NRC Form 366
(9-83)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES: 8/31/85

# LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

| FACILITY NAME (1) | DOCKET NUMBER (2) | PAGE (3) |
|---|---|---|
| SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT 2 | 0 5 0 0 0 3 6 1 | 1 OF 0 2 |

TITLE (4)
JANUARY 16, 1984, SPURIOUS CONTAINMENT PURGE ISOLATION SIGNAL

| EVENT DATE (5) | | | LER NUMBER (6) | | | REPORT DATE (7) | | | OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| MONTH | DAY | YEAR | YEAR | SEQUENTIAL NUMBER | REVISION NUMBER | MONTH | DAY | YEAR | FACILITY NAMES | DOCKET NUMBER(S) |
| 0 1 | 1 6 | 8 4 | 8 4 | — 0 0 4 | — 0 0 | 0 2 | 1 5 | 8 4 | | 0 5 0 0 0 |
| | | | | | | | | | | 0 5 0 0 0 |

| OPERATING MODE (9) | 5 |
|---|---|
| POWER LEVEL (10) | 0 0 0 |

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 20.402(b) | | 20.405(c) | X | 50.73(a)(2)(iv) |
| | 20.405(a)(1)(i) | | 50.36(c)(1) | | 50.73(a)(2)(v) |
| | 20.405(a)(1)(ii) | | 50.36(c)(2) | | 50.73(a)(2)(vii) |
| | 20.405(a)(1)(iii) | | 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) |
| | 20.405(a)(1)(iv) | | 50.73(a)(2)(ii) | | 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) |
| | 20.405(a)(1)(v) | | 50.73(a)(2)(iii) | | 50.73(a)(2)(x) |

| | |
|---|---|
| | 73.71(b) |
| | 73.71(c) |
| | OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A) |

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

| NAME | TELEPHONE NUMBER |
|---|---|
| | AREA CODE |
| J. G. HAYNES, STATION MANAGER | 7 1 4 — 4 9 2 - 7 7 0 0 |

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

| CAUSE | SYSTEM | COMPONENT | MANUFACTURER | REPORTABLE TO NPRDS | | CAUSE | SYSTEM | COMPONENT | MANUFACTURER | REPORTABLE TO NPRDS | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | |

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

| | | EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15) | MONTH | DAY | YEAR |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) | X NO | | | | |


ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On 1/16/84, at 1050, with Unit 2 in Mode 5 and a routine main purge in progress, the Train "A" Containment Purge Isolation System (CPIS) was spuriously actuated from a spike on Containment Area Radiation Monitor 2RE7856. All Train "A" CPIS actuated valves closed to isolate the containment purge. Operators used redundant Containment Area Radiation Monitor 2RE7857 to verify that the actual containment area radiation levels were below the CPIS actuation setpoint. Train "A" CPIS and 2RE7856 were reset, and the containment purge was reinitiated.

At 1445, on 1/16/84, Train "A" CPIS was again spuriously actuated from a spike on 2RE7856, and the containment purge was again isolated. After verifying that actual containment radiation levels were below the CPIS actuation setpoint, the containment purge was reinitiated.

The spikes on 2RE7856 coincided with Train "A" Engineered Safety Features (ESF) subgroup relay testing. A voltage transient on the ESF bus, resulting from subgroup relay actuation, caused the sensitive gamma detector in 2RE7856 to spike, thereby initiating the CPIS. No corrective action is planned since minor voltage transients are expected during ESF subgroup relay testing. However, the containment purge was terminated until the completion of the Train "A" ESF testing.


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| FACILITY NAME (1) | DOCKET NUMBER (2) | LER NUMBER (6) | | | PAGE (3) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | YEAR | SEQUENTIAL NUMBER | REVISION NUMBER | |
| SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT 2 | 0 5 0 0 0 3 6 1 | 8 4 | 0 0 4 | 0 0 | 0 2 OF 0 2 |

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

On January 16, 1984, at 1050, with Unit 2 in Mode 5 and a routine containment main purge in progress, the Containment Purge Isolation System (EIIS Code VA) was spuriously actuated from a spike on Containment Area Radiation Monitor 2RE7856 (EIIS CODE RE). All Train "A" Containment Purge Isolation System actuated valves closed to isolate the containment purge. Operators used redundant Containment Area Radiation Monitor 2RE7857 to verify that the actual containment area radiation levels were below the Containment Purge Isolation System actuation setpoint. The Train "A" Containment Purge Isolation Signal and 2RE7856 were reset, and the containment purge was reinitiated.

At 1445, on January 16, 1984, the Train "A" Containment Purge Isolation System was again spuriously actuated from a spike on 2RE7856, and the containment purge was again isolated. After verifying that actual containment radiation levels were below the Containment Purge Isolation System actuation setpoint, the containment purge was reinitiated.

The first event was reported to the NRC pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(ii). After the second event, operators identified the cause of these events and, therefore, did not consider another report appropriate or necessary. Our review of this matter has determined that the second event should have been reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(ii). The need for supplementary training or instruction to operating personnel on the need to report ESF actuations pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(ii) had been identified earlier (see LER 84-003, Docket 50-362), but corrective action had not been completed by January 16, 1984. Operators have been instructed to make all reports required by 10 CFR 50.72.

There are no credible circumstances under which this event would have been more severe.

Operators reviewed shift activities and determined that the spikes on 2RE7856 coincided with Train "A" ESF subgroup relay testing. A voltage transient on the ESF bus, resulting from subgroup relay actuation, caused the sensitive gamma detector in 2RE7856 to spike, thereby initiating the Containment Purge Isolation System. No corrective action is planned since minor voltage transients are expected during ESF subgroup relay testing. However, the containment purge was stopped at 2016 on January 16, 1984, until the completion of the Train "A" ESF testing.

*Southern California Edison Company*

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STATION MANAGER

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February 15, 1984

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject: Docket No. 50-361
30-Day Report
Licensee Event Report No. 84-004
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), this submittal provides the required 30-day written Licensee Event Report (LER) for two occurrences involving the actuation of the Containment Purge Isolation System. Since these events involved the same components, system, cause and method of discovery, these events have been combined into a single report in accordance with NUREG-1022. The health and safety of plant personnel or the public were not affected by this event.

If you require any additional information, please so advise.

Sincerely,

JG Haynes

Enclosure: LER No. 84-004

cc: A. E. Chaffee (USNRC Resident Inspector, Units 1, 2 and 3)
J. P. Stewart (USNRC Resident Inspector, Units 2 and 3)

J. B. Martin (Regional Administrator, NRC Region V)

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Inspection and Enforcement

Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO)

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