Final Report - La Salle Site-Specific Off-Site
Exercise, July 12, 1983

Attached is the La Salle Final Report. The State of Illinois and La Salle County demonstrated the capability to protect the population in the Emergency Planning Zone. This report follows the guidance in the April 5, 1982, memorandum regarding REP Exercise Evaluation Reports. Also attached is the Scenario of the July 12, 1983, exercise.

A copy of this report has been provided the State of Illinois, requesting a schedule of corrective actions by October 28, 1983.

This report will become a part of the "Regional Director's Evaluation (350 submission) forwarded to FEMA Headquarters February 18, 1982.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Dan", is positioned above the printed name.

Dan Bement

Attachments

PART II

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report contains the findings of a five member evaluation team who observed and evaluated the emergency response to a simulated radiological emergency at the La Salle Nuclear Power Station, Seneca, Illinois, July 12, 1983. The exercise participants included the State of Illinois (small scale), La Salle County (full scale), the licensee, Commonwealth Edison Company/LaSalle Nuclear Power Station. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region III evaluated the Licensee's emergency response onsite at the La Salle Nuclear Power Station.

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region III report for onsite evaluation will be provided to the participants they evaluated separate of this report. The Federal Emergency Management Agency Region V is responsible to provide this report to the Director, Illinois Emergency Services and Disaster Agency.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency Region V evaluators were positioned at the principal emergency response centers. The evaluators' findings are summarized in the following interim critique with Parts III-V of this Final Report providing specifics in greater detail.

For this exercise, an oral agreement had been made; in view that Grundy County will be exercising their capability for radiological emergency preparedness in the forthcoming Dresden annual exercise, they were exempt from the La Salle Nuclear Power Station exercise, July 12, 1983. The agreement was made by FEMA Region V and the Director of the Illinois Emergency Services and Disaster Agency.

In consideration of the scope of the exercise, the scale of the exercise for each governmental body, and the particular components demonstrated, the State Emergency Services and Disaster Agency and the emergency response organizations of La Salle County adequately demonstrated their capabilities to effectively respond to a radiological emergency resulting from an accident at the La Salle Nuclear Power Station. Some deficiencies were observed but they do not detract significantly from the overall demonstrated capability.

I. Emergency Operations Facilities and Resources
(Space, internal communications, displays, security)

State: The State Emergency Operations Center (to include communications, displays, etc.) has been evaluated during previous full scale exercises and found to be adequate for the conduct of emergency operations for an extended period. During this small scale exercise, no deficiencies were observed.

La Salle County: The communications were adequate to contact all the necessary organizations. The Nuclear Accident Reporting System (NARS), commercial telephone and radio were used to communicate. The Emergency Operations Center (EOC) is a large well-ventilated area with good lighting. It is located in a large area in the basement of the County complex providing ample space for emergency workers. The security desk

was positioned by the entrance to the EOC with two people handling the registration, handing out pocket dosimeters and thermoluminescent dosimeters to those entering the EOC.

II. Alerting and Mobilization of Officials and Staff
(Staffing, 24-hour capability, alerting timeliness)

State: The State warning point is manned on a 24-hour basis. The State's procedures and equipment are adequate for completing alerting and mobilization of the State's emergency staff in an expeditious manner. Initial warning for the State and local units of government is received via the NARS. This being a small scale exercise for the State, all State agencies did not send representatives to the EOC. This mode of operation for this exercise is acceptable due to the nature of the exercise.

La Salle County: The capability does exist for 24-hour operation of communications. This is accomplished through the County Sheriff's dispatchers. It was demonstrated that La Salle County can operate on a continuous 24-hour basis. Notification of the response organizations was done very quickly and the messages were verified. The communications equipment is located in the Sheriff's Department and is adequate to notify emergency organizations and emergency response personnel. There is the capability to communicate with fixed and mobile medical units. The EOC was activated within 30 minutes after the initial call.

III. Emergency Operations Management
(Organization, control, leadership, support by officials, decision-making)

State: The State EOC is staffed by an experienced professional staff. The Illinois ESDA Deputy Director exercised leadership and control of emergency operations.

La Salle County: The support organizations necessary for operations of the EOC were present. The La Salle County ESDA Coordinator was in complete charge of the operation and was effective in having control of the situation by conducting frequent briefings. It should be noted the plan specifies the County Board Chairman is to be in command of all emergency organizations.

IV. Public Alerting and Notification
(Means of notification - sirens, vehicles, or other systems, timeliness)

State: The State EOC coordinated the simulated sounding of the sirens with the local units of government. A copy of the July 5, 1983, monthly Prompt Notification System Siren Test is included in this report as Attachment A.

La Salle County: Public alerting via sirens and route alerting by the County Sheriff's Department was simulated promptly. The County also promptly contacted the area Emergency Broadcast Station (EBS) with an instructional message to broadcast. The instructional message prepared by the County did not correctly describe the protective actions to be taken. More care should be used in drafting EBS messages to ensure that proper instruction is given to the public. Also, the County should develop a procedure to ensure that the timing of EBS broadcasts and siren activation is well coordinated. A siren test was conducted by the County at 10:00 a.m. on July 5, 1983. The results of the test are listed in Attachment A.

V. Public and Media Relations

(Publications, press facilities, media briefings, release coordination)

State: The State and utility information staff performed very well. Printed news releases and oral briefings were timely and understandable. The publication for distribution to the residents is well done (What To Do In Case of...). Posted emergency information for transients was not evident.

The Joint Press Information Center (JPIC) facility is good, although not adequately ventilated for very warm weather. Greater concern needs to be given to more complete placement of informational materials pertaining to actions the public needs to take in the event of an accident at the power station.

La Salle County: La Salle County has a room on the first floor of the County complex that is adequate for the local press. There was adequate classroom type chairs, a chalkboard, podium, and a table for the public information officer and others involved in the press briefings. The County did not send a spokesperson to the JPIC.

VI. Accident Assessment

(Staff and field operations, monitoring, equipment, technical calculations, use of PAGs)

State: Most of the criteria items in this section were not observable at the State EOC due to the small scale of the exercise. The Department of Nuclear Safety did demonstrate their mobile computer terminal capability.

La Salle County: The area of accident assessment was not observed nor evaluated because of the design of the scenario.

VII. Actions to Protect the Public

(Sheltering, evacuation, reception and care, transportation)

State: The Illinois Emergency Services and Disaster Agency and the Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety recommended evacuation and sheltering of persons within the hazard area. They also recommended protective actions for the safety of dairy cattle.

La Salle County: There is sufficient evidence of a capability to adequately shelter the public through the use of public school buildings, and an acceptable adequacy for evacuation, reception and care through the combined cooperation of school officials in La Salle and adjacent Counties, the American Red Cross, Salvation Army, the Civil Air Patrol, and other local, County and State agencies.

VIII. Health, Medical and Exposure Control Measures
(Access control, adequacy of equipment, dosimetry, use of KI)

State: Not observed nor evaluated at the State EOC.

La Salle County: Control of exposure to the public was simulated by controlling access to the evacuated area along major roads. The County should consider the use of barricades or emergency units to block access along the secondary roads that crisscross the area. Assistance from adjacent Counties or the State may be needed in order to cover the numerous secondary roads.

IX. Recovery and Reentry Operations

State: The Illinois Emergency Services and Disaster Agency relies on data developed by the utility and verified by the Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety to establish time for reentry. The Nuclear Accident Reporting System is used to disseminate changes in the status to local response organizations.

La Salle County: Recovery and reentry play was minimal. The Sheriff's Department was prepared to provide traffic control along reentry routes. Reentry was slightly delayed due to a communication problem. Greater emphasis needs to be given reentry operations at the next annual exercise.

X. Relevance of the Exercise Experience
(Benefit to participants, adequacy of the scenario)

State: The State EOC staff was in support of La Salle and Grundy Counties. The exercise, as with all training activities, when taken seriously, as this exercise was, is of benefit to the participants.

La Salle County: The scenario tested the capability of the response organizations to respond to an accident at the La Salle Nuclear Power Station. The response organizations worked well together and were able to receive experience from the exercise.

PART III

NARRATIVE DESCRIPTIONS AND SUMMARY LISTINGS

Resulting from the exercise each team evaluating the demonstration of capability developed a consolidated finding. Those results are as follows:

SUMMARY I Emergency Operations Facilities and Resources

State: The State Emergency Operations Center (to include communications, displays, etc.) has been evaluated during full scale exercises and found adequate for the conduct of emergency operations for an extended period. During this small scale exercise no deficiencies were observed.

La Salle County: The communications was adequate to contact all the necessary organizations. The NARS system, commercial telephone, and radio were used. The EOC is a large well ventilated and lighted area. It is a large area in the basement of the County complex giving ample space for emergency workers. The security desk was positioned by the entrance to the EOC with two people to distribute dosimeters, TLD's, and register the persons entering the EOC.

Communications with the utility, the State, and with nearby local governments were available over several radio frequencies, NARS and commercial telephone.

F 1 b Adequacy of Communications Systems (Primary and Backup)
with Contiguous State/Local Governments within the EPZs

State: The communications systems, both primary and secondary, have been evaluated during previous full-scale exercises and determined to be adequate.

La Salle County: The primary communications system with the State is NARS. The local units of government are contacted by commercial telephone. The backup communications system is radio.

F 1 c Adequacy of Communications, as Appropriate, with Federal
Emergency Response Organizations

State: The communications systems, both primary and secondary, have been evaluated during previous full-scale exercises and determined to be adequate.

La Salle County: The capability exists to communicate with Federal response organizations by telephone.

F 1 d Adequacy of Communications Systems Between the Nuclear Facility and Near-Site EOF, and State and for Local EOCs

State: The communications systems, both primary and secondary, have been evaluated during previous full-scale exercises and determined to be adequate.

La Salle County: Telephone is used to communicate with the nuclear facility and EOF. Telephone and radio are used to communicate with the local EOC's. Tele-fax is also used to communicate with the EOF, State EOC, and utility.

C 1 c Adequacy of Specific State or Local Resources Needed to Support Federal Response

State: Not observed during this exercise.

La Salle County: If needed, space would be made available in the county complex to support Federal response organizations.

Adequacy of EOC Working Space and Amenities

State: The EOC working space and amenities have been evaluated during previous full-scale exercises and found adequate.

La Salle County: The EOC is a large area in the basement of the County Complex. It is air conditioned and has ample lighting. The area is unfinished at the present time. The working space has tables set up in a "U" shape, NARS phone, telefax machine and radio.

Adequacy of EOC Internal Communications, Including Equipment, Displays, and Message-Handling Procedures

State: NARS messages were recorded and copies were made and distributed to all participants. Other communications, both incoming and outgoing, were recorded and logged. Copies of the log were distributed periodically to all participants.

A new NARS form was field tested during the exercise.

La Salle County: Messages were handled efficiently, duplicated and distributed to all participants. Emergency classification was posted. The status board was kept up-to-date. News releases were posted on a separate board.

Adequacy of EOC Security Measures

State: Security has been evaluated during full-scale exercises and found to be adequate.

La Salle County: Security measures at the EOC were adequate, with requirement to show proof of identification, sign in/out log and armed police security.

H 3 Overall Adequacy of the Emergency Operating Center (EOC)

State: The State EOC is designed for nuclear attack operations. It is fully adequate to support radiological emergency operations resulting from an accident at a nuclear power station.

La Salle County: The EOC is adequate.

J 10 a Adequate Maps Displayed Showing Evacuation Routes, Sampling Points, Relocation Centers and Shelter Areas

State: Maps showing evacuation routes and sampling points were displayed in the EOC. Maps showing relocation centers and shelter areas were not displayed, but are in the plan. The plan was available in the operations room and used as necessary.

La Salle County: There were adequate maps displayed in the EOC showing sampling points and the relocation centers for intended use during this exercise; however, maps depicting the evacuation routes and general relocation and shelter centers were not displayed. There was a listing of center locations and 8½" x 11" maps depicting the evacuation routes.

J 10 b Adequate Maps Displayed Showing Population Distribution Near Nuclear Facility by Evacuation Areas

State: Although maps showing population distribution near the nuclear facility by evacuation areas were not displayed, diagrams showing population distribution by evacuation areas were available at each work station in the EOC.

La Salle County: There was no map displayed in the EOC showing population distribution near the facility by evacuation areas. There were sufficient 8½" x 11" sheet maps for handouts depicting this information.

SUMMARY II Alerting and Mobilization of Officials and Staff (Staffing, 24-Hour Capability, Alerting Timeliness)

State: The State warning point is manned on a 24-hour basis. The State's procedures and equipment are adequate for completing

alerting and mobilization of the State's emergency response staff in a expeditious manner. Initial warning for the State and local units of government is received via the NARS Network. This was a small scale exercise for the State, all agencies did not send representatives to the EOC. This is acceptable due to the nature of the exercise.

La Salle County: The capability does exist for 24-hour operation of communications. This is accomplished through the sheriff's dispatchers. It was demonstrated that La Salle County can operate on a continuous 24-hour basis. Notification of the response organizations was done very quickly, and the messages were verified. The communications equipment is located in the Sheriff's Department and is adequate to notify emergency organizations and emergency response personnel. There is the capability to communicate with fixed and mobile medical units. The EOC was activated within 30 minutes after the initial call.

Round the clock staffing was adequately demonstrated by shift changes at all positions.

A 1 e Capability for 24-hour Initial Emergency Response and Manning of Communications

State: The Illinois ESDA Communications Center is manned on a 24-hour basis.

La Salle County: The capability exists for 24-hour notification through the sheriff's dispatchers.

A 4 Capability for 24-hour Continuous Emergency Response

State: The Illinois ESDA EOC has the capability for 24-hour continuous operation.

La Salle County: It was demonstrated that a 24-hour continuous operations capability exists. A complete shift change was accomplished.

E 1 Adequacy of Procedures Used for Notification of Emergency Response Organizations Including Means for Verification of Messages

State: Notification procedures were initiated, and those agencies responding to the small-scale State exercise mobilized upon notification.

La Salle County: Municipal emergency response organizations at Marseilles, Seneca, and other towns were notified promptly by

telephone, as were representatives of the county response organizations. LaSalle County was notified by IESDA.

E 2 Adequacy of Procedures Used for Alerting, Notifying and Mobilizing Emergency Response Personnel

State: This was a small-scale exercise for the State and a full-scale demonstration was not practical. Notification procedures were initiated and those agencies' personnel responding to the small-scale exercise came to the EOC.

La Salle County: Personnel were alerted promptly by telephone. This worked well for the exercise, but it is suggested key personnel carry radio-activated pagers to ensure their availability at all times.

C 2 a If Appropriate, Timely Dispatch of a Representative to Licensees Near-Site EOF

State: This activity was simulated for this exercise. The person had been prepositioned.

La Salle County: No representative was sent to the EOF. It is the position in Illinois not to send a representative to the EOF from the County.

F 1 a Adequacy of Emergency Response Communications Equipment Used With Prompt Activation

State: The State emergency response communications equipment used with prompt activation has been evaluated during full-scale exercises and found adequate.

La Salle County: The NARS and the county's other communications systems were in good working order, and many are in use on a regular basis. The new NARS form simplified the NARS procedure and allowed faster message transmission.

F 1 e Adequacy of Communications Equipment Used for Alerting and Activating Emergency Response Personnel

State: The State communications have been evaluated during full-scale exercises and found to be adequate.

La Salle County: Communications equipment located in the Sheriff's Department is available for activating emergency response personnel.

F 2 Capability To Communicate With Fixed and Mobile Medical Support Facilities

State: Not observable at the State EOC.

La Salle County: The County communicates with Ottawa Fire and Rescue Unit by radio and the hospital by commercial telephone. However, they can communicate with the hospital by radio through the State Police.

H 4 Demonstration of Timely and Efficient Activation and Staffing of EOC's and Other Facilities

State: The notification procedures were implemented, and the staff responded in a timely manner.

La Salle County: The EOC was activated and almost completely staffed in approximately 30 minutes (from 6:30 a.m. - 7:00 a.m.). By 7:00 a.m., it was staffed by representatives from the County Board, Sheriff's Department, County ESDA, State ESDA, IDNS, County Radeb, Regional Superintendent of Schools, County Highway Department, County Coroner, communications personnel, and clerical support staff. By 8:00 a.m., staffing was completed with the addition of representatives of Red Cross, Salvation Army, and Kline Bus Company.

SUMMARY III

Emergency Operations Management (Organization, Control, Leadership, Support by Officials, Decision Making)

State: The State EOC is staffed by an experienced professional staff. The Deputy ESDA Director exercised leadership and control of emergency operations.

La Salle County: The support organizations necessary for operation of the EOC were present. The La Salle County ESDA Coordinator was in complete charge of the operation and was effective in having control of the situation through frequent staff briefings. It should be noted the plan specifies the County Board Chairman is to be in command of all emergency organizations.

A 1 a Evidence That Specific Organizations Have Been Adequately Established as Part of Overall Response

State: The State plan assigns responsibility for emergency response to various State agencies.

La Salle County: All of the necessary organizations were present in the EOC.

A 1 d Demonstration That a Specific Individual, by Title, was Effectively in Charge of Emergency Response

State: The State plan provides for emergency operations management and was effectively demonstrated during this exercise.

La Salle County: The La Salle County ESDA Coordinator was in charge of the EOC. He kept the emergency workers well informed of the situation by giving frequent briefings. The plan states that the County Board Chairman will be the person in command of all operations.

A 2 a Demonstration That Primary and Support Functions and Responsibilities Have Been Assigned to Specific Organizational Elements

State: The State plan assigns primary and support functions to various State agencies. These assignments were demonstrated during this exercise.

La Salle County: Response organizations representatives were present and participated in the exercise. However, the lack of any field activity or direct free-play precluded a full exercise of functional assignments.

C 1 a Evidence That A Specific Person Has Been Authorized To Request Federal Assistance (State Only)

State: The State plan assigns responsibility and authority for requesting Federal assistance. A specific individual is designated.

La Salle County: Not observed (State Function).

D 4 Adequate Written Procedures Are Used For Emergency Actions Consistent With Facility Recommendations and Local Offsite Conditions

State: The State has written procedures for implementing PAGs.

La Salle County: The various response organizations representatives were provided with adequate and useful written procedures.

Demonstration of Effective Coordination Between Emergency Response Director and Staff, Thru Oral Briefings, Staff Meetings, Etc.

State: Periodic briefings were held, involving an exchange of information among exercise participants.

La Salle County: The ESDA Coordinator announced key events to keep everyone informed and coordinated staff activities. It is suggested round table reports be more frequent (in which each agency reports its activities). The Director read the NARS message aloud.

Adequacy of Support and/or Participation by Elected Officials

State: Being a small scale exercise for the State, no elected officials visited the EOC.

La Salle County: The Chairman of the Board of Commissioners was not present. The Sheriff and a County Board member were present. The County Board Chairman came to the EOC at the time the exercise terminated.

SUMMARY IV

Public Alerting and Notification (Means of Notification - Sirens, Vehicles, or Other Systems, Timeliness)

State: The State office coordinated the simulated sounding of the sirens with the local units of government. A copy of the July 5, 1983, Monthly Prompt Notification System Siren Test is included as Attachment A.

La Salle County: A message was prepared which described the areas that were to be evacuated by natural and man-made boundaries. The message was for all news media and broadcast over EBS (simulated). They simulated sounding sirens and notification of the rural and transient population by sheriff's cars with loud speakers. The media center at La Salle County was adequate with a simulated news briefing held. No reporters were present. A functional test of the Prompt Notification System was accomplished at 10:00 a.m. on July 5, 1983. The System was found to be 100% operational at this time.

E 5

Evidence of a Reliable System for Dissemination to the Public of Appropriate Information Received from the Licensee, e.g., EBS

State: Not observed.

La Salle County: Local radio stations on AM and FM are available for EBS broadcasts. A station was contacted during the exercise, but did not broadcast any message. It should be noted these local stations are not 24-hour stations. Although other 24-hour stations can be used, they are not listed in the public information pamphlet; therefore, the public may not be aware of the need to tune to these alternate stations during off hours.

E 6

Adequacy of Means Used for Notification & Prompt Instruction To The Public In The Plane EP2 (Within 15 Minutes)

State: The State directed the sounding of sirens (simulated) at approximately 0737, July 12, 1983.

La Salle County: According to the NARS form filled out in the County EOC, the first protective action message resulted from conditions determined by the licensee at 8:20 a.m. and the message was given to the county at 8:38 a.m. Simulated siren activation came at 8:51 a.m. Route alerting was also simulated by Sheriff's Department units. Thus, the public notification was promptly demonstrated. However, prompt instruction of the public cannot be evaluated, since the procedure involves several steps that were unobservable. La Salle County promptly gave an instructional message to the EBS station. The procedure in the IPRA site specific Volume III calls for messages to be transmitted to the EBS station from three sources (La Salle and Grundy Counties and the State) with a call back procedure if any source is tardy. Without this whole procedure, the promptness of instruction cannot be evaluated. Also, it cannot be determined whether the sirens and the EBS message would have been coordinated so that when the public responds to the sirens by turning on their radios, there is a message waiting for them.

E 7 Effective Use of Instructional Messages For The Public In Affected Areas

State - Not observed.

La Salle County: Instructional messages from the plan were used. There were two problems: (1) the first message did not correctly indicate the protective actions to be taken. Only sheltering was advised, whereas ESDA had recommended evacuation out to 2 miles. (2) Both messages did not describe the protective action areas in terms of familiar landmarks and boundaries, or outline evacuation routes. This specific information should be included in instructional EBS messages, accompanying the sounding of the sirens.

J 10 c Adequacy of Means Used for Notifying All Segments of Transient and Resident Population

State: Not observed

La Salle County: Sheriff's cars with loud speakers are used to notify the transient population and resident population living in remote areas.

SUMMARY V

Public and Media Relations (Publications, Press Facilities, Media Briefings, Release Coordination)

State: The State and utility information staff performed very well. Printed news releases and oral briefings were timely and understandable. The publication for distribution to the residents is well done. Posted emergency information for transients was not evident. The JPIC facility is good, although, not air conditioned.

La Salle County: La Salle County has a room on the first floor for press briefings. It is well ventilated and lighted. It is equipped with classroom type chairs, a chalkboard, podium and a table for the PIO and others involved in a press briefing. The county did not send a representative to the JPIC.

G 1 Evidence of Dissemination of Information to the Public,
Within the Last Year

State: The publication "What to do in case of a Nuclear Station Emergency" was printed in December 1982. The booklet was specifically printed for the La Salle County Station and was distributed to residents in the 10 mile EPZ.

La Salle County: Not observed.

G 2 Evidence of a Public Information Program for Permanent and
Transient Population in the Plume EPZ, Such as Posted Notices,
Etc.

State: No posted instructions for transient population were observed during a survey of the EPZ by evaluators.

La Salle County: Not observed.

G 3 a Appropriate Points of Contact for the Media Have Been Designated

State: Appropriate points of contact for the media have been established at the JPIC located at the EDF, Mazon. There was usually one or more technical representatives on hand to answer questions.

La Salle County: La Salle County has a room on the first floor for press briefings. It is about 30 feet by 60 feet, well-ventilated and lighted. Adequate classroom type chairs, with a table for the PIO and others involved in the press briefing. There is also a podium and chalkboard. No telephone or typewriters are available. The county did not send a person to the JPIC.

Adequacy of Joint Media Facility, Where Appropriate

State: The JPIC facilities are adequate. An overhead projector was used during briefings and proved useful. Phones were in place and working. Security was excellent. Their JPIC facility is not air conditioned.

La Salle County: Not observed.

Adequacy of Issued Press Releases

State: State releases were timely and adequate. They were coordinated with Springfield via telecopier. Commonwealth Edison

releases were very good and were coordinated with the Chicago Headquarters via telecopier.

All press releases should have a release date/time group.

La Salle County: Not observed

G 4 a A Media Spokesperson has been Designated Who has Access to All Necessary Information

State: The State Public Information Officer performed his job well. He was supported by technical representatives from the Department of Nuclear Safety.

La Salle County: A County PIO was available and did have access to the information.

G 4 b Adequacy of Arrangements for Exchange of Information Among Spokespersons

State: The JPIC is located in the same building as the EOF making easy access for the exchange of information. Coordination was good.

La Salle County: Not observed

G 4 c Adequacy of Coordinated Arrangements for Rumor Control Measures

State: Rumor control was activated from Springfield and tested at the JPIC at Mazon. A couple of rumors were reported and corrections were provided the media.

La Salle County: Not observed

SUMMARY VI Accident Assessment (Staff and Field Operations, Monitoring, Equipment, Technical Calculations, Use of PAGs)

State: Most of the criteria items in this section were not observable at the State EOC due to the small scale of the exercise. The Department of Nuclear Safety did demonstrate their computer terminal capability.

La Salle County: Not observed

H 7 Adequacy of Offsite Radiological Monitoring Instruments

State: The State DNS has remote reading instruments in areas around the plant that were accessed by a computer terminal at the State ESDA EOC.

La Salle County: Not observed

- H 12 An Adequate Central Point has been Established for Receipt and Analysis of Field Monitoring Data and Sample Media

State: Not observed

La Salle County: Not observed

- I 7 Adequacy of Capability and Resources for Field Monitoring Within the Plume EPZ

State: Not observed

La Salle County: Not observed

- I 8 Adequate Capability to Make A Rapid Assessment of Magnitude & Location of Liquid or Gaseous Radiological Hazards

State: Not observed

La Salle County: Not observed

- I 9 Capability for Measurement of Radioiodine Concentrations in Plume EPZ under Field Conditions to 10 F-7 (State Only)

State: Not observed

La Salle County: Not observed

- I 10 Capability for Relating Measured Parameters to Dose Rates and Estimated Integrated Doses (State Only)

State: State DNS personnel translated measured rates to estimated doses to establish/confirm areas for Evacuation/sheltering.

La Salle County: Not observed

- I 11 Capability for Locating and Tracking Airborne Radioactive Plume with Aid of Federal and/or State Resources (State Only)

State: Not observed

La Salle County: Not observed

- J 10 m Capability to Recommend, Protective Action, Based on PAGS, in Plume EPZ (State Only)

State: State DNS personnel recommended protective actions based on the comparison of field data to the PAGs.

La Salle County: Not observed

C 3 Evidence of Availability and Capability of Radiological Laboratories (State Only)

State: Not observed

La Salle County: Not observed

SUMMARY VII Actions to Protect the Public (Sheltering, evacuation, reception and care, transportation)

State: ESDA and DNS recommended evacuation and sheltering of persons within the hazard area. They also recommended protective actions for the safety of dairy cattle.

La Salle County: There is sufficient evidence of a capability to adequately shelter the public with the use of public school buildings and an adequacy for evacuation, reception and care through the combined cooperation of school officials in La Salle and adjacent counties, the American Red Cross, Salvation Army, the Civil Air Patrol and other local, County and State agencies.

J 2 Coordination with Utility for Movement of Onsite Individuals to Offsite Locations

State: Not observed

La Salle County: Not observed

J 10 d Adequacy of Methods Used for Protecting Mobility Impaired Persons, Including Institutionally Confined

State: Not observed

La Salle County: Not observed

J 10 g Adequacy of Methods Used for Implementing Relocation of Populace

State: Not observed

La Salle County: Not observed

J 10 k Adequacy of Organizations Identification of and Means for Dealing with Potential Impediments to Evacuation

State: Not observed

La Salle County: Not observed

J 11

Adequacy of Protective Measures in Ingestion EPZ, Including Dairy Facilities, Food Processing Plants, etc. (State Only)

State: The recommendation to place dairy cattle on stored feed in downwind sectors (A, B and C) out to 10 miles was released at 8:37 a.m.

La Salle County: Not observed

J 10 h

Adequate Relocation Centers Have Been Established At Least 5 Miles and Preferably 10 Miles Outside the Plume EPZ

State: Not observed

La Salle County: Relocation centers have been adequately located outside the ten mile plume EPZ as observed during previous exercises, and as depicted in the State's written plan. During the exercise play, evacuees were simulated transported to the La Salle-Peru High School, La Salle, Illinois.

Adequacy of Facilities, Supplies & Equipment at Relocation and/or Mass Care Centers

State: Not observed

La Salle County: The La Salle-Peru High School is an adequate facility for use as a relocation and mass care facility, providing the school cafeteria routine cooking and eating utensils, tables and seating, gymnasium and classroom spaces are made available during an evacuation period. There will be a need to bring in additional medical supplies, foodstuffs, cots and blankets, and other incidental needs for the care of evacuees.

Adequacy of Staffing at Relocation and/or Mass Care Centers

State: Not observed

La Salle County: Simulated exercise play at the La Salle County EOC indicated there were four receptionists for registration of evacuees; six individuals trained in first aid, seven nurses and four cooks on scene at the La Salle-Peru High School for receipt of an estimated 2,300 evacuees. The available Red Cross contact at the EOC indicated that additional staffing in all categories could be made readily available through the American Red Cross Chapter. The overflow of incoming evacuees at the La Salle-Peru Relocation Center would be directed to a second shelter at nearby Lincoln High School as explained by the La Salle County ESDA Coordinator.

- J 12 Adequacy of Procedures for Processing Evacuees in Relocation Centers, Including Health Care, Decontamination & Radiological Monitoring, Etc.

State: Not observed

La Salle County: Not observed

- SUMMARY VIII Health, Medical, and Exposure Control Measures (Excess control, adequacy of equipment, dosimetry, use of KI)

State: Not observed at the State EOC.

La Salle County: Control of exposure to the public was simulated by controlling access to the evacuated area along major roads. The County should consider the use of barricades or emergency units to block access along the minor roads that crisscross the area. Assistance from adjacent counties or the State may be needed in order to cover the numerous minor roads.

- J 10 e Adequacy of Provisions for Use of KI for Emergency Workers and Institutionalized Persons in Plume EPZ

State: Not observed

La Salle County: Not observed

- J 10 f Adequacy of Methods Used in Making Decisions to Administer KI to Central Population

State: Not observed

La Salle County: Not observed

- J 10 j Adequacy of Control of Access to Evacuated Areas

State: Not observed

La Salle County: According to the Sheriff's Department representative at the EOC, there are only enough Sheriff's Department units to cover the traffic control points on major roads. The area is crisscrossed with minor roads on a one-mile grid, so blocking all roads would require a large staff. State or inter-county assistance should be requested. County procedures include this.

