

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

Attachment to AECM-83/0595

Page 1 of 2

CONTROL BLOCK:

PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

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7 8 9 14 15 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58

LICENSEE CODE LICENSE NUMBER LICENSE TYPE CAT 56

CON'T

REPORT SOURCE L 6 0 5 0 0 0 4 1 6 7 0 8 2 7 8 3 8 0 9 2 6 8 3 9

DOCKET NUMBER EVENT DATE REPORT DATE

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 | On August 17, 1983, after an auto-initiation of HPCS by a false low
0 3 | reactor water level trip, the HPCS diesel generator tripped after 13
0 4 | minutes due to high jacket water temperature. There was no effect
0 5 | on the health or safety of the public nor was there a threat to plant
0 6 | safety. This is reported pursuant to T.S.4.8.1.1.3 and 6.9.1.13.c.
0 7 | This is a final report.
0 8 |

SYSTEM CODE 09		CAUSE CODE WA		CAUSE SUBCODE A		COMPONENT CODE VALVEX				COMP SUBCODE B		VALVE SUBCODE D					
EVENT YEAR 83		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. 129		OCCURRENCE CODE 03		REPORT TYPE L		REVISION NO. 0									
ACTION TAKEN X		FUTURE ACTION H		EFFECT ON PLANT Z		SHUTDOWN METHOD Z		HOURS 0000		ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED Y		NPRD-4 FORM SUB. N		PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER Z		COMPONENT MANUFACTURER Z999	

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

10 The cause was personnel error. The SSW valves to the diesel were throt-

11 tled closed as part of a SSW pump surv. The procedure stated that if the

12 diesel auto-started, the valves were to be immediately reopened. The

13 valves were reopened after the trip and the diesel was restarted, loaded

14 and run successfully. All operations personnel will be informed.

7 8 9
FACILITY STATUS (1) 5 (6) 28 (29) 0 0 0 NA (30)
% POWER OTHER STATUS
40
METHOD OF DISCOVERY (31) A Operator Observation 80
DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION
35
ACTIVITY CONTENT
RELEASED OF RELEASE (1) 6 (2) 33 (3) 34 NA
AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)
40
LOCATION OF RELEASE (36) NA 80

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES									
NUMBER			TYPE	DESCRIPTION					
1	7	0	0	0	37	Z	38	NA	39

PERSONNEL INJURIES		NUMBER		DESCRIPTION	
1	H	0	0	0	NA

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)
TYPE DESCRIPTION
1 9 2 (42) NA
7 8 9 10 8310070239 830926
NDC USE ONLY

PUBLICITY
 ISSUED N 44 DESCRIPTION NA
 PDR ADOCK 05000416
 S PDR
 NRC USE ONLY
 2 0
 7 8 9 10 68 69 80

NAME OF PREPARER

D. E. Cathey

PHONE

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION TO
LER 83-129/03 L-0

Mississippi Power & Light Company
Grand Gulf Nuclear Station - Unit 1
Docket No. 50-416

Technical Specification Involved: 4.8.1.1.3
Reported Under Technical Specification: 6.9.1.13.c

Event Narrative:

On August 27, 1983, a HPCS auto-initiation occurred. The auto-initiation was caused by a false low reactor water level 2 signal from level transmitters N073R and N073L. The two transmitters share a common reference leg with a third water level transmitter (N080D) which was being calibrated. A pressure spike was inadvertently injected into the reference leg thus causing a high differential pressure across the "R&L" transmitters. A high differential pressure corresponds to a low reactor water level signal.

Because the actual water level on a level transmitter was above the level 8 HPCS injection valve interlock setpoint, the injection valve did not open and HPCS did not inject into the reactor vessel. The actual water level was confirmed and the HPCS pump was secured. The initiation signal was reset prior to diesel generator loading.

The HPCS diesel generator auto-started and nine minutes later was manually loaded onto the grid. Approximately four minutes after loading, the diesel tripped because of high jacket water temperature. When initiation occurred, the monthly ISI Standby Service Water (SSW) Pump Division III surveillance was in progress. Per the surveillance procedure, the HPCS Diesel Generator water jacket inlet valves from SSW were throttled closed to adjust flow equal to its reference flow rate specified in the procedure. The procedure had a note prior to the step which throttled the valves, that, should an automatic start of the HPCS diesel occur, the valves were to be immediately reopened. After the valves were reopened, the diesel was successfully restarted, loaded and run for 30 minutes.

The root cause of the diesel trip on high jacket water temperature is attributed to personnel error for not following procedures. All operations personnel will be informed of the event and the need to read and follow notes, warnings, and precautions in procedures. Additional emphasis will be included in the training program to be more attentive to notes, warnings, and precautions in procedures.

Per Regulatory Guide 1.108, Regulatory Position C.2.e.(2), this was not a diesel generator valid failure or test because the failure is attributed to operating error. There was no effect on the health or safety of the public nor was there a threat to plant safety. This is reported pursuant to Technical Specification 6.9.1.13.c in accordance with Technical Specification 4.8.1.1.3. This is a final report.



MISSISSIPPI POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

Helping Build Mississippi

P. O. BOX 1640, JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI 39205

September 26, 1983

83 OCT 4 A8:52

NUCLEAR PRODUCTION DEPARTMENT

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
101 Marietta St., N.W., Suite 2900
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Attention: Mr. J. P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

SUBJECT: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station
Unit 1
Docket No. 50-416
License No. NPF-13
File 0260/L-835.0
HPCS Auto-Initiation Due to
False Reactor Water Level
Trip and Subsequent D/G
Trip Due to High Jacket
Water Temperature
LER 83-129/03 L-0
AECM-83/0595

On August 27, 1983, after an automatic initiation of HPCS by a false low reactor level trip, the HPCS diesel generator tripped after 13 minutes of operation due to high jacket water temperature. This is reported pursuant to Technical Specification 6.9.1.13.c in accordance with Technical Specification 4.8.1.1.3. Attached is LER 83-129/03 L-0 with Supplementary Information

Yours truly,

L. F. Dale
Manager of Nuclear Services

EBS/SHH:sap
Attachment

cc: Mr. J. B. Richard (w/a)
Mr. R. B. McGehee (w/o)
Mr. T. B. Conner (w/o)
Mr. G. B. Taylor (w/o)

Mr. Richard C. DeYoung, Director (w/a)
Office of Inspection & Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

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