NRC FORM 366
(7-77)

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1	LICENSEE CODE: O H D B S 1 (2)	LICENSE NUMBER: Ø Ø - Ø Ø Ø Ø Ø - Ø Ø (3)	LICENSE TYPE: 4 1 1 1 1 (4)	CAT (5)

CON'T

0 1	REPORT SOURCE: L (6)	DOCKET NUMBER: Ø 5 Ø Ø Ø 3 4 6 (7)	EVENT DATE: Ø 8 2 7 8 3 (8)	REPORT DATE: Ø 9 2 3 8 3 (9)

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 (NP-33-83-57) On 8/27/83 at 0955 hours, while hooking up leads for ST 5030.09, "Reac-
0 3 tor Protection System (RPS) Response Time Test", an I&C technician shorted test leads
0 4 together causing an essential bus fuse to blow, de-energizing Y1 bus. This made NI-2
0 5 inoperable, placing the unit in the action statement of Technical Specification
0 6 3.9.12. There was no danger to the health and safety of the public or station per-
0 7 sonnel. NI-1 was operable throughout this occurrence.
0 8

	SYSTEM CODE	CAUSE CODE	CAUSE SUBCODE	COMPONENT CODE	COMP. SUBCODE	VALVE SUBCODE
0 9	I A (11)	B (12)	A (13)	I N S T R U (14)	E (15)	Z (16)

(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER	EVENT YEAR		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.		OCCURRENCE CODE	REPORT TYPE		REVISION NO.
	8 3	—	Ø 4 5	/	Ø 3	L	—	Ø

ACTION TAKEN	FUTURE ACTION	EFFECT ON PLANT	SHUTDOWN METHOD	HOURS (22)	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED	NPRD-4 FORM SUB.	PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER
X (18)	G (19)	Z (20)	Z (21)	Ø Ø Ø Ø	Y (23)	N (24)	Z (25)	Z 9 9 9 (26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 Due to the close confinement of the terminal board locations, the I&C technician in-
1 1 advertently shorted the test leads together. NI-2 was declared operable at 1250
1 2 hours on 8/27/83. Design modifications have already been made to these terminals to
1 3 preclude recurrence. A procedure modification will be made to make I&C technicians
1 4 more conscious of the potential of shorting out essential buses.

	FACILITY STATUS	% POWER	OTHER STATUS (30)	METHOD OF DISCOVERY	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)
1 5	H (28)	Ø Ø Ø (29)	NA	B (31)	During performance of ST 5030.09

	ACTIVITY RELEASED	CONTENT OF RELEASE	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)	LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)
1 6	Z (33)	Z (34)	NA	NA

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

	NUMBER	TYPE	DESCRIPTION (39)
1 7	Ø Ø Ø (37)	Z (38)	NA

PERSONNEL INJURIES

	NUMBER	DESCRIPTION (41)
1 8	Ø Ø Ø (40)	NA

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)

	TYPE	DESCRIPTION
1 9	Z (42)	NA

8309300273 830923
PDR ADOCK 05000346
S PDR

PUBLICITY

	ISSUED	DESCRIPTION (45)	NRC USE ONLY
2 0	N (44)	NA	

DVR 83-107

NAME OF PREPARER Greg Blunk PHONE: 419-259-5000, Ext. 239

TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY
DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT ONE
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-33-83-57

DATE OF EVENT: August 27, 1983

FACILITY: Davis-Besse Unit 1

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE: NI-2, Source Range Neutron Flux Monitor, inoperable

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: The unit was in Mode 6, with Power (MWt) = 0 and Load (Gross MWe) = 0.

Description of Occurrence: On August 27, 1983, at 0955 hours while hooking up leads for ST 5030.09, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Response Time Test", the Instrument and Control (I&C) technician shorted test leads together causing an essential bus fuse to blow, and as a result, deenergized 120 VAC essential bus Y1. This made NI-2 inoperable, and placed the unit in the action statement of Technical Specification 3.9.2, which requires two source range monitors to be operable in Mode 6. Per the requirements of the action statement, core alterations must be suspended. There were no core alterations in progress at this time.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence: The cause of this occurrence was due to design error. Due to the close confinement of the terminal board locations, the I&C technician, while exercising extreme caution, inadvertently shorted the test leads together.

Analysis of Occurrence: There was no danger to the health and safety of the public or station personnel. The redundant source range monitor, NI-1, was operable and was providing the audible indication in containment and the Control Room.

Corrective Action: Section 4 of SP 1105.02 "Reactor Protection System and Nuclear Instrumentation Operating Procedure" was completed. RPS Channel 1 was re-energized at 1100 hours on August 27, 1983, and NI-2 was declared operable at 1250 hours on August 27, 1983. This removed the unit from the action statement of Technical Specification 3.9.12. Design modifications have previously been made to the terminals in the RPS cabinets intending to preclude recurrence. Procedure modifications will be made to ensure that the I&C technicians are more conscious of the potential of shorting out the essential buses.

Failure Data: There have been no previous occurrences of the loss of a source range monitor due to a similar cause. However, an occurrence has been reported in Licensee Event Report NP-33-80-70 (80-056) in which essential bus Y3 was deenergized when insulated alligator clips slipped off the terminals in RPS Channel 3 cabinet during the performance of ST 5030.09.

LER #83-045

TOLEDO EDISON

September 23, 1983

Log No. K83-1334
File: RR2 (NP-33-83-57)

Docket No. 50-346
License No. NPF-3

Mr. James G. Keppler
Regional Administrator, Region III
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
799 Roosevelt Road
Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137

Dear Mr. Keppler:

LER No. 83-045
Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Unit 1
Date of Occurrence: August 27, 1983

Enclosed are three copies of Licensee Event Report 83-045 which are being submitted in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9 to provide 30 day written notification of the subject occurrence.

Yours truly,

Terry D. Murray

Terry D. Murray
Station Superintendent
Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station

TDM/ljk

Enclosures

cc: Mr. Richard DeYoung, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Encl: 30 copies

Mr. Norman Haller, Director
Office of Management and Program Analysis
Encl: 3 copies

Mr. Walt Rogers
NRC Resident Inspector
Encl: 1 copy

SEP 27 1983

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