- K 3 a Adequacy of a 24 Hour A Day Capability to Determine Dose Received by Emergency Workers

State: Not observed

La Salle County: Not observed

- K 3 b Demonstration of Adequate and Frequent Emergency Worker Dosimeter Readings & Maintenance of Dosage Records

State: Not observed

La Salle County: Not observed

- K 4 Evidence that an Adequate Decision Chain has been Established to Authorize Exposure for Emergency Workers in Excess of PAGS

State: Not observed

La Salle County: Not observed

- K 5 a Evidence that Appropriate Action Levels have been Specified for Determining Need for Decontamination

State: Not observed

La Salle County: Not observed

- K 5 b Adequacy of Measures for Decontamination of Emergency Personnel, Supplies, and Equipment, and for Waste Disposal

State: Not observed

La Salle County: Not observed

- L 1 Adequate Capability Demonstrated by Local and/or Backup Hospital and Medical Services for Handling Personnel

State: Not observed

La Salle County: Not observed

- L 4 Adequate Capability Demonstrated for Transportation of Radiological Accident Victims to Medical Support Facilities

State: Not observed

La Salle County: Not observed

- M 4 Capability for Periodic Estimation of Total Population Exposure (State Only)

State: Not observed

La Salle County: Not observed

SUMMARY IX

Recovery and Re-entry Operations (Adequacy of Plans and Procedures)

State: ESDA relies on data developed by the utility and verified by the DNS to establish time for re-entry. The NARS network is used to disseminate changes in status to local response organizations.

La Salle County: Recovery and re-entry play was minimal. The Sheriff's Department was prepared to provide traffic control along re-entry routes. Re-entry was slightly "delayed" due to a communication problem.

Apparently ESDA intended to authorize re-entry via the NARS message received by the county at 11:56 a.m. However, the county did not interpret the message as authorizing re-entry. An ESDA person called the State EOC and determined that re-entry was allowed and passed this information to the EOC director. The net delay was about 20 minutes. This can probably be avoided in the future by amending the new NARS form to include the term "re-entry".

M 3 Adequacy of Established Means for Informing Response Organization That Recovery and Re-entry Can Be Initiated (State Only)

State: The State uses the NARS network to notify local units of government that recovery and re-entry operations can be undertaken.

La Salle County: Not observed

M 1 Adequacy of Procedures Demonstrated for Re-entry and Relaxation of Protective Measures Allowing Re-entry

State: ESDA used data, presented by the utility and DNS prepositioned monitoring devices, that is verified by the DNS field teams, to determine the time for re-entry.

La Salle County: Recovery and re-entry play was minimal. The Sheriff's Department was prepared to provide traffic control along re-entry routes. Re-entry was slightly delayed due to a communications problem. Apparently ESDA intended to authorize re-entry via the NARS message received by the county at 11:56 a.m. However, the county did not interpret the message as authorizing re-entry. An ESDA person called the State EOC and determined that re-entry was allowed and passed this information to the EOC Director. The net delay was about 20 minutes. This can probably be avoided in the future by amending the new NARS form to include the term "Re-entry".

SUMMARY X

Relevance of the Exercise Experience (Benefit to participants, adequacy of the scenario)

State: The State EOC staff was in support of La Salle and Grundy Counties.

This exercise, as with all training activities, when taken seriously, as this one was, was of benefit to the participants.

La Salle County: The scenario tested the capability of the response organizations to respond to an accident/incident at the La Salle Nuclear Power Station. The response organizations worked well together and did gain experience from the exercise.

N 1 b Adequacy of Scenario to Test Capability to Mobilize State and Local Personnel and Resources

State: This was a small scale exercise at the State level so all agencies were not required to respond. The scenario did adequately stress those agencies that were required to respond.

La Salle County: The scenario tested the capability of the response organizations to respond to an accident/incident at the La Salle Nuclear Power Station.

N 1 a Adequacy of Exercise to Test Integrated Capabilities & Major Portions of the Basic Existing Response Elements in Affected Organizations

State: The State was in support of La Salle and Grundy Counties during this small scale exercise. At the JPIC, the scenario did require the public information staff to provide appropriate material to media representatives.

La Salle County: The exercise was adequate to test many aspects of response. However, the lack of field activities limited the opportunities for the participants to demonstrate coordination, decision-making, and capability to take protective action.

Benefit of Exercise to Participants

State: This exercise, as with all training activities, when taken seriously, was of benefit to the participants. The exercise provided the State with an opportunity to field test a new NARS reporting form.

La Salle County: The exercise participants benefited due to the fact it gave them a chance to work together in solving major problems.

PART IVSUMMARY LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT DEFICIENCIESSTATE OF ILLINOIS

There were no significant deficiencies in the State's performance during the small scale exercise at the La Salle Nuclear Power Station, July 12, 1983.

LA SALLE COUNTY

E.7 Effective Use of Instructional Messages for the Public in Affected Areas

The EBS instructional prescribed messages from the plans were used when the State ESDA recommended protective actions. The first message indicated sheltering out to two miles when the State ESDA recommendation had been to evacuate out to two miles. Both messages, as released to EBS, did not describe the areas involved in terms of familiar landmarks, boundaries, or outline evacuation routes to be used to accomplish the evacuation. All specific information should be included in instructional EBS messages in synchronization with the prompt alerting and notification system sirens.

M.1 Adequacy of Procedures Demonstrated for Re-entry and Relaxation of Protective Measures Allowing Reentry

The reentry phase was delayed at the County due to a communication problem relating to the use of the new NARS form. The message received at 11:56 a.m. was not interpreted as the authorization to begin reentry at the County. This caused a 20 minute delay in the implementation procedures following reentry/recovery. Adding a space on the NARS form to clearly identify reentry would alleviate a delay such as the one experienced during this exercise.

PART VSUMMARY LISTING OF MINOR DEFICIENCIESSTATE OF ILLINOISPLANS:

Minor deficiencies in the area of plans were not observed during the small scale exercise at the La Salle Nuclear Power Station, July 12, 1983.

TRAINING:

Minor deficiencies in the area of training were not observed during the small scale exercise at the La Salle Nuclear Power Station, July 12, 1983.

RESOURCES:

C.2. Evidence of a Public Information Program for Permanent & Transient Population in the Plume EPZ, such as Posted Notices, Etc.

The FEMA Region V evaluators scheduled sufficient time to conduct a random survey of public use areas previous to the exercise. This survey indicated a lack of posted information in those areas likely to be frequented by persons traversing through the area. Endeavors should be made to encourage the owners of restaurants, service stations, motels, campgrounds, and other public use facilities in the areas affected by the EPZ, to distribute copies of the "What to Do in Case Of..." pamphlet to area travelers visiting these establishments.

LA SALLE COUNTYPLANS:

A.1.d Demonstration that a Specific Individual, by Title, was Effectively in Charge of Emergency Response

The La Salle County ESDA Coordinator was in charge of the EOC during this exercise which is in conflict with the plan. The plan indicates the County Board Chairman will be in charge of emergency response. The plan should be updated to reflect the chain of command as implemented during the exercise, or the County Board Chairman should command his role during subsequent exercises.

TRAINING:

E.6 Adequacy of Means used for Notification of Prompt Instruction to the Public in the Plume EPZ (within 15 minutes)

The coordination procedures outlined for dissemination of information to the public was revised during this exercise. Messages are to be transmitted to the EBS station from three sources, La Salle and Grundy counties, and the State, with callback procedures if any of these sources are tardy. Since many of the procedures involved were not demonstrated, it cannot be determined the sirens and the EBS

messages would have been coordinated, and the EBS message would have been ready when the sirens were sounded. The recommendation is made to continue training in the coordination of EBS messages and siren activation.

RESOURCES:

J.10.j Adequacy of Control of Access to Evacuated Areas

The area to be evacuated in the EPZ is crisscrossed with minor roads on a one-mile grid which, also, requires roadblocks. The County Sheriff's Department units available to man roadblocks are limited; therefore, only the major roads can be blocked. Since this situation does not adequately secure the area, State or inter-county assistance should be requested. Procedures to request manpower and equipment should be annexed to the current plan.

July 13, 1983


Mr. Dean Schlee
IPRA Coordinator
110 East Adams Street
Springfield, Illinois 62706

Dear Dean:

Subject: Sirens-LaSalle County

A functional test of the Prompt Notification System was accomplished at 10:00 A.M. on July 5, 1983. The System was found to be 100% operational at this time.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Emerson D. Tidd".

Emerson Tidd
LaSalle County Coordinator



FULTON
CONTRACTING CO.

7N574 GARDEN AVE
ROSELLE, ILL. 60172
893-1395

July 7, 1983

Mr. William B. Brenner
Commonwealth Edison Co.
125 W. Clark Street
Room 1248
Chicago, Illinois 60603

Dear Bill:

As per our meeting at the EOC at La Salle on July 5, 1983, one of our surveillance crews has gone through the county and taken the counter readings of all equipment in the La Salle plant.

The system was 100% functional at the time of the test. There were no exceptions to the run as verified by all counter readings immediately after the test on the 6th and 7th. We did have additional reports during the time of checking from the ESDA co-ordinator, Mr. Tidd, that units 1, 2, 3, 21 and 23 had not operated during the exercise. The survey crew checking the sight for the counter readings, contacted one resident or more at each of these locations, and were told, without any reservation, that the siren at that particular location had definitely worked at 10:00 on Tuesday. Most of the people in each of the locations were very cooperative and seemed pleased with the fact that they were being appraised of the general circumstance and were further pleased to see that the equipment was being maintained and checked as we have done to date. There was more than one comment to this effect.

It has been apparent to us in the past and to date, that many third party reports are sent in that, unfortunately, are not based upon fact and often are made without an understanding or realization of the design and function of a system of this nature. Many people inside a building with a considerable amount of background noise, which would never hear an outdoor warning system, due to their lack of understanding of the system itself, can readily turn around and make a report of failure of the unit closest to them, because they did not hear it. We do find, that as time goes on, and the public becomes more educated in the overall intention and purpose of the warning systems, that these reports tend to decrease and eventually become minimal.

Mr. William B. Brenner

- Page 2 -


July 7, 1983

The system status report on La Salle for July 5, 1983, will be completed within approximately ten days, and, of course, it will contain all of the work sheets concerning the checking and alignment of the new radio equipment, the re-coding of the system to an acceptable pattern for maintenance and follow-up procedures, the checking of all of the counter readings, and the ground potential verification we are performing on all of the sights.

If I can be of any further help, or if you have any additional questions concerning this matter, please don't hesitate to call.

Sincerely,

FULTON CONTRACTING CO.



Frank J. Kehoe

FJK/jas

cc: Mr. A. J. Gremer