

UPDATE REPORT:

PREVIOUS REPORT DATE: 9-12-83

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

CON'T	
0	1

REPORT  
SOURCE

60 61 DOCKET NUMBER 68 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 | During an orderly reactor shutdown, while attempting to automatically transfer bus 2D  
0 3 | from the unit auxiliary transformer (UAT) to the unit startup transformer (SAT), a  
0 4 | loss of 4160 V emergency bus E-3 occurred. In addition, No. 3 diesel generator was  
0 5 | determined to be inoperable. This event did not affect the health and safety of the  
0 6 | public.  
0 7 |

Technical Specifications 3.8.1.1, 3.8.2.1, 6.9.1.9b

09		SYSTEM CODE E B		CAUSE CODE E	CAUSE SUBCODE A	COMPONENT CODE C K T B R K				COMP SUBCODE F	VALVE SUBCODE Z		
7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
LER/RO REPORT NUMBER		EVENT YEAR			SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.			OCCURRENCE CODE		REPORT TYPE			REVISION NO.
8 2		8 2		—	1 2 3		/	0 3		L		—	3
21		22		23	24		25	26		27		28	29
ACTION TAKEN		FUTURE ACTION		EFFECT ON PLANT	SHUTDOWN METHOD		HOURS		ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED		NPRD-4 FORM SUB.		PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER
D X		A		C	0 0 2 6		Y		Y		L		I 2 0 3
33		34		35	36		37		40		41		42
18		19		20	21		22		23		24		25
33		34		35	36		37		40		41		42
18		19		20	21		22		23		24		25
33		34		35	36		37		40		41		42
18		19		20	21		22		23		24		25
33		34		35	36		37		40		41		42
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18		19		20	21		22		23		24		25
33		34		35	36		37		40		41		42
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33		34		35</									

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 This event occurred because both the SAT output breaker and No. 3 diesel generator  
1 1 output breaker failed to close when the UAT output breaker was opened. The UAT  
1 2 breaker, Model No. 5HK350, was installed in place of the SAT breaker and power to E-3  
1 3 was restored. Procedural changes were implemented to compensate for simultaneous  
1 4 close and open signals to the diesel generator's output breakers under certain  
7 8 9 conditions.

8 9 conditions.

FACILITY STATUS      % POWER      OTHER STATUS      (30)      METHOD OF DISCOVERY      DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION      (32)

1 5      X      (28)      0 1 7      (29)      NA      A      (31)      Operational Event

7 8 9      10 11 12      13      44      45      (31)      46      80

ACTIVITY CONTENT  
RELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) NA

LOCATION OF RELEASE (36) NA

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES										
NUMBER			TYPE	DESCRIPTION						
1	7	0	0	0	(37)	Z	(38)	NA		

PERSONNEL INJURIES		NUMBER		DESCRIPTION	
1	8	0	0	0	NA

7 8 9 11 12  
LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)  
TYPE DESCRIPTION  
1 9 2 (42) NA  
8 9 10 11 12  
8602220504 010210

7 8 9 10  
PUBLICITY  
ISSUED DESCRIPTION (45)  
20 N (44)  
8402220586 840210  
PDR ADOCK 05000324  
S PDR  
NRC USE ONLY

NAME OF PREPARER

R. M. Poulk, Jr.

PHONE:

919-457-9521

LER ATTACHMENT - RO #2-82-123

Facility: Unit No. 2

Event Date: October 10, 1982

While performing an orderly reactor shutdown, an attempt to manually transfer the power source to bus 2D from the unit auxiliary transformer (UAT) to the unit startup transformer (SAT) failed. When an attempt was made to effect an automatic transfer of the power source to bus 2D, a loss of voltage to 2D, and thus emergency bus E-3, occurred. The loss of bus E-3 rendered 2A core spray pump and 1A and 2A RHR pumps inoperable due to lack of their normal and emergency power supplies.

This event occurred when the UAT output breaker was manually opened and the SAT output breaker, ITE Model No. 5HK350, failed to automatically close in to supply bus 2D. Prior to this event, No. 3 diesel generator had been started under Control Room manual control and brought up to operating speed with the diesel generator output breaker open. This was done so that the diesel would be up to speed if the transfer failed. Emergency bus E-3 is normally supplied from bus 2D, and No. 3 diesel generator is the emergency standby power source to E-3. Immediately following the failure of the SAT output breaker, No. 3 diesel generator failed to close on bus E-3. This rendered bus E-3 dead which assisted in causing a scram and Group I isolation.

Shortly after this event, a quick trouble check of the SAT output breaker determined a problem within the breaker. The UAT output breaker was then installed in the SAT output breaker compartment and power to bus 2D was restored from the SAT within one hour and forty-five minutes of the event. In addition, bus E-3 reenergized. A close inspection and troubleshooting of the failed SAT output breaker revealed the breaker had failed to automatically close as a result of a sheared breaker charging spring motor actuator. The charging spring motor casing mounting screw had backed out of the motor housing causing the motor actuator to shear and separate from the breaker which prevented charging the breaker charging springs for breaker closing capability. The failed breaker from the SAT output breaker compartment was then repaired using a replacement charging motor assembly, tested satisfactorily for operation, and installed in the UAT output breaker compartment.

The failure of a breaker in this manner could prevent it from closing following a trip or a normal opening operation, thus causing a potential loss of power to its respective bus. A sufficient number of failures occurring at the same time could affect the operability of safety-related systems. These 4160 V breakers are located throughout the plant in both safety-related loads and balance-of-plant loads.

An investigation into the failure of the output breaker of No. 3 diesel generator to close in to bus E-3 revealed that simultaneous close and open signals to the breaker prevented automatic closing of the breaker on loss of



84 FEB 10 1984  
Georgia Power & Light Company

Brunswick Steam Electric Plant  
P. O. Box 10429  
Southport, NC 28461-0429  
February 10, 1984

FILE: B09-13510C  
SERIAL: BSEP/84-0295

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Administrator  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Region II, Suite 3100  
101 Marietta Street N.W.  
Atlanta, GA 30303

BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNIT NO. 2  
DOCKET NO. 50-324  
LICENSE NO. DPR-62  
SUPPLEMENT TO LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 2-82-123

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

In accordance with Section 6.9.1.9b of the Technical Specifications for Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Unit No. 2, the enclosed supplemental Licensee Event Report is submitted. The original report fulfilled the requirement for a written report within thirty (30) days of a reportable occurrence and both are in accordance with the format set forth in NUREG-0161, July 1977.

Very truly yours,

C. R. Dietz, General Manager  
Brunswick Steam Electric Plant

MJP/mcg/LETG2

Enclosure

cc: Mr. R. C. DeYoung  
NRC Document Control Desk

